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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the history and structure of the Urdu press discourse on 
Pakistan-US relations since the 1971 War in order to understand its perceptions 
of US betrayal. Two of the most popular Urdu newspapers in Pakistan have been 
studied with reference to three alleged cases of US betrayal. These are: the US 
failure in the 1971 War to provide sufficient military support to Pakistan to prevent 
its disintegration; US opposition to Pakistan's nuclear program and ignoring of the 
security concerns of its ally in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s; and the unilateral US 
operation conducted on 2 May 2011 targeting Osama bin Laden which violated 
Pakistan’s sovereignty. The Urdu press has not only been identifying examples of 
US betrayal of Pakistan since the 1971 War, but also has developed a structure 
for that discourse. The dominant voices of the discourse generally argue that the 
US not only betrays but also conspires against Pakistan's security. The discourse 
offers certain modalities of US conspiracy, such as pressurising tactics like 
sanctions and attaching conditions onto economic and military aid to Pakistan, or 
interfering in Pakistan's domestic affairs through diplomatic or undiplomatic 
means. Further, US conspiracy and betrayal is also rationalised by mainly offering 
three types of causes. First, it is argued that the US betrays Pakistan in order to 
pursue its own strategic interests in South Asia. Second, it is argued that the US 
is a hegemonic, capitalistic force, which conspires against Pakistan in 
collaboration with the Pakistani ruling elite and betrays it in order to protect its 
own material interests. Third, it is argued that the US is an anti-Islamic force, 
which conspires against and repeatedly betrays a Muslim country. Interviews with 
some of the prominent journalists and politicians conducted for this research also 
identified some excluded voices within Pakistan which did not agree with this 
discourse of a US politics of betrayal. Thus, this study analyses the history of the 
Urdu press discourse which contributes to the social construction of the idea of a 
US politics of betrayal, but in so doing, it also builds understanding of its 
structure, and helps to rationalise the perception of a US politics of betrayal since 
the 1971 War. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND: PERCEPTIONS OF A US POLITICS OF BETRAYAL 
EXPRESSED AS ANTI-AMERICANISM IN PAKISTAN 
Around ten to thirteen thousand people gathered in Peshawar on 23 
November 2013, in response to the call of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf to protest 
against ongoing US drone strikes in Pakistan, which was regarded as a US 
politics of betrayal.
1
 The protesters vowed to block the NATO supply trucks inside 
Pakistani territory unless the attacks ceased as reported in The New York Times.
2
 
The conduct of the protesters symbolised their perceptions about the US (Figure 
1). The protest rally was called by Imran Khan, a key political figure and leader of 
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf who was extremely critical of the US drone strikes and 
Pakistan's military presence in the country's border areas, where reportedly the 
"Taliban and Al Qaeda militants had found a haven."
3
 
 
Figure 1, at Peshawar, on 23 November 2013, participants of the rally burning US flags 
as a protest against drone attacks
4
 
Opposition to drone strikes reached its height when Hakimullah Mehsud
5
 was 
killed in a drone strike, on 1 November 2013.
6
 Reportedly, this attack came about 
                                              
1
 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf is a right of the centre mainstream political party, which has its 
government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and is a major party of opposition in the National 
Assembly since May 2013. 
2
 NATO military supplies are sent to Afghanistan by using land routes in Pakistan as latter has 
been important ally of the US and NATO in the War on Terror against Al Qaida and Taliban since 
2001; S. Masood and I. Mehsud, The New York Times, news article, 23 November 2013. 
3
 Imran Khan is the Chairman of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, a former international cricket player 
(1971-1992) and a philanthropist. 
4
 O. Waraich, The Independent, news article, 24 November 2013. 
5
 A leader of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan 
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when all political parties and the Pakistani military decided to start negotiations 
with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Interior Minister, Nisar Ali Khan, 
condemned the killing of the Taliban leader, as it had "jeopardised the nascent 
peace process" in Pakistan. Imran Khan, on 23 November 2013, while addressing 
the protest rally against US drones, urged Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to take a 
firm stand against the US for its drone policy. Imran Khan also reaffirmed his 
determination to continue with protests unless drone attacks were stopped.
7
 
In 2012, according to a survey conducted by The Pew Research Centre, 
public opinion in Pakistan was reportedly becoming ever more critical of the US, 
as 74 percent of the population perceived the US as "an enemy," demonstrating 
an upward trend in negative perceptions, as compared to 69 percent in 2011 and 
64 percent in 2009 (Appendix E). Only 13 percent of Pakistanis believed that 
bilateral relations with the US have improved; this proportion was 16 percent in 
2011. Strengthening the relationship with the US was a priority for just 45 percent 
Pakistanis, down from 60 in 2011. Approximately every four-in-ten had negative, 
and one-in-ten positive, perceptions about the usefulness of American economic 
and military aid to the country. Almost two-thirds, 65 percent, of Pakistanis 
distrusted US foreign policy, considering it, "too selfish and unilateral" (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2, ten years' data on Pakistan's public distrust of the US
8
 
                                                                                                                                  
6
 The drone strikes allegedly killed and injured "thousands of innocent civilians" in Pakistan. 
According to The New America Foundation, total 2076-3421 people, including 258-307 civilians, 
and 199-334 unidentified were killed, in 368 drone attacks, between 2004 and 2013 (All figures 
showing casualties are given in range showing the minimum and maximum number according 
to research estimates). For that reason, all the political parties perceive drone strikes as 
violations of Pakistan's sovereignty and believe them to be "counterproductive," forcing families 
of victims to "resort to violence and terrorist attacks" in Pakistan. In their opinion, such terrorist 
attacks directed against Pakistan's military, law enforcement agencies, and civilian population 
not only inflicted grave casualties and injuries but also resulted in devastating deterioration of 
economic activity; M.H Bhakkar, Dawn, news article, 14 July 2012; M. Kamal, United Press 
International (UPI), news article, 26 August 2013. 
7
 S. Masood and I. Mehsud, 23 November 2013. 
8
 ‘Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of US: 74% Call America an Enemy’ (Global 
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However, distrust of the US is not a new trend in Pakistan, as the survey data 
for the years 2002-2012 shows that the proportion of the Pakistani population with 
favourable views of the US ranged between 10-27 percent, and that those with 
unfavourable views ranged between 56-80 percent (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3, Pakistani public opinion of the US
9
 
This negative public perception of the US at such a high level is translated 
into anti-Americanism and is expressed through public attitudes. Madiha Afzal 
argues that anti-Americanism in Pakistan stems from three different sources. 
First, from US socio-cultural identity, i.e. American identity based on religion, 
culture, and internal political/economic values and structure. Second, from US 
foreign policy, i.e. US policies towards Pakistan. Third, from US identity and its 
policies characterised through discourse with the objective of using anti-American 
sentiment for domestic political gain.
10
  
Afzal further explains four different categories of anti-American sentiments in 
Pakistan. In the radical category, the smallest in terms of number, are radical 
groups such as Tehrik-i-Taliban and Al Qaeda and their sympathisers, who wish 
to destroy the US due to its identity and policies in order to decrease the US’s 
global power and to increase their own. A second socio-religious category of 
Pakistanis holds a dislike of the US, perceiving it a non-Muslim country doing 
harm to the Muslim world. This category demonstrates a reluctance to criticise 
radical Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda and is inclined to condemn US policies 
such as drone strikes. A sovereign-nationalist category detests the US due to its 
policies, which are perceived as hostile and harmful to Pakistan, e.g. 
condemnation of US drone strikes in Pakistan. Finally, a liberal category of anti-
                                                                                                                                  
Attitudes Project, Pew Research Centre, 2012). <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2013/10/23/few-americans-trust-pakistan/> [accessed 24 November 2013]. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Madiha Afzal, ‘On Pakistani Anti-Americanism’, Brookings <www.brookings.edu> [accessed 1 
June 2014]. 
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American sentiment is based on the perception of the US as a hegemonic power 
which is engaged in exploiting other, weaker states like Pakistan and failing to live 
up to its own claimed liberal and progressive goals such as supporting 
democracies and freedom in the world.
11
 Pakistani public perceptions of US 
politics of betrayal result in higher level of negative public opinion of the US. Such 
perceptions are based on the US's identity, foreign policy, and the social 
construction of the US identity and policies through discourse. In this background 
the substantial anti-American public perceptions trigger anti-American behaviour, 
which can be categorised in radical, socio religious, sovereign-nationalist, and 
liberal categories. 
1.2 DO PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS REALLY MATTER? 
The Pew Survey further confirms that in 2012, only 8 percent of Pakistani 
people considered the US as a trustworthy partner, whereas 74 out of 100 people 
perceived it as "an enemy state" (Figure 4). The survey was conducted a year 
before Pakistan's general elections in May 2013. According to this survey, 70 
percent of Pakistani people held positive views regarding Imran Khan, and 60 
percent regarding Nawaz Sharif hence recording a highly positive public opinion 
of the two mainstream politicians.
12
 Both of these leaders had been highly critical 
of the US. Later, in the general elections of 2013, the parties of Imran Khan and 
Nawaz Sharif were successful, securing 22.6 million out of 44.8 million of the total 
votes polled (Appendix B).
13
 Therefore, it can be argued that among other factors, 
the voters rewarded the anti-US stances of the political parties. 
 
Figure 4, public perceptions of the US in Pakistan
14
 
                                              
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Telegraph, news article, 27 May 2013. 
14
 ‘Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of US: 74% Call America an Enemy.’ 
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Previously, there had been widespread public agitation against the US after 
two significant events in 2011. First, Raymond Davis incident on 27 January 2011 
antagonised Pakistanis when an American citizen Raymond Davis murdered two 
armed Pakistani men in Lahore. The US authorities claimed that Davis was a 
diplomat working for the US consulate in Lahore and therefore was entitled to 
diplomatic immunity. Pakistani government however arrested and criminally 
charged Davis with double murder and illegal possession of firearms. Davis was 
acquitted on all charges and released on 16 March 2011 after families of the two 
murdered men accepted 2.4 million dollars as compensation. The US stopped its 
drone strikes after the incident and resumed on 17 March 2011 after Davis was 
released.
15
 Second, the Salala Check-Post incident on 26 November 2011 in 
which US-led NATO forces attacked a Pakistani military post on the Pakistan-
Afghan border, killing 24 Pakistani Army officers. Pakistan formally blocked NATO 
supplies under enormous public pressure, but later resumed them on 3 July 2012, 
after receiving an official apology from the US.
16
 All political parties and the media 
in Pakistan criticized the US for the incident. Consequently, negative public 
perceptions put tangible constraints on Pakistan's decision makers and influenced 
the bilateral relations between Pakistan and the US. 
Not only are democratic governments concerned with negative public 
perceptions, military governments also attempt to pacify them.
17
 For example, 
after 9/11, the military government of General Pervez Musharraf took a very quick 
decision to support the US in its War on Terror, but later, though doing so, 
Musharraf kept trying to justify his decision.
18
 There were widespread public 
demonstrations in Pakistan against the military government's decision to join the 
war. In his memoir, Musharraf mentioned that although the US was behaving like 
"a wounded bear," and Pakistan had "no choice" but to support the War on Terror, 
extremism was not only a threat to the US but was also a tangible threat to 
Pakistan.
19
 One purpose of such justifications was to keep public perceptions 
                                              
15
 'US Drone Strike Kills 40 in Pakistani Tribal Region,' BBC, news article, 17 March 2011, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12769209> [accessed 1 June 2014]. 
16
 C. Lawrence and others, cnn.com, news article, 4 July 2012. 
17
 Democratic governments have been in power in Pakistan since 2008, when General 
Musharraf's eight years military rule was finally over as a result of general elections held in that 
year. Pakistan has been ruled by military generals from 1958-1971, 1977-1988, and 1999-
2008.  
18
 General Pervez Musharraf came into power in the result of a military coup, overthrowing the 
democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif. Pervez Musharraf ruled Pakistan during 
1999-2008. 
19
 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2006), 200. 
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under control and defuse the mass movements against his government. In fact, 
even important figures of the US administration, including Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, were surprised by "the quick decision of General Musharraf."
20
 
More generally, researchers have also been interested in identifying the 
relationship between public opinion and the foreign policy of a state. After the 
Second World War, an understanding among researchers, known as the 
"Almond-Lippmann" consensus, emerged regarding the role of public opinion in 
foreign policy. This consensus focused on three propositions about public opinion: 
(1) it is unpredictable and unstable, and therefore provides an inadequate basis 
for effective foreign policies; (2) it lacks coherence and appropriate structure; and 
(3) it has a very slight impact, if any, on foreign policies.
21
 However, events such 
as US direct intervention into the Vietnam War between 1961-1975 challenged all 
three of these propositions.
22
 
Views on the role of public opinion in the formulation of foreign policy have 
differed almost as much as the opinions of the public themselves.
23
 Marcus 
Hobley notes that for Winston Churchill, public opinion was not important; only the 
opinion communicated through the mass media mattered, whereas Abraham 
Lincoln perceived public opinion as everything for his country.
24
 Among these 
differing opinions, Hobley argues, public opinion is important, as states and 
leaders cannot ignore it altogether, and such opinions have the potential to play a 
role in the development of foreign policy.
25
 Leaders may ignore public opinion at a 
particular time, but the public will not forget this and leaders may later have to pay 
the political price.
26
 
Thus, students of international relations cannot ignore the importance of 
public perceptions.
27
 Public perceptions are important, as leaders of two different 
states live in different physical spaces and cognitive frameworks, so their tacit 
assumptions differ about the importance and need for different acts. A country’s 
                                              
20
 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 51-53. 
21
 Ole R. Holsti, ‘Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann 
Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 36 (1992), 439–66. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Marcus Hobley, 'Public Opinion can Play a Positive Role in Policy Making,' news article, The 
Guardian, 3 September 2012. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid; Hobley analyses protests against former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair during the Iraq 
War Inquiry, in 2012. 
27
 Robert Axelord and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions’, World Politics, 38 (1985), 226–54. 
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decision makers mostly do not know how their acts and decisions will affect 
others and how others will perceive them.
28
 Jervis believes that no analysis of 
international relations can be complete without consideration of such 
perceptions.
29
 Therefore, the study of people's perceptions of events, in spite of 
their being "subjective," is an important part of international relations.
30
 
1.3 THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
In the aftermath of the Iraq War, American political leaders from both the 
Democratic and the Republican parties complained about the media coverage, 
which was apparently shaping public opinion against the war.
31
 Congressman 
James Marshal blamed the media for presenting a "falsely bleak picture" of the 
war, which, he claimed, was weakening US's "national resolve."
32
 Defence 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said on one occasion that: "the news media seem to 
want to carry the negative."
33
 These concerns of political leaders reflect some of 
their shared assumptions: first, that public opinion is one of the important factors 
in foreign policy; second, that the information disseminated by the media is 
different from the information political leaders wish to convey to people; and third, 
that the media shapes public opinion about foreign policy.
34
 
Although Baum and Potter note that many political leaders assume the media 
plays an independent role in shaping political opinion, some scholars consider the 
media to be a more passive actor, which merely conveys elite views to the 
public.
35
 In terms of an active role for the media in shaping public opinion, Baum 
and Potter and others have suggested a link between media coverage and public 
                                              
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1976). 
30
 Hoffman suggests that Jervis' study of perceptions and misperceptions is an effort to fill a gap 
in study of international relations. However, this study is subjective not objective and does not 
involve any mathematical formulations or significant generalisations. Case studies of 
perceptions do not have potential to quench the thirst to predict and to advocate. But in spite of 
being subjective public perceptions are important factor to understand international relations; 
Stanley Hoffmann, ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, Daedalus, 106 
(1977), 41–60. 
31
 Mathew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, ‘The Relationship Between Mass Media, Public 
Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis’, Annual Review of Political 
Science, 11 (2008), 39–65. 
32
 Ibid, 40. 
33
 Ibid, 40. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 For example: R.A. Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public 
Support (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991); B.W. Jentleson, ‘The Pretty Prudent 
Public Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 36 (1992), 49–74. 
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opinion.
36
 Baum and Potter argue that the media influences public opinion and 
foreign policy, whereas public opinion influences the media and decision makers. 
They further argue that foreign actors also affect public opinion both directly 
through their conduct, and indirectly through the media.
37
 In fact, for the majority 
of people, perceptions of foreign actors and their policies is based on knowledge 
gained through the media.
38
 Therefore, the media plays a significant role in the 
development of public perceptions towards a foreign actor and international 
events.
39
 
1.4 THE URDU PRESS: AN IMPORTANT MEDIA IN PAKISTAN 
Newspapers in Pakistan have been a comparatively independent medium of 
information for people in the presence of a state-controlled radio and TV channel 
in Pakistan. It was only after 2002 that electronic media, especially radio and TV, 
were granted a degree of independence when the government allowed private 
channels to operate in the country.
40
 Mainstream newspapers in Pakistan are also 
divided into two categories based on language. The English press is considered 
the press of the elite in the country, and has a limited circulation. A minority of the 
educated elite reads the English newspapers. The majority of Pakistani people 
read newspapers in their national language, Urdu. Therefore, the circulation and 
                                              
36
 For example: D.A. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, sixth edition (Washington, DC: 
CQ Press, 2002); Mathew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, 'The Relationship Between Mass 
Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy', 39-65. 
37
 Mathew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, 'The Relationship Between Mass Media, Public 
Opinion, and Foreign Policy', 39-65.  
38
 For example see Ambrose Akor, ‘The Media, Public Opinion, and British Foreign Policy: PhD 
Thesis’ (University of Manchester, 2011). 
39
 This view is premised on  Mathew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, 'The Relationship Between 
Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy', 39-65; Ambrose Akor, ‘The Media, Public 
Opinion, and British Foreign Policy'; R.A. Brody, Assessing the President; Nico Carpentier and 
Benjamin De Cleen, ‘Bringing Discourse Theory into Media Studies: The Applicability of 
Discourse Theoretical Analysis (DTA) for the Study of Media Practises and Discourses’, 
Journal of Language and Politics, 6 (2007), 265–93; Marco Mezzera and Safdar Sial, ‘Media 
and Governance in Pakistan: A Controversial yet Essential Relationship’ (Brussels: Initiative for 
Peacebuilding, Democratisation and Transitional Justice Cluster Funded by European Union, 
2010); Lilie Chouliaraki, ‘Discourse Analysis’, in The SAGE Handbook of Cultural Analysis, ed. 
by T. Bennett and J. Frow (London: SAGE Publications, 2008), 674–98; J. John Mearsheimer 
and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (New York: Penguin, 2007); 
Rudi Guraziu, ‘To What Extent is Foreign Policy Making Affected by Public Opinion in a Liberal 
Democracy?’ (Middlesex University, 2008); Pervez Hoodbhoy, ‘How TV Dupes Our Public’, 
Dawn, 27 September 2014; Teun A Van Dijk, ‘Political Discourse and Ideology’ (Amsterdam: 
University of Amsterdam, 2000), 15–34; Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, ‘Foreign 
Policy’, in International Relations, tenth edition (New York: PEARSON, 2014), 126–51. 
40
 Marco Mezzera and Safdar Sial, Media and Governance in Pakistan, 12-13. 
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reach of the Urdu press has traditionally been far higher than the English press 
(Appendix C).
41
 
Newspapers in Pakistan can also be categorised on the basis of their 
ideological affiliations. Some newspapers adhere to religious and conservative 
values, whereas others subscribe to a more liberal and progressive agenda. The 
Urdu newspapers also subscribe to specific ideological positions. The Daily Jang 
and The Daily Nawa-i-Waqt are the two most popular Urdu newspapers with the 
highest circulations, and have been in print continuously since the country's 
independence in 1947. The Jang Group demonstrates a leaning towards a liberal 
school of thought, whereas Nawa-i-Waqt has attached itself to conservative 
argument in society and demands a greater role for religion in the system.
42
 
Thus, in the Pakistani context, because of its comparative independence, its 
reach and understanding, and its representation of both liberal and conservative 
perspectives, the Urdu press should be regarded as one of the most influential 
media sectors in shaping the public perception of the US in Pakistan.
43
 
1.5 THE US POLITICS OF BETRAYAL AND THE URDU PRESS 
The Urdu press in Pakistan, generally through its verbal and non-verbal 
content, highlights the "US politics of betrayal," which contributes to the 
enhancement of negative public perceptions of the foreign policy of a country.
44
 A 
                                              
41
 Shahzad Ali, ‘Growth of Print Media in Pakistan from the Perspective of Economic and Social 
Indicators’, in The Asian Conference on Media and Mass Communication (The International 
Academic Forum, 2011), 35–53; Zamir Niazi, The Press in Chains, ed. by Zubeida Mustafa 
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 This view is premised on Tridivesh Singh Maini, ‘The Urdu Press in India and Pakistan - A 
Comparison’, ISAS Working Paper (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, National 
University of Singapore, 2009), 1–12; Markus Daechsel, The Politics of Self-Expression: The 
Urdu Middle-Class Mileu in Mid-Twentieth Century India and Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Zahid Yousaf, Farish Ullah and Ehtisham Ali, ‘Coverage of Pak-India 
Relations in the Elite Press of Pakistan (June 2013-August 2013)’, Rsearch on Humanities and 
Social Sciences, 3 (2013), 18–23; Hijab Shah, ‘The Tongue-Tied Press of Pakistan: Comparing 
English and Urdu Newspapers’ (Washington DC: Centre for Strategic & International Studies, 
2010); Bonnie W. Pstein, ‘Pakistan: Background & General Characteristics’, Press Refference, 
2012 <http://www.pressreference.com/No-Sa/Pakistan.html> [accessed 1 March 2014]; Mrinal 
Chatterjee, ‘History of Urdu Journalism in India’, in History of Journalism in Orissa (Mediahive, 
2011); Marco Mezzera and Safdar Sial, ‘Media and Governance in Pakistan'; Shahzad Ali, 
‘Growth of Print Media in Pakistan from the Perspective of Economic and Social Indicators’, in 
The Asian Conference on Media and Mass Communication (The International Academic 
Forum, 2011), 35–53; C. M. Naim, Ambiguities of Heritage (Karachi: City Press, 1999); 
Gurbachan Chandan, ‘Birth of Urdu Journalism in the Indian Subcontinent’, The Milli Gazette 
(New Delhi, 25 June 2011), 12; Javed Jabbar, ‘Pakistan - U.S. Relatoins: Known Myths 
Unknown Truths’, ed. by George Perkovich (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2011); Zamir Niazi, The Press in Chains. 
44
 Mathew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, 'The Relationship Between Mass Media, Public 
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balanced discourse would ideally allow the expression of widely different 
perspectives on Pakistan-US relations. However, the discourse of the Urdu press 
seems to project particular themes and perspectives while restricting the 
appearance of others. Such a discourse is, therefore, one of the contributing 
factors in the development of negative public perceptions of the US, a pattern 
generally regarded as anti-Americanism.
45
  
This phenomenon of anti-Americanism is not peculiar to Pakistan, and is also 
found in various other countries of the world.
46
 However, it can be argued that 
anti-Americanism in Pakistan at such a high level becomes a special case when it 
is also considered that Pakistan and the US have been in a close strategic 
partnership on many occasions since the 1950s.
47
 At many times in history 
Pakistan has helped the US to achieve its strategic objectives.
48
 Similarly, the US 
has also provided significant military and economic aid to Pakistan (Appendix A). 
Undoubtedly, both bilateral partners have experienced critical times, and at times 
have been unable to live up to the expectations of the other. Still, due to 
Pakistan's strategic location and its status as a nuclear state, the US cannot 
ignore Pakistan's importance, whereas the friendship of the US, as the sole world 
superpower and one of the major providers of military and economic aid, is also 
                                                                                                                                  
Opinion, and Foreign Policy', 39-65. 
45
 Social cognition, as basis for developing social perceptions of identity of self and others, in 
groups and out groups, is a much more complex process. Therefore, it cannot be argued with 
surety that what exactly would be the proportionate contribution of the Urdu press, in 
development of negative public perceptions, about the US in Pakistan. But, the discourse of the 
popular press certainly has an important role to play, in production and reproduction of the US 
image. Dijk defines social cognition as "a socially shared system of SRs, a system which, 
however, also includes a set of strategies for their effective manipulation in social interpretation, 
interaction, and discourse. Located in semantic (or rather, social) memory, SRs may be 
conceptualized as hierarchical networks, organized by a limited set of relevant node-
categories." Thus, social cognition provides the basis for developing social perceptions of 
identity of self and others, in groups and out groups. People in a group on the basis of social 
cognition develop perceptions of who they are and how they are different from others. For 
example, a social representation of a group may include nodes such as Appearance, Ethnic 
Origin, Language, Religion, Ideology and not only provides the basis of shared social 
knowledge but also helps to evaluate and develop general opinions about the other members 
within the group. Teun A. Van Dijk, ‘Social Cognition and Discourse’, in Handbook of Language 
and Social Psychology, ed. by H Giles and W P Robinson (John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1990), 163–
83. 
46
 For details see, Shane Szarkowski, ‘Dominant Voice, Dominant Silence: Foucault’s 
Governmentality and the US-Pakistan Relationship’, in Voices: Post Graduate Perspectives on 
Inter-disciplinarity, ed. by Kathryn Vincent and Juan Fernando Botero-Garcia (Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2011), 76–92. 
47
 For example, they have been military allies in SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan played the role of 
a frontline state in the Afghan War in 1980s, and Pakistan has been an ally in the War on 
Terror. The US has been providing military and economic aid to Pakistan during times of close 
cooperation. 
48
 For example, Pakistan played a pivotal role in the normalisation of relationship between the US 
and China in 1971, apart from playing role of frontline state in the two Afghan wars. 
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important to Pakistan.
49
 Therefore, such strongly negative public perceptions are 
a disabling constraint in the smooth conduct of the bilateral relationship.
50
 
Perceptions of a US politics of betrayal are not a new phenomenon, as 
references in the literature confirm that such perceptions have existed since at 
least 1965, when the US suspended its military aid to Pakistan during the latter’s 
war with India.
51
 Since Pakistan claimed itself victorious in the war, not much 
attention was given to "US betrayal." By 1970, the political situation in Pakistan 
was changing, unrest among the Bengali population was increasing, and the 
discourse in the Urdu press turned its focus onto the international conspiracies 
they claimed had been hatched or at least supervised or facilitated by the US. In 
the 1971 War, the US failure to rescue its ally to avert the disintegration of the 
country was the tipping point of public feeling about the US politics of betrayal. 
Perspectives describing the US as a betraying ally emerged with full force in 1971 
and since then, with some variations, have persisted in the discourse of the Urdu 
press. Therefore, in order to understand its nature and role, it is important to study 
the history of this discourse along with the perspectives and themes it carries. 
1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW 
A wide range of literature exists which provides a window to understanding 
Pakistan-US relations from different perspectives. This section of the chapter 
presents a review of the relevant literature categorised according to the 
perspectives which provide the conceptual basis for the different categories. First, 
historians and academics have written most of the literature on Pakistan-US 
relations from a "realist" point of view. Second, plenty of personal accounts and 
memoirs of different government functionaries, including former heads of states, 
diplomats, and foreign ministers, are available. Although the purpose of such 
accounts is to share the personal experiences of the writer, such works have also 
been rationalised through a realist argument. 
Third, there is a category of literature which was originally written to describe 
Pakistan-US relations based on some particular and non-variable pre-occupation, 
such as Pakistan's hostility towards India, issues of religious extremism in 
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Pakistan, and/or Pakistan's powerful military and religious clergy. These issues 
are presented as factors that define its identity and the national interest behind 
Pakistan's relationship with the US. Thus, premising itself on the national interest, 
this category also attempts to understand the relationship from a realist 
perspective. The fourth category relates to literature written from a Marxist 
perspective which seeks to understand Pakistan-US relations in terms of Marxist 
argument, that is based on class struggle. Finally, discourse analysis is a 
comparatively smaller category, at least in terms of the quantity of research, and 
has attempted to understand the nature of the relationship from the existing 
discourse of the media in order to judge how the Pakistani media perceives the 
US and vice versa. 
The purpose of reviewing this literature and categorising it according to the 
different perspectives outlined above is to understand how writers within the 
different categories have attempted to deal with the "politics of betrayal" in 
Pakistan-US relations, in order to provide a rationalisation for this research. 
1.6.1 Literature from the Realist Perspective 
Realists treat states as unitary and rational actors. They strongly follow a 
positivist methodology in believing that social phenomenon may be explained in 
the same way as those of the natural world. They assume that facts and values 
can be clearly separated and, therefore, that scientific inquiry should be based on 
empirical validation or falsification. They also accept that actors and concepts are 
exogenously given, whereas actors act in this pre-given world according to the 
demands of instrumental rationality.
52
 According to the substantive theory of 
realism, power as defined in terms of material capabilities plays a central role in 
politics of all kinds.
53
  
In this context, Robert McMahon’s account focuses on the reasons why 
peripheral countries like India and Pakistan were drawn into the broader 
superpower Cold War arena.
54
 Why did these militarily and economically 
"insignificant states" appeal to a superpower like the US to consider them 
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important enough to extend its area of influence to these regions? The brief 
answer is that a combination of "strategic interests" and threats convinced the US 
to seriously consider these South Asian countries. But these US strategic 
interests remained "essentially vague, inconsistent, and inchoate [in] nature."
55
 
 McMahon argues that American foreign policy makers have been unable to 
consider the relative worth of Pakistan and India. In the 1950s, Pakistan was 
viewed as a key to the US defence of its Middle East interests, without proper 
knowledge of Pakistan's limits of effectiveness. In the 1960s, the US started 
looking towards India as a counterweight to China, a policy which was not 
pragmatic either.
56
 McMahon further continues that “its alliance with Pakistan, 
consummated in 1954, lay at the heart of America’s policy failures in the South 
Asia."
57
 The objectives of entering into this alliance were different for each of the 
partners. America made this commitment in order to strengthen its defences in 
the Middle East against the perceived communist threat. Pakistan joined the 
alliance with the purpose of strengthening its military against “the potential threat 
from its chief rival,” India.58 
 McMahon further observes that contradictions in US foreign policy were 
exposed in the wake of Sino-Indian War of 1962: “The Pakistanis angrily 
denounced their ally’s military support for India, as they had earlier criticised 
Washington’s expanded economic aid effort as a grievous betrayal."59 
Consequently, disenchanted Pakistani decision makers moved away from 
“dangerous dependence on an unreliable superpower” and turned towards China 
in search of new and more reliable friends.
60
 McMahon concludes that: “the 
American alliance with Pakistan appears a monumental strategic blunder."
61
 This 
alliance achieved little in terms of its objectives, and “added almost nothing to the 
overall global strength of the United States… the alliance unavoidably fostered a 
patron-client relationship between Washington and Karachi that proved satisfying 
to neither side."
62
 On the one hand, it drained the resources of the US for little 
return, and on the other hand, it made Pakistan dependent on “the largesse of a 
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distant and not always reliable superpower for its very national survival."
63
 For 
McMahon it is the inaccurate assessment of Pakistan by US policy makers and 
the contradictions in US policy, which underpin the idea of what this present 
research terms a US politics of betrayal. 
Dennis Kux explains the relationship between Pakistan and the US as 
“intense and extraordinarily volatile."64 He claims that “the unusual volatility has 
puzzled and frustrated both Americans and Pakistanis,” and claims that the 
reason for the many ups and downs in the history of Pakistan-US relations is not 
"American fickleness or Pakistani stubbornness," but that the interests of both 
states have been at odds.
65
 “Pakistan has been and remains fixated on India.” 
Therefore, Pakistan’s alliance with the US in the 1950s, its development of a 
nuclear program in the 1970s, and its wish for a friendly regime in Afghanistan 
have all been due to a strategy directed against India. However, except in the 
Bangladesh case in 1971, the US has never taken Pakistan’s side against the 
larger state, India. The “US has never seen India as an enemy."66 US interests in 
Pakistan have been variable in different administrations according to its 
perception of Pakistan’s utility to support its global agenda.67 Thus, Kux's reply to 
explain a perceived US politics of betrayal is that both partners have different 
interests vis-à-vis India, a situation which has resulted in policies and actions 
which are viewed as betrayals by one or the other, and which have caused 
disenchantment between the two allies. 
Hafeez Malik argues that the US is not only a superpower, but also that its 
power constitutes an "imperial system" which in fact, regulates and influences the 
affairs of a large number of states all over the world.
68
 Malik observes that 
strategic interests are the major driving force for US relations with India or with 
Pakistan. The US maintains good relations with India because it sees it as an 
effective counterweight against China. After every downturn in the relationship, 
the relations based on strategic interests become warm again when the stronger 
partner requires it to be so, because of its strategic interests and because 
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“Pakistan is another state which is always willing to be a part of the American 
imperium."
69
 This has happened throughout the history of Pakistan-US relations. 
Malik believes that the international environment compelled Pakistan to 
change its policy after 9/11. Similarly, the international environment was 
responsible for forcing the US to change its course in the 1990s, leaving Pakistan 
and Afghanistan in the lurch. Even the US’s imperial instincts are triggered by the 
wider environment. Therefore, conflict is not an inherent phenomenon in the 
nature of states but it is reflective of an international environment based on 
anarchy. This anarchy creates a vacuum and allows the powerful states to fill this 
vacuum by assuming the role of super power and managing the affairs of the 
world through imperialism for their own benefit. This recent imperialist view of the 
modern world is different from the previous European model of imperialism. The 
new imperialism implies an exercise of power by wielding influence over other 
states without capturing their territories. Thus, for Malik, the US politics of betrayal 
should be understood in terms of its strategic interests, which are driven through 
the international environment.
70
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1.6.2 Memoirs and Personal Accounts of Government Officials  
Memoirs by officials are, in essence, also a kind of literature written from 
realist perspectives. Mohammad Ayub Khan,
71
 the former military ruler of 
Pakistan, associates his initiatives to develop the relationship with the US, and 
later with China, to structural forces, especially those emerging from Pakistan’s 
eastern neighbour India.
72
 He perceives US aid to India in the wake of the Sino-
Indian War of 1962 as having been a grievous and personal betrayal by Kennedy, 
but does not discuss the public perceptions, the role of a discourse of betrayal, or 
the impacts of this betrayal on the bilateral relations of both countries.
73
 Similarly, 
Pervez Musharraf makes an argument in his memoir in favour of a realist school 
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of thought.
74
 He justifies his decision to give unconditional support to the US as a 
choice dictated by structural forces, also claiming it was a rational move to make 
a u-turn on Pakistan’s Afghan policy in order to support the US in the War on 
Terror.
75
 
Abdul Sattar, a career diplomat and an ex-foreign minister of Pakistan, also 
presents a realist argument. He claims that all the decisions made in Pakistan’s 
foreign policy since 1947 had been taken independently by its decision makers in 
order to protect the national interest of the country. Some of these decisions 
proved useful and others less useful. He is also among those writers, who 
mention the perception of betrayal among the masses, but does not give much 
importance to this phenomenon and does not explain how such perceptions 
would have been produced or reproduced over a period.
76
 
Jamsheed Marker is a Pakistani diplomat who has also written his memoirs.
77
 
Though his work is distinctive, as it also looks into the internal or domestic factors 
including the media affecting Pakistan-US relations, he ignores the contributory 
phenomenon of shared public perceptions or, for that matter, discourse in general 
or the role of the media in particular. He notes that in 1987, while the issue of 
Pakistan's nuclear program was a matter of contention and Pakistan was 
attempting to obtain approval for an aid package of 4.2 billion dollars, Pakistan's 
nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan's interview with an Indian journalist increased 
difficulties for Pakistani diplomats in Washington. 
The presidency was already handicapped under the lame 
duck status of the final year of a second term incumbency. 
The Republicans' loss of the Senate majority despite 
Reagan's personal intervention followed by the Iran-Contra 
scandal, not only seriously weakened the administration, but 
rendered it an attractive target for Democratic opposition on 
every possible issue, including its firm support for Pakistan. 
For us the year began inauspiciously with a series of 
disconcerting attacks on our nuclear policy, the most 
significant of which were Ambassador Deane Hinton's 
speech at Islamabad and the publication of a report by 
Leonard Specter, a respected authority on nuclear issues, of 
the Carnegie Endowment. This was followed by Kuldip 
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Nayyar's interview with A.Q. Khan, published in papers all 
over the world, the devastating effect of which remained 
unrelieved despite our denials.
78
 
Although some consideration is given to the role of the media in affecting the 
conduct of foreign relations by a country, Marker does not however attempt to 
explain the importance of public opinion, or the role of the popular press in 
producing and reproducing the sense of a US politics of betrayal, or its impact on 
bilateral relations. 
Iqbal Akhund is a Pakistani diplomat who calls himself a "bystander" who has 
had little control or influence over events.
79
 He notes that Pakistan's size and 
situation allow its diplomats "little options of action and initiative." He argues that:  
Pakistan is not among those few countries that have the 
power or influence to shape world events and who are, 
relatively speaking, free agents on the world scene. Like the 
great majority of the world's states, Pakistan must take things 
as it finds them and adjust to them as well as it can.
80
 
Akhund provides an interesting insight into the nature of Pakistan's diplomacy and 
its conduct of foreign relations. However, again, he does not explain the 
relevance of public opinion, or address the influence of the prevailing media 
discourse on public opinion and on the conduct of the country’s foreign relations. 
Overall, most personal accounts and memoirs explain the politics of betrayal 
in realist terms of the structural forces of the international environment which 
determine US interests and policies. Like most other realist accounts, they tend to 
ignore the relevance of public opinion both in the US and in Pakistan, and they 
generally do not discuss the role of the popular press in affecting public opinion 
and/or the bilateral relations of the country. 
1.6.3 Literature Describing Pakistan's Preoccupations with the Internal 
and External Factors Affecting its Relationship with the US 
The literature addressing this theme explains Pakistan-US relations against a 
backdrop of particular preoccupations that not only derive from this relationship 
but also shape it over time and through changes in circumstances. For example, 
Owen Bennet-Jones states that Islamic extremists and other actors like Baluch 
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and Pashtun nationalists have been calling for change and the overhauling of 
political institutions in Pakistan.
81
 The influence of Islamic sentiment in the armed 
forces of Pakistan also cannot be denied, and has the potential to affect the future 
of Pakistani policy on Kashmir. These have been the major challenges and 
preoccupations of Pakistan’s successive governments and they have 
continuously affected Pakistan’s relations with its neighbours and with 
superpowers like the US.
82
 Jones explains the politics of betrayal in Pakistan-US 
relations through Pakistan's preoccupations with its internal political problems. 
In a similar way, Husain Haqqani explains that the relationship between the 
US and Pakistan has been shaped and affected by the military and religious elites 
in Pakistan.
83
 Pakistan became an independent state based on the distinct 
religious identity of the Muslims in the former British India. After independence in 
1947, the ruling elite used religious rhetoric and logic as a binding force for the 
nation. Because of the inexperience of the political elite, the civil and military 
bureaucracy controlled the system. The military demonised India using religious 
rhetoric against Hindu Brahmins in Congress in order to stifle internal opposition. 
Any parties or groups demanding their political rights were regarded as Indian 
agents who wanted to dismember the country. The US, in this scenario, was seen 
as the “country’s provider of arms and finances."84 However, the US was 
preoccupied with its global agenda, and established relations with Pakistan in 
order to strengthen the latter to use it to check possible communist aggression in 
the region. Any twists and turns in this bilateral relation should be viewed in the 
context of the specific and separate preoccupations of both countries. 
Zahid Hussain argues that in the post 9/11 scenario, President Musharraf 
failed to stand firmly against the religious right.
85
 He backpedalled on his promise 
to reform "controversial and discriminatory Islamic laws" that were continuously 
misused by "Islamic fanatics." The legislation preventing sectarian violence and 
the spreading of hatred was not enforced. The jihadist media, through channels 
such as audio and video recordings, pamphlets, books, etc., were flourishing and 
their material was easily available in the country. Private militias and extremist 
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armies were not completely disarmed.
86
 Musharraf failed to take concrete action 
against extremists, because of an “unholy alliance” which has existed between 
the "religious militants" and the ruling military since the inception of Pakistan. Any 
inconsistencies between foreign policy pledges and practice must therefore be 
assessed in the context of the internal handicaps that continue to preoccupy 
Pakistan.
87
 
Similarly, Ahmad Rashid argues that since independence, the military in 
Pakistan has used the threat from India as a principal reason to build a national 
security state in Pakistan and to justify the prolonged rule of the military, with 
heavy spending committed to defence.
88
 The military, through pro-extremist 
policies, has used Islamic militants to pursue Kashmir and Afghan policies, which 
have resulted in a strong bond between the country’s military and extremist 
groups.
89
 This preoccupation has made it very difficult for Pakistan to take 
substantial measures "to curtail fundamentalism."
90
 Rashid does not, however, 
make it clear how the "threat from India" has been communicated to people, or 
indeed discussed what role the media, especially the popular Urdu press, has 
played in the process. 
Hilary Synnott analyses the issue of fundamentalism and proposes that 
Pakistan faces certain internal political, economic, and social challenges.
91
 These 
"chronic" domestic problems have restricted the growth of its political and social 
institutions. The US and the other countries that have supported the military rulers 
in Pakistan for their own interests are also responsible for its institutional plight. 
Its underdeveloped institutions have not been able to deliver effectively for its own 
people, or for the country’s external partners like the US. In the absence of 
effective political and social institutions, the country is simultaneously fighting the 
war against terror and helping the growth of fundamentalism. The absence of 
effective institutions preoccupies the country and, therefore, its foreign policy 
decisions must be studied in this context.
92
 Conversely, US support of the military 
rulers of Pakistan, restricting the growth of the political and social institutions the 
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country needs, could also be explained as a betrayal, but Synnott has premised 
his argument on the concept of national interest and demonstrates understanding 
of the realist argument. Consequently, Synnott also ignores the role of the media 
and popular press in explaining the US’s role. 
Shahid Amin argues that the ruling classes, narrow-minded official circles and 
the hate lobbies on both sides have contributed to the deterioration of relations 
between India and Pakistan.
93
 Perceptions of India's efforts to undo Pakistan and 
Kashmir and other disputes have further worsened the situation over the 
decades.
94
 Pakistan’s quest for security was driven by fears aroused by its 
experience with India.
95
 “The first task of Pakistani diplomacy was therefore to 
somehow find [a balancing power] against India. This has, ever since, remained 
the most important preoccupation of Pakistan’s foreign and defence policies."96 
Thus, it was Pakistan’s sense of insecurity in relation to India that pushed it to 
seek alignment with the US. However, Amin does not clarify the role of the Urdu 
press in communicating the discourse of "the hate lobbies" in India and Pakistan.  
Some writers have expressed the belief that betrayal is an inherent problem in 
Pakistan, given the fact that India and Pakistan have a history of opposition, and 
for this reason, they have always remained on opposite sides. Sangat Singh, for 
example, makes a detailed analysis of Pakistan’s foreign policy and argues that it 
is primarily based on "negative foundations."
97
 Pakistan, due to its "history of 
enmity," has a permanent feeling of animosity against India. Therefore, all 
Pakistan’s external relations are shaped and reshaped because of this permanent 
and “sole motivating factor."98 Any adjustments in its foreign relations or important 
foreign policy decisions must always primarily be directed against India. 
Pakistan’s decision to join alliances with the US, bringing the Cold War to the 
subcontinent, and its decision to develop relations with China and the USSR, 
were all directed against India. He also refutes Pakistan’s claims of feelings of 
insecurity and threats from India and claims that it is not the insecurity but instead 
the "animosity of Pakistan" that directs its foreign relations. Following Singh’s 
argument, the logical conclusion about the phenomenon of betrayal would be that 
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it is inherent in the nature of Pakistan given its permanent sense of animosity 
towards India and therefore, its foreign policy decisions should be seen in this 
context. The roles of factors like public opinion, media, and political leadership are 
once again not taken into account in producing and reproducing a "demonised 
other" in Pakistan. 
Kanishkan Sathasivam, in his more balanced analysis, makes the argument 
that although US relations with Pakistan and India are two distinctive but related 
bilateral relations, “the historic rivalry and conflict between the two neighbours” 
provides the context for these relations.
99
 Pakistan-US relations are cyclical in 
nature and have gone through various ups and downs throughout their history. 
Some significant events, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and 
9/11 attacks in 2001, have started a new cycle of relations between the two 
countries. However, the perceived threat from India remains the primary focus of 
Pakistani policy while negotiating its relations with the US.
100
 Therefore, any 
significant decisions in Pakistan’s foreign relations must be seen in the light of its 
apparently permanent "animosity against India." 
Furthermore, P. James Farwell observes that Pakistanis have a fantastic 
ability to create conspiracy theories.
101
 Conspiracy theorists or xenophobic writers 
create sensations among the public. Zaid Hamid is one example of such analysts. 
He is a defence analyst, and during several TV talk shows has claimed that 
Jewish, Christian, and Hindu lobbies have hatched conspiracies against Pakistan 
and the Islamic world. He also claims that the US is scared of Pakistan’s nuclear 
capability, and that Israel, India, and the US are conspiring to destroy and 
dismember Pakistan.
102
 For Zaid Hamid it is the conspiratorial nature of the US as 
perceived as an anti-Islamic force which defines the US politics of betrayal. 
Similarly, Ameer Hussain argues that the US and India are "the real enemies" of 
the Muslim world and Pakistan.
103
 They are "conspiring against the nuclear 
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program" of Pakistan. The US has been supportive of the Indian nuclear program 
but at the same time, the argument goes, it cannot allow a Muslim country to 
become a nuclear power. The US has strong objections to Iran’s nuclear program 
as well. Pakistan-US relations can be better understood in the context of 
"conspiracies of Israel, the Jewish lobby in the US, and India."
104
 Therefore, for 
Ameer Hussain, the US politics of betrayal can be rationalised through its anti-
Islamic policies. 
This literature describing Pakistan's preoccupations with certain factors such 
as demands for change in its political system, the hegemony of its military and 
religious clergy, Pakistan's attitude towards India, and the issue of religious 
extremism, explains the differences of interests and objectives of the two states. It 
is argued that the US politics of betrayal can be rationalised based on these 
preoccupations which drive the two states in different directions, with the result 
that, at times, they find themselves opposed to each other, a situation which is 
perceived as betrayal of one or the other partner. The role of the popular press in 
producing and reproducing "a demonised other" to establish and rationalise the 
politics of betrayal in international relations is generally not considered.
105
 
1.6.4 Literature from Marxist Perspective 
Mark Rupert has explained Marxist theory as means to understand "capitalism 
as an historically particular way of organising social life" in terms of the political, 
economic, and social factors affecting social relations at both domestic and 
international levels.
106
 Capitalism in this view is not a phenomenon which has 
emerged from human nature, instead it is seen as a historically developed mode 
of socio-economic relations.
107
 Capitalism is viewed as a form of social life in 
which human labour has become a commodity and is bought and sold on the 
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market. Workers who are the real producers are free to sell their commodity of 
labour to anybody in a private owned free market economy. However, limits are 
put on this freedom as the means of production are in the ownership and control 
of private owners. Labourers therefore have to compete against each other and 
sell their labour to the owning class in order to get access to the means of 
production and to ensure their own survival by buying the material necessities for 
everyday life. The productive powers of human societies have been greatly 
increased by virtue of capitalism, but, this has been done in disabling, 
exploitative, and undemocratic ways.
108
 
Tariq Ali, a prominent journalist and Marxist writer has translated this Marxist 
interpretation into the context of US-Pakistan relations. He believes that the US 
has always used Pakistan on its flight path of power.
109
 Pakistani military and civil 
elites have always been used by the US to pursue its global agenda for power. As 
such, the US has always preferred to work with the military in Pakistan. A civilian 
opposition has also been supported by the US in order to maintain pressure on 
the military. Changes in the political setup of Pakistan have always been directed 
"to maintain the status quo" in the bilateral relations with the US.
110
 In response, 
Ali argues, the Pakistani elites have also supported the US to "strengthen their 
grip on domestic power centres" and to "accumulate wealth by corruption and by 
abusing the aid" given by the US. Civilian and military elites cooperate with the 
US because the shared interest of the two is "the maximisation of power" through 
the accumulation of wealth.
111
 The "greed for power and money" displayed by the 
Pakistani elite has actually "mortgaged the past, present, and future" of Pakistan 
to Washington.
112
 The US has built up so much "influence on Pakistan" that in 
practice, American foreign policy "determines the domestic and external relations" 
of Pakistan.
113
 For Ali, the local ruling elites have betrayed the poorest classes by 
siding with the international capitalist elites. The media, which is also owned and 
controlled by the capitalists, naturally protects the interests of the ruling elites. 
Consequently, there would be no point in studying a phenomenon such as the 
politics of betrayal.  
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Likewise, Feroz Ahmad, another Marxist writer, argues that in the post-
colonial and post-independence period, the powerful Hindu merchant class in 
East Pakistan migrated to India, whereas the equally powerful trading class of 
Muslims migrated to West Pakistan, where the military, bureaucracy, and other 
centres of power were also located.
114
 The unequal class structure of the two 
wings was to be addressed by the elite in the western wing, but unfortunately, no 
ruling class voluntarily abdicates its powers. Therefore, the theory here is that the 
capitalistic appetites of the West Pakistani bourgeois were further enhanced by 
the US’s military and economic aid, which jeopardised the unity of the country.115 
In another study, Feroz Ahmad analyses the 1971 break-up of Pakistan in the 
context of Pakistan-US relations.
116
 He argues that US aid to Pakistan in the 
1950s supported the bourgeois class of West Pakistan at the cost of the 
bourgeois of East Pakistan.
117
 The US was the leading moneylender in the world 
in the post-World War II period and was actively looking for Cold War allies in 
order to provide economic and military aid to the third world ruling elites who were 
willing to cooperate with it. Without American economic and military aid, the West 
Pakistani elite would not have been able to compete with their eastern 
counterparts and establish a monopoly over them. Therefore, in one way or the 
other, the alliances with the US caused the alienation of the East Pakistani 
bourgeois, which ultimately resulted in breakup of the country into Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. Similarly, Aziz Ahmad argues that the primary interest of the US in 
Pakistan has been strategic, as Pakistan has always been viewed as a militarily 
important area that can be used to protect the US’s worldwide imperialistic 
economic interests.
118
 The major portion of the economic aid given by the US to 
Pakistan has been used to buy American commodities on unfavourable terms and 
has therefore caused further underdevelopment of the country.
119
 
Overall, this selective review of the literature from the Marxist perspective 
shows that it explains the US politics of betrayal as a logical consequence of the 
tacit understanding between the ruling elite of Pakistan and the US in order to 
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protect their own interests. The role of the popular press is also marginalised, as 
the "media" is assumed to be owned and used by the capitalistic elite, which 
shapes public opinion to protect their own interests.
120
 
1.6.5 Literature Attempting to Understand the Discourse on Pakistan-
US Relations 
Discourse, at least in Foucauldian terms, is "a way of speaking, thinking, or 
writing that presents particular relationships, situations, and events as self 
evidently true."
121
 Michel Foucault describes discourse as "a complex, 
differentiated practice, governed by analysable rules and transformations" which 
may not be able to change the world or life, but at least has the potential to 
change their meanings.
122
 Categories and domains of saying and doing things are 
specified and determined by the social and cultural organisation of discourse. The 
limits of what people can say and write about certain issues and themes are 
structured by the discourse employed. Power relations also emerge from 
discourse. Meaning and language are important factors in determining those 
power relations.
123
 Foucault explains power as follows: 
[power] is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, 
something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power 
is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of 
nonegalitarian and mobile relations.
124
  
Language helps to define, contest, and construct the subjectivity of a people and 
their social organisation. The relations between the language used, the originator 
of a statement, the discourse itself and the understanding of the people hearing, 
reading, and interpreting the statement together determine these power 
relations.
125
 Within a discourse, dominant voices exist that are most easily heard, 
as well as more dormant and passive voices which remain unnoticed.
126
 Inside a 
discourse only certain things, events, and situations can be written, said, noted, 
recorded, or thought about.
127
 Therefore, in order to challenge these 
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assumptions, a scholar has to step out of the parameters and configurations of 
discourse.
128
 Foucauldian post-structuralism encourages deconstruction of the 
dominant voice in order to reveal the power-knowledge nexus.
129
 To Foucault, not 
even suppressed voices can be trapped forever, as power's grip can always be 
modified in suitable conditions.
130
 However, a precise strategy is required to 
recover those suppressed voices.
131
 
Edward Said has adapted Foucault's discourse theory in terms of Orientalism, 
a term for the nature of western discourse on societies and cultures of the East, 
namely Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. In doing so, Said argues that the 
representations offered by the western discourse are inaccurate and fictional, as 
such representations are tied to the western imperialist societies who produce 
and originate the discourse and use them as a means of asserting their authority 
and control over such regions.
132
 Said further explains that the history of Asia 
written in the West, which is based on Orientalism as an intellectual norm used by 
western scholarship for cultural judgement, invented the "exotic East" and the 
"inscrutable Orient" which represented eastern cultures and societies as 
inferior.
133
 This alleged inferiority is used to justify foreign/western intervention for 
purposes of improvement and development. In contrast to Said's thesis of 
Orientalism, Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit present their concept of 
Occidentalism and argue that the nationalist and nativist resistance in the Islamic 
world to the West as a source of modernisation has resulted in a stereotyped 
negative image of the West among both utopian radicals and nationalist 
conservatives in the East. These latter groups tend to view liberalism, capitalism, 
and secularism as destructive forces.
134
 
In this context, Shane Szarkowski attempts to apply Foucault in order to 
understand the discursive construction of knowledge about the Pakistan-US 
relationship in relation to security, insurgency, and terrorism.
135
 The study has 
examined how western analysts followed by American scholars created a 
dominant voice and are involved in a multilateral process to "portray and 
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compose a historical account in order to further concretise the image of a 
demonised other."
136
 Therefore, the dominant voices of the West and the US have 
described Pakistan as "a failed state" through their discourse. The author, 
however, does not address the question of highlighting the silent or suppressed 
voices of Pakistani identity and self-knowledge.
137
 
In a related way, Iftikhar H. Malik analyses the attitude of the American Press 
towards Pakistan movement during 1940-1947.
138
 He argues that the coverage of 
the American popular press was based on "semi-truths" and "biased information" 
because the American media failed to ensure "the authenticity of statements 
before their publication" and the All India Muslim League's inability to "establish a 
viable public information machine in the USA to counterbalance misinformation on 
Pakistan."
139
 
Zafar Ali, Mirza Jan, and Noshina Saleem have also analysed the projection 
of Pakistan's image in two American news magazines, Time and Newsweek, 
through conducting a content analysis.
140
 The authors analysed the content 
published in the magazines between July and December of 2009. The study 
concludes that the US media predominantly projects "a negative image of 
Pakistan" that explains "negative public perceptions and mistrust on the US part. 
Pakistan is portrayed as a "failing state" due to political instability and its alleged 
support for terrorism. The authors argue that the US has "failed to succeed" in the 
War on Terror against the Taliban in Afghanistan and that therefore, its media 
attempts to "blame Pakistan for supporting the Taliban."
141
 Muhammad Ashraf 
Khan and Fatima Imran have also conducted a similar study analysing the 
content published in Newsweek, Time, and The Economist between 26 
November 2008 and May 2009.
142
 Their study concludes that the US media 
projects "a negative image of Pakistan." The authors argue that journalists 
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belonging to a different culture are unable to understand other cultures and 
therefore project "a negative image" of a foreign country.
143
 
Conversely, Ayesha Ashfaq and Adnan Hussein argue that the projection of 
the US’s image in the Pakistani media and other countries has changed from 
positive to negative and vice versa according to changes in its policies, foreign 
relations, and audience preferences. Therefore, the US’s image in the Pakistani 
media has also changed along with the ups and downs in the Pakistan-US 
relationship.
144
 Likewise, A.M. Hanan observes that Pakistani newspapers project 
"a positive image of the US" during times when Pakistan-US relations are 
comparatively smooth, and the two countries find themselves in harmony. The 
study argues that the press changes its tone according to the US attitude towards 
Pakistan.
145
 Similarly, I.P. Cheema argues that the US projection of a negative 
image is a worldwide phenomenon, especially with regard to Muslim states. The 
US image in Pakistan has been negative because the "people of Pakistan" are 
"not happy" about US policies towards Pakistan.
146
 
Noshina Saleem studied the US’s image in two Pakistani English 
newspapers, The Pakistan Times and Dawn for the period 1979 to 1988.
147
 
According to the author's findings, during times when the US as a superpower 
safeguarded Pakistan's interests, the Pakistani press responded accordingly and 
projected a positive image. Therefore, the author argues, the projection of the 
US’s image in the Pakistani press is interest-specific. In 1981, when the US 
resumed military and economic aid to Pakistan, the two English newspapers 
portrayed a positive and favourable image through their editorials. On the other 
hand, a negative image was constructed during times when the interests of the 
two countries diverged or the US expressed a hostile attitude. For example, when 
the US influenced France to cancel a deal relating to a nuclear processing plant 
in Pakistan, or when military and economic aid was halted under sanctions in 
1990, the Pakistani press projected a negative image accordingly.
148
 Noshina 
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Saleem has also studied the role of Pakistani English newspapers in their 
projection of the US’s image for the period 1991 to 2004,149 finding that national 
interest determined and directed the projection of the US’s image in the Pakistani 
press. The author also explains that the Pakistani press, being "an independent 
force," criticised the US War on Terror and expressed public concerns about the 
US military presence in Pakistan's border areas.
150
 
F. Islam, in a similar study, evaluates US image projection in relation to the US 
missile attacks on Afghanistan during August-September 1998, the Washington 
Declaration about the Kargil War during July-August 1999, and the US President's 
visit to South Asia in March-April 2000.
151
 The study examines the editorials of 
three English language newspapers: Dawn, The News and The Nation, and finds 
that the newspapers criticised the US and projected a negative image of the 
country in the case of the Kargil War and the missile attacks on Afghanistan 
because the US attitude was perceived as hostile to Pakistan.
152
  
Similarly, M.A. Khan and A. Safdar analyse the projection of the US image in 
Dawn and Nawa-i-Waqt for the period between September 2001 and September 
2004.
153
 Their study rejects the media conformity theory and argues that the 
media does not necessarily conform with the foreign policy of a government. The 
authors observe that the Pakistani press communicated a highly "negative image 
of the US" on the issues of the War on Terror, the US attack on Iraq, nuclear 
issues, and in relation to perceived US interference in Pakistan's internal matters. 
The authors interestingly find the liberal and progressive Dawn more critical than 
the right-leaning conservative Nawa-i-Waqt, as the former clearly declared the US 
"an enemy country" to Pakistan. They also observe that Pakistani press remained 
opposed to the government's policy of support for the US led War on Terror.
154
 
Discourse analysis, often in forms which do not draw on Foucault and Said, 
has been used to consider the role of the media and its discourse on Pakistan-US 
relations. However, most of the work based on the English language newspapers 
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has been done for the purpose of media studies in order to judge the overall 
projection of the US, or of Pakistan, in positive or negative terms. The existing 
literature does not focus on the evolving history of the discourse, its themes and 
perspectives, or the ways in which such a discourse carries political implications 
for Pakistan-US relations. 
1.6.6 Discussion of the Reviewed Literature 
An important issue in relation to the foregoing literature is the level of analysis. 
In international relations, there are two important levels of analysis.
155
 The first is 
known as the systemic level, which involves study of international relations at the 
level of the international system, as both independent and dependent variables. 
With regard to the dependent variables, patterns of state behaviour at the 
aggregate level are taken as an object for explaining the international system. 
Whereas, in the independent variable sense, the purpose of international 
relations theory is to explain the causal powers of the structure of the international 
system in understanding state behaviour.
156
 The second level of analysis is the 
state level at which the purpose of theory is to explain state behaviour as a 
dependent variable, as it is affected by the sub state or unit level factors such as 
domestic politics.
157
 
In this context, to realists national interest is a permanent thing and there is 
little space for the impacts of good or bad experiences in bilateral relations. When 
national interest requires to strengthen bilateral relations with some other state, 
the history of previous experiences is not expected to have any effects on the 
relationship. Moreover, the state is also treated as a "black box" and no deeper 
consideration is given to different stakeholders in the process of policymaking. 
For example, Hafeez Malik refers to pressure group politics and the influence of 
the Jewish and Indian lobbies on Pakistan-US relations, however he does not 
offer a deeper interpretation that how effective these lobbies are in shaping the 
foreign policies of Pakistan or of the US.
158
 The influences of the media and of 
public opinion are also largely ignored. Both of these factors have however 
                                              
155
 Different writers have provided varying number of analysis i.e. two, three, four or even five 
levels of analysis. For details, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in 
International Politics, 13-18. 
156
 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
11-12. 
157
 Ibid. 
158
 Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, 48-50. 
32 
 
gained increased importance in the democratic set up in shaping the national 
interest and interpretations of it. 
It is also very common in the realist school of thought to make no distinction 
between short-term and long-term interests. The end of the Cold War was a major 
blow to realist thought because the bipolar balance of power in the international 
environment ended and the strategic environment and numerous national 
interests changed. Similarly, it is possible that a democratic process takes root in 
Pakistan in the near future, and political parties such as Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, 
Jamaat-e-Islami,
159
 or other religious parties with anti-US rhetoric in their 
manifestos may come to power. If this happens, the question of whether or not 
such a government in Pakistan can avoid popular public perceptions of the US, 
especially in the presence of a free and vibrant media and politically aware 
masses, will be of great importance. Traditional realist thought has been unable to 
see beyond immediate national gains and interests of a country, and therefore 
have avoided discussing the future implications of Pakistani public opinion for the 
conduct of Pakistan-US relations. 
The role of the media, political parties, and public opinion in foreign policy 
decision making is generally ignored in realist literature. As they exclude public 
opinion from the factors affecting foreign policy, realist writers ignore perceptions 
of betrayal, and specifically, the role of the media (especially the popular press) in 
producing and reproducing such perceptions. Realists explain the volatility of 
Pakistan-US relations as being due to changing national interests and attempts to 
maximise or retain power based on material factors, and for that reason, ups and 
downs are also driven by such interests, not by other factors or conditions. It is 
assumed that everything after every cycle becomes automatically the same and 
that these states pursue their interests in similar ways. 
In summary, the realist school of thought follows a positivist ontology in 
assuming that reality is exogenously given and power defined in terms of interest 
which depends only on material realities. Security is the prime and permanent 
national interest, which is both measured and sought through material power. 
Therefore, no consideration is given to the variation of interests or even the 
internal conflicts of interests within states. Realists treat states as unitary, rational 
and the only significant actors in the international system. The role of domestic 
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political actors like public opinion, the media, and political parties in determining 
the state's particular identity and behaviour is largely marginalised.  
While realists mention the existence of perceptions of betrayal, but exclude 
public opinion as an effective factor of foreign policy. Such writers usually ignore 
or marginalise the importance of the phenomenon of betrayal. What they cannot 
explain is that national interest is perceived by states as a consequence of their 
particular social identities, and for this reason may not be fixed forever and should 
instead be considered as a dynamic process that changes over time in relation to 
a complex interaction of differing and conflicting agents and sub-agents within 
and outside the state. Governments may follow their national interest, but betrayal 
may affect the social perceptions of national interest. In other words, the realist 
writers discussed above tend to conceptualise Pakistan-US relations based on 
national interests and argue that the ups and downs experienced are only driven 
by material interest, when the process is in reality much more nuanced and 
complex. 
The Marxist argument on bilateral relations is similar to the realist argument. 
The difference between the two is the ultimate impact of the decisions taken to 
protect the national interest. According to realist thinking, decisions taken by the 
ruling elite to protect the national interest ultimately benefit everyone. Marxists 
assume that the decisions taken by the elite to protect strategic interests only 
protect the interests of the elites, not those of the whole nation. Both arguments 
exclude the importance of significant factors like public opinion, domestic political 
stakeholders, and the media on bilateral relations.  
Marxist literature also ignores the phenomenon of betrayal. Marxism is 
premised on the social evolution of societies through control of the historical 
means of production and of reproduction of themselves. The media, domestic 
political stakeholders like political parties and public opinion are seen as 
secondary agents of the ideological superstructure, but are also important 
elements of modern societies that play significant roles in the socialisation and 
evolutionary processes. Moreover, a phenomenon like betrayal is inherent in the 
behaviour of the socio-economic ruling class who will always tend to ‘betray’ or 
exploit the poor working classes in their domestic and international policies. 
Therefore, the phenomenon of betrayal is not taken into account because it is 
considered as a given reality. 
34 
 
The literature analysing the discourse on Pakistan-US relations attempts to 
deal with the role of the media in projecting a negative or positive image of the 
US. The majority of works from this perspective have focused on Pakistan's 
English language newspapers while ignoring the popular Urdu press which is 
more widely read and understood throughout the country. Moreover, none of the 
studies in this area have attempted to highlight the history of this discourse and 
the dominant voices, perspectives and themes privileged for inclusion, or the 
suppressed voices, perspectives and themes which are excluded from the 
discourse. 
1.7 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THIS RESEARCH 
The objective of this research is to deconstruct the discourse of the Urdu 
press by analysing its news content in order to identify the dominant voices and to 
understand how such voices have established and rationalised a US politics of 
betrayal through different themes and perspectives. This is done while also 
recovering those voices which have remained suppressed or even silent and 
which could have worked as a counter argument to challenge the notions of a US 
politics of betrayal. Foucauldian post-structuralism encourages recovering the 
suppressed or silent voices in a discourse because, as was explained above, 
they cannot be trapped forever in a situation where power's grip can always be 
modified in determinate conditions with the help of a precise strategy.
160
 
Therefore, this work also intends to recover some of those unheard, excluded, 
and suppressed voices within the discourse through conducting interviews with 
prominent journalists and politicians. The complete absence or under 
representation of a counter argument certainly renders a discourse biased and 
affects perceptions in a different manner than that of a more balanced discourse. 
In this background, discourse analysis serves as a methodological framework 
for this research. There are various kinds of discourse analyses which can be 
applied to study popular media discourses on relations between two countries. 
The term Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) more often used interchangeably with 
the term Critical Linguistics (CL) is one of the frequently applied frameworks for 
such studies.
161
 However, critical discourse analysis having its roots in linguistics 
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regards "language as social practice" and considers the language to be crucial.
162
 
The focus of this research is more on the thematic meaning than on the language 
itself. Therefore, it is not based on critical discourse analysis and will not go into 
detail regarding the language structures, syntax, and grammatical choices that 
are applied in this discourse. Instead, it will engage with discourse analysis in a 
Foucauldian fashion in order to focus on the themes and perspectives included 
and excluded in the discourse at the macro level, with the objective of 
deconstructing the knowledge and highlighting its different building blocks. This 
deconstruction seeks to divide the discourse into different themes under which 
knowledge about perceived US betrayal of Pakistan has been created and 
rationalised since 1971. This process of deconstruction will also help to point out 
consistencies, changes, and excluded voices in those themes.
163
 The nature of 
this present research is qualitative and subsequently its discourse analysis will 
yield qualitative results. Quantitative findings such as figures and numbers of 
published news content does not constitute the purpose as the objective is to 
understand the thematic structure and changing history of the discourse of the 
Urdu press. 
Thus, the overall objective is to apply the above-described methodological 
framework to explain how the Urdu press in Pakistan has constructed knowledge 
about a US politics of betrayal since 1971 and to delineate the perspectives which 
might have challenged the notions of US betrayal, but which have not been 
included in the discourse. 
1.8 HOW CAN THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF DISCOURSE IN THE 
URDU PRESS BE STUDIED FOR A PERIOD OF OVER 43 YEARS 
(1971-2015)? 
Ideally, all the Urdu newspapers covering each interaction between Pakistan 
and the US should be thoroughly analysed in order to establish that the themes 
and perspectives regarding Pakistan-US relations have been identical and have 
helped to produce and reproduce the idea of US betrayal over a long period. 
However, such a task is too broad to attempt in the present research. Therefore, it 
has been practical to select two of the most popular newspapers, each of them 
adhering to different ideological traditions. To deal with the high volume of 
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interactions between the two states over such a long period, the selection of 
some significant cases which cover major portions of this time and which have 
been strongly portrayed as instances of a US betrayal of Pakistan has also 
proved helpful. These cases have been selected on the basis of their high profile, 
deep consequences, and importance. The most serious perceived betrayal by a 
partner state may be one that endangers the security and survival of its ally. 
Three cases of such a nature in this relationship are therefore chosen: the 1971 
War leading to the creation of Bangladesh, US opposition to Pakistan's nuclear 
program between 1972 and 1998 and the Abbottabad operation in 2011. The 
background of each of these cases is set out briefly as context below. 
1.8.1 The 1971 War 
The war between India and Pakistan in 1971 culminated in the disintegration 
of Pakistan and created a new independent country from formerly Pakistani 
territory, Bangladesh. Wars, especially wars of independence, involve multiple 
causal factors embedded in an extended historical course. The process of 
disintegration had begun long before the actual and ultimate separation was 
confirmed. In August 1947, based on the two-nation theory Pakistan gained its 
independence from the British Empire and became a country with the largest 
Muslim population in South Asia. Apart from religion, there was little in common 
between the eastern and western wings, which were separated by a thousand 
miles and had Indian hostile territory in between them. Their cultures, languages, 
and ethnicities were very different. 
The majority of the population resided in the eastern wing and was 
overwhelmingly of Bengali origin.
164
 People living in West Pakistan were divided 
in four different ethnic groups from Punjab, Sindh, North Western Frontier 
Province,
165
 and Balochistan. Punjabis were the majority faction and dominated 
the newly independent country's military, bureaucracy, and politics. Since 
Independence, politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers from Punjab have 
dominated in power.
166
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The dominance of the political and bureaucratic elite of West Pakistan was 
not the only issue alienating the people in the eastern wing of the country. The 
capital of the state was located in the west and was therefore the centre of 
development too. The East Pakistani leaders claimed that there was a huge 
disparity between development expenditures spent in East and West Pakistan, 
which had caused the underdevelopment of the eastern wing of the country.
167
 
The status of the national language was given to Urdu, ignoring the Bengali 
language against the wishes of the Bengalis of East Pakistan. They were also 
often ridiculed by the Punjabis for their physiques and cultural habits. All these 
factors led to their estrangement and inspired them to demand autonomy for the 
province.
168
 
The First General Elections were held on 7 December 1970 under the Martial 
Law government of General Yahya Khan after he had taken over from another 
military dictator, Ayub Khan. Khan had to step down in 1969 due to popular mass 
movements lead by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in the west 
and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League in the east.
169
 The Awami League 
produced a manifesto based on six points demanding maximum autonomy for the 
provinces leaving defence, foreign affairs, and currency under federal government 
control.
170
 The PPP offered a program based on the concept of "Islamic 
socialism" promising food, clothes, and shelter for everyone while favouring a 
strong central government and opposing the six point agenda of the Awami 
League.
171
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The Awami League secured 160 out of a total 300 National Assembly seats 
establishing their majority to form a government.
172
 
 
Figure 5, party positions in Pakistan’s 1970 elections173  
After the 1970 elections, the Awami League insisted on a new constitution on the 
basis of their six point agenda whereas political parties including the Pakistan 
People's Party wanted negotiations on the issue of provincial autonomy before 
the first session of the assembly was called by the President.
174
 General Yahya 
called this session of the assembly at Dhaka in the east of the country on 3 March 
1971.The PPP rejected the call and asked to postpone the session so that the 
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major political parties could settle the issues first. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as Chairman 
of the party, also threatened to launch a mass movement if his demand for 
postponement was not accepted. Under this pressure, President Yahya Khan 
rescheduled the session, an action which was viewed with suspicion by Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman's Awami League. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman rejected the decision 
and asked for an immediate transfer of powers to the newly elected members. On 
7 March 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman announced a civil disobedience 
movement and proposed the non-acceptance of any orders and instructions from 
the federal government.
175
 
The military government banned the Awami League and took military action 
by launching "Operation Searchlight" on 25 March 1971. The Awami League was 
banned and all other political parties were suspended. Strict censorship on the 
media was also imposed. The militant separatists "Mukti Bahini" announced the 
independence of East Pakistan and resisted the Pakistan Army. India entered into 
the war on 3 December 1971. The war ended on 16 December 1971 after the 
Indian forces entered Dhaka and the Pakistani military officially surrendered. 
Therefore, in the end, Pakistan's internal political problems resulted in the 
disintegration of the country. However, Indian military intervention gave the issue 
an international dimension. Pakistan expected the US, its military ally, to be 
supportive enough to defend its national security and integrity. However, 
President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger had to try to 
convince an opposing Congress to lift bans on Pakistan's military and economic 
support.
176
 Consequently, the US, in spite of being a military ally of Pakistan, 
could not help it to avert its territorial disintegration and, in its lack of action, 
appeared to betray its ally.  
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Figure 6, General A.K. Niazi of Pakistan Army signing the document of surrender on 16 
December 1971.
177
 
1.8.2 Pakistan's Nuclear Program 
In response to the Indian nuclear explosions in 1974, Pakistan, having had a 
bitter recent experience of disintegration, facilitated through Indian intervention in 
the 1971 War, decided to change the direction of its nuclear program. Pakistan 
signed an agreement with France for a nuclear reprocessing plant, an act which 
was opposed by its ally, the US. France, under US influence, changed the terms 
of the deal, resulting in its cancellation by the end of 1978. Moreover, the US 
imposed sanctions restricting Pakistan's economic aid in April 1979, suspecting 
its developments of nuclear weapons.
178
 
US aid to Pakistan was resumed in early 1980s to enable the US to pursue its 
interests in Afghanistan. As the war in Afghanistan ended, the US interest in the 
region evaporated, resulting in the re-imposition of sanctions on US aid once 
again. Pakistan finally conducted its nuclear tests in May 1998 following Indian 
nuclear tests, resulting in increased sanctions on economic and military aid.
179
 
These new sanctions were perceived as a further betrayal of Pakistan by its ally. 
1.8.3 The Abbottabad Operation 
After 9/11, Pakistan accepted its position of a frontline state in the US led War 
on Terror against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Pakistan lost thousands of lives 
including both civilians and military men and suffered financial losses of around 
60 billion dollars. Despite this, Pakistan was suspected of supporting the Taliban 
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in Afghanistan even though the country’s army was fighting against the Taliban 
and other terrorist groups in Pakistan. Al Qaeda's Head, Osama bin Laden, who 
was the most wanted person in the War on Terror, was killed on 2 May 2011 in 
Abbottabad as the result of unilateral action taken by the US. Pakistan's 
intelligence and military services and government authorities were suspected of 
"complicity or inefficiency" in not having located Bin Laden before then. The US 
operations caused embarrassment to Pakistan by violating its sovereignty and not 
taking it into confidence. Pakistan was also enraged because it faced threats to 
its security and survival and perceived the US to have betrayed its ally.
180
  
1.9 METHODOLOGY 
For analysing the discourse of the Urdu press with regard to Pakistan-US 
relations, news content published about the above three cases, namely, the 1971 
War, Pakistan's nuclear program and Osama bin Laden's killing in the Abbottabad 
operation were collected from two of the most popular Urdu newspapers in 
Pakistan, Nawa-i-Waqt and Jang.
181
 The archives of the two newspapers exist 
mostly in hard-copy print form, and are stored in Pakistan. The required content 
from the newspapers was accessed from the Central Library of Bahauddin 
Zakariya University, Multan and the District Library, Bahawalpur, between 
January-August 2014. 
The newspaper content was archived and analysed in three stages. At the 
first stage, any content about the US-Pakistan relations appearing in the 
newspapers was captured through a digital camera and systematically stored in 
an external hard drive. The data for the two newspapers was stored separately. 
For each newspaper the data was stored in different folders created for each year 
starting from 1970. At the second stage, headlines and titles of the archived news 
content were carefully read to separate the news content related to the three 
selected cases of the US betrayal that is the 1971 War, Pakistan's nuclear 
program, and the Abbottabad operation. At the third stage, the news content was 
read thoroughly in order to organise the content into different themes creating 
separate electronic folders. The news content organised into different themes 
helped to analyse the discourse and write up of this present thesis. 
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Semi structured interviews with some senior and prominent journalists and 
politicians were conducted as a strategy to recover the suppressed and excluded 
perspectives in the discourse (Appendix D). Senior and prominent means those 
mainstream journalists and politicians who have been in their profession ideally 
since or before 1971, or have at least written or spoken on different issues of 
Pakistan-US relations including the 1971 War, Pakistan's nuclear program and 
the Abbottabad operation. Since the purpose of this aspect of the present 
research was to identify the perspectives which were not represented in the 
discourse, the interviews were continued until it appeared that no additional 
perspectives were forthcoming, and most of the perspectives mentioned were 
being repeated. In total, twenty interviews were conducted, and these took place 
between January-August 2014. 
1.10 LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
First, this research is based on data drawn from the two Urdu newspapers, 
and therefore a generalisation about discourse in the Urdu press and the 
Pakistani media should be made keeping this fact in mind. The analysis is solely 
based on the data related to the three cases selected for this research and 
therefore, generalisation about this discourse must also keep this fact in mind. 
Interviews for this research were conducted to discover the existence of some 
of the perspectives excluded with regard to the three cases. However, these 
interviews do not serve as a survey and this research cannot comment regarding 
the proportion of these alternate perspectives among Pakistani journalists and 
politicians. Although this research gives useful insight into the included and 
excluded themes and perspectives, it is not a comprehensive history of discourse 
in the Urdu press covering all interactions between Pakistan and the US. 
Moreover, due to time and space constraints, this research only focuses on 
discourse in the popular press on the Pakistani side, and does not analyse the 
US side. 
This research also does not focus on psychological factors of public/individual 
perception and only discusses the history, themes, and perspectives of the 
discourse which are important in understanding the US politics of betrayal 
presented in the discourse. 
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1.11 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The current chapter has introduced 
and discussed the phenomenon of public perceptions of US betrayal, the 
importance of such perceptions to Pakistan-US relations, and the role of the 
media in the development of such perceptions. The chapter has also reviewed a 
wide range of relevant literature on Pakistan-US relations in order to highlight the 
gap therein and determine an appropriate conceptual framework. This chapter 
then discussed the methodology and limitations of this research.  
Chapter two explains the Urdu press discourse on the 1971 War, as the first 
significant case of perceived US betrayal. The chapter explains how the dominant 
voices in the Urdu press produced and reproduced a sense of a US politics of 
betrayal in relation to the disintegration of Pakistan. In its conclusion, the chapter 
also discusses the alternate perspectives which did not appear in the Urdu press.  
Chapter three discusses Pakistan's nuclear program and the US opposition to 
it and analyses the Urdu press discourse on the issue. The chapter attempts to 
explain how the dominant voices of the Urdu press produced, rationalised, and 
developed a discourse on a US politics of betrayal on the issue. Likewise, some 
of the alternative voices recovered through interview research are presented in 
the chapter. 
Chapter four analyses the Urdu press discourse on the Abbottabad operation 
in 2011 and explains how the dominant voices presented it as a violation of 
Pakistan's sovereignty, thus confirming the event as a US act of betrayal and 
providing the rationalisation for such an act in terms of a developing discourse of 
US betrayal. Similarly, this chapter also presents some of the key alternative 
voices within Pakistan on the issue.  
Chapter five concludes this research and discusses its findings in order to 
sum up the main themes and the excluded voices in the discourse. It argues that 
the idea of US betrayal has been produced, reproduced, and rationalised since 
1971. This chapter also reviews how this discourse in the Urdu press has evolved 
over the period under study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 THE 1971 WAR AND THE US POLITICS OF BETRAYAL: A 
STORY OF SHATTERED HOPES 
The 1971 War between India and Pakistan, which resulted in the latter's 
territorial disintegration and the independence of Bangladesh, was a difficult 
situation for the US as a military ally of Pakistan. On the one hand, the US was 
accused of betrayal for not providing sufficient support to Pakistan to protect its 
territorial integrity.
1
 On the other hand, some in the international community also 
blamed the Nixon administration for offering unnecessary support by ignoring 
Pakistan's military operation and human rights violations in East Pakistan.
2
 The 
Urdu press in Pakistan reflected the former view of the US’s conduct. 
After Kissinger's visit to China in July 1971, the US was appreciative of 
Pakistan's role, as hopes were high for normalisation of the US-China 
relationship, and as a result, the balance of power was expected to tilt in favour of 
Pakistan.
3
 The US’s supportive attitude during the crisis was reported by Jang 
and Nawa-i-Waqt, which possibly raised the expectations of the Pakistani people 
of what they could expect from their ally. The prominent voices in the discourse 
included the opinions of newspapers, journalists, and politicians across the right-
left spectrum. The opinions published in the Urdu press subsequently constructed 
an image of the US as a betraying ally, which was suspected of conspiring 
against Pakistan as a Muslim country. The US was also accused of always being 
willing to have cordial relations with much larger India to use it as a counterweight 
against China, as well as being responsible for the underdevelopment of East 
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Pakistan, causing civil unrest leading to demands for autonomy and separation, 
and of being unable to protect its ally from territorial disintegration in the wake of 
Indian aggression. Therefore, the shattered expectations of Pakistanis were 
strengthened by discursive representations which emphasised external factors 
instead of internal ones and even offered biased and misleading facts regarding 
the disintegration of Pakistan. 
Section 2.1 of this chapter analyses how the discourse raised the 
expectations of the people about the US capacity to restrict war or at least to 
ensure Pakistan's security. This later led to feelings of US betrayal in the 1971 
War due to its inability to save an ally from defeat and disintegration. Section 2.2 
discusses the idea of a US conspiracy which was used to rationalise the 
perception of a US politics of betrayal. Section 2.3 explains the modalities of the 
US conspiracy presented as evidence of the conspiracy which were used to 
crystallise understanding of a US politics of betrayal in the 1971 War. Section 2.4 
analyses the different causes of the conspiracy and US betrayal. Section 2.5 
gives some alternate voices recovered through the interviews for this research, 
which rejected the idea of any form of US betrayal or conspiracy in relation to the 
1971 War. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter by consolidating the argument 
regarding the perception of a US politics of betrayal in the 1971 War by referring 
to both the included and excluded voices of the discourse. 
2.1  PERCEIVED STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE OF THE US-CHINA 
RAPPROCHEMENT 
The close strategic and friendly relations between Pakistan and the US were 
not very good since 1962, when the US increased its military aid to India against 
China. On the other side, the US was also annoyed with Pakistan for developing 
its ties with China in the period after Sino-Indian War of 1962. Although 
excitement over the US-China rapprochement in 1971 was a natural reaction on 
Pakistan's side, in fact, Pakistan played an important role in bridging the gaps 
between the US and China as it facilitated communication and contacts between 
the two countries. Consequently, Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt expressed their 
enthusiasm over the changed circumstances (as shown in Figure 7). 
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Figure 7, Nawa-i-Waqt on 18 July 1971 published this cartoon to reflect Pakistan's 
excitement and India's concerns with regard to opening of relations between China and 
the US. The cartoon showed President Yahya Khan bringing closer President Nixon and 
Chairman Mao Zedong to shake hands while in the background Indian Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi was shown as worried. The caption of the cartoon read, "what will happen 
now? (Indira Gandhi looked worried) Pakistan has played an important role in bringing 
both (China and the US) closer."
4
 
Nawa-i-Waqt argued that these changed circumstances and Pakistan's role in 
bringing them about would favour Pakistan's security, as it would result in 
strategic advantages to Pakistan and disadvantages to India.
5
 It was argued that 
the US would feel obliged and in consequence Pakistan's influence over the US 
would increase vis-à-vis India. Where earlier Pakistan's relationship with China 
was believed to be the major reason for driving the US and Pakistan away from 
each other. Now in changed circumstances Pakistan would be able to get more 
military and economic aid. Moreover, the balance of power in South Asia would 
shift in favour of Pakistan thereby enhancing its security. The changed 
circumstances were also explained favourable because it would cause a strategic 
and diplomatic disadvantage to India as the US was expected to put its weight on 
Pakistan's side. 
2.1.1 Expected increase in Pakistan's Influence on the US  
First and foremost, it was argued that Pakistan would have more influence on 
the US vis-à-vis India. For example, Nawa-i-Waqt reported with a sense of 
excitement that President Yahya Khan in his forthcoming visit to the US in July 
1971 would be able to inform President Nixon about India's "hostile and 
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aggressive" attitude.
6
 Consequently, the US was expected to do something about 
"Indian aggression." 
 In August 1971, the American House of Representative's Committee on 
Foreign Affairs attempted to force Pakistan to accept US foreign policy by putting 
a condition of suspending the aid until Pakistan accepted all the refugees back 
from India in the early stages of the 1971 crisis.
7
 President Yahya Khan said in an 
interview that Pakistan would not accept any conditional aid. Jang appreciated his 
stance and concluded in an editorial that the President had clearly told the 
superpowers that in his presence none of them could make Pakistan a slave 
under pressure, for the sake of its selfish interests.
8
 To confirm Pakistan's 
increased influence on the US, President Nixon was reported by Nawa-i-Waqt 
and Jang criticising the committee's attempt by arguing that it would not resolve 
the issue of East Pakistan.
9
 
Moreover, Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt also noted that some members of the 
American House of Representatives demanded that India's aid should be stopped 
immediately in order to protect Pakistan against "India's designs" for Pakistan's 
disintegration. Republican member of the house, Edward Derwinski demanded 
that America should not cooperate with "criminal Indian foreign policy." He also 
insisted on continuing every kind of aid to Pakistan because its suspension would 
clearly mean that the US intentionally wanted to weaken Pakistan. For that 
reason, he requested that if it was necessary to establish that Pakistan was 
justified in receiving aid, before resuming the same and to create a balance, India 
must also not be given any kind of aid.
 10
 Edward Derwinski was also reported to 
argue that Pakistan was facing a difficult situation at home and he had little doubt 
that India would not try to exploit the conditions. "With all due respect to the 
Indian government," he went on to say, that their foreign policy was an attempt to 
"cover their internal blunders," and had started the "propaganda against 
Pakistan." He would not "bear at any cost" that Americans directly or indirectly 
cooperated with "such a foreign policy."
11
 Thus, the discourse of Jang and Nawa-
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i-Waqt attempted to establish that in the changed circumstances Pakistan had 
comparatively more influence on the US administration which could be used 
against India and in benefit of Pakistan. 
2.1.2 More Aid to Pakistan 
The changed circumstances were also explained as beneficial to Pakistan 
because there was a hope that as the result of improved relations, Pakistan 
would be able to get more military and economic aid from the US.
12
 For instance 
on 27 July 1971, Nawa-i-Waqt reported that Pakistan would be able to get 
American military equipment of rupees 50 million, in excess to the equipment 
already agreed with the US.
13
 The Urdu newspapers hoped that Pakistan would 
also be able to get some additional economic aid. Thus, in August 1971, the US 
approved a wheat purchase package of 10.7 million dollars for Pakistan, and a 
million dollar aid for East Pakistan on top of 70 million dollars aid already 
provided.
14
 Additionally, President Nixon announced two million dollars more aid 
to Pakistan, arguing that there was already food shortage in East Pakistan, and 
the situation could get more averse if appropriate actions were not taken.
15
 An 
editorial in Jang appreciated the American aid and regarded it as useful aid to 
Pakistan.
16
 Therefore, it emerged through this discourse that Pakistan's efforts to 
bring China and the US closer were rewarding Pakistan in its securing more 
military and economic aid. 
2.1.3 Strategic Disadvantage of India 
The Urdu press also explained the changed circumstances as a disadvantage 
to India.
 
Nawa-i-Waqt explained that India used to get aid from the US, under the 
"pretext of the Chinese threat." However it would not be able to receive such aid 
anymore due to change in US-China relations. Moreover, after US and China 
coming closer with help of Pakistan, it was logical that both of them would support 
Pakistan, causing isolation to India. It was argued that Pakistan had not only 
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successfully won two strategic partners onto its side, but also had deprived India 
of an important supporter (as shown in Figure 8).
17
 
 
Figure 8, Nawa-i-Waqt on 30 July 1971 published this cartoon to reflect Indian frustration 
over China and the US siding with Pakistan. The cartoon showed that Indian Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi was using a pair of binoculars to find new strategic partners. The 
caption of the cartoon read, "we are left alone in this world (Indira Gandhi) India started to 
find new partners against America and China."
18
 
Nawa-i-Waqt observed that the immediate impact was India's anxiety and 
searching for allies against a China-America-Pakistan developing nexus. It was 
argued that the treaty of friendship signed between India and the USSR in August 
1971 was actually driven by pressure created by this reconciliation (Figure 9).
19
 A 
news article disclosed that India was also frustrated over US consideration of 
military aid to Pakistan. The Indian Minister of Defence Jagjivan Ram was 
reported to have said that American leaders seemed "mentally abnormal" as they 
were attempting to damage the cause of democracy and freedom, for which US 
itself had struggled.
20
 
 
Figure 9, Nawa-i-Waqt on 12 August 1971 published this cartoon to reflect Indian efforts 
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to find new strategic partners against Pakistan, China, and the US. The cartoon showed 
Indira Gandhi embracing the USSR in response to the US and China standing together. 
The caption of the cartoon read, "peace treaty signed between the USSR and India."
21 
Nawa-i-Waqt observed that India which was earlier supposed to be supported 
by both the US and the USSR, now was being seen as backed by the Soviets 
alone.
22
 Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi was to visit the US in November 
1971 and was expected to press for suspension of aid to Pakistan. However, it 
was reported that she would not be able to convince Nixon as he had already 
decided in the favour of Pakistan (Figure 10).
23
 The US Secretary of State, 
William Rogers, clarified the position by telling the media that America was not 
pressing Pakistan for any particular political solution of East Pakistan, whereas he 
had advised India to remain patient and adopt a reconciliatory approach.
24
 India 
rejected American appeals to avoid war while hastened its war preparations, but 
the US along with other major powers, continued trying to influence both India 
and Pakistan to avoid war.
25
 Thus the US was characterised as pro-Pakistan in 
the cause of peaceful resolution of situation.  
 
Figure 10, Nawa-i-Waqt on 23 August 1971 published this cartoon to reflect the changed 
attitude of the US towards India. The cartoon showed Indira Gandhi begging for aid while 
President Nixon putting conditions on the aid. The caption of the cartoon read, "Nixon 
warns Indira: accept the suggestion for appointing the [UN] observers [on the border of 
India and East Pakistan, as suggested by Pakistan] or the [US] economic aid [to India] 
will be discontinued."
26
 
According to both Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt, during the Indian Prime Minister's 
visit, Nixon advised Indira Gandhi to remove military forces from Pakistan's 
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border. She protested against US supply of weapons to Pakistan. She was 
described as failing to achieve the objectives of her visit, as America would not 
allow conflict between India and Pakistan.
27
 Reportedly, Indira Gandhi remained 
unsuccessful in convincing the US to stop aid to Pakistan (Figure 11). However, 
differences between the Indian and American positions were clear, as India would 
not call its forces back from the border. Indira Gandhi agreed to talk to President 
Yahya Khan but only on controversial issues other than East Pakistan. Indira 
Gandhi also argued that East Pakistanis had elected their representatives, and 
therefore any talks regarding Bangladesh should be with the elected 
representatives, not with the military government.
28
 After her visit to the US, Jang 
and Nawa-i-Waqt observed that Indira Gandhi was upset with the world, for not 
being able to understand her point of view, whereas she was determined not to 
pull back at any cost.
29
 On the other side, President Nixon was also in favour of 
continuing to help Pakistan under the foreign aid program considering it essential 
for peace.
30
 The Pakistani newspapers were hopeful that foreign countries 
including the US would not support India if it attacked Pakistan.
31
 
 
Figure 11, Nawa-i-Waqt on 24 October 1971 published this cartoon to argue that 
President Nixon to Indira Gandhi's disappointment denied accepting Indian position over 
the issue of East Pakistan. The cartoon showed Indira Gandhi walking with the Soviet 
Premier Alexei Kosygin towards a fantasy house named Bangladesh, while attempting in 
vain to invite President Nixon to join them. The caption of the cartoon read, "America 
refused to be trapped into Bangladesh catch: Indira complains."
32 
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Overall Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt explained the changed circumstances as a 
disadvantage to India because the US being closer to Pakistan and losing interest 
in India as a counterweight to China, would give less importance to India. These 
changed circumstances were expected to favour Pakistan as the US would not be 
interested in giving military and economic aid to India, and it would support 
Pakistan's stance on the issue of East Pakistan. 
2.1.4 Diplomatic Disadvantage of India 
Pakistan's role in the US-China rapprochement was also interpreted as 
disadvantage to India not only in its bilateral relations with the US but also at the 
UN and multilateral diplomacy. President Nixon was reported demanding India 
stop the potential war and step back. On 29 November 1971, Nawa-i-Waqt 
reported that America had serious concerns about the situation in East Pakistan, 
and Nixon also asked the USSR to use its influence to stop India from war. In his 
letter to President Yahya Khan, President Nixon expressed his apprehensions 
about the situation. According to Nawa-i-Waqt, President Nixon promised that 
America was opposed to the war, and wished to settle the issues, and would try 
its best to avoid the situation getting worse in South Asia.
33
 
According to Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt, the US in consultation with Britain had 
decided to take up the issue of India-Pakistan war at the UN.
34
 It was also 
reported that America had also declared its support for Pakistan's suggestion of 
appointing UN observers on the borders of India and Pakistan to avoid 
escalation.
35
 However, India did not agree to the suggestion and in consequence, 
the US stopped all its military supplies and licences for telecommunications and 
electronic equipments to India.
36
 On 5 December 1971, the US also threatened to 
stop financial aid to India when India attacked Pakistan.
37
 India was perceived as 
diplomatically isolated in the world. 
On 5 December 1971, Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt disclosed that the American 
resolution in the Security Council was vetoed by the USSR. It was argued that an 
Indian and Soviet "conspiracy against Pakistan" was unveiled. The newspapers 
explained that the USSR had asked the Security Council to resolve the political 
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issue of East Pakistan while America claimed that India had committed "military 
aggression" against Pakistan. The resolution demanded both countries to stop 
the war and return military forces to their borders. Reportedly, although backed by 
the USSR, India's isolation at international level was visible as eleven members 
voted to support the resolution, two France and Britain abstained, whereas only 
two the USSR and Poland voted against it.
38
 The USSR used its veto power a 
second time in twenty-four hours. The Soviet resolution about ending the war and 
massive killings within East Pakistan were backed by Poland and the USSR.
39
 
Pakistan's Urdu press reported India being isolated at the UN. 
 Pakistan's efforts for US-China rapprochement were further perceived to be 
paying back when the Chinese resolution was discussed and American 
representative George Bush argued that time must not be "wasted" as the world 
was looking at the Security Council. Bush was also reported to have explained 
that India had started a large scale offensive against East Pakistan with a 
hundred and twenty thousand soldiers, and therefore it was the duty of all the 
Security Council members to stop India from this "aggression." He further said 
that the crisis resulting from Indian attack should be resolved and must not be 
used as a political issue. The Security Council could not do anything and the 
session was suspended once again.
40
 However, Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt 
emphasised the full support of the US and China for Pakistan's security, although 
checkmated by the USSR backing India, at the Security Council. 
Moreover, Nawa-i-Waqt reported that the US and China did not give up their 
support and they took the matter to the UN General Assembly, where the 
resolution demanding an end to the war and return of military forces to the 
borders was passed. American support was once again visible when on 9 
December 1971 the American representative George Bush was reported to have 
told the General Assembly that responsibility for the current crisis lay with India.
41
 
Nawa-i-Waqt endorsed Pakistan's representative to the UN Agha Shahi saying 
that the General Assembly's resolution about a ceasefire was Pakistan's "moral 
and political victory." The American representative Bush regarded Indian 
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interference in East Pakistan as "unjust" and moreover India refused to accept the 
resolution.
42
 
Hence Nawa-i-Waqt and Jang through their news coverage and editorial 
content highlighted the US providing full diplomatic support to Pakistan in 
opposing India at the UN and also attempting to influence the USSR in regard to 
the issue of the 1971 War. India was argued to have a disadvantage in its 
international diplomacy. 
2.1.5 Balance of Power Shifting in Favour of Pakistan - Yet Not Enough 
to Save it from Disintegration 
In wider terms, the changed circumstances were argued to be as a shift in the 
balance of power in favour of Pakistan. According to a news article, the US 
stopped its spy flights over China in July 1971, which was an indication of the 
changed relationship between the two countries. The initiative which symbolised 
initiation of cordial relations between China and the US was appreciated by 
Nawa-i-Waqt by explaining it as a strategic advantage to Pakistan.
43
 Moreover, 
the US also made it clear to India that in case of an India-Pakistan war, if China 
intervened, the US would not provide any support to India (Figure 12).
44
 
 
Figure 12, the cartoon published on 31 July 1971 in Nawa-i-Waqt reflected the US 
indifferent attitude to India vis-à-vis China. The cartoon showed Indira Gandhi trying to 
call President Nixon for help telling him about Mao Zedong trying to trespass Indian 
territory. The caption of the cartoon read, "America will not provide any help to India if 
China intervenes in Pakistan-India war."
45 
In July 1971, Pakistan informed the US and other powers about Indian 
shelling across the Pakistani borders with a hope that they would stop India from 
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escalating the situation.
46
 In this context, Jang advised the US and other powers 
to think how they could stop the probable war, when Pakistan was ready to 
respond to the Indian aggression.
47
 It was a good sign for Pakistan that the 
spokesperson of the State Department expressed concerns over any situation 
that might lead to war between the two countries.
48
 Moreover, Jang and Nawa-i-
Waqt urged the United Nations and the superpowers to take some immediate 
steps to stop India in order to avoid the probable war, as it was feared that such a 
war could potentially involve the USSR and China.
49
 In August 1971, President 
Nixon during a meeting of National Security Council warned India that an attack 
on Pakistan would have "serious consequences."
50
 On 6 August 1971, Jang had 
already observed that one of the purposes of Nixon's forthcoming visit to China 
was pursuance of peace in South Asia.
51
 Therefore, Jang argued, President 
Nixon's statements and intentions seemed in favour of Pakistan's security and the 
US was perceived putting its weight on Pakistan's side in a new balance of power 
in Asia.
52
 
Consequently, it was observed by the Urdu press that America was trying to 
reduce the chances of war between India and Pakistan. It was argued that India 
was "exaggerating" the "dangerous situation" in South Asia. On 26 August 1971, 
a news article published with reference to The Washington Post's staff writer, 
Stephen Klaidman's report stated that one of the basic and important principle of 
existing US policy was to protect Pakistan's federation and unity at any cost.
53
 
However, there were some "pro-India US officials," such as former Ambassador 
Chester Bowles, who did not agree with the US policy of supporting Pakistan, as 
it was "annoying for an old friend" like India.
54
 
On 26 November 1971, Nawa-i-Waqt reported William Rogers, the former US 
ambassador hinting, that because of its military agreements, the US would have 
to get involved on Pakistan's side, if the USSR joined India in the war.
55
 Benjamin 
Oehlert, another former US ambassador to Pakistan, while talking to journalists at 
an Eid dinner in New York, affirmed that an agreement between the two countries 
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was concluded in 1959. Agha Shahi, Pakistan's ambassador to the UN, was 
asked if Pakistan was considering protest, as the US was not fulfilling its 
responsibilities according to the agreement. Mr Shahi denied any considerations 
of protest as according to him the US had a realisation of the critical nature of 
circumstances in South Asia.
56
 Thus, the discourse continued to interpret the 
balance of power in Pakistan's favour and there were hopes that the US would 
either convince India to avoid waging war or if it started the war, the US would get 
involved on Pakistan's side. 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 8 December 1971 reported that President Nixon after talking 
to his high-level advisors concluded that suspending military and financial aid to 
India was the right decision.
57
 Later, White House sources reportedly confirmed 
that President Yahya Khan was ready to give larger autonomy to East Pakistan, 
whereas the Indian purpose of attacking Pakistan was to cause an independent 
country to disintegrate.
58
 The American government was of the view that there 
was "no justification" for Indian forces to enter East Pakistan. It was argued by the 
US Department of State, the Urdu press observed, that India had caused failure 
of each and every effort to reduce tensions in the subcontinent. Nawa-i-Waqt also 
reproduced The Washington Post's report quoting a senior official of the State 
Department saying that from the beginning "India had plans" to cause East 
Pakistan's disintegration and the US was opposed to this outcome.
59
 
Pakistan's Prime Minister Nurul Amin was reported to have said that the 
American warning to end "Indian aggression" was right and timely.
60
 On 11 
December 1971, Nawa-i-Waqt published a report from The Voice of America 
which blamed India for disturbing peace in the region by rejecting the American 
proposals for peace which were accepted by Pakistan.
61
 Since India neither was 
responding positively to the US appeals nor to the UN efforts to cease hostilities, 
and the US was convinced of Indian intentions, therefore segments of the Urdu 
press expressed hopes that the US would intervene in favour of Pakistan. Nawa-
i-Waqt on 12 December 1971 argued that three major powers of the world the 
USSR, China, and America were related to this war. The USSR was supporting 
India in its "imperialistic designs." China had assured Pakistan every kind of help. 
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China was not a superpower, like the other two therefore, it was time to ask the 
US to fulfil its duties under the defence agreements, such as SEATO 1954 and 
CENTO 1955. Although America had already declared "India an aggressor" and 
asked it to stop the war it was argued that it had to "do more practical things" to 
support its military ally.
62
 
 
Figure 13, Nawa-i-Waqt on 14 December 1971 published this cartoon to reflect US 
support to Pakistan against India. The cartoon showed President Nixon aiming at Indira 
Gandhi making her hands up. The caption of the cartoon read, "America gives ultimatum 
to India, [and Indira says to Nixon] please do not shoot me as I am died already."
 63 
A columnist Marghoob Sidiqui observed that President Nixon was analysing 
the war situation and the Soviet involvement therein that might threaten the US 
interests in the region. He argued that it was the time for America to use its 
Defence Agreement of 1959 with Pakistan, in order to cope with this Indian-Soviet 
"conspiracy." The journalist noted that America had made two agreements with 
Pakistan in 1954 and 1959 respectively, which clearly guaranteed that in case of 
threats against Pakistan's territorial integrity America would help Pakistan by 
supplying military weapons, and even using its military forces. The journalist 
hoped that the US would send at least a part of its aircraft carrier of the Seventh 
Fleet towards the Bay of Bengal to help the Pakistani forces.
64
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Figure 14, the cartoon appeared on 15 December 1971 in Nawa-i-Waqt disclosing that 
"US starts delivery of weapons to Pakistan." 
65 
On 15 December 1971, Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt stated that the Seventh Fleet 
containing fighter planes and nuclear weapons was moving towards the Bay of 
Bengal from the Gulf of Tonkin. According to the Department of Defence, the US 
had plans for an emergency evacuation of American citizens from East Pakistan. 
According to "credible sources" in newspapers, there were "signs of anxiety" on 
the Indian side as the Seventh Fleet was expected to arrive before the Indian 
forces could enter the East Pakistani capital. Reportedly, the US on Pakistan's 
request was also considering military aid to Pakistan on a massive scale. Nawa-i-
Waqt argued that "Indian evil designs" backed by the USSR were bringing the 
world on the brink of the Third World War, especially when China and the US 
were all prepared to resist those designs.
66
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Figure 15, the photograph of "the American flight career and nuclear equipped ship 
Enterprise" which was part of the Seventh Fleet appeared in Jang on 16 December 
1971.
67 
On 16 December 1971, when the Indian forces entered Dhaka and Pakistan 
had signed the surrender document, Pakistani newspapers still had hopes with 
regard to the US nuclear fleet that had reached Bay of Bengal. Nawa-i-Waqt and 
Jang reported that eight war ships including the nuclear Enterprise, a day before 
had crossed the strait of Melaka and entered into the Bay of Bengal.
68
 
 
Figure 16, on 16 December 1971 Nawa-i-Waqt published the cartoon to reflect the 
deterrence and impact of the US expected help as the caption read, "Enterprise (the 
Seventh Fleet) has reached Bay of Bengal." Indian Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence seem scarred as they talk to each other saying "on our two sides is Pakistan, 
China in the north, and the Seventh Fleet in the south."
 69 
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The game was however over. Pakistan had already lost the war. A news article 
about the surrender was published on 17 December 1971 and the US had not 
lived up to its commitments to protect Pakistan's territorial integrity.
70
 A senior 
journalist during an interview conducted for this research explained the reaction 
on Pakistan's side saying that there were high expectations from the US and 
"there was a general perception that America was with us and the Seventh Fleet 
was just around the corner." During the war, people had the perception that 
"Americans would come to our help as they were afraid of Chinese influence on 
the situation." However, when the time came, "they stepped back and let things 
happen."
71
 A senior politician and foreign affairs expert of Jamaat-e-Islami said in 
an interview conducted for this research: 
whenever we needed American help we did not find the 
feelings of friendship and cooperation. In case of the 1971 
War, you can see how Russia cooperated with India, and 
how America cooperated with Pakistan. You should at least 
see that in separating our eastern wing from western part, 
what role was played by our allies. Americans put all their 
weight to break our arm and separate East Pakistan from us. 
And we kept listening to the announcements of that 
American fleet.
72
 
In another interview for this research, a comparable argument was offered by 
a Pakistan People's Party politician and a former office bearer of the party by 
emphasising that "actually America facilitated the disintegration." He further 
explained his viewpoint:  
they were doing 'diplomacy'. They were pretending that they 
would be with Pakistan. Then Yahya Khan helped with the 
opening with China. Moreover, when Kissinger went there, 
Chou En Lai said that we must not demolish the bridge. 
Pakistan is our bridge and we have to take care of this 
bridge. In fact, there was a difference in their words and 
practices. This has been the problem. There are hundreds of 
examples about America that it says one thing and does the 
other. Where it saved West Pakistan it became clear. He 
[Nixon] said to Brezhnev over the hotline 'now this is my 
territory'. If he had given a similar warning about East 
Pakistan and would have said 'no way, let them settle,' it 
would have avoided the disintegration.
73
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Similarly, another journalist explained Pakistan's reaction by saying: 
The US created a decoy in 1971 that the American Seventh 
Fleet was coming and people expected some help from the 
US. However, when they [the people] saw that it was just a 
decoy or a false sort of expectations, disappointment was 
everywhere, not only in the media but among the people as 
well.
74
 
A senior politician of Pakistan People's Party, who also served as federal 
minister, criticised: 
American foreign policy decisions made especially in the 
1950s when America had offered all help to Pakistan. But in 
spite of its commitments, it did not help at all in the 1965 War 
or in the 1971 War which was seen as a betrayal by an ally 
so why should the people of Pakistan love America?
75
 
 In sum, the US-China rapprochement facilitated by Pakistan was perceived 
as a significant advantage to Pakistan and disadvantage to India. It was argued 
that Pakistan would not only have more influence on the US, but would also 
receive more economic and military aid, and India would be isolated by losing 
America as its ally and supporter. Therefore, the US was identified by the Urdu 
press as a significant international ally who was brought back to Pakistan's side. 
However, the balance of power which was perceived as favourable to Pakistan 
did not help it to avoid its disintegration. The expectations of a military ally were 
shattered as the Seventh Fleet never arrived to support Pakistan's forces fighting 
against India. Pakistan's strategic advantage was perceived as having enough 
capability to save Pakistan from a potential war with India or in the case of war at 
least ensuring its security and territorial integrity. Conversely, the US neither 
avoided the war nor ensured Pakistan's territorial integrity. Consequently 
Pakistani hopes were shattered and betrayal dominated the discourse. Moreover, 
ideas of US conspiracy, the identified modalities of conspiracy and possible 
causes behind the same began to emerge and facilitate the rationalisation of a 
US politics of betrayal in relation to the 1971 War. 
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2.2 A US POLITICS OF BETRAYAL RATIONALISED THROUGH THE 
IDEA OF CONSPIRACY 
The idea of a US politics of betrayal in the 1971 War was ultimately in the 
Urdu press rationalised through the idea of conspiracy. It was argued that the US 
had been conspiring to harm Pakistan's unity and integration. All mainstream right 
and left-wing political parties hinted about this US conspiracy against Pakistan's 
territorial integrity. Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt both supported the idea of a US 
conspiracy to explain the idea of a US politics of betrayal having caused 
Pakistan's disintegration. Such a rationalisation by the dominant voices of the 
discourse was not only provided after the war but also before the conflict was 
finished and would become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
After losing the war in December 1971, the responsibility of defeat was placed 
on "the biggest conspiracy" against Pakistan. On 17 December 1971, Head of 
Tehrik-e-Istiqlal and former Air Marshall Asghar Khan was reported to have said 
that Pakistan's strategy in war had failed due to some conspiracy.
76
 Nawa-i-Waqt 
endorsed his statement and argued that Pakistan's army was not defeated, rather 
it was "not allowed to fight due to a conspiracy" and the US failing to physically 
intervene was all suspected to be part of this "biggest conspiracy" (Figure 17).
77
 
 
Figure 17, the cartoon is based on the statement of Air Marshal (retired) and Head of 
Tahrik-e-Istiqlal Asghar Khan who said, "Pakistan's strategy failed due to a conspiracy." 
The cartoon shows an invisible hand stopping Pakistan's army to fight whereas Indian 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is being supported by the USSR.
78
 
It was not only after the war that different political forces talked about the 
conspiracy against Pakistan's unity and integration but also there had been such 
frequent references since 1970. For example, Convener of Jamiat Ulema-e-
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Pakistan (JUP) Syed Mehmood Shah Gujrati on 3 April 1970, was reported to 
have told a press conference that money was being injected from outside into 
Pakistan (by America) to "destroy the unity of Pakistan."
79
 He criticised Jamaat-e-
Islami for "using the name of Islam" for their political purposes and for supporting 
the fulfilment of the "objectives of imperial powers."
80
 Likewise, Fazl-ul-Qadir 
Chaudhry, President of Muslim League (Convention) told an election rally on 17 
June 1970 that "some forces were trying to destroy the unity of Pakistan."
81
 In an 
interview in Nawa-i-Waqt he said that India and America were even "trying to 
purge the very existence" of Pakistan.
82
 In September 1970, he told his party 
workers that if political forces of the country could not resolve their differences 
"the conspiracy to disintegrate the country" would be successful.
83
  
In the same manner Qayoom Khan, President of Muslim League (Qayoom) 
addressed a public rally in Peshawar on 21 March 1970, and told his audience 
that his party was entrusted to protect Pakistan against "foreign conspiracies" in 
order to protect Pakistan's physical and ideological borders.
84
 On 8 April 1970, he 
addressed another election rally and claimed that "some foreign powers" were 
trying to increase their influence in the country by "conspiring with their local 
agents" in order to cause destruction of the country.
85
 
Likewise, after the elections of 1970 Mufti Mehmood of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam 
(JUI) also hoped that no one would protect American interest anymore in Pakistan 
and newly elected parliamentarians of JUI and Pakistan People's Party would do 
their best to get rid of American influence.
86
 On 27 February 1971, through a 
statement given to press, he asked President Yahya Khan to limit the activities of 
the American ambassador and other staff of the US embassy, in order to avoid 
any new conspiracy of the American CIA.
87
 On 11 January 1971, Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman also warned "the conspiring forces" to leave the country or they would 
be wiped out.
88
 He believed that conspiring forces were frustrated after the Awami 
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League's victory in the election and were "trying to hatch" even more 
conspiracies.
89
 Similarly, in January-February 1971, three rounds of negotiations 
between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman could not reach any 
agreement between the two parties. Bhutto warned politicians of both East and 
West Pakistan that if they failed to be united conspiracies of disintegration would 
be successful.
90
 
On 9 May 1970 Jang expressed its concerns over an international conspiracy. 
Since March 1970, there were several events of terrorist attacks in East Pakistan 
claiming lives and inflicting injuries on its poor citizens. Such activities were 
considered as demonstration of "some hidden conspiracy" fully prepared with the 
help of "some foreign hands." The newspaper was convinced that it had become 
an open secret that some "hostile world powers" wanted to "damage the unity and 
integration" of the country. The newspaper speculated that in order to weaken 
Pakistan the only option left to such powers was to cause Pakistan's 
disintegration.
91
 
On 27 March 1971, Jang thereby was able to report political parties blaming 
"imperialistic conspiracies and designs for the disintegration of Pakistan" and it 
demanded a military action against the anti-state elements in East Pakistan.
92
 
However, in its editorial on 28 March 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the 
Awami League were accused of stubborn behaviour and testing the limits of 
patience of the military government.
93
 Nawa-i-Waqt advised Pakistani politicians 
who were demanding transfer of power that they had to read "the writing on the 
wall" and remain patient, because "Pakistan's arch enemy" India by "conspiring 
with world powers," was trying to make every effort to destroy Pakistan.
94
 
Thus, the Urdu press and mainstream political parties consolidated the idea of 
a US conspiracy which would provide a rationalisation of a US politics of betrayal 
in the 1971 War. The idea of US conspiracy was also reinforced by suggesting 
steps to counter it. For example, On 11 July 1970 Jang suggested that keeping in 
view the deteriorating law and order conditions in the country politicians should 
put their efforts into foiling attempts of "some elements" who wished to delay or 
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cancel the elections of 1970.
95
 Similarly on 7 February 1970, Nawa-i-Waqt urged 
Pakistanis to be united against the "possible injustice."
96
 In a column in Nawa-i-
Waqt appeared on 8 April 1970, R.A. Ali a journalist argued that Pakistan's 
enemies wanted anarchy by promoting differences. He observed that the 
"opportunists" were trying to gain benefit by "planting the seeds of provincial 
prejudices." The journalist advised that Pakistanis needed a single national 
identity, which religion provided them in order to "neutralise the poison of 
provincialism." Pakistanis were Muslim first and Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, 
Baluchis, and Pakhtoons after.
97
 
A senior politician of Jamaat-e-Islami in an interview conducted for this 
research also still held the US "equally responsible for the disintegration" and 
argued:  
it is not possible at all that five hundred thousand Indian 
military forces could cross the international border and enter 
East Pakistan without the consent of the USA. In today's 
world, it is not understandable that any country could take 
independent decisions. So, it is not possible at all. And a 
country like India, which made this decision, acted with 
American consent. Moreover, we were part of SEATO and 
CENTO and we supported the US, and Badaber air base 
was circled in red by the USSR. And we accepted and bore 
all this, even the possibility of attacks. But when we needed 
them, we were told that Seventh Fleet had arrived. But 
Pakistan was torn into two pieces. Our forces had to 
surrender and they were taken as prisoners of war but the 
American fleet never arrived. So it is quite clear that if 
America wanted Pakistan not to be disintegrated, it could 
have played such a game. Therefore, America was part of 
this conspiracy. And 1971 is the worst example of America 
being a fair weather friend who could backstab you at the 
critical time.
98
 
The various dominant voices of the discourse converged on the idea of US 
conspiracy against Pakistan's integration and suggested different ways to deal 
with it. However, arguments in the discourse diverged on the modalities and 
causes of the US conspiracy in the search for ways to explain US betrayal, further 
crystallising understanding of a US politics of betrayal. 
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2.3 MODALITIES OF "CONSPIRACY" EXPLAINED THROUGH 
DISCOURSE 
The different voices in the discourse agreed on the idea of US conspiracy but 
they differed on the ways which could be used to express such a conspiracy. 
Majority of voices including left and right-wing political parties as expressed 
through the Urdu press argued that the US interfered in Pakistan's domestic 
affairs by utilising political and diplomatic means. A few voices however went the 
extra mile to argue that undiplomatic channels such as the CIA, nongovernmental 
organisations, intellectuals, western media, suspension of financial aid to 
Pakistan, encouraging India to interfere, were also different means applied to 
achieve the objectives of the conspiracy.  
2.3.1 Diplomatic Means Utilised to Conspire 
It was gradually articulated that the US had "actually encouraged" the 
sentiments of separatism in East Pakistan. According to Nawa-i-Waqt, when on 
25 February 1971, in his second annual report to the Congress on United States 
Foreign Policy, President Nixon attempted to highlight the cultural and other 
differences between the two parts of the country, it was actually a continuation of 
"an organised US campaign" to highlight the differences based on social, 
economic, and cultural distance in order to reinforce the idea of the Bengali 
nationalism. The newspaper argued that this was done to convince the younger 
generation that there was nothing common between the two wings except 
physical distance and mutual hatred. The newspaper explained that US attempts 
were made to create a sense that East Pakistan was "a colony" of West Pakistan, 
and Bengalis were "treated as slaves," while the federal government always 
behaved like "a step mother." The newspaper suggested that people who raised 
slogans of independent Bangladesh did not realise that it would only "serve the 
objectives" of America and India.
99
 
The US embassy in Pakistan was blamed too for indulging in suspicious 
activities. Ambassador Joseph Simpson Farland was accused of interfering in 
Pakistan's internal matters and was suspected of support for political parties in 
order to weaken the influence of the left-wing parties in the country. On 2 April 
1970, a senior leader of Pakistan People's Party Mubashir Hassan condemned 
the attempt on Bhutto's life. He associated the attempt with the US and told 
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journalists that "the imperialists and their lackeys" were frustrated to the extent 
that Ambassador Farland, who had the support of local conservatives, was 
visiting different parts of the country to affect the upcoming elections of October 
1970. He accused Americans along with their local conservative supporters of 
using "the sacred name of Islam" in order to "conceal their conspiratorial 
designs."
100
 
Nawa-i-Waqt with reference to "very credible sources" on 10 August 1970 
reported a recent report by Ambassador Farland to the US State Department. The 
newspaper noted that according to the report after martial law in Pakistan in 
1969, the left leaning parties were in "very strong position," and any elections 
would have resulted in a pro-China government in Pakistan. Reportedly, it was 
argued in the report that over the years, the Political Bureau of the US Embassy 
in Pakistan had made enormous efforts to condition the situation. Consequently, 
the report concluded, the US hoped that the results for the October 1970 
elections would not be opposite to its expectations and Farland's interference was 
substantiated.
101
 
On 1 September 1970, Nawa-i-Waqt reported and endorsed Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto's statement that elections to be held in October 1970 were not delayed 
due to devastating floods in East Pakistan, but instead the US and Government of 
Pakistan had two objectives. First, they wanted to strengthen right-wing parties. 
Second, in the mean time, the US wanted to pressurise Pakistan to start 
negotiations with India over Kashmir, so that any forthcoming government would 
be bound to engage in endless negotiations. He had already told journalists that 
the US wanted to press Pakistan for reconciliation with India over Kashmir.
102
 
Ambassador Farland, once again came into lime light, in March 1971, when 
he reportedly saw Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for 45 minutes, in an unscheduled 
meeting at Dhaka. The question was raised about his "original mission" in 
Pakistan, as he was suspected of interference in domestic affairs. Suspicions 
were also raised because nobody knew what was discussed during the meeting. 
Nawa-i-Waqt also referred to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's previous "suspicious 
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meetings" with the US official. The editorial advised politicians and government to 
stop Ambassador Farland and other US officials involvement in such activities 
which might increase a level of misunderstanding in East and West Pakistan.
103
 
The imminent danger of Pakistan's disintegration was thought to be averted by 
the military operation started in March 1971 and actions against the Awami 
League, but Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his party was suspected of having a 
secret alliance with India, supported and encouraged by the US and other 
powers. 
 According to Nawa-i-Waqt after Pakistan's successful control of the situation 
in East Pakistan due to military operation in March 1971, there were also signs of 
"another US conspiracy." A London based Pakistani revolutionary Tariq Ali
104
 was 
reported to be in Calcutta to look after the struggle for the "Socialist Republic of 
Bengal." The idea was to unite Bengali populations divided between India and 
Pakistan in order to establish a socialist state. Nawa-i-Waqt regarded Tariq Ali as 
a "traitor" and expressed the possible involvement of America and the West in the 
conspiracy. It was argued, that "pro-America and pro-India" Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman was his closest friend and right hand of Professor Rehman Subhan. 
Subhan was the person who fled to Washington, through Oman and London, after 
the military operation started in East Pakistan. Reportedly, he was a close friend 
of Tariq Ali's parents and during all his visits always stayed at their house in 
Lahore, and was in continuous contact with them.
105
 Nawa-i-Waqt was left 
speculating about the connections between US agents and socialist 
revolutionaries.
106
 
On 29 March 1971, Nawa-i-Waqt in its editorial complained that such activities 
could be expected from India being Pakistan's "declared enemy," although ethics 
and norms of international relations demand non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of a country. It was therefore shocking for people that some countries like 
the US and UK, presumed to be Pakistan's friends and even allies, were 
demonstrating a similar "hostile behaviour." Pakistan's Foreign Office had 
summoned the ambassador and the high commissioner of the two countries to 
protest against negative media campaigns going on in their countries. The 
                                              
103
 Ibid, editorial, 2 March 1972, p.3. 
104
 Tariq Ali is the author of The Duel: Pakistan on the flight path of American power. 
105
 also revolutionaries 
106
 Nawa-i-Waqt, editorial, 6 June 1971, p.3, Bashir Riaz, column, 22 August 1971, p.6, editorial, 
23 August 1971, p.3, and Muhammad Iqbal Sohail, column, 9 October 1971, p.2. 
69 
 
newspaper advised the government to ask the US ambassador about his alleged 
meetings with "separatist" Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The ambassador was also 
reported to have been asked to clarify the US position and if it was supporting 
anti-state activities of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Awami League.
107
 The 
newspaper asked the government to demand US recall of Ambassador Farland 
for his "suspicious activities."
108
 
On the other hand, the right-wing parties were also concerned about US 
interference in domestic politics. Mufti Mehmood a senior leader of Jamiat Ulema-
e-Islam (JUI) expressed his concerns and told a press conference on 2 June 
1970 that "American samraaj" by providing moral and financial support to 
likeminded parties was trying to create a government of its liking. He blamed the 
US embassy for open interference in domestic politics and vowed to continue the 
struggle for independence from "American samraaj."
109
 He also claimed in his 
address to a conference on 27 June 1970 that he had credible evidence of the 
US smuggling weapons into Pakistan through Afghanistan in order to start a civil 
war and that Ambassador Farland was involved in anti-state activities trying to 
influence the forthcoming elections of October 1970.
110
 The JUI kept demanding 
that the Government of Pakistan sent Ambassador Farland back to his country.
111
 
Similarly, former Speaker of Punjab Assembly and senior politician of the 
Muslim League (Convention) told the public on 18 April 1970 that no "isms" 
except Islam was acceptable in Pakistan, whereas foreign powers under the 
pressure of their foreign policies were "trying to interfere" in the country's internal 
matters and were influencing ideas of people.
112
 Former member of the National 
Assembly and a key figure of the party, Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi addressed the 
public in June 1970, and told them similarly that some foreign powers by using 
some of the local politicians were putting Pakistan's stability at stake.
113
 
As a result of such accusations, Nawa-i-Waqt on 19 June 1970 with reference 
to "credible sources" revealed that martial law authorities had decided to 
investigate the allegations of foreign aid to political parties. The investigation 
would be carried out by a judicial committee, headed by a supreme court Judge, 
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and would be published before the forthcoming elections in 1970. Parties likely to 
be investigated included National Awami Party (Wali Group), Jamaat-e-Islami, 
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Pakistan People's Party, National Awami Party (Bhashani), 
and Pakistan Labour Party.
114
 
Thus, the Urdu newspapers reflecting different left and right-wing political 
views argued that the US had been interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs which 
signalled some conspiracy was in process against Pakistan. Left wing parties 
accused the US of supporting parties of the right and vice versa. The newspapers 
also observed and explained US interference and demanded the government 
take serious actions to stop such interference. President Yahya Khan was 
reported to have decided to carry on investigations into parties suspected of 
receiving external aid which supported the argument based on suspicions of US 
interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs through utilising official and diplomatic 
sources. US interference was presented as a modality for conspiracy as a basis 
for a US politics of betrayal in the 1971 War which caused Pakistan's 
disintegration. 
2.3.2 The CIA, Media, NGOs and Other Sources Believed to have been 
Used to Interfere in Pakistan's Internal Affairs 
Some of the journalists, the Urdu press, and official sources explained some 
other modalities of US conspiracy apart from its utilisation of diplomatic means. 
The majority of these voices would argue that "the conspiratorial designs" were 
carried out by the CIA or the western media, whereas others explained that it was 
actually NGOs, sources of international aid, American intellectuals, or 
encouraging India to interfere in Pakistan's affairs which were the means to 
realise the conspiracy. However, such modalities explained generally by a few 
individuals or newspapers were presented as additional evidence and deep 
analysis. All this additional evidence would not only strengthen the idea of US 
conspiracy but would also help to rationalise the idea of a US politics of betrayal 
in the 1971 War.  
The CIA was suspected of carrying out certain suspicious activities in the 
country. A journalist, Waqar-ul Rehman, in his column in Nawa-i-Waqt on 15 April 
1970, highlighted "the dubious role of the CIA being the notorious American 
agency," entrusted to protect US interests all over the world. The journalist argued 
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that the intelligence organization known for its "conspiratorial capabilities," was 
playing "a negative role," to protect US commercial interests all over the world. 
The journalist explained that wherever America wished to interfere, conspire, or 
create disturbance it entered its intelligence agents in the disguise of 
businessmen, tourists, intellectuals or even hippies to secretly achieve US 
targets. The journalist claimed that people coming from the US were generally 
CIA agents, trained and equipped to be used for military purposes. The journalist 
concluded that the US preferred limited activities as the old method of toppling 
governments was getting obsolete and the US had started considering 
intervention through the help of the CIA.
115
 
Political leadership of East and West Pakistan and the military government 
failed to resolve political differences, mainly based on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's 
six points agenda. The military action started on the night of 25-26 March 1971, 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested, all political activities were banned, and 
Awami League was blacklisted. Sarmila Bose describes the decision of military 
action as an element of surprise, as to this date no one is sure, what actually 
sabotaged the political dialogue, which was intact on 25th March.
116
 On 26th 
March, at a White House Meeting, Henry Kissinger stated, "I have no idea what 
caused breakdown in talks. I was as much surprised as anyone else."
117
 Nawa-i-
Waqt through its editorial however came up with the idea, as early as 27 March 
1971 that the political dialogue failed because of a CIA conspiracy. The 
newspaper argued that actually the US "wanted to penalise" Pakistan by breaking 
it into two parts for developing its relationship with China. There was a further 
concern that activities of the CIA would not be restricted to East Pakistan and it 
would also continue in West Pakistan. Concluding paragraphs of the editorial 
were censored in an unusual way, which gave an impression that there were 
some instructions/changes at the last moments (as shown in Figure 18).
118
 Nawa-
i-Waqt also explained the CIA's modes of working and objectives including 
toppling the local governments and directly intervening in the internal matters of a 
country. The newspaper associated the failure of political parties to resolve their 
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differences with the CIA and thereby facilitated understanding of a US betrayal of 
Pakistan with the aim of causing its disintegration.
119
 
 
Figure 18, the image shows the editorial having title "the CIA's conspiracy," published by 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 27 March 1971. The editorial was censored in a unique way as black 
blocks were used to hide the text.
120 
Likewise, the western media, especially British and US newspapers, were 
also blamed for giving Bengalis and the Bengali leadership undue importance 
resulting in their stubborn and arrogant behaviour in their demands for autonomy. 
On 17 February 1970, Nawa-i-Waqt noted in an editorial that some elements in 
and outside the country, especially the American and British press had made it 
usual to write about Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the next Prime Minister of 
Pakistan, which made him more arrogant. He was being given importance due to 
his six points agenda. It convinced Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to further enhance 
this idea in a hope to get more political benefit in the forthcoming elections in 
October 1970.
121
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Figure 19, the cartoon published on 4 July 1971 in Nawa-i-Waqt with a caption "American 
and British newspapers are instigating India to attack Pakistan: political analysts." The 
cartoon shows Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi holding a three-pronged weapon of 
attack generally associated with Hinduism is using some western newspaper as a magic 
flying mat to attack Pakistan.
122 
On 17 May 1971, Pakistan's ambassador to the US, Agha Hilali was reported 
to have said, that the "American newspapers and television were biased" and not 
presenting Pakistan's point of view on East Pakistan. Propaganda against 
Pakistan was being promoted by the American media. Ambassador Hilali 
complained that news about the murder of a Dhaka University professor by 
Pakistan's military was denied by the Pakistan embassy, but it was not published 
in the US newspapers. Similarly the embassy had requested time on television to 
justify Pakistan's position which was also denied. Ambassador Hilali exclaimed 
with anger that there had to be some limit to bias.
123
 
A senior journalist during an interview conducted for this research further 
explained the role of the US and western media saying that "in fact the US was 
watching the situation from a distance" whereas "the American and western 
media was observing what our military was doing in East Pakistan." Public 
opinion and official policies in the US and western countries were influenced 
because "military action and atrocities in East Pakistan were given exceptional 
projection." Consequently, "they actually accepted the separation of East Pakistan 
and establishment of an independent Bangladesh government."
124
  
Thus, alleged biased attitudes of the western media as explained by Nawa-i-
Waqt and Pakistan's Ambassador to US Agha Hilali in the Urdu press, provided 
additional means to conceptualise US betraying Pakistan in the 1971 War. Other 
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individual voices however explained many different modalities of US conspiracy to 
facilitate understanding of the US as a betraying ally. For example, a journalist 
S.M. Akthar in his article published on 20 October 1971 in Nawa-i-Waqt argued 
that the issue of economic disparity between the two parts of Pakistan was 
exaggerated by American professors, working as economic advisors for the 
Planning Commission of Pakistan in Dhaka. The journalist accused the American 
advisors of trying to promote hatred in East Pakistan. The Institute of Economic 
Development based in Dhaka was responsible for conducting research on 
economic issues. The Bengali students working on economic problems were the 
students of those American professors. Therefore, the journalist claimed, the 
research and conclusions drawn about the disparity between East and West 
Pakistan were biased as they ignored the ground realities such as climate factors, 
availability of resources, and better utilisation of capital.
125
 
A main headline appeared in Nawa-i-Waqt in the issue of 18 January 1971 
stated, "America is hatching a serious conspiracy of creating two Pakistans 
instead of one." The details disclosed that this statement was based on the 
speech of a Rotary Club International's President Luther Hodges at the annual 
conference in Dhaka.
126
 Rotary club members were reported to be angry over the 
controversial statement and they resented an effort to create differences between 
two parts of the country.
127
 Moreover, on 14 May 1971, Nawa-i-Waqt claimed that 
international nongovernmental organisations such as Rotary International, Lions 
International, and Free Mason were actually "American spy bases" in Pakistan 
and hands behind such organisations were "the enemies of Pakistan."
128
 
Furthermore it was argued that India finding "encouragement from some 
superpowers" had created difficult situations for Pakistan.
129
 A banner headline 
stated "conspiracy of Russia, America, and India against Pakistan" with reference 
to the Chinese newspaper The Peoples' Daily. The newspaper explained that 
India had deployed large number of troops on the border of East Pakistan, and 
non-uniformed Indian armed soldiers were also infiltrating for violent activities into 
Pakistani areas. Although the US had declared its impartiality, it "wished to 
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interfere" in the crisis being part of the conspiracy. The newspaper claimed that all 
Indian activities at the Pakistani border were part of the conspiracy.
130
 
The Aid Consortium of Western Countries recommended suspension of all 
economic debts, as long as Pakistan could not reach a political solution of the 
problem. In response the Urdu press believed such a suspension was unfair, 
because problems for which the political solution was being advised were actually 
created by those powers themselves. The objective was to force Pakistan to form 
a government loyal and subservient to their interests. Nawa-i-Waqt expressed 
sorrow on behalf of the Pakistani public for their inability to differentiate between 
friends and enemies and selecting "wrong friends and allies," who were 
"betraying them at every step." It was supposed that some superpowers annoyed 
with Pakistan's "more neutral foreign policy" used India as their pawn in their 
attempt to punish Pakistan. India was able to find "traitors in Pakistan," who tried 
to create anarchy and deteriorated law and order conditions in the country to the 
extent that Pakistan's military had to take action. The conditions were thought to 
have been restored quickly against the expectations of disintegration by 
Pakistan's enemies. After the failure of the hatched conspiracy, the US and 
western powers were trying to destroy Pakistan through economic pressure. They 
were trying to achieve objectives through economic tactics, which they could not 
achieve through force.
131
 
Thus, although the different voices of discourse developed a consensus on 
the idea of US conspiracy, they differed on the modalities. The majority of left and 
right-wing political parties accused the US of interfering in Pakistan's domestic 
affairs through diplomatic means whereas a few voices went to greater extent to 
explain some additional methods such as the CIA, western media, NGOs, 
American intellectuals, allowing India to interfere, and the suspension of aid 
utilised to achieve the "conspiratorial designs." All the modalities explained 
through discourse would enhance the understanding of the idea of US conspiracy 
and for that matter US betrayal.  
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2.4 THE CAUSES OF US CONSPIRACY EXPLAINED THROUGH 
DISCOURSE 
In addition to presenting the idea of a US conspiracy and explaining its 
modalities, the discourse also offered three different causes of such a conspiracy. 
First, in pragmatic terms, US strategic interests in South Asia would compel it to 
conspire and betray Pakistan. Second, the US perceived as driven by an 
international economic elite caused underdevelopment to maximise its material 
interests. Third, the US perceived as an anti-Islamic force would conspire against 
a Muslim country. Each cause explained through the discourse provided 
rationalisation to the idea of US conspiracy and betrayal in the 1971 War. 
2.4.1 US Strategic Interests in South Asia  
 An Impression of the India-US Nexus against Pakistan and China 
Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, and different political parties remained highly critical of 
the US before its rapprochement with China. This criticism was silenced for a 
while between July-December 1971, but before this period the US was explained 
as a pro-India power. Although it had hostilities with the USSR in other matters, at 
least in supporting India against China both the superpowers were viewed as 
having found a common ground. Thus, the discourse could clearly identify a 
nexus between the US, the USSR, and India against China and Pakistan. This 
predated discourse would rationalise the US betrayal in the 1971 War. China was 
the main factor in this argument as the US and the USSR would remain closer to 
India while ignoring Pakistan's security concerns. The military aid given to India 
under the pretext of "the Chinese threat" would disturb the balance of power in 
South Asia against Pakistan. 
Jang on 30 July 1970 in its editorial argued that India was receiving military 
aid from the US and the USSR under the pretext of the Chinese threat since 1962 
which was increasing security threats to Pakistan. The newspaper advised the 
two superpowers to reconsider their policy of strengthening one country in the 
region, while keeping the other weaker.
132
 Pakistan had requested a modern 
version of the US manufactured Patton Tanks, which was opposed by India. It 
was argued in the Urdu press that Pakistan's requests for military assistance had 
always been subject to Indian response. In August 1970, according to Nawa-i-
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Waqt, Americans were thinking of turning down Pakistan's request under Indian 
pressure. Consequently, they were accused of "being unfaithful friends," who 
loved their "double dealings" and always gave "a cold shoulder" to an ally. The 
American delayed response to the request was seen as proof of its indifference to 
Pakistan's security requirements. Therefore, the two newspapers advised 
Pakistan to avoid dependence on a "hypocritical partner" and build a relationship 
with someone, who would show interest and sincerity in Pakistan's security.
133
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 4 October 1970 observed that India was increasing its 
defence capabilities with the help of the USSR whereas the US seemed 
indifferent to Pakistan's security needs.
134
 The newspaper explained in another 
editorial that US military aid worth 75 million rupees to Pakistan was not 
appropriate to its requirements. The newspaper argued that although Pakistan 
militarily aligned itself with America in the 1950s, and by the time J.F. Kennedy 
became president was considered as a "most allied ally," the Kennedy 
administration had also started looking at non-aligned countries, such as India 
with a new respect, while ignoring the importance of military alliances.
135
 The 
newspaper claimed that the US had totally ignored its contractual and moral 
responsibilities in the 1965 War, and it even ignored them for the next four years 
in supplying spare parts for already provided equipment.
136
 US aid to India, a non-
aligned country, was explained as a contradiction in the US foreign policy and a 
"disrespect" to an ally.
 
Nawa-i-Waqt in its editorial on 17 May 1971, discussed US 
policies in South Asia. The US was blamed for favouring India against China, 
while ignoring its ally since 1962. It was argued that enormous military aid to India 
by the US and the USSR had increased the "arrogance of India," and for that 
reason had raised Pakistan's sense of insecurity. Therefore, in-fact US policies in 
South Asia had pushed Pakistan closer to China.
137
 
The newspaper observed that Pakistan did not extend the lease of Badaber 
air base in Peshawar, which was used by the US for its spy missions against the 
USSR from 17 July 1959 to 7 January 1970. According to the newspaper, 
Americans were planning to shift the base to Ladakh, an area in Indian held 
Kashmir. It was seen as interference in a disputed territory. Nawa-i-Waqt also 
                                              
133
 Nawa-i-Waqt, editorial, 7 August 1970, p.3; Jang, editorial, 30 July 1970, p.3. 
134
 Nawa-i-Waqt, editorial, 4 October 1970, p.3. 
135
 Ibid, editorial, 10 October 1970, p.3. 
136
 Ibid. 
137
 Ibid, editorial, 17 May 1971, p.3. 
78 
 
reported a resolution passed by Kashmiri political workers, who saw this act as "a 
conspiracy against Pakistan" and "its reliable friend China." It was argued that 
moving the spy base from Badaber to Ladakh was suspicious as it would further 
complicate the issue of Kashmir, given the fact that Pakistan and India had 
already fought two wars on the issue. It was claimed that the purpose was to 
besiege China and endanger the newly opened Silk Route, connecting China and 
Pakistan.
138
 
On 5 May 1970, Nawa-i-Waqt and Jang reported that the Head of East 
Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami, Professor Ghulam Azam, blamed the US for hatching 
the conspiracy to cause Pakistan's disintegration. Azam had told his party 
workers that the US and the USSR wanted the disintegration of Pakistan in order 
to strengthen and use India as a base against China. He explained that India due 
to its geographical location was not in a position to commit aggressive activities 
against China, and therefore the superpowers wanted East Pakistan to be 
separated to use this area as an Indian satellite territory against China.
139
 
Likewise Air Marshal Noor Khan, senior leader of the Muslim League (Council) 
told a press conference on 23 August 1970, that the US and the USSR were 
providing overt support to India by supplying weapons on large scale. He blamed 
both superpowers for attempting to make East Pakistan a common base against 
China. He said that changes in international politics had brought the US and the 
USSR together against China, and therefore both were supporting India for that 
purpose.
140
 On 13 July 1970 Qayoom Khan, President of Muslim League 
(Qayoom) was also reported of accusing the US, the USSR, and India for their 
attempts to form a government in Pakistan subservient to India. He said that 
Pakistan and China were true friends and "conspiracies" were directed against 
this relationship.
141
 
A senior politician of Jamaat-e-Islami argued in an interview conducted for this 
research that the People of Pakistan have concerns as "in 1971 America was 
openly backing India." He further explained that:  
Pakistan was kept in the dark whereas separating East 
Pakistan from West Pakistan was part of the American 
strategy under long term planning, because the American 
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plan was to weaken Pakistan and become powerful in the 
region against China. And [also] to give an upper hand to 
India in the region against Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, and 
China has been the American plan and part of its strategy. 
That is why this game is continuously going on since 1971.
142
 
Thus, some of the political parties and the Urdu newspapers had been hinting 
for a long time that disintegration of Pakistan was on the US agenda in order to 
strengthen India against China. Such narratives in advance regarding US-USSR-
India conspiracies to cause disintegration of Pakistan worked as a testimony of 
US betrayal for the future and help the people to rationalise their disappointment 
with the US. 
US Desires to Forge India-Pakistan Confederation 
President Nixon was of the view, "peace for us [USA] is much less likely if 
there is no peace in Asia" and in his report to Congress on 18 February 1970, he 
suggested that for peace in Asia, the US had to show: 
commitment to helping [the] partners develop their own 
strength. In doing so, we must strike a careful balance … the 
one-fifth of mankind who live in India and Pakistan can make 
the difference for the future of Asia. If their nation-building 
surmounts the centrifugal forces that have historically divided 
the subcontinent, if their economic growth keeps pace with 
popular demands, and if they can avert further costly rivalry 
between themselves, India and Pakistan can contribute their 
vast energies to the structure of a stable peace. But these 
are formidable "ifs." We stand ready to help the subcontinent 
overcome them. These nations' potential contribution to 
peace is too great for us to do otherwise.
143
 
 There was a strong reaction in the Urdu press in Pakistan against this report 
and it was viewed as "a conspiracy" against Pakistan's integrity. Nawa-i-Waqt 
argued that the US in an attempt to attain its objectives against China was trying 
to pressurise Pakistan to accept Indian hegemony in the region and play second 
fiddle to India. The newspaper claimed that the US and the USSR had a wish to 
bring Pakistan and India closer to achieve their global objectives. It was argued 
that the United States had failed to realise Pakistan's "genuine feelings" and 
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emotions vis-à-vis India and had always drawn "wrong conclusions" based on 
"false cases." Whereas Pakistan wanted good friendly relationship with all 
powers, it was not ready to become "subservient" to anyone of them and could 
not accept "Indian hegemony" and leadership in the region at any cost.
144
 While 
addressing his party workers, on 12 March 1970 at Karachi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
said that he would "fix the traitors, secessionists, supporters of India-Pakistan 
confederation and lackeys of capitalists."
145
 The working Committee of Muslim 
League (Council) passed a resolution on 16 March 1970 condemning President 
Nixon's report of 18 February and vowing to "foil all American conspiracies" 
against Pakistan.
146
  
On 13 June 1970, a senior leader of Jamaat-e-Islami Wazir Ahmad Ghazi 
claimed that the US, in order to pursue its international agenda, wanted to see 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as Prime Minister of Pakistan, so that he could be used 
to facilitate the realisation of the "evil American designs" of forging a 
confederation of India and Pakistan.
147
 It was also stated occasionally that 
Americans and Soviets were joined together in introducing and propagating 
socialism in Pakistan, in order to achieve a confederation of India and Pakistan 
against China.
148
 Nawa-i-Waqt argued that the US wanted to forge a 
confederation of India and Pakistan against China. Such a confederation would 
also favour the USSR given its hostilities with China. This was the reason, 
explained the newspaper, that to achieve these objectives, the US and West were 
supporting Sheikh Mujibur Rahman because of his different stance towards India. 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was believed to be a supporter of resolving all issues 
with India, excluding the Kashmir issue. According to Nawa-i-Waqt, he had a top-
secret meeting with the US Counsel General Archer Blood in Dhaka, but details of 
this meeting were not known even to his closest companions. The newspaper 
presumed that the Americans were hoping that with the possibility of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman voted to power, for first time in the history of Pakistan, there 
were chances that Pakistan and India would be able to end their mutual 
differences. On India's side, Indira Gandhi talking to a television channel in New 
York, had demonstrated similar hopes by insisting that all other issues should be 
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resolved first, and the most complicated issue of Kashmir could be left for the last 
stage. Nawa-i-Waqt concluded that it was actually "a conspiracy" of forging a 
confederation of Pakistan and India, and the US, western countries, India and 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were part of "the controversial plan."
149
 
Thus, some of the mainstream political parties and the Urdu press argued that 
the US wanted to compromise Pakistan's independence by suggesting a 
confederation of India and Pakistan, to make it a more effective counterweight to 
China. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League was suspected of being an 
"American agent" for his wish to resolve all issues with India, while ignoring the 
Kashmir issue. Apparently, the proposal of a confederation between India and 
Pakistan seemed in favour of unity between East and West Pakistan too but 
some of the left and right-wing political parties especially belonging to West 
Pakistan would see it another way. They would argue that Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman was being supported by the US as he was the one who would help to 
compromise Pakistan's independence to appease India and the US. However, if 
West Pakistan, where Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did have a very limited political 
influence as compared to that of East Pakistan, resisted the idea of an India-
Pakistan confederation, then East Pakistan should be separated to make a 
confederation between India and East Pakistan. US alleged desires to forge an 
India-Pakistan confederation helped to rationalise the discourse of a US politics of 
betrayal in 1971 resulting in Pakistan's disintegration and at least use of East 
Pakistan to achieve American objectives. 
US an "Enemy in the Guise of a Friend" 
On the other hand, Pakistan was explained as having China the only reliable 
international power at its back against the Indian threat to its security. On the 
other hand, the US was described as an "enemy" in the guise of a friend. The 
statements of influential political leaders such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, news reports 
and editorials of the Urdu press also endorsed the assumptions of China being a 
reliable partner as compared to the US. However, the US being a superpower 
opposed to China was represented as "annoyed" with Pakistan for developing its 
ties with China. Nawa-i-Waqt explained the nature of Pakistan-China relations 
which were annoying for the US. For example, the newspaper argued that in 
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providing China access to Europe and Middle East markets by the Silk Route, 
Pakistan had "annoyed the US."
150
  
Similarly, important political figures of the country were also reported as 
explaining the reasons for the US being "annoyed" with Pakistan. For example, 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, remained vocally critical of the US policies during his 
campaign for the General Elections of 1970. On 9 March 1970, while addressing 
a huge rally at Lahore, in his three hours speech, he discussed many political 
issues including Pakistan's foreign policy. He told the audience that in 1963, when 
he became foreign minister, the foreign policy of Pakistan was "subservient" to 
America to the extent that "the US ambassador used to instruct Pakistan" on each 
and every issue. Consequently, he further said, Pakistan was not on good terms 
then with China, the USSR, and Afghanistan. He emphasised that it was he who 
played his role in "liberating the foreign policy" of the country by "defeating the 
imperialist powers" at international level.
151
 Bhutto with his narrative on the US 
and China alluded that the US did not want Pakistan to be on good terms with 
China. His use of the phrase "liberating foreign policy," communicated the sense 
that the US had made Pakistan's foreign policy hostage and Pakistan making a 
decision to develop its relations with China equalled its liberation from "American 
imperialism." Thus, the US was likely to punish Pakistan by showing an indifferent 
attitude to its security and supporting India as "enemy" to both Pakistan and 
China. The US was therefore characterised as an "enemy in the guise of a 
friend." 
Similarly the Urdu press could explain that the US being irritated over 
Pakistan's increasing ties with China had caused serious consequence to 
Pakistan's security. At first, US actions and words about Pakistan were seen as 
far from being friendly. Second, India due to its increased military power had 
become "arrogant." Nawa-i-Waqt even argued that the US "in complicity with 
India" and the USSR had planned to "teach Pakistan a lesson."
152
 
Nawa-i-Waqt also argued that it was due to the support and backing of the 
two superpowers that India had become so "arrogant" that it would not listen to 
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any international warnings or reprimand. The newspaper claimed that almost all 
countries except the Soviet Union had declared military action in East Pakistan 
starting in March 1971 as "Pakistan's internal matter." Conversely, the USSR 
"inspired by Indian propaganda" had asked Pakistan to "stop violent activities and 
bloodshed." Nevertheless, the newspaper observed, the Soviet Union was also 
"silenced after President Yahya Khan's appropriate reply" by asking it to advise 
India to "avoid interference in Pakistan's internal matters." However, the 
newspaper wrote, India by ignoring all warnings and advice was seen to continue 
meddling because of "the enormous military power" attained due to "patronage of 
the US and the USSR."
 
Pakistan would bring the US attention to this issue time and again but of no 
use. Nawa-i-Waqt reported that during the CENTO conference at Ankara in April 
1971, Pakistan informed the member countries including the US, UK, Turkey, 
Iran, and others about Indian interference and open aggression against Pakistan. 
CENTO members were briefed about the situation and requested to use their 
influence to stop India from unacceptable activities.
153
 Having been the 
responsible for adding to "India's arrogance" the US was expected to realise its 
duties to stop India from threatening Pakistan's security.  
Nawa-i-Waqt explained that due to its alleged "arrogance" India was all set to 
wage war against Pakistan. On 11 May 1971, Indira Gandhi was reported to have 
said that India was seriously considering recognising "the so called Bangladesh's 
government in exile," and therefore it was even ready to face war with Pakistan 
and China. The newspaper advised the Indian premier that in-spite of having 
support from America and Soviet Union, she should think carefully before taking 
any decision in this regard. She was expected to consider the interests of "her 
poor citizens" instead "dancing to the tunes of the superpowers" (Figure 20).
154
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Figure 20, the cartoon shows Indian Prime Minister dancing with joy for the idea of 
receiving aid in the name of Bangladesh. The USSR, Britain, and the US would be 
probable sponsors. The cartoon also signifies India dancing on big powers' wishes. "India 
would receive significant aid from foreign countries in order to share the burden of so 
called Bangladesh."
155
 
A senior politician of Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) also explained in an 
interview conducted for this research that:  
it was not like the whole blame was given or transferred to 
America, the failure of the state to the extent was also 
blamed, and even Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission 
exposed the failures of different organs of state as well. 
Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission Report is an authentic 
document on the 1971 debacle and does not blame America. 
So how can we say that America was blamed for the failure 
of the state? Well I think that is the fact. If Congress was 
against Pakistan, so Congress is an American Congress. 
And if Congress does not support an ally against a neutral 
country so people and the Urdu media have every right to 
complain about that thing, because this thing is still not 
understandable in our culture that a friend and an ally 
betrays you at a difficult time. Well the fact that America 
warned India to invade West Pakistan was in American 
interest as well. They do not want to create another monster 
in South Asia. So that was not a favour for Pakistan. It was in 
their interest. When India crossed the international borders 
America failed to rescue and to help an ally and a friend and 
to stop the grave violation in the twentieth century, which was 
the highest violation of crossing an international border and 
attacking an independent country.
156
 
Thus, some of the influential political figures and the Urdu press identified the 
US as "an enemy in the guise of a friend". It was argued in the Urdu press that 
the US was annoyed with Pakistan for developing its ties with China and in 
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response was supporting India to teach Pakistan a lesson. India backed by both 
superpowers had become more arrogant and did not hesitate to commit 
aggression against Pakistan. Such a characterisation of the US helped to 
understand its betrayal through a conspiracy in the 1971 War. 
US Policy to Appease India 
The Urdu press further observed that Pakistan had kept the US informed 
about the situation and Indian intentions, whereas the US instead of siding with 
Pakistan had adopted a continuous policy of appeasing India. For instance, the 
US senators and government officials would issue statements which were seen 
as anti-Pakistan and pro-India. Pakistani officials and the Urdu press would 
strongly refute such statements. Not only the words but also US actions would be 
seen by the Urdu press as favouring India more than Pakistan, thus encouraging 
India to wage war against Pakistan. Therefore, the alleged US "policy of 
appeasing India" would provide rationalisation for the idea of a US politics of 
betrayal in the 1971 War. 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 19 August 1970 wrote that Pakistan had been urging the 
superpowers to "bring India to the right path" as otherwise, India would "cause 
human destruction by waging war" and "the superpowers would be responsible" 
for it.
157
 The newspaper on 9 October 1971, observed that Pakistan had kept the 
US informed about Indian intentions to wage war against Pakistan and therefore 
expected the US to play its role to avoid the danger of war. The newspaper 
reported Mehmood Ali, Head of the Pakistan's mission to the United Nations to 
have informed the US Secretary of State William Rogers about "India's political 
motives" in rejecting the proposal of appointing UN observers on the Indo-
Pakistan border. He was also informed that the "situation was really serious" and 
if India was not stopped, it would push both countries into war.
158
 The newspaper 
also observed that Pakistan had notified America about "Indian provocative and 
aggressive activities" on the border, and had asked the American President to 
stop India from such activities.
159
 The newspaper argued that the situation was 
also critical because in case of an Indo-Pakistan war, the USSR and China might 
be involved in the conflict.
160
 The newspaper on 3 November 1971 wrote that the 
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US and other countries had not been successful in influencing India to stop from 
waging war, therefore it was "the US responsibility as an ally" to support Pakistan 
in case war happened.
161
 Thus, the news reports and editorials of the Urdu press 
identified Pakistan as a "peace loving nation" and India as "an aggressor" 
attempting to impose war on Pakistan and the US in "a position to influence India" 
to avoid war. It was also argued that if war happened India would be responsible 
for the war and the US as a military ally had to support Pakistan. However, the 
US statements and actions reported in the Urdu press were at times contrary to 
the expectations. 
For example, Senator Edward Kennedy, known for his "anti-Pakistan" and 
"pro-India" stance, was expected to visit Pakistan in August 1971. According to 
Nawa-i-Waqt, the Pakistani military had "taken control of the situation in East 
Pakistan," which made him very vocal against Pakistan in the American Senate, 
and was "pressurising his government" to stop Pakistan's military and economic 
aid. It was argued that he proved his "biased approach" with his "anti-Pakistan" 
and "pro-Indian behaviour." Therefore, Nawa-i-Waqt was of the view that "such a 
person" should not be invited and allowed to visit Pakistan as it might be "against 
the national interest."
162
 
Consequently, Senator Edward Kennedy, who was not allowed to visit 
Pakistan, offered India a treaty of friendship and cooperation, and criticised the 
US President's policy towards Pakistan while reiterated that he would continue to 
argue that Pakistan's aid must be stopped, as long as it did not politically resolve 
the issue of East Pakistan.
163
 Agha Hillali, Pakistan's Ambassador to the US 
addressed a press conference in order to refute Senator Edward Kennedy's 
allegations on Pakistan. He said that Senator Edward Kennedy had started using 
the phrase East Bengal instead of East Pakistan, after his visit to India, which 
was "enough evidence to show his bias." He also denied the allegations that 
Pakistan was using American weapons against its civilian population and there 
was a danger of food shortage in East Pakistan.
164
 Nawa-i-Waqt argued that the 
Americans such as Senator Edward Kennedy were not serving the purpose of 
peace instead, they were promoting war.
165
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Some of the Urdu newspapers and Pakistan's officials reacted strongly to any 
appeals directed to Pakistan to show restraint and patience. The US Secretary of 
State William Rogers and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko after their 
meeting in Washington, observed that the situation in the subcontinent was 
critical and both India and Pakistan should "remain patient, show restraint to 
avoid war and resolve their issues with peaceful mutual dialogue." On 3 October 
1971, Nawa-i-Waqt criticised both world powers and held them responsible for 
this situation. The newspaper argued that both major powers provided military 
and economic aid to India to counterbalance China, and hence "disturbed the 
balance of power" in the region. India was also held "responsible" for this critical 
situation, whereas Pakistan had showed "utmost restraint and patience." The 
newspaper wrote that India, who admitted openly its interference in East 
Pakistan, should have been asked to "pull back and stop interfering in Pakistan's 
internal affairs." The newspaper wrote that the major powers were "not sincere 
about peace" in South Asia. The newspaper argued that if the powers like the US 
and the USSR were to "cross the limits in favouring India," in pursuance of their 
own interests, that would make "a proud nation" like Pakistan, "fight for its 
honour." Therefore, the newspaper argued, if the US and the USSR were sincere 
they should direct their advice towards India instead of Pakistan.
166
 So, some of 
the Urdu newspapers explained that it was India backed by the two superpowers 
that was responsible for the deterioration of the situation in South Asia and 
therefore the superpowers should ask India to mend its ways not to Pakistan.  
The Urdu press also reported and interpreted certain US actions as a "policy 
of appeasing India" while "unnecessarily pressurising" Pakistan. For example, 
Nawa-i-Waqt speculated that the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit to the 
US in November 1971 would be decisive for war or peace. The newspaper wrote 
that President Nixon might not agree to her "suggestion to increase pressure on 
Pakistan" for a political solution. However, the US would continue its "policy of 
appeasing India," and the President would let her know that the US had already 
suspended the military aid to Pakistan.
167
 Consequently, on 10 November 1971, 
Nawa-i-Waqt with reference to "its sources in Washington" reported that America 
cancelled $3.6 million licences for weapons to Pakistan in order to remove "one of 
the major reasons of tensions between India and Pakistan." Spare parts of worth 
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sixty-six thousand dollars only would be provided to Pakistan. The newspaper 
also reminded that, since the 1965 War, the US had stopped weapons supply to 
Pakistan, and after 25 March 1971 supplies of spare parts were also suspended, 
except on already issued licences. Spare parts worth $5 million had already been 
supplied. Now, the newspaper observed that after the cancellation of licences "the 
US would not provide any kind of military support" to Pakistan.
168
 
This suspension of military supplies was seen by Nawa-i-Waqt as "another 
betrayal to appease India" similar to the one in 1965. The newspaper argued that 
it was "tragic," especially when the USSR was providing "full military support to 
India." The newspaper wrote that it was not clear whether the US had "rewarded 
Pakistan for its efforts" to bring China and the US closer or it was "being punished 
for making efforts for China's UN membership." The newspaper explained that 
whatever the reason was, this action would leave Pakistan's weapons "unusable 
and non repairable." Therefore, the newspaper advised that Pakistan should 
decide to gain "self sufficiency at least in conventional and ordinary weapons" 
such as small arms and ammunition.
169
 
Moreover, President Nixon in a TV interview disclosed that the Indian Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi had concerns about Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's life, and 
therefore the Red Cross was expected to play its role in verifying his status as 
being alive. On 10 November 1971, Nawa-i-Waqt explained it as a part of "US 
policy of appeasing India" as President Nixon was giving more importance to the 
concerns of "Pakistan's enemy" instead of accepting Pakistan's position that 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was "safe and sound in Pakistan's custody."
170
 
Similarly, on 14 November 1971 the American Secretary of State William 
Rogers, during a conversation with journalists was reported to have said that "war 
will breakout between India and Pakistan," and if war was started "the United 
States would remain neutral" as it had friendly relations with both India and 
Pakistan. Secretary Rogers further said that the US had tried its best to convince 
both countries to avoid war, but border skirmishes were on the increase, thus 
worsening the situation.
171
 Nawa-i-Waqt also observed the statement with 
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suspicion and explained that the US had given "a green light to India" to attack 
Pakistan by making "its position clear" that it would not intervene in the War.
172
 
Likewise, on 27 November 1971 the American President Nixon and British 
Prime Minister Edward Heath were reported to have appealed to Pakistan's 
President Yahya Khan to release Sheikh Mujibur Rahman which might be "helpful 
in avoiding the danger of war."
173
 Nawa-i-Waqt viewed the appeal or demand as 
"against Pakistan's interests," which would "weaken Pakistan's stance" on the 
issue. Therefore, the newspaper advised that Pakistan "must not follow any such 
suggestions" that might make it "subservient to India."
174
 The newspaper 
explained that in a way the US was "unnecessarily pressurising Pakistan," which 
was encouraging India to wage war. The newspaper complained that the USSR 
was extending its full support to India, whereas China was the only country 
supporting Pakistan at all forums including the UN, while the US was showing 
indifference.
175
  
Accordingly, Nawa-i-Waqt on 4 December 1971, reported the Indian military 
attack on West Pakistan.
176
 However, it was also reported that America had no 
intentions of bringing the issue to the Security Council and advised both India and 
Pakistan to resolve their issues by applying diplomatic methods.
177
 As a result, 
the newspaper explained that the US following its "policy of appeasing India" had 
failed to stop the war, and it would not even provide its diplomatic backing to 
Pakistan at the UN, and would continue to "appease India." Thus, the Urdu press 
and Pakistan's government officials, while reacting to US statements and actions, 
confirmed US policy as one of appeasement to India to ignore Pakistan's security 
and encouraging India to wage war against Pakistan and cause its disintegration. 
It appears that India remained an important factor in Pakistan-US relations, 
during the crisis in East Pakistan. The US was explained conducting its 
international relations in order to circle China and Pakistan with the help of India 
and the USSR. It was also argued that the US was willing to compromise 
Pakistan's independence by forcing it to enter in a confederation with India to use 
it as a more effective counterweight to China. The US was also described as an 
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unreliable friend quite contrary to that of China which was explained as a 
"trustworthy" friend. It was also argued that the US was pursuing a policy to 
appease India at Pakistan's cost which resulted in its failure to stop the war and 
consequently caused Pakistan's disintegration. Thus, the US interest in India to 
use it as a counterweight against China was explained as the reason why it 
ignored Pakistan's security and finally caused the 1971 War and Pakistan's 
disintegration. Such a discourse provided a basis on which the idea of a US 
politics of betrayal in the 1971 War was rationalised. 
2.4.2 The US Described as an Anti-Islamic Force and Part of an 
International Non-Muslim Nexus Against Islam 
Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, and most of the mainstream political parties of Pakistan 
described the US as an anti-Islamic force which was opposed to Pakistan 
because of its religious identity. It was further explained that the US was also part 
of a worldwide non-Muslim nexus against Muslims and therefore was opposed to 
Pakistan. The political parties belonging to both right and left accused their 
opponents of being American agents. In response, each political party rejected 
the accusation. Thus, the discourse of the political parties in the Urdu press was 
not solely focused on describing the US as an anti-Islamic, pro-Islamic, or a 
country indifferent to religious identity but to establish who was actually the 
"American agent."  
The General Secretary of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Maulana Ghaus 
Bakhsh Hazarvi
178
 while addressing a public rally, on 10 March 1970 said, that 
everyone was duty bound to wage jihad against the US for its hostility to Muslims 
and friendliness with Jews.
179
 He was also reported to have said that fatwas 
(religious rulings) against communism or socialism were attempts to distract 
attention from the facts, whereas "American rats"
180
 were "strengthening Jews by 
opposing Arabs and passing such rulings."
181
 He also told another rally that "the 
American samraaj" (imperial power) was "the worst enemy of Muslims" and 
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involved in "various conspiracies to eliminate Islam." "Israel backed and 
encouraged by the US," he explained, was creating a "bloodbath for Muslims," 
and "dreaming of conquering Makah and Medina."
182
 He further argued that "the 
US had always betrayed Muslims," as it "trapped Pakistan" into defence 
agreements, but "behind the scene provided India with weapons," in huge 
quantities, "encouraging Hindus to backstab Muslims."
183
 Mufti Mehmood, a 
senior leader of the party was reported to have said that no issue of Islam could 
be resolved without giving "a funeral to American samraaj."
184
 
The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam described other right-wing political parties such as 
Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan as "American agents" who were 
trying to protect the interests of American samraaj by criticising Bhutto's concept 
of Islamic socialism. It also described the US as an anti-Islamic force. In 
response, Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan rejected the allegation 
and argued that the concept of the Islamic socialism presented by Bhutto was 
also "an American tactic" to restrict the development of the Islamic system in 
Pakistan. 
On 10 July 1970, the Head of Jamaat-e-Islami, Syed Maududi was reported to 
have said in one of his public addresses that "some elements" were trying to 
eliminate Islam and for that reason, different foreign ideologies were being 
propagated in the country.
185
 He also warned the people that acceptance of the 
ideas of 'socialism' and 'nationalism' would weaken the roots of the country.
186
 
Therefore, it was argued that the forthcoming elections of 1970 were referendum 
on socialism, capitalism, and the Islamic system of governance.
187
 
Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) also opposed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, his Pakistan 
People's Party and the ideology of Islamic Socialism in the elections of 1970.
188
 
The President of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, Khawja Qamar Ul Din Sialwi, 
while addressing a conference on 28 July 1970, said, "the US was trying its best" 
to stop Pakistan from adopting an Islamic code of life and for that reason "it had 
bribed Bhutto" with full financial aid to raise "the propaganda of socialism." He 
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accused Bhutto of receiving 4 million rupees to propagate socialism and distract 
the people's attention from demands of an "Islamic system."
189
 Consequently, left 
of the centre party PPP also rejected the allegations and in order to establish that 
it was not working on "the American anti-Islamic agenda" also described the US 
as "an anti-Islamic force" and declared Jamaat-e-Islami and other right-wing 
parties as "American agents." 
In May 1970, about a hundred and thirteen religious scholars issued a 
religious ruling (fatwa), declaring the concept of socialism, un-Islamic. The 
Pakistan People's Party responded to the issue by associating the ruling with 
America. A senior party leader, Maulana Kauser Niazi, while addressing a public 
rally at Lalaa Moosa on 20 May 1970, criticised the religious clergy by calling 
them "American agents." He told the audience that "such rulings had actually 
damaged the cause of Islam" as during his Hajj visit, when he asked Muslims of 
Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and Aljazair the reason for their support of India against 
Pakistan, they replied that "it was because of religious clergy of Pakistan" who 
regards them "as infidels." They were fighting against Jews, which meant 
indirectly they were at war with America, because "Jews could not fight for a 
single day" without the American support, whereas "such rulings were 
backstabbing" those Muslims, fighting against Jews.
190
 
In June 1970, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Chairman of Pakistan People's Party claimed 
that the two founding fathers of the Nation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali 
Khan, were also murdered by American agents, because both of them believed in 
Islamic socialism. Bhutto further said that opposition to Islamic socialism and 
attempts on his life were also a "continuation of imperialist conspiracies."
191
 So, 
Bhutto attempted to explain the US as an anti-Islamic force and argued that the 
US hostility towards Pakistan and Islam was not a recent phenomenon as it 
murdered two of the country's founding fathers because they believed in Islamic 
socialism and the US had objections to both Islam and socialism.  
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party also kept telling people that 
the US was not only against the concept of Islamic socialism, but its "policies 
were against Islam and the Muslim world." On 7 August 1970, while addressing a 
huge public gathering at Lahore, he was reported in the Urdu press as stating that 
the policies of both superpowers were against the Islamic and Arab world as "they 
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were responsible for allowing the existence of Israel," which was being used 
"against Arabs and Muslims." He said Jamal Abdul Nasir of Egypt was "trapped 
by both powers" in similar way that "Ayub Khan was trapped" by the Tashkent 
Agreement in 1966.
192
 On 26 July 1970, another Pakistan People's Party 
politician and candidate for the National Assembly from Lahore Malik Muhammad 
Akhtar also reiterated in the Urdu press the idea of an American conspiracy. He 
said that right-wing political parties such as the Muslim League and Jamaat-e-
Islami were "conspiring with the American Imperialists" to win the elections in 
spite of knowing the fact that Americans had already "conspired to annihilate 
Pakistan" in 1965, by helping "its enemy India" during the war.
193
 
Thus, political parties identified themselves as loyal to Islam and accused 
their political opponents of being "traitors" and "American agents" working on an 
anti-Islamic agenda. Discourse between them was focused to establish who was 
actually the American agent. Consequently, a common assumption was 
communicated that the US was an anti-Islamic force and anyone having close 
relationship or not speaking against the US would be considered as an American 
agent. By constructing an identity for the US as an anti-Islamic force, political 
parties also provided a further way to rationalise a perceived US politics of 
betrayal in the 1971 War.  
Moreover, the Urdu newspapers and political parties also attempted to 
rationalise the image of the US as an anti-Islamic force in terms of a wider 
ideological confrontation. The US in this sense was described as part of a 
worldwide non-Muslim nexus mainly consisted of Christianity, Judaism, and 
Hinduism against Islam. A senior leader of Jamaat-e-Islami, Mian Tufail in March 
1970, while addressing a huge public gathering at Loyalpur, told the audience that 
America, the Soviet Union, and India were united against Islam, and they were 
determined to harm the unity of Pakistan.
194
 Maulana Ghaus Bakhsh Hazarvi of 
the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam elucidated that "India dared to cross Pakistan's 
international border" in 1965, simply at "American behest," whereas The BBC 
broadcasted the "baseless news" about Lahore falling, which was "enough proof" 
of the "conspiracy against Pakistan."
195
 He was also reported to have told a public 
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rally in Okara that the US had "violated the agreement," under which both 
countries had agreed to support each other in case of war with a third country.
196
 
A columnist Saadi Sangrori discussed the "putrid intentions of Hanood and 
Yahood"
197
 whose "wishes for expansionism" were a threat to world peace. He 
hinted at "a historical nexus" of Hinduism and Judaism against Muslims based on 
their "common hatred."
198
 Similarly, "conspiracies of crusading powers against 
Islam have been overtly disclosed" was one of the headlines on the front page of 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 7 April 1971. According to details given below the published 
headline, it was with reference to Al-Dawa, a weekly magazine published from 
Saudi Arabia. The magazine had argued that "enemies of Islam" were conspiring 
and the "crusading powers were in the forefront" of such conspiracies. The 
magazine further wrote that it was clear from the events recently happening in 
East Pakistan that "such forces were working hard" to divide Pakistan into two 
parts.
199
 
The Bangladesh crisis was also described in terms of ideological 
confrontation. Nawa-i-Waqt argued that considering this crisis as part of an anti-
Muslim drive, the US and the West could also be suspected for their support of 
"such Indian designs" in assisting a traditional nexus of "Hanood and Yahood." As 
on Kashmir, India was supported by one or the other superpower, Israel had been 
supported by the US on Palestine. Jewish, Christian, and Hindu countries were 
"conspiring" against Pakistan as "the symbol of Islam" and home of Muslims. It 
was argued that the non-Muslim world had not been able to accept the ideology 
of Pakistan and was trying to refute the ideology.
200
 The newspaper argued that 
the Pope's statement declaring military action in East Pakistan as "the bloodiest 
part" of human history was a "part of the conspiracy." Therefore, the newspaper 
suggested that Pakistan in such hostile conditions could only rely on God 
almighty but not on the non-Muslim countries being united against Pakistan.
201
 
A columnist Shaukat Yousaf Khan argued that "propaganda against Pakistan" 
was actually driven by "ideological hostilities" and for that reason was planned 
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and directed by the Jewish lobby which had a monopoly over the US media. It 
was argued that the US media had "ignored all ethical and professional codes of 
practices" in order to exploit the situations in East Pakistan. The columnist 
explained that the floods of 1970 in East Pakistan were one of the worst 
disasters, but instead of sympathising, "the US media severely criticised" 
Pakistan's government in order to "malign Pakistan." The columnist observed that 
the American media was pressurising the US government and the UN to play 
effective role to restrict the so-called bloodshed going on East Pakistan. The 
columnist argued that the American media was putting unnecessary pressure on 
the US government because it was already pressurising Pakistan on its internal 
matters. The columnist explained that this was a pre-planned and common 
strategy of the US and India to press Pakistan to allow deserters (refugees) to 
return to East Pakistan, so that "American agents" could also enter East Pakistan 
along with those refugees. The columnist argued that such American agents 
backed by more US resources would be facilitated by "other American agents" 
already present in Pakistan. The columnist concluded that actually "Christianity 
and Judaism" were making every possible effort to "confront the ideological 
forces" of Islam.
202
 
Thus, some of the political parties and the Urdu newspapers identified the US 
as "an anti-Islamic force" being a part of a worldwide non-Muslim nexus against 
Islam mainly based on the followers of Judaism, Christianity, and Hinduism. 
Political parties played a significant role in the construction of the US identity as 
an anti-Islamic force because in attempt to express their loyalty with Islam and 
Pakistan each party would describe the US as hostile to Islam and Pakistan and 
they would also explain their political opponents as "American agents." Such a 
description of the US helped rationalise the idea of a US politics of betrayal in the 
1971 War as a logical consequence of its anti-Islamic identity and Pakistan being 
a Muslim country. 
2.4.3 The US Described as an International Capitalist Force Causing the 
Underdevelopment of East Pakistan to Protect its Own Interests 
Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, and some of the political parties of Pakistan attempted to 
explain the causes of East Pakistan's poverty in socialist or Marxist terms of the 
ruling elite in collaboration with the US causing East Pakistan's 
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underdevelopment. In response, voices of political parties and the Urdu press in 
West Pakistan refuted the argument by detaching themselves from the ruling elite 
of West Pakistan and criticising them for the underdevelopment of the whole 
country and especially of East Pakistan. Therefore, the common point of the 
discourse admitted the US as "an exploitative capitalist force" and the debate 
remained focused that who was actually responsible within Pakistan of supporting 
the US and allowing the exploitation of the poor in the country. All dominant 
voices agreed in identifying the US as an exploitative force as a means of 
rationalising the discourse of a US politics of betrayal in the 1971 War as 
demands for provincial autonomy and even for independence in the form of 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's six points manifesto were premised on the 
underdevelopment of East Pakistan. 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, while suggesting a political system based on socialism as a 
solution, also blamed the economic exploitation of the capitalist ruling elite, who 
were supported by the international capitalist elite. He blamed former President 
Ayub Khan for not paying attention and resolving issues between India and 
Pakistan including the issue of Kashmir "under American pressure." He also 
accused the former Chief Minister of Sindh and a senior Muslim Leaguer Yousaf 
Haroon,
203
 who was settled in New York and to his belief was supporting Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman on behalf of the US.
204
 He noted that President Ayub Khan was 
also responsible for the economic exploitation of East Pakistan, which resulted in 
alienation of Bengalis. He wrote: 
... although he was hard working he was corrupt and his 
family members went on a veritable spree. He also suffered 
from many blind spots and had a heavy handed approach to 
problems. Above all, he bore an intense prejudice against 
East Pakistan. In his time the links between East and West 
Pakistan were critically weakened. On the surface the regime 
was stable, but a deep and dangerous decomposition was 
taking place. It was during this period that the plunder of Big 
Business reached its apogee. Ayub Khan built his power 
structure on the pillars of Big Business, Bureaucracy, and the 
Basic Democrats, all anti-people forces.
205
 It was during the 
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latter part of this period that militant Bengali nationalism 
began to show its face.
206
  
Hence, Bhutto described the US as international capitalist elite, which joined 
hands with the local ruling elite of both East and West Pakistan in order to 
continue its exploitation of poor belonging to both East and West Pakistan. This 
was the reason that on 20 September 1970, a Pakistan People's Party politician 
Malik Muhammad Akhtar, one of Bhutto's close companions, while addressing a 
huge election rally was cited in the Urdu press for claiming that "American 
imperialists" and their agents in Pakistan were afraid of Bhutto's popularity, as the 
PPP would deprive the US of their "sources of exploitation."
207
 Bhutto was also 
reported by the Urdu press to have warned people to be cautious of the agents of 
imperialists who were trying to weaken Pakistan.
208
 Subsequently, Bhutto and his 
PPP portrayed the election campaign as a contest between capitalism and 
socialism where the former was believed to be promoted by the US and the West 
and the PPP was presented as the champion of socialism. Therefore, political 
opposition inside the country was analysed by the PPP politicians as an American 
conspiracy for protection of its capitalistic interests at the cost of people of East 
and West Pakistan. 
Likewise, the right-wing political parties belonging to both parts of Pakistan 
described the US as an exploitative force. For example, a senior office bearer of 
Jamaat-e-Islami Matee-ul-Rehman Nizami informed a press conference at 
Peshawar in April 1970, that since independence "under a conspiracy by ruling 
elites, capitalists, and their agents" the country had become home for ideological 
confrontations, which resulted in the accumulation of wealth in a few hands at the 
cost of the poor majority.
209
 
 Similarly, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman perceived the military as his major 
adversary, as at least twice he refused to see President Yahya Khan, after the 
elections in December 1970.
210
 However, it was perceived in East Pakistan that 
the US completely backed President Yahya Khan during East Pakistan crisis in 
1970-71. On 6 February 1970, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman told journalists that a 
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senior East Pakistani leader joined hands with Ayub Khan in the conspiracy 
against the six point agenda of the Awami League.
211
 On 4 July 1970, while 
talking to journalists Sheikh Mujibur Rahman said, twenty-three years earlier 
Muslims of India fought against the British and in response capitalists, feudal 
lords, and the bureaucracy made Muslims fight against each other after the 
formation of Pakistan.
212
 However, the exploiting forces were afraid of his six 
points and for that reason they were saying to people that the unity of the country 
or even Islam was at stake.
213
 Further, he also warned the "opportunist and 
selfish elements" to stop their "conspiracies to sabotage" the elections in the hope 
of continuing "exploitation of the poor."
214
 
So the political voices from both the right and left-wing and from East and 
West Pakistan agreed on the idea that the US was "an exploitative force." These 
voices however diverged to argue whether the poor of East Pakistan were more 
affected than the people of West Pakistan or the exploitation equally affected the 
poor of the two wings of the country. The Urdu press participated in this discourse 
through communicating the political voices and adding its own analysis and 
opinion about the issue.  
Nawa-i-Waqt at multiple times between 3 May 1971 and 5 June 1971 
observed that Pakistan's foreign debts were increased manifold as compared to 
its annual national income through exports. The newspaper explained that the US 
and other countries in its circle wanted to use aid and debts as a means to their 
own ends. Therefore, the newspaper advised the government to decrease its 
dependence on them. The newspaper argued that Pakistan's economic structure 
was developed by American advisers in a manner, that capital gained from aid 
and debt was used either to produce consumer products or non productive 
ventures. The newspaper explained that small and insignificant factories such as 
those producing plastic items were built in Pakistan for which it had to import 
expensive raw materials. However, the newspaper argued, nothing was done to 
utilise critical national resources such as iron, steel, and natural gas. Therefore, it 
was concluded that "American advisors" were responsible for protection of the 
interest of a Pakistani elite resulting in a limited wealthy class, while leaving the 
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overwhelming majority of the people in poverty and misery. Consequently, the 
newspaper advised restructuring the whole economic system on a fair basis.
215
 
Likewise, on 23 September 1970, Nawa-i-Waqt's editorial, based on the World 
Bank's President Robert McNamara's observation about five hundred million 
people in the world living below poverty lines which was expected to double in ten 
years time, blamed America and the western powers for this poverty. The 
newspaper argued that America having only six percent of the world population 
possessed thirty percent of the world's resources. America and other western 
powers were responsible for the poverty in underdeveloped countries as they did 
not allow trade on favourable terms and foreign aid and debts were used as "tools 
of exploitation" instead of helping the underdeveloped.
216
  
Similarly, another Daily Nawa-i-Waqt's editorial, on 28 September 1970, 
discussed a report recently presented to a subcommittee of the US Congress 
about supplies of medicine at very high prices to underdeveloped countries, 
including Pakistan. According to Nawa-i-Waqt, the report revealed, that prices for 
some medicine being supplied to Pakistan were seventy to eighty times higher 
than international prices. It was argued, that there was a likely "nexus between 
American and domestic exploiters." The newspaper explained that there was a 
"sheer criminal abetment" on the part of Pakistani authorities and decision 
makers, who allowed the purchase of such expensive medicines that put an 
enormous burden on poor Pakistanis. The US was described as "responsible for 
this conspiracy" because they had "always tried to make money by using all 
exploitative tactics." It was also pointed out that for a long time the US had been 
providing loans with conditions whereby the amount of loan had to be used to 
purchase particular items from US companies. It was further explained that they 
were making money with debt services and they were also selling their items at 
higher prices. All this caused "exploitation of poor" Pakistanis.
217
 Moreover, it was 
highlighted that generally political conditions were attached to the aid provided by 
the US. Therefore, the newspaper advised Pakistan to decrease its dependency 
on the foreign aid.
218
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Nawa-i-Waqt's special correspondent in Dhaka Muhammad Faiz, on 1 June 
1970 reported the internal factors of Bengalis' plight and argued that political 
parties in East Pakistan were misguiding the people by putting all the blame of 
underdevelopment on West Pakistan. The correspondent wrote that politicians in 
West Pakistan had not been able to "reply appropriately" to those allegations. At 
most, they blamed in return such critics as "foreign agents." The journalist 
suggested that the appropriate answer would have contained the facts and 
figures to prove that West Pakistan was not responsible for the plight of Bengalis, 
but colonial exploitation, geographical and environmental factors, the lazy attitude 
of Bengalis towards hard work and their emotional and irrational approach were a 
few of the main causes of their underdevelopment.
219
 
Likewise, Jang's argument on the issue of foreign aid was not different. The 
aid was seen as a form of dependency, and therefore the newspaper advised 
Pakistan seek self-sufficiency and gradually decrease its dependence on the 
foreign aid and debts.
220
 
Thus, left and right-wing political parties belonging to East and West Pakistan 
reported by Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt described the US as responsible for the poor 
economic conditions in the country especially in East Pakistan. The Urdu press 
explained that the US exploited in collaboration with the local ruling elite. The US 
described as responsible for the economic plight of the country that caused 
disintegration of Pakistan provided a means to rationalise the discourse of a US 
politics of betrayal in the 1971 War as, the US caused the exploitation of an ally 
by pursuing its capitalist interest. 
2.5 RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DISCOURSE 
Senior journalists and politicians during the interviews conducted for this 
research responded to the role and discourse of the Urdu press in the 1971 War 
in two ways. First, admitting the fact that the narrative had serious issues and the 
US image presented in the crisis was not a factual and true picture of the US 
conduct. Second, they defended the narrative and criticised the US role during 
the crisis.
221
 The discussions published by the Urdu newspapers helped construct 
Pakistan's perspective on the issue. However, opinions given space were at times 
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biased and misguided people about the policies and intentions of the US. 
Alternate arguments that might explain the US position were generally excluded. 
Some of the alternate views recovered through the interviews for this research 
rejected the idea of a US conspiracy by emphasising more internal factors for the 
disintegration of Pakistan in 1971. 
2.5.1 Internal Factors were More Important In Causing the 
Disintegration  
One senior politician who also served as Prime Minister of the country 
accepted that disintegration was caused because of internal issues and he 
stated: 
the fact is that we did not give the due rights to the people of 
East Pakistan. When I was the Prime Minister, the biggest 
demand from the smaller provinces was that we need 
provincial autonomy. Had we given provincial autonomy at 
that time, East Pakistan would have been still with us. That is 
the reason when we deprive them of their rights and we 
usurp their rights, and we did not give them equal rights, and 
there was like a male chauvinism a Punjabi chauvinism that 
we are intellectually better, we are physically better, we are 
[more] presentable, we are taller and they are not, they do 
not have fair complexions. Therefore we used to looked 
down upon them and that caused confusion and had we 
been fair with each other neither America nor anybody else 
could have done anything.
222
 
A former ambassador to the US and federal minister belonging to Pakistan 
Muslim League also did not blame the US for the disintegration of Pakistan and 
said: 
West Pakistan's civilian, military, and political establishment 
refused to accept the results of elections of 1970 when East 
Pakistan, Bengalis had to form the government ... so we lost 
ourselves one half of the country because we could not 
resolve an internal political conflict. Then we expected 
Americans somehow to bail us out and General Yahya Khan 
kept expecting the Seventh Fleet to come to the Bay of 
Bengal to rescue us. So we expected the Seventh Fleet to 
come to our rescue but obviously Americans did not move 
their ships. However, they did counsel Indira Gandhi not to 
attack on our western front. So West Pakistan remained 
intact ... The fact of the matter is that we have been 
psychologically coming out of a colonial mind set, so we 
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have got into an imperialistic mindset reliant on others, to 
pullout our chestnuts out of the fire.
223
 
2.5.2 Biased and Misleading Discourse 
One of the respondents having a life time experience of Urdu journalism 
accused both the Urdu and English press of "misinforming the people." He 
explained that one of the reasons was that "the only TV channel was controlled 
by the government." According to his understanding, "it was never the United 
States policy that it would move its Seventh Fleet to defend East Pakistan and 
support Pakistan's position." However, this issue was "totally misconceived rather 
than a falsehood, that they [the media] were aware that this was not going to 
happen, but they publicised it." He further explained that this is one of the reasons 
that "why there is so much opposition to America among the common level of 
people, because they thought that they [US] promised and betrayed and did not 
prove to be Pakistan's true friend." Pakistan's military government and other 
political forces failed to recognise the sensitivity of the issue, in spite of the fact, 
that even China advised that "it should be identified, very politely, by Pakistan's 
establishment, and it should be recognised that there is a national issue in East 
Pakistan." 
The journalist recollected that when any member of the press wanted to say 
the truth they: 
were accused of being Indian and foreign agents. When 
someone tried to tell people that the Pakistani Army is being 
defeated, they were [laughs] not convinced and actually 
some of them were very angry, that is why such comments 
are being made, because media was telling them that we 
have conquered such and such places, we have got that 
mountain, and we have made the Mukti Bahini on the run, 
and we have done this and that.
224
 
One of the reasons for the inability of Pakistani press to inform the people 
about the facts was the stringent control and suppression by the military 
government of the time. A senior journalist who also served for the Foreign 
Services of Pakistan said: 
I think the big tragedy was that media was not free and 
media was nationalistic. We had anti-press laws, which 
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remained intact until 1985, when they were set aside. The 
media was state owned [or state controlled] and it 
misrepresented the situation in East Pakistan. Yeah the 
tragedy is, now the facts are coming out, that President 
Nixon sided with Pakistan while the rest of the world and the 
American nation was greatly angered by the actions taken by 
the Pakistan army. You know that Pakistan was ruled by the 
Army.
225
 
Pakistani newspapers under the strict control of the military government 
attempted to shape public opinion to support official policy and decisions. 
Pakistani media due to its biased representation of the US role and expected help 
raised false expectations in the masses. One of the most senior journalists of the 
country also believed that the role of the Urdu press was "absolutely misleading," 
as "during the 1971 War as in 1965 War, the media by and large and Urdu 
newspapers were fed completely by official agencies." The media told people that 
the Pakistan military was in a good position to win the war and "they did not tell 
the people what was [actually] happening" and for that reason on "16th of 
December when Dhaka fell people were taken by surprise" and even 
"newspapers themselves became very angry." Pakistani media especially the 
Urdu press failed to show a complete and true picture of the situation and "it did 
not perform its functions honestly and efficiently." It was argued by the journalist 
that Pakistan lost both the 1965 and 1971 Wars but the "press never told the 
people." In 1971, there was little room for telling lies about the victory as finally 
the "people saw that their country had lost." No one could hide the ground 
realities such as "the separation of East Pakistan ... Indian planes [that] were able 
to attack West Pakistan's civilian population," and Indians who had "occupied 
Pakistan's territory" which were known to everyone. Therefore, for the 
government and the media, "there was no possibility of telling lies on 71."
226
 
When people expect some help from an ally or a friend and are disappointed 
by them they feel betrayed. A journalist explained similarly that:  
the feelings and perceptions of US betrayal actually resulted 
from failed expectations ... For example, in the 1971 War 
people were expecting a particular kind of support from the 
USA, and when they did not receive this support they felt 
betrayed. 
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However, if their expectations were based on misunderstanding of the 
commitments by an ally then "political forces, civil or military and mass media can 
be held responsible for raising the expectations of the people." The respondent 
shared his information on the issue and claimed that: 
in 1998 once I asked an American diplomat who was 
appointed on the Seventh Fleet in 1971, was the Seventh 
fleet really coming to rescue Pakistan? He smiled and said 
that issue was reported in the wrong manner to the public. 
However, after the disintegration happened, America was blamed for its inability 
to save Pakistan in order to transfer responsibility for the events. In the opinion of 
the respondent "powerful political forces, civil or military used the media to make 
America a scapegoat for state failure in East Pakistan. It was easy to associate 
things with conspiracy." The respondent concluded: 
even to this date people, who point out the wrong doings of 
the Pakistani government and military establishment in East 
Pakistan, are portrayed as traitors. A recent example is an 
attempt to murder a famous journalist who has been 
continuously writing and talking about atrocities committed 
by the Pakistani Military in East Pakistan.
227
 
Thus, interviewees had different opinions about the issue. Most of them think 
that the media discourse was misguiding, biased, and based on propaganda that 
raised popular expectations, which later caused a sense of betrayal on the part of 
Pakistanis. Others think that the role was not that biased as the US actually 
betrayed Pakistan and therefore it is the US who is to be blamed for its conduct 
and policies not the media for communicating the US response to the people. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Between July and December 1971, when Pakistan needed the US on its side 
for deterrence purposes by projecting the balance of power in its favour, the 
Pakistani media gave a positive projection of the US, which raised expectations of 
their ally among the people. During the Bangladesh crisis in general and the 1971 
War in particular, the Pakistani media, political parties and ruling elite failed to 
communicate a true and complete picture of the situation. When, all of a sudden, 
the people heard the news of defeat, they could not understand the reasons for 
losing a war in which, they had been told, their superpower military ally was ready 
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to come to help under its obligations of past military agreements. Pakistani public 
expectations were shattered, and the people felt betrayed. 
Although the US commitment to Pakistan was originally given in the context of 
a communist threat, and the 1959 agreement gave some guarantee against the 
threat from India, it was never meant to involve the automatic physical 
intervention of the US. Rather it provided for mutual consultations and appropriate 
actions mutually agreed that may include physical involvement. Therefore, from 
the responses of the respondents and the discourse analysis of Nawa-i-Waqt and 
Jang it is evident that the dominant voices of the newspapers, both the right and 
left-wing political parties, and of the journalists included in the discourse 
presented only one side of the picture. The alternate opinions which could have 
challenged the dominant voices of the discussion were largely excluded. 
Consequently, the image of the US which was given through the discourse of 
the Urdu press was that of an unsympathetic ally, insensitive to the security of a 
friendly country. The US was portrayed as having anti-Muslim tendencies, as 
being involved in economic exploitation, and as causing the underdevelopment of 
poorer international partners. It was also accused of stirring up conflict situations 
and conspiring against an ally through interfering in its internal affairs for its own 
selfish ends, while sometimes extending half-hearted support which was not 
enough to save an ally from territorial disintegration. Different voices in the 
discourse established the concept of US betrayal of Pakistan in the 1971 War first 
by exaggerating the help which could reasonably have been expected from the 
US after the change in its relationship with China, and later by rationalising it 
through the idea of a US conspiracy, its modalities, and causes. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND DOUBTS ABOUT 
US INTENTIONS 
Pakistan's nuclear program, which was developed in response to India's 
interest in developing nuclear weapons in the 1970s, was opposed by the US on 
the basis of concerns about nuclear proliferation. A major section of academic 
scholarship on Pakistan's side accused the US of ignoring the security concerns 
of its ally vis-à-vis India and of opposing Pakistan's nuclear program and ignoring 
that of India.
1
 On the other hand, a significant majority of western and Indian 
intellectuals joined by a few Pakistanis criticised the US for not taking enough 
measures to restrict Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons.
2
 The Urdu press 
predominantly echoed the former view of the US policy regarding Pakistan's 
nuclear program.  
Multiple voices within the mainstream Urdu newspapers between 1971 and 
1998 discussed Pakistan's nuclear program, primarily from Pakistan's 
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perspective. One of the most prominent opinions was provided by journalists in 
the media itself. The newspapers generally expressed their opinions in the form of 
editorials associated with the newspapers instead of presenting them as any 
particular author’s view. Others who expressed themselves through the 
newspapers included politicians and members of the ruling elite, senior scientists 
related to Pakistan's nuclear program and, at times, individual journalists and 
intellectuals. Most of the voices in the discourse were of Pakistani origin, however 
occasionally opinions of the foreign media, politicians, journalists, and 
intellectuals were included too. 
The Urdu press discourse on Pakistan's nuclear program established that by 
ignoring serious security threats to Pakistan, the US did not equally oppose the 
Indian nuclear program. This, combined with the US failure to help Pakistan 
strengthen its conventional military defence against India between 1965 and 1981 
meant that Pakistan arguably had no choice but to opt for nuclear options. 
Moreover, Pakistan's program always remained a direct response to the Indian 
nuclear program. Therefore, Pakistan kept arguing that it had no objection to 
signing the international Non-Proliferation Treaty provided India signed it first. 
However, the US continued to pressure Pakistan to unilaterally sign agreements 
on international monitoring and inspections. Thus in order to ensure its security, 
Pakistan had to keep the option of nuclear weapons open. 
An important perspective presented in the discourse on Pakistan-US relations 
over nuclear weapons is also the Indian connection. India’s criticism of the US 
showing an interest in Pakistan's security raised doubts in Pakistan as to the US’s 
commitment to Pakistan. Consequently, when the US opposed Pakistan’s 
planned purchasing of a French nuclear reprocessing plant and suspended 
military aid in 1979 and 1990, these actions were described as a US betrayal 
under Indian influence. It was also argued that US conduct was not merely a 
betrayal rather, it was a betrayal which formed part of a wider conspiracy. So, the 
discourse tended to explain different modalities and causes of that US conspiracy. 
The modalities of US conspiracy as presented by the discourse included the 
US using the American and western media for propaganda purposes against 
Pakistan's nuclear program, the US deploying pressurising tactics including the 
suspension of military and economic aid, and interference in Pakistan's domestic 
politics to harm Pakistan's nuclear program. The three causes of US conspiracy 
included: first, the US being a hegemonic power which wanted to protect its 
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capitalistic interests and to keep Pakistan dependent on it. Second, the US, being 
an anti-Islamic force, would not allow a Muslim country to have a nuclear program 
for its development and security purposes. Third, the US preferred India over 
Pakistan as India is a larger country and is therefore comparatively more useful 
for the pursuance of US interests in South Asia.  
All the perspectives on the nuclear discourse in key newspapers in the Urdu 
press, that is Jang, and Nawa-i-Waqt, as well as government officials, journalists 
and politicians belonging to both right and left-wing ideologies, all supported the 
idea that there had been a US betrayal of an ally. Excluded from the discourse 
were voices offering an alternate understanding of the issues rather than simply 
seeing it as a complete US betrayal as part of a conspiracy. 
Section 3.1 of this chapter analyses the perceived US politics of betrayal vis-
à-vis Pakistan's nuclear program and details how the different voices in the Urdu 
press expressed Pakistan's security threats and viewed the US response under 
Indian criticism with suspicion, and finally, how they observed the US as 
backtracking from its commitments. The Urdu press saw the US’s opposition to 
Pakistan's nuclear program as a US politics of betrayal. Section 3.2 discusses 
how different voices in the Urdu press adhered to idea of a US conspiracy lying 
behind its perceived betrayal. Section 3.3 details different modalities of the US 
conspiracy against Pakistan. Such modalities mainly included using the US and 
western media for propaganda purposes, pressurising tactics such as the 
suspension of economic and military aid, and interfering in Pakistan's domestic 
politics. These modalities crystallised the idea of a US conspiracy against 
Pakistan. Section 3.4 presents the different causes, as described by the 
discourse, behind the US conspiracy and for that matter, behind the perceived 
betrayal of an ally. These described causes primarily included first, that the US, 
as a hegemonic power, wanted to keep Pakistan dependent on it. Second, that 
the US, as an anti-Islamic force, conspired against the nuclear program of a 
Muslim country, and third, that the US, in pursuance of its interests in South Asia, 
preferred India over Pakistan as an ally, India being a larger country. These 
described causes facilitated the rationalisation of the idea of a US conspiracy and 
a politics of betrayal vis-à-vis Pakistan's nuclear program. Section 3.5 concludes 
the chapter by summarising the discourse on the US betrayal vis-à-vis Pakistan's 
nuclear program, the argument behind the existence of a conspiracy, and its 
modalities and causes as constructed by the hegemonic voices of the discourse. 
109 
 
The conclusion also considers the alternative voices which broadly remained 
excluded from the press discussions. 
3.1 THE US POLITICS OF BETRAYAL VIS-À-VIS PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM 
Having a bitter experience of shattered hopes due to "US betrayal" in the 
1971 War the Urdu press seemed conscious of security threats to Pakistan from 
India with regard to imbalance in conventional military power and more 
specifically due to India showing interests in developing nuclear weapons. 
Consequently, Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, and the dominant voices of politicians, state 
officials, and journalists adhering to both right and left-wing ideologies expressed 
Pakistan's security concerns vis-à-vis India. The discourse in the Urdu press in 
post 1971 era started from highlighting the increasing imbalance in conventional 
military power between India and Pakistan creating a strategic disadvantage to 
Pakistan especially due to US sanctions on military supplies since the 1971 War. 
Additionally, India's nuclear tests on 18 May 1974 further enhanced Pakistan's 
threat perceptions with regard to India. Though the US empathised with 
Pakistan's critical security position and attempted to express its determination to 
help Pakistan overcome its problems, the Urdu press expressed doubts with 
regard to US commitment and its reliability as a military ally because of Indian 
criticism on US intentions to support Pakistan. 
Thus, when the US was perceived backtracking from its earlier commitments 
or opposing Pakistan's nuclear program, the dominant voices noted that 
simultaneously it was supporting India's nuclear program or at least India was not 
subject to the same US opposition to its nuclear development. Therefore, the 
doubts that the US might once more give preference to India and betray Pakistan 
were confirmed after US opposition to the purchase of a French nuclear 
reprocessing plant and suspension of military aid in 1979 and 1990. 
3.1.1 Security Threats due to an Imbalance in Conventional Weapons 
Pushing Pakistan to Nuclear Weapons 
Jang on 12 March 1973 reported Governor Punjab Ghulam Mustafa Khar, as 
special messenger of President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to have been sent to the US to 
convince Americans of Pakistan's security requirements. The newspaper argued 
on the one hand that Pakistan had entered defence agreements with the US, as it 
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wanted "security against the Indian threat" and had always been friendly with 
America. On the other hand after 1962, it was indicated that India got aid from 
both the US and USSR on the pretext of the Chinese threat, India also continued 
after the 1965 War to receive weapons from Soviet and other sources, and finally 
caused the disintegration of Pakistan with the help of those weapons. Therefore, 
the newspaper suggested that it was "unfair for the US" to treat both Pakistan and 
India equally, as latter was not threatened by Pakistan or China, instead the 
former faced a clear threat from the Indian aggression.
3
 
Consequently, the US decision, in March 1973, to resume military supplies to 
both India and Pakistan was incomprehensible on the Pakistan's side. Jang on 17 
March 1973 argued that in the past this policy had not worked and encouraged 
India to pursue its "aggressive designs." In future, it was less likely that this policy 
would promote peace and stability in South Asia. The newspaper argued that the 
US had claimed pursuing this policy to maintain the balance of power in South 
Asia, but there was the question of protecting a smaller state, Pakistan from a 
much larger and "aggressive country," India. Therefore, the newspaper concluded 
that American policy to give an equal treatment to both countries was in fact 
"unreasonable" and not in Pakistan's interest.
4
 
A journalist in Jang, Asif Jillani on 15 July 1973 advised the US to reconsider 
its policies, because it could not ignore South Asia as India supported by the 
USSR could threaten the peace of the region.
5
 Jang argued that peace between 
India and Pakistan could only be preserved through maintaining a balance of 
power in the region. Therefore, the US had a responsibility to fulfil its obligations 
towards Pakistan under the old agreements.
6
 The newspaper noted that Prime 
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto therefore in line with this viewpoint expected some 
military assistance during his visit to the US in September 1973. However, no 
particular US assurances of military aid caused disappointment. The newspaper 
on 22 September 1973 argued that US assurances of political support to Pakistan 
were indeed important for Pakistan's security and survival. However, the kind of 
confidence a stronger defence gives a nation cannot be compared with that of 
political support. Therefore, the US was advised to realise this fact, and if it could 
not strengthen Pakistan's defence, then it must use its influence to resolve those 
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issues between India and Pakistan due to which Pakistan had to seek strength 
and depth in its defence capabilities. At the same time, the newspaper advised 
Pakistan to continue seeking good relations and military support from all the 
superpowers.
7
 
Jang on 15 December 1973 conversely noted that the US cancelled the 
significant amount of 16.64 billion rupees India had to pay against the wheat 
purchases in 1973-74.
8
 Subsequently, the newspaper regarded it as a policy to 
appease India and claimed that the US had also resumed military aid worth $19 
million to India, which would affect the balance of military power in the region, 
already disturbed due to increasing the military power of India. The newspaper 
also noted that India had been receiving military aid from the USSR and other 
sources, and US continuous rewards to India were perceived to threaten 
Pakistan's security and survival. The newspaper advised that if the US could not 
provide arms to Pakistan for the sake of peace and security, it was better not to 
provide any military assistance to India either.
9
 
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in April 1974, once again demanded that the 
US lift the sanctions on supply of arms to Pakistan. He had requested the same 
during his visit to the US in September 1973. Jang seconded the Prime Minister's 
argument that the biggest deterrent to aggression in South Asia had been 
Pakistan's defence capability, and for that reason, as soon as the capability was 
weaken because of American sanctions on arms supply to both India and 
Pakistan since 1965, "India dared to commit aggression" in 1965 and 1971. The 
newspaper further argued that to "restrict expansionism" in South Asia, Pakistan 
needed a stronger defence. The newspaper explained that threats to Pakistan 
were multiplied because its western neighbour Afghanistan was also receiving aid 
from the USSR, and was allied with India in opposing Pakistan while claiming 
territory inside Pakistan. Conversely, the newspaper claimed, "Pakistan did not 
have territorial claims," and had "no wish to expand" its territory.
10
 The newspaper 
on 22 September 1974 further argued that India during the previous twenty seven 
years had occupied the states of Kashmir, Hyderabad, Juna Gadh, Goa and 
Sikkim and its forces had entered East Bengal in 1971 to help the disintegration 
of Pakistan. The newspaper claimed that in its "obsession to become a regional 
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superpower" India had conducted nuclear tests on 18 May 1974. For all these 
reasons, a stronger Pakistan, able to defend against Indian aggression was 
required for peace and security in South Asia.
11
 
3.1.2 Expression of Pakistan's Security Concerns vis-à-vis India's 
Nuclear Program 
Information about the Indian nuclear weapons program, as early as 24 June 
1971, increased Pakistan's security concerns. Nawa-i-Waqt endorsed the 
statement of I.H. Osmani, then Chairman of Pakistan's Atomic Energy 
Commission (PAEC), who said that international society had to take notice of "war 
obsessed Indian policies," and even consider taking India's nuclear reactor into 
international custody in order to restrict the possibility of developing a nuclear 
bomb. If India succeeded, some of the smaller countries in the region might also 
have to become involved in the race. The newspaper argued that by developing 
nuclear weapons India wanted to threaten the security of its neighbours and 
blackmail them, especially Pakistan, to evade its international obligations of non-
interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. The newspaper warned the 
superpowers that they had to realise the fact that allowing India to go ahead with 
its nuclear program would introduce a new series of nuclear states such as 
Canada, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Israel, and Japan.
12
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 1 July 1971 noted that the timing of Indian expression of 
interest in nuclear technology was important, as Pakistan was facing a severe 
internal crisis in East Pakistan. The newspaper argued that it was a blackmail 
tactic to pressurise Pakistan to accept Indian hegemony in the region. The 
newspaper claimed that the US, UK, USSR, and Canada were among the 
countries helping India to become a nuclear power. Therefore Pakistan had to 
make the superpowers realise their mistakes and provide protection against this 
potential nuclear threat from India.
13
 Jang reported on 22 August 1972 that India 
possessed all the ingredients required to develop a nuclear device and was 
expected to conduct tests soon.
14
 The newspaper on 27 November 1972 reported 
that the US was providing enormous aid to India, approximately 56.5 percent of 
total foreign assistance for various social and economic spheres, and also helping 
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it to build the largest nuclear reactor in Asia at Tarapur in 1963. The newspaper 
observed that American aid to Pakistan was far less in proportion as compared to 
that of India.
15
 Jang on 30 November 1972 argued that Pakistan's interest in the 
nuclear program was therefore justified on the basis of "Indian aggressive 
designs." The newspaper claimed that installation of a nuclear power plant, at 
Karachi in November 1972, was Pakistan's first important achievement in the 
nuclear field. It was argued that progress in the nuclear field would help to meet 
the requirements of energy and defence. Therefore it was essential that Pakistan 
after achieving a milestone in the field of energy must pursue the other one of 
nuclear military security.
16
 
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto told a press conference on 21 May 1974 
"Pakistan could not be blackmailed" by a nuclear threat. He requested the nuclear 
powers to cooperate with Pakistan for peaceful purposes to enable Pakistan to 
speed up its implementation of its nuclear program. He said, Pakistan would 
convey its concerns to CENTO, USSR, Canada, France, Britain, and China. 
Bhutto further appealed to the United Nations to take notice of Indian tests and 
ensure that the Security Council would provide a guarantee against the Indian 
nuclear threat. Bhutto also told journalists that Pakistan would continue its nuclear 
program at a faster pace in order to achieve peaceful goals and that the purpose 
of Pakistan's nuclear program was to attain economic progress and the wellbeing 
of the people. Bhutto finally said that Pakistanis would eat grass and compromise 
on their necessities but not on their nuclear program.
17
 Likewise Muneer Ahmad 
Khan, Chairman Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was reported by 
Jang on 21 May 1974, to have said that Pakistan needed nuclear energy for its 
survival and progress. He also said that Pakistan had talented scientists and 
enough reserves of uranium to implement a nuclear program successfully.
18
 Jang 
on 21 May 1974 supported the statement of Muneer Ahmad Khan by explaining 
that small countries of the region such as Bangladesh, Nepal, and Burma were 
not in a position to reply to the Indian threat. Therefore, Pakistan had to take this 
responsibility.
19
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Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesman was reported on 20 May 1974 to have 
said that entire world was concerned about Indian nuclear tests on 18 May 1974 
and so was Pakistan. The spokesperson further said that it was not an element of 
surprise as Pakistan had been warning international society, nuclear and 
superpowers about the Indian nuclear program and India's intentions for the 
previous ten years.
20
 The spokesperson argued that the treaty of 1968 to restrict 
nuclear proliferation, signed under the supervision of the US and USSR had been 
undermined due to Indian intentions and actions.
21
 
Jang on 22 May 1974 raised the question that while world powers failed to 
restrict India from conducting nuclear tests, was it possible at all to avoid 
proliferation? The newspaper's reply was in the negative, because India had 
generated concerns of security and survival for some non-nuclear countries. 
Therefore, the newspaper suggested that the five nuclear powers were duty 
bound to ensure security of the threatened states. However, a nation could not 
rely completely on international regulations and guarantees because they are "not 
powerful enough" to ensure the survival of a smaller country like Pakistan or to 
restrict the high headedness of a larger country like India. It was also feared that 
countries, which were important sources of nuclear supplies such as Canada, 
would no more provide nuclear support to other countries such as Pakistan in "the 
pretext of proliferation" because India had "deceived" them. Consequently, the 
newspaper concluded that it was the responsibility of the UN and superpowers, 
either to ensure avoiding new entrants into nuclear club through back doors, or to 
allow every state to get access to the technology.
22
 
Aziz Ahmad, Pakistan's Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs was 
reported by Jang on 23 May 1974 to have told a press conference in Washington 
that Pakistan would ask the UN and all nuclear powers, especially the US to 
assure Pakistan of its security against the Indian nuclear threat. He said that the 
US had already provided such an assurance to India during its war with China in 
1962. He said that Pakistan did not sign the treaty about non-proliferation 
because India refused to sign the same. In the given circumstances, he said, the 
US should reassure Pakistan for security against Indian nuclear threat.
23
 In 
consequence, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was reported by Jang on 12 June 
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1974 to have received a letter from Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to assure 
that India did not want to use nuclear technology for military purposes. However, 
the newspaper described the letter as "part of the Indian propaganda campaign" 
to convince the world of the "peaceful nature" of its nuclear program. Jang noted 
that Bhutto responded to the letter primarily with two suggestions. First, all 
nuclear powers or at least one of them would provide a guarantee to counter 
nuclear threats. Second, India must assure Pakistan of its peaceful intentions 
through signing more than one international arrangement for nuclear safeguards. 
The newspaper endorsed Bhutto's suggestions and urged superpowers to pay 
special attention to the issue.
24
 Likewise some members of the National 
Assembly, during the budget session, were reported by Jang on 17 June 1974 to 
have asked the government of Pakistan to seek guarantees against a nuclear 
threat or to think about developing its own nuclear weapons.
25
 Pakistani Minister 
of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmad on 20 June 1974, told the 
National Assembly that Pakistan would do everything to strengthen its defence, 
including requesting the superpowers to provide required assurances.
26
 
Jang on 1 October 1974 noted that India wanted to keep the choices of 
nuclear weapons open and for that reason had opposed the Pakistani suggestion 
of creating a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia. Therefore, the newspaper 
argued that India's program was neither peaceful nor were its intentions good. It 
had hegemonic ambitions in South Asia and wanted to expand its territories. The 
newspaper further wrote that it had caused the disintegration of a neighbour and 
wished to repeat the same. Hence Pakistan's intentions in making efforts for a 
nuclear weapons free zone were to highlight Indian aggressive intentions.
27
 Iqbal 
Akhund, Pakistan's permanent representative in the UN, while talking to a 
delegation of officers from American War College in New York, was reported by 
Jang on 22 October 1974 to have explained Pakistan's intentions. He said that 
the proposed nuclear weapons free South Asia meant that all countries of the 
regions would promise not to construct nuclear weapons, offering their peaceful 
nuclear program for international inspection and observation, coupled with an 
assurance by the nuclear powers that they would not threaten or use nuclear 
weapons in this region. Pakistan knew, he explained, that application of this 
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suggestion would interfere in the sovereignty of countries, but this would ensure 
peace and stability.
28
 
Fazal Elahi the President of Pakistan in one of his letters to the UN, was 
reported by Jang on 25 October 1974 to have emphasised, that practical steps 
were needed to protect sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity 
of the smaller and comparatively weaker states. He highlighted the need for 
realisation of the increasing threats of the nuclear war, and therefore the 
importance of controlling nuclear proliferation.
29
 Similarly, Prime Minister Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto, during his visit to the USSR in October 1974, told Kosygin that 
achieving the objectives of a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia, would 
help to maintain peace and security, through an effective control of the nuclear 
proliferation.
30
 
Nayaz Saif a columnist in Nawa-i-Waqt on 13 December 1976 highlighted the 
General Assembly adopting Pakistan's resolution about nuclear proliferation and 
assurances by the nuclear states for the protection of non-nuclear states in 
December 1976. The columnist regarded it an achievement for Pakistan, but at 
the same time argued that it was unfortunate that in the past resolutions of the 
weaker states remained ineffective, given the fact that the UN was dominated by 
powerful actors like the US. Indian nuclear tests posed a serious threat to 
Pakistan's security, whereas the UN was not capable of providing credible 
assurance against these threats, especially in the context of historical 
experiences and facts on ground. The journalist further argued that the only way 
to get protection against these threats was to reply to it in the kind by acquiring 
the same nuclear technology.
31
 
The prominent voices of Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, journalists, and government 
officials speaking through the newspapers attempted to establish Pakistan's 
security concerns because of growing imbalance of conventional and nuclear 
military power in South Asia in favour of India. It was argued that the US, other 
nuclear powers, and the international society failed to restrict India from 
conducting nuclear tests, and therefore the US being an ally of Pakistan had a 
responsibility to reassure Pakistan's security against the Indian nuclear threat. It 
was also suggested that the US should also support Pakistan's proposals of a 
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nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia to maintain peace and stability in the 
region. Such a situation demanded a positive and appropriate response from a 
military ally like the US. 
3.1.3 US Response to Pakistan's Security Threats 
The Urdu press represented the US empathising Pakistan's security 
concerns. Jang on 12 July 1974 noted that there was a realisation of Pakistan's 
problems in the US as Senator Henry Jackson, a probable candidate for the 
forthcoming presidential elections in 1976, told a press conference that the US 
had "better resume supplies of weapons" to Pakistan, as the USSR was trying to 
"cause its further disintegration." He also reportedly confessed that China and the 
US were supposed to help Pakistan in 1971 as the USSR helped India which had 
proved very effective for the latter. In general terms he expressed his concerns 
about the USSR, trying to increase its influence in the South Asian region.
32
 The 
newspaper on 14 July 1974 further noted that Senator Henry Jackson had told 
the United States Committee on Finance, that according to his knowledge, US 
was aware that India had attempted to conduct nuclear tests in February 1974 
and it was not the first attempt, as India had also done its first nuclear tests in the 
previous year. Therefore, he said, that the US was in full knowledge of Indian 
intentions about its nuclear program and was not doing much to control 
proliferation, instead it kept supplying nuclear equipment even after the tests.
33
 
Jang argued that even US parliamentarians were of the view that the US aware of 
Indian intentions of developing nuclear weapons failed to take appropriate 
measures to restrict India from such a development and therefore had a moral 
obligation to reassure Pakistan of its security against Indian nuclear threat. 
Similarly, Jang on 12 August 1974 observed that President Gerald Ford after 
taking charge of his office in 1974 wrote a letter to Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto "affirming to fulfil all American promises" with Pakistan. He wrote that to 
support its important political allies had been "the corner stone" of the US foreign 
policy. Therefore, the newspaper noted that President Ford "assured Pakistan of 
observing" all international obligations in its relations with Pakistan and other 
nations. He also admitted that over the years "the solid and warm relationship" 
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between the two countries had helped "the cause of peace" in the world.
34
 
Extracts from his views on foreign policy were also published in Pakistani 
newspapers according to which President Ford believed that "the US could help 
with weapons and financial aid" to other countries for their territorial integrity and 
security, but in any case "it would not help by sending its own military forces." 
Therefore, a hope was raised in the media that the Ford administration might 
think about resuming supplies of weapons to Pakistan.
35
 
In the meantime Jang on 12 August 1974 observed that Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger wrote a separate letter to Pakistan's Minister of State for Defence 
and Foreign Affairs Aziz Ahmad, expressing his hope that "Pakistan and US 
would work together" for the cause of peace. Secretary Kissinger also 
appreciated the fact that over the years, "the two countries had discovered" that 
they had "several common objectives" and interests. Therefore, he hoped that the 
relationship would get even stronger in coming years.
36
 Jang further noted that 
Kissinger in addressing the CENTO conference at Ankara on 22 May 1975 said 
that the US would continue to "take interest in the territorial integrity" of Pakistan 
along with supporting the reconciliation process between India and Pakistan after 
the Simla Agreement.
37
 Similarly, Jang on 12 July 1975 reported a group of fifty 
Pakistani journalists visiting the US Department of State. The newspaper noted 
that the journalists were told by "high level officials" that "the US would not remain 
silent," if Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity was "threatened by any 
foreign aggression." The US officials also stated that the US had concerns over 
Soviet naval presence in the region, and it would not allow any of the South Asian 
countries to develop its relations with any power, in a way that would help to 
create hegemony of one power.
38
 
While Jang appreciated such US statements in favour of Pakistan, at the 
same time it raised questions about the effectiveness of such statements. The 
newspaper on 13 July 1975 argued that because of the way in which the balance 
of power in the region had been disturbed and smaller countries had become 
subject to aggression, it was less likely that mere statements could help resolve 
the issue. The US had to "change its policy" of "providing half hearted support" to 
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its allies and had to implement more practical measures to ensure their security. 
The newspaper hoped that unlike previous experiences this time, the US 
authorities would not abandon the relationship after taking it to the maximum 
heights because this action would cause more harm to a dependent ally.
39
 
3.1.4 Indian Criticism on US Response 
Jang on 16 December 1972 observed that India nonetheless was expressing 
its concerns over the possibility of American military aid to Pakistan. Indian 
Foreign Minister Sardar Sawaran Singh, while addressing the lower house of the 
Indian parliament in December 1972 was reported to have warned America for 
thinking about resuming military supplies to Pakistan, as it would affect the 
possibilities of normalisation of their bilateral relationship and peace in the 
region.
40
 The newspaper on 16 March 1973 once again reported Sawaran Singh 
to have told the Indian parliament that it was unrealistic to place Pakistan on a par 
with India.
41
 The newspaper on 17 March also reported President Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto to have stated that Indian protests were "unnecessary" and that Pakistan 
was aware of Soviet aid to India but it never protested. Conversely, Bhutto further 
stated that Pakistan and the US were attached to mutual defence agreements 
and the latter was not fulfilling its duties.
42
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 12 October 1978 noted that Indian Foreign Minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee criticised the American decision to resume military aid to Pakistan 
in 1978 and especially the American intentions to provide fighter planes to 
Pakistan.
43
 Nawa-i-Waqt on 15 February 1979, reported the Indian Foreign 
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to have warned the US that it should not repeat the 
mistake of arming Pakistan as weapons could not help political stability and 
economic growth of a country.
44
 Similarly, the newspaper on 18 March 1979 
reported the Indian Defence Minister Ram Singh having said that India had firmly 
asked the US not to provide arms to Pakistan, as the latter did not face any threat 
from India, instead Pakistan was actually threatened by its internal and economic 
problems.
45
 The newspaper on 2 April 1979 once again reported Vajpayee to 
                                              
39
 Ibid, editorial, 13 July 1975, p.3. 
40
 Jang, news article, 16 December 1972, p.2. 
41
 Ibid, news article, 16 March 1973, p.1. 
42
 Ibid, news article, 17 March 1973, p.1. 
43
 Nawa-i-Waqt, news article, 17 October 1978, p.1. 
44
 Ibid, news article, 15 February 1979, p.1.  
45
 Ibid, news article, 18 March 1979, p.1. 
120 
 
have told the Indian Parliament, that India's relations with the US were improving, 
but the two countries had differences over the issue of arms supply to Pakistan.
46
 
The Urdu press nonetheless observed that India attempting to divert US attention 
from India's accumulation of conventional and nuclear military weapons was 
criticising US intentions to support Pakistan (as shown in Figure 21, 22, and 23). 
 
Figure 21, Nawa-i-Waqt on 27 November 1978 published cartoon which reflected 
whenever the US considered fulfilling its obligations to provide military support to 
Pakistan India would start propaganda. The cartoon showed Indian Foreign Minister Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee riding a heavily loaded truck with arms whereas personified Pakistan 
riding a meagre scooter and armed with a shotgun. The caption of the cartoon read, "I 
have reservations even at [Pakistan's] shotgun. Indian government is against arms race 
in South Asia: Atal Bihari Vajpayee."
47
 
 
Figure 22, Nawa-i-Waqt on 8 March 1979 published the cartoon to reflect Indian 
propaganda to influence the world about Pakistan's nuclear program while hiding nuclear 
weapons in its sleeves. The cartoon showed Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
talking to world, "we are concerned that Pakistan will develop nuclear bomb ...the atom 
bomb is a very bad thing ... stop Pakistan from making an atom bomb ..."
48
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Figure 23, Nawa-i-Waqt on 2 June 1982 published cartoon, which reflected Indian 
reaction to US consideration of supplying F-16 fighter aircrafts to Pakistan. The cartoon 
showed Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi shouting "F-16!" at the US President Ronald 
Reagan. The caption of the cartoon read, "Indira Gandhi will talk to President Reagan 
about the offer of American arms [especially F-16] to Pakistan."
49
 
Furthermore, Nawa-i-Waqt on 14 July 1982 noted that the most disturbing fact 
for India was the proposed supply of F-16 fighter planes that would enhance 
Pakistan's strike capability, and increase the range manifold. The newspaper also 
noted that it was also a cause of worry that the US had not taken any assurance 
that the supplied military equipment would not be used against India, and 
Pakistan would not try to become a nuclear power.
50
 The reason for Indian 
criticism on American aid to Pakistan, Nawa-i-Waqt observed, was to somehow 
convince the US to stop the aid.
51
 
Subsequently, Nawa-i-Waqt on 28 July 1982 observed that just before her 
visit to the US the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had changed her tone on 
American military aid to Pakistan. According to the newspaper, the change was 
not due to some change in Indian approach, but it was an attempt to create a 
better environment before Indira Gandhi's visit in order to get extra mileage.
52
 
However, the newspaper hoped that in spite of Indian pressure, the US would not 
change its policy of providing aid to Pakistan as long as it was in US interest vis-
à-vis the Afghan War.
53
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 2 August 1982 reported that Indira Gandhi could not 
convince the US to change its policy towards Pakistan. She was however 
successful in getting one billion dollars arms for India. The newspaper argued that 
it was understandable that being a larger country, the US could not ignore India, 
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but did the US take any guarantee from India that American weapons supplied to 
it would not be used against Pakistan?
54
 The newspaper explained that the US 
would sell its arms to a larger country like India to increase its profits.
55
 Nawa-i-
Waqt advised Pakistan to think and cater for its own defence especially in a 
condition, where India was increasing its military power by all sources.
56
 
 
Figure 24, Nawa-i-Waqt on 4 August 1982 published cartoon to reflect US military aid to 
India. Indian Prime Minister was reported to have signed an agreement to buy military 
weapons of worth one billion dollars from the US. The cartoon showed Indian Prime 
minister as "dove of peace" flying back with military equipment from the US and the US 
President Reagan seeing her off. The caption of the cartoon read, "India will acquire one 
billion dollars American arms."
57
 
The Urdu press on one hand observed India criticising the US intentions to 
resume military supplies to Pakistan or to place Pakistan at par with India. It was 
argued on the other hand that India wanted to acquire more weapons from the 
US while putting a pressure on it to deprive Pakistan of the same. Since, both the 
USSR and the US were providing India with weapons it was disturbing balance of 
power in the region against Pakistan's security. 
3.1.5 Pakistan's Doubts on US Intentions 
Indian criticism on the US intentions to resume military aid to Pakistan 
increased the doubts of the Urdu press that the US might be influenced by the 
larger country India. Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt however appreciated, with a mixed 
response comprised of hopes and doubts, the US decision of March 1973 to 
resume military supplies to both Pakistan and India. During Prime Minister 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's visit to the US in September 1973, the US President Nixon 
was reported to have affirmed to "keep Pakistan-US friendship alive for ever." The 
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American President was also reported to claim that he had "great regard for 
Pakistanis" and "the US had always supported Pakistan" and "would continue to 
cooperate in future" with the same spirit. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
responded with comparatively little enthusiasm and said that Pakistan was "an 
ally who always kept its promises" and "would happily do so in future." He further 
said that "Pakistan believed in peace" but "conditions that might cause 
disintegration" of smaller countries must be avoided.
58
 The Bhutto-Nixon joint 
statement made headlines as the two leaders agreed that the problems of South 
Asia were to be resolved according to "generally accepted international norms" 
and "respect for territorial integrity" to guarantee peace and stability.
59
 
Nawa-i-Waqt later on 5 December 1973 reported that in spite of Indian 
pressure, the US had decided to supply military equipment of thirty million rupees 
with a possibility of adding more supplies for fifteen million. However, the 
newspaper argued that the US had not given any special favour to Pakistan as 
the supplies were ordered before the sanctions imposed during the 1971 War.
60
 It 
was further argued by a columnist in Nawa-i-Waqt Abdul Nasir Ghauri that 
American weapons were crucial for Pakistan's security and survival as China and 
Arab or Muslim countries were not in a position to fulfil Pakistan's requirements. 
The columnist suggested that the nature of Pakistan's relations with the USSR did 
not leave any space to expect the required help from the communist superpower. 
Therefore, Pakistan had to rely on American weapons.
61
 
Jang on 23 September 1974 reported head of the Indian Atomic Energy 
Commission to have told the session of International Atomic Energy Agency at 
Vienna that India had made a written agreement with the US, that enriched 
uranium would be used for the mutually agreed purposes only. The newspaper 
made it clear that the nuclear fuel supplied to India by the US was used at an 
American supplied reactor in Tarapur, near Hyderabad. The newspaper explained 
that those reactors had the ability to produce plutonium used in nuclear bombs. 
The newspaper also noted that according to the US Atomic Energy Commission, 
the supply of nuclear fuel was resumed, after receiving assurance from India that 
the fuel would not be used in nuclear tests.
62
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Jang on 19 September 1974 argued that the US wanted to get an assurance 
from India not to use its plutonium for nuclear tests, even for peaceful purposes. 
The newspaper further explained that the US also wanted to make sure that India 
would not use waste or by products of uranium acquired through any reactor built 
with American financial or technical aid. However, India refused to give such an 
assurance.
63
 The newspaper on 25 September reported the US Secretary of 
State, Henry Kissinger, to have told the United Nations that the US would stop 
supplying nuclear fuel to other countries if anyone tried to use it for nuclear tests. 
He said that America and some other countries supply nuclear fuel and 
equipment for peaceful purposes only.
64
 Jang argued that the US would punish 
other countries including Pakistan by denying them nuclear support for Indian 
failure to assure the misuse of nuclear fuel. 
Likewise Jang on 25 September and 17 October 1974 argued that American 
reservations on supply of weapons to Pakistan were not justified in the pretext of 
tensions between India and Pakistan, as there were other regions in the world 
where weapons were supplied in spite of the mutual tensions and hostilities 
between the countries. For example, the newspaper explained, Greece and 
Turkey were two countries having mutual tensions but the US had continued 
providing them with weapons, considering it a matter of national interest. Another 
example was Saudi Arabia and Jordan, in the Middle East, where the US was 
inclined to provide nuclear reactors and arms for the same reason. The 
newspaper complained that India was also able to get weapons from the USSR 
and other sources and had caused the disintegration of Pakistan taking 
advantage of a huge imbalance of power. It was also claimed that India would 
never agree to resolve any outstanding issues with a militarily weaker Pakistan. 
The newspaper noted that India had conducted nuclear tests ignoring its own 
economic difficulties, whereas the US was giving it enormous financial and food 
aid. The newspaper advised the US to consider that its policies were 
unintentionally and indirectly supporting the Indian nuclear program whereas 
denying the right to protect an ally and friendly country's territorial integrity and 
security.
65
 
Subsequently, Jang on 30 October 1974 reported Henry Kissinger to have 
told the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the US did not have any desire 
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to interfere in the affairs of South Asia. He however advised India to remain 
patient and cooperate with international efforts to avoid an arms race, while the 
US believed in its promises to pursue a peaceful nuclear program. He clarified 
that the US realised the importance of India and therefore "a powerful India was 
not a threat to peace" and "the US was not opposed to India" becoming 
stronger.
66
 At the same time, the newspaper expressed hopes that the US might 
resume weapons supplies to Pakistan during Kissinger's visit to Pakistan.
67
 
Conversely, the newspaper on 3 November 1974 expressed its disappointment, 
as Kissinger during his visit did not give any clear indication about easing the 
sanctions. The newspaper however speculated that the US might give sufficient 
financial aid to Pakistan which could be utilised to purchase defence equipment 
from France and Britain.
68
 The newspaper emphasised that the US had to realise 
Pakistan's defence requirements and the two sides had to figure out some 
solution.
69
 Similarly, Senator Khawja Safdar who was a right-wing politician of 
Pakistan Muslim League, on behalf of opposition through an adjournment motion 
in the senate, was reported by the Urdu press to have called the attention of the 
house to the issue of US arms supplies to Pakistan. The senator told the house 
that Kissinger during his visit to India had promised in Delhi that the US would not 
provide arms to Pakistan. Pakistani Minister of State, Aziz Ahmad responded to 
the motion and said that the government of Pakistan had hopes that America 
would remove the sanctions on the delivery of arms very soon, as the issue was 
strongly taken up during the negotiations with Henry Kissinger in his recent visit to 
Pakistan.
70
 Jang was of the view that the US was ignoring Pakistan's genuine 
security requirements under the Indian pressure. 
On the contrary, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was reported to have 
desperately told the Sunday Observer, on 1 December 1974 that if Pakistan did 
not receive the US arms, it would conduct a nuclear explosion. The Prime 
Minister said that there was no progress on the issue of American arms and 
Pakistan could not afford to suspend defence preparations. He informed the 
interviewer that Pakistan had access to knowledge and material regarding 
nuclear technology which could be utilised for development of a nuclear program 
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in the national interest. The Prime Minister further said that Pakistan had a 
nuclear reactor working in Karachi and a new heavy water reactor and separation 
plant would be installed soon. The Prime Minister made it clear that Pakistan was 
looking for conventional weapons and as long as it was able to get them would 
not go for a nuclear option.
71
 Conversely, on 9 December 1974, Pakistan's 
Minister of State, Aziz Ahmad told journalists in Tokyo, that Pakistan had no 
desire to become a nuclear power and for that reason Pakistan was suggesting a 
nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia to effectively control the nuclear 
proliferation. However, he also made it clear that at some stage if India developed 
nuclear weapons, the situation would be different.
72
 The Urdu press observed that 
the US insufficient response to Pakistan's security needs under Indian pressure 
was making Pakistan think opting the nuclear weapons option.  
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on 10 March 1975 was however reported to 
have said that the US recent decision to resume military supplies to Pakistan in 
1975 would not affect Pakistan's purchasing of arms from other countries but the 
major part of the arms would be acquired from the US.
73
 On the question of 
continuing the nuclear program after resumption of US arms supplies, Jang 
reported that Prime Minister Bhutto changed his tone and said that Pakistan's 
nuclear program was essentially for peaceful purposes and therefore must be 
continued.
74
 The newspaper argued that although the US decision to resume 
arms supplies was an important development, Pakistan needed to strengthen its 
defence especially where viewed in the perspective of a developing nexus 
between India, USSR, and Afghanistan.
75
 
Jang on 21 April 1975 argued that the recent change of American policies 
towards Vietnam and Cambodia had increased the doubts and concerns of US 
allies all over the world. The newspaper also noted that the US also suspended 
military aid to its ally Turkey after the Cyprus crisis in 1974. Moreover, the 
newspaper suggested that given the differences between the US President and 
the Congress over the issue of foreign aid, the allies had to reconsider relying 
fully on the US for their defence. The newspaper also argued that trustworthiness 
of the US as an ally and credibility of its foreign policy commitments were being 
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questioned. The newspaper suggested that a clear foreign policy and a 
preferential treatment to its allied nations could help to restore the trust of the 
friendly countries. The newspaper also suggested that Pakistan needed the trust 
more than anyone else, as it was "already betrayed" in 1965 and 1971.
76
 
Jang on 23 October 1975 reported Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to have 
visited France and talked to the French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and 
Prime Minister Jacques Chirac to purchase one hundred million dollars of 
weapons and a six hundred megawatts nuclear reactor for power generation. 
Bhutto told journalists that Pakistan appreciated the US decision to lift the ban on 
arms supply, but for its defence requirements, it needed weapons from other 
sources too. He clarified that Pakistan was not looking for a nuclear reactor to 
develop nuclear weapons, instead it was needed to meet energy requirements.
77
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 14 October 1976 argued that it was totally unacceptable for the 
US, to oppose a peaceful program of a struggling ally, repeatedly regarded as a 
"corner stone of policy," whereas at the same time, supporting an aggressor state 
like India with all nuclear facilities and equipments.
78
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 16 October 1976 reported India to have registered its protest 
with the US State Department against US provision of six million dollars weapons 
and fighter aircrafts to Pakistan. According to the details, India had serious 
reservations about inclusion of A-7 bomber aircrafts.
79
 The newspaper on 17 
November 1976 reported with little excitement the US decision to approve the 
sale of seven million dollars, a hundred and ten A-7 light fighter aircrafts. The 
Urdu press had doubts about US intentions to fulfil its commitments because of 
the Indian pressure on the US. An insignificant space allocated to this piece of 
news published within a single column under a small heading reflected the 
newspaper's meagre excitement (Figure 25).
80
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Figure 25, Nawa-i-Waqt on 19 November 1976 published a single column small piece of 
news with regard to "American Department of Defence approved sale of fighter aircrafts 
to Pakistan" which reflected little excitement of the Urdu press in Pakistan over 
resumption of US military aid.
81
 
 
Figure 26, Nawa-i-Waqt on 22 March 1979 published the cartoon reflecting Pakistan's 
decision to quit CENTO in March 1979. The cartoon showed impacts of mistrust of US 
allies as one after the other was leaving its military alliance. In cartoon American 
President Jimmy Carter was speaking to his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance standing 
beside a building named "American interests bloc" with its first floor named CENTO bloc 
and second as Arab bloc. Carter to the Secretary of State: "all building is getting 
evacuated ... go and get some new tenants!"
82
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 9 April 1979 reported an unidentified spokesperson of 
Pakistan's Foreign Office to have said that Pakistan would not accept interference 
in its independence and the hegemony of any country. He continued saying that 
the mutual defence agreement between the two countries, was not practicable 
anymore due to repeated violations by the US, as it could not honour the 
agreement in the 1965 War, by imposing a ban on arms supply to Pakistan. He 
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complained that though the ban was lifted in 1975, since then Pakistan could not 
receive any military aid. He also said that one of the reasons for disassociating 
Pakistan from CENTO was "US hostile attitude" towards the nuclear program. 
Nawa-i-Waqt was of the view that the US had been unsympathetic to Pakistan's 
security requirements in order to appease the larger country India.
83
 
Similarly, Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 November 1981 noted that the US Congress was 
to decide about the proposed economic and military aid of 3.2 billion dollars 
including F-16 fighter aircrafts and Pakistan had concerns over the slow pace of 
the process. The newspaper argued that it was a test of the American 
determination to cooperate with Pakistan, and therefore the US had to speed up 
the measures so that Pakistan's security and independence which was also a 
"corner stone" of US policy, could be ensured. The newspaper also hoped that 
this time the US would not be influenced by Indian propaganda against 
Pakistan.
84
 Nawa-i-Waqt on 24 September 1982 further observed that a possible 
delay in supply of US arms to Pakistan was expected. The reason being cited 
was the non-allocation of appropriate funds for granting loans to Pakistan to 
purchase the agreed arms. The newspaper hoped that these were not traditional 
delaying tactics due to Indian pressure, whereby at no cost India would be 
granted a veto on Pakistan-US relations. Otherwise, the newspaper suggested 
that on the part of the US, unnecessary delay or walking away from its 
commitments would cause "bitter feelings" on Pakistan's side.
85
 
In sum the Urdu press observed that given the past experience the US was 
more likely to be influenced by the Indian criticism of US intentions to resume 
military aid to Pakistan. Therefore the Urdu press expressed doubts that the US 
might betray again in order to appease the larger country India, as it did earlier in 
the 1971 War. 
3.1.6 Confirmation of a US Politics of Betrayal 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 December 1976 reported the US to have warned Pakistan, 
if it did not withdraw from its purchase of the nuclear reprocessing plant, its 
military and economic aid would be blocked. The newspaper expressed its 
disappointment over the US attitude towards an ally. It was argued that though 
this "American indifference and betrayal" was not a new phenomenon, its recent 
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attitude was even more unbearable, because it was trying to reverse the 
agreement between two independent countries, Pakistan and France, in a sheer 
violation of international norms and morality.
86
 A journalist in Nawa-i-Waqt 
Masood Javed Hamdani argued that Pakistan had been among the allies who 
had "suffered due to US betrayals," and for that reason, kept advising the US that 
unnecessary favours to India would not be of any benefit to its ally. The journalist 
advised that this attitude most likely would decrease the number of American 
allies and friends, all over the world and therefore, the US had to reconsider its 
attitude towards its allies.
87
 
 
Figure 27, Nawa-i-Waqt on 21 December 1976 published the cartoon, which showed 
American President, Jimmy Carter as a traffic sergeant, allowing Indian vehicle loaded 
with the Soviet heavy water and American Sky Hawk aeroplanes to come, while stopped 
Pakistan's truck loaded with French nuclear reprocessing plant.
88
 
Mushahid Hussain a right leaning journalist who later turned politician, in his 
article in Nawa-i-Waqt on 9 September 1978, attempted to explain US opposition 
to Pakistan and preference to India. He noted that American opposition to the 
reprocessing plant, culminating in a temporary suspension of all economic and 
military aid was received in Pakistan, with the utmost dismay and with a 
perception of American "betrayal of an old and faithful ally." The journalist 
explained that the US always preferred India being a larger and more powerful 
country as compared to Pakistan and therefore in future it would continue to 
prefer India in the same manner.
89
 
Jang on 10 April 1984 criticised the US and its western allies for showing 
"partial and unjust behaviour" towards Pakistan's nuclear program. The 
newspaper also condemned the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' 
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efforts to put conditions on Pakistan's aid package.
90
 The committee had 
proposed the aid package subject to verification of the US government that 
Pakistan was not making nuclear weapons.
91
 The newspaper censured this 
"insulting behaviour" of US attitude towards Pakistan's "peaceful nuclear 
program."
92
 
A politician and philanthropist, Vice Chairman of a right-wing small political 
party Pakistan Himayat Tahreek (Support to Pakistan Movement), Sheikh Saeed 
on 3 March 1984 was reported by Jang to have said that Pakistanis did not 
expect any help from the US due to their bad experiences of the past. He said 
that the US had assured Pakistan in 1971 that in the case of Indian aggression in 
East Pakistan the Seventh Fleet would be moved promptly for rescue, but when 
the time came, the Seventh Fleet remained a silent spectator. Therefore, he 
concluded that Pakistan could not "afford to trust" and rely on the US.
93
 
In the meanwhile, Jang on 5 April 1984 noted that India had been expressing 
its concerns over the US arms supply to Pakistan.
94
 The newspaper reported on 6 
March 1986 that Pakistan was hoping and even requested twofold increase in US 
aid, which was turned down to Pakistan's disappointment.
95
 The newspaper on 7 
March 1986 argued that due to increasing inflation and up to sixty percent 
depreciation in the value of Pakistan's currency as compared to the US dollar, in 
the last six years, US aid would not be of much help to Pakistan.
96
 Moreover, the 
newspaper on 26 March 1986 noted that the aid would also become conditional 
on the "peaceful nature of the nuclear program," after 30 September 1987.
97
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 17 April 1998 wrote that recent events of missile testing by 
India and the rhetoric of its political leadership was enough to make everyone 
understand that Pakistan was bound to take reciprocal defensive steps and the 
US was advised to realise the fact. The newspaper further wrote, if the US had an 
                                              
90
 Jang, editorial, 10 April 1984, p.3. 
91
 Ibid, news article, 30 March 1984, p.1. 
92
 Ibid, news article, 31 March 1984, p.1., news article, 8 April 1984, p.1., editorial, 9 April 1974, 
p.3. and editorial, 10 April 1984, p.3. 
93
 Ibid, news article, 3 March 1984, p.1. 
94
 Ibid, news article, 5 April 1984, p.1. 
95
 The US State Department stated in March 1986, that the amount of aid for the next six years 
would be approximately four billion dollars whereas Pakistan was expecting over 7 billion 
dollars; Jang, news article, 6 March 1986, p.1 
96
 Ibid, editorial, 7 March 1986, p.3. 
97
 The Pressler Amendment 1985 which enabled Pakistan to become an exception in the 
Symington Amendment 1976 regarding nuclear proliferation, would not be applicable after date, 
thus making the future aid conditional to US law. The aid was finally barred in 1990; Jang, news 
article, 26 March 1986, p.1. and editorial, 23 November 1990, p.3. 
132 
 
understanding of Pakistan's threats, then it had to abolish "the prejudiced" 
Pressler Amendment. Moreover, the newspaper argued that expressions of 
regrets over F-16s issue was appreciable, but not enough indeed, as more 
practical steps were required to return Pakistan's money.
98
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 April 1997, reported a US nuclear policy analyst Michael 
Krepon to have stated in Karachi that Pakistan, contrary to its promises, had 
made advances in its nuclear technology. He said that the US agreed to give 
military aid to Pakistan, due to its Afghan policy with a condition, that it would not 
develop nuclear weapons. He argued that Pakistan was punished because it 
could not keep its promises.
99
 A journalist in Nawa-i-Waqt Nusrat Mirza 
responded to allegations and wrote, that Pakistan could not be accused of 
betrayal for certain reasons. He argued that first of all, the US helped Pakistan to 
pursue its interests in Afghanistan and was always aware of Pakistan's security 
concerns and its interest and level of development of the nuclear program. He 
explained that the US knew everything about the program because of its 
intelligence sources including its links within Pakistan. The author argued that the 
US kept quiet because the success it was getting with the help of Pakistan was 
comparatively much bigger than the success Pakistan was getting in return. 
Therefore, it was a good deal for the US.  
Nusrat Mirza further argued that in fact "the US betrayed Pakistan," as it 
changed its attitude after fulfilment of its objectives in Afghanistan. He explained 
that given the Soviet threats from the west and Indian threats from the east, 
Pakistan was justified in acquiring nuclear deterrence. The author also argued 
that the US emerged as a sole superpower at the end of Cold War and started 
criticising its ally Pakistan for its nuclear program so that it could not ask for its 
share in the benefits of the victory in Afghanistan in terms of setting up a 
Pakistan-friendly Afghan government. The author concluded that the US knew 
very well that Pakistan needed nuclear deterrence to cope with threats to its 
security, therefore, it was "not a betrayal on Pakistan's part" instead it was "the 
US who always betrayed."
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Discussions in the Urdu press were mainly focused on the idea of US betrayal 
of its ally by targeting its nuclear program in order to appease India which had 
concerns about US positive responses to Pakistan's security. The idea of US 
betrayal was also endorsed by some of the journalists and politicians interviewed 
for this research. However, interviews disclosed that there were also some 
important voices which did not accept the idea of US betrayal vis-à-vis Pakistan's 
nuclear program. One such voice was of the chief editor of a mainstream right 
leaning Urdu newspaper, which explained the issue as follows: 
Actually, expectations of Pakistanis, with reference to India, 
have been shattered, and because their basic problems [with 
India], such as Kashmir could not be resolved. They 
[Pakistanis] still expect from America. They repeatedly say 
that there should be third party intervention by America in 
this, and America can play a role in it. However, America 
says, that it would be better if both countries engage with 
each other. They say that they can facilitate but cannot 
interfere. After all India is a big country too. So, how could 
the US interfere without the consent of India? How is it 
possible that on Pakistan's insistence America along with 
Pakistan can convince India of something? If America cannot 
force Pakistan for doing anything, how can it force India? 
This is our problem. Our narrative has a problem, from the 
beginning, it is focused on India, America, and Pakistan. Our 
policy makers used to tell India and America, that we are with 
America, against the Soviet and communist threat. That is 
how we were allies. But, public perception was, that America 
was with us against India. There is a contradiction in both. 
Anyhow, now our understanding is that India and America 
are united against us. This is not the case. Not to speak of 
America, I think, now we should not treat even India as an 
enemy country. And we never treated India as an enemy 
country, before the 1965 War. India was not an enemy 
country. We need to go back to 1947.
101
  
Thus, Nawa-i-Waqt, Jang, journalists writing for the two newspapers, and 
Pakistani government officials expressed Pakistan's security threats vis-à-vis 
India mainly emerging from the imbalance in conventional military power and 
India progressing in the nuclear technology. While the US was described 
empathising with Pakistan's security concerns, nonetheless the discourse pointed 
out strong reaction from India to the US showing interest in Pakistan's security. 
Therefore, doubts on the US intensions were expressed by the dominant voices, 
and when the US opposed Pakistan's nuclear program or stopped Pakistan's 
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economic or military aid it was described as a US politics of betrayal. However, 
there were some voices which mainly remained excluded from the discourse and 
possibly would have rejected the idea of describing India as an enemy country 
and doubts on US intentions being supportive to India while ignoring Pakistan. 
3.2 CLAIMS OF A US CONSPIRACY AGAINST PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM 
The discourse of the Urdu press not only established a US politics of betrayal 
with regard to Pakistan's nuclear program, but also explained it as a betrayal 
under "a wider conspiracy" with the involvement of the US, India, the USSR, and 
Israel. Different voices in the discourse described the US behaviour as "double 
crossing," "incomprehensible," "indifferent," "untrustworthy," "insufficient," 
"unreasonable," "showing double standards," "doubtful," and "unfair" to conspire 
against Pakistan's security by targeting its nuclear program, while supporting that 
of India. 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 2 July 1977 noted that in addition to pressurising Pakistan 
and France to reverse the agreement with regard to the French nuclear 
reprocessing plant, the US had also cancelled the deal for A-7s to Pakistan for 
which both countries had negotiated for more than three years. The newspaper 
on 21 July 1977 observed that under American pressure, Canada had also 
unilaterally cancelled the agreement, and denied the supply of uranium and 
necessary equipment for the nuclear reactor in Karachi to be used for power 
generation. Consequently, the newspaper regarded it an "American double cross" 
and argued that it was "a sheer injustice" to Pakistan to deny its due rights as an 
ally, in "the pretext of nuclear proliferation," whereas providing uranium and other 
nuclear accessories to India was in clear contradiction of its claims and concerns 
for non-proliferation.
102
  
Nawa-i-Waqt on 25 October 1978 reported that under US pressure France 
finally backtracked and offered Pakistan an alternate nuclear plant to meet its 
energy requirements, while ensuring non-proliferation. The US announced 
resumption of economic and military aid to Pakistan and the newspaper also 
noted that Pakistan rejected the changes in the design of nuclear reprocessing 
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plant.
103
 Subsequently, the newspaper on 2 November 1978 argued that 
American opposition to Pakistan's efforts to purchase the nuclear reprocessing 
plant was "a betrayal of a friend." The newspaper also argued that such an 
opposition by the enemies could be understood, but this kind of behaviour by a 
friendly country and an ally was "incomprehensible."
104
 The newspaper advised 
that in spite of American opposition, Pakistan had to remain firm and consistent in 
its demands for the reprocessing plant because this requirement was a matter of 
its survival.
105
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 January 1979 with reference to US magazine Newsweek's 
disclosure reported that contrary to its earlier announcement of October 1978, the 
US had refused to resume military aid to Pakistan. The newspaper explained that 
Pakistan had requested purchase of military equipment due to the establishment 
of a pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan in 1978 and the increasing danger of 
Soviet expansion. The newspaper reported that the US Under Secretary of State, 
David Newsom, in his visit to Islamabad had advised Pakistan to accept the new 
circumstances in Afghanistan and therefore turned down the Pakistani request. 
The newspaper also claimed that after receiving a cold shoulder from its military 
ally, Pakistan had decided to disassociate itself from CENTO and transferred its 
ambassador to the US, Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan, to Moscow on 3 January 1979, 
with the objective of improving Pakistan's relations with the USSR. The 
newspaper also reported that Ambassador Khan, earlier in his farewell speech in 
Washington, said that historians of the future would note 1978 for its shift in a 
balance of power against western nations.
106
 Nawa-i-Waqt responded to the issue 
by arguing, that Newsweek's revelations were not surprising for Pakistan, as the 
US had been following this policy of indifference and giving a cold shoulder to its 
allies long before the newly changed circumstances in Afghanistan. However, the 
newspaper claimed that this was the first incident where the US had openly 
confessed its unresponsiveness.
107
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Figure 28, Nawa-i-Waqt on 10 January 1979 published cartoon to reflect Pakistan's 
perception of the US with regard to Newsweek's disclosure of US turning down Pakistan's 
request for military aid after establishment of a pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan. 
The cartoon showed that the dual face of the US was exposed to its allies as it pretended 
as brave as a lion but actually was as coward as a sheep. The caption of the cartoon 
read, "America in the eyes of its allies."
108
 
Subsequently, Nawa-i-Waqt on 12 January 1979 reported the US Embassy in 
Islamabad to have issued a statement to clarify that Newsweek's information was 
not based on facts and the US would supply arms to Pakistan within the 
framework of its international and regional policies.
109
 The newspaper on 13 
January 1979 responded to the clarification and argued that due to past 
experiences of American "friendship and assurances" in hard times, there was 
little reason to be satisfied, trust, and depend on "the superficial clarification" of 
the American embassy.
110
 
President Zia-ul-Haq on 17 March 1979 was reported by Nawa-i-Waqt to have 
told journalists that "he was not sure," if the US had lost its interest in the region, 
or "was there something else" keeping Pakistan and the US apart. However, he 
hoped that the US would adopt a positive attitude in the wider interest of peace 
and for the sake of Pakistan's territorial integrity. He also said that in the past 
Pakistan had considered itself as an ally of the US and the relationship between 
the two remained good, but in spite of all this, the American response to 
Pakistan's requirements had been insufficient.
111
 
Nawa-i-Waqt endorsed the President's views by noting that there was a 
growing "lack of trust" on the Pakistani side, as the US could not or would not 
help Pakistan according to Pakistan's expectations. The newspaper explained 
that most recently, the US had given "unfair treatment" to Pakistan's nuclear 
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program, which obliged France to walk away from its commitments. The 
newspaper further reminded its readers that the US also turned down Pakistan's 
request for acquiring conventional weapons and fighter aircrafts for its defence, 
whereas India was increasing its power by all means. The newspaper argued that 
previously India and the USSR cooperated with each other against Pakistan 
because the latter was an American ally, however, after quitting CENTO Pakistan 
was no more in defence ties with the US, yet both India and the USSR were still 
continuing their hostile attitude towards Pakistan as a friend of China. The 
newspaper also argued that the USSR was a superpower and therefore, it was 
unimaginable for Pakistan to challenge its strategy, whereas "Indian expansionist 
and aggressive designs" were not only threatening Pakistan's security, but also 
"threatening American interests in the oil rich Middle Eastern areas."
112
 Thus, the 
newspaper suggested that it was "unreasonable of Americans" to regard India as 
a hegemonic power of the region while ignoring the security of its ally and failing 
to protect its own interests.
113
 
 
Figure 29, Nawa-i-Waqt on 10 April 1979 published cartoon to reflect on some secret and 
"illegitimate" affair between India and the US hinting a conspiracy against Pakistan.
114
 
The cartoon showed the US President Jimmy Carter bowing down to Indian Prime 
Minister Morarji Desai to express his love, as the caption of the cartoon read, "you are 
free to do anything ... all restrictions are only for Pakistan ..!"
115
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Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 September 1979 began to escalate the discourse on 
politics of betrayal by observing that "a wider international conspiracy" involving 
the US, USSR, Israel, and India was being hatched against Pakistan's nuclear 
program. The newspaper explained that Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai 
knowing that India was far ahead of its neighbour, ignored the American 
President's request to help stop Pakistan from becoming a nuclear power, and 
declared that India faced no threat from Pakistan's nuclear program. One of the 
reasons for such a response, the newspaper speculated, was that India knew that 
the US would execute its plan to sabotage Pakistan's nuclear program with the 
help or in the name of Israel and therefore it did not need to annoy Arab 
countries. The newspaper further noted that Prime Minister Desai was removed 
from power soon afterwards most probably on American behest because he 
annoyed the US by not agreeing to become part of the conspiracy against 
Pakistan's nuclear program.
116
 
Subsequently, Nawa-i-Waqt explained that the new Prime Minister of India, 
Chaudhry Charan Singh, on Indian independence day changed the Indian stance 
and expressed concerns over Pakistan's nuclear program.
117
 Reportedly, he said 
that if Pakistan wanted to develop a nuclear bomb, it was surely against India, 
and therefore, the latter reserved the right to consider developing nuclear 
weapons. The newspaper argued that Prime Minister Singh's statement was 
actually "the expression of a conspiracy" of the US, USSR, Israel, and India, 
which at any cost wanted to stop Pakistan from becoming a nuclear power. The 
newspaper further explained that the US had one of four options to sabotage 
Pakistan's nuclear facilities. First, Americans through their commandos or by 
some other terrorist activity would secretly try to destroy Pakistan's nuclear 
plants. Second, India would be used to attack the facilities. Third, Israeli secret 
terrorists might be used for this purpose. Fourth, terrorists belonging to left-wing 
parties in Pakistan could be used to "achieve American objectives" of destroying 
Pakistan's nuclear program.
118
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Nawa-i-Waqt on 26 September 1982 reported the US Ambassador to 
Pakistan, Ronald Spiers clarification of the policy of nuclear cooperation. He 
explained that due to legal restrictions, the US could not extend nuclear 
cooperation to a country which was a non-signatory of international agreements 
on non-proliferation. The newspaper argued that if this was the case, why were 
India and other countries such as Israel, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentine not 
subject to American opposition at the same level? The newspaper explained 
further that in the case of India which was a non-signatory of international non-
proliferation agreements, the US continued to supply enriched uranium until 
1981-82, and more recently transferred this responsibility to France. Therefore, it 
was "totally unreasonable" to deny nuclear cooperation to Pakistan, in the pretext 
of legal constraints and the US was betraying its ally.
119
 
The main headline of Jang, on 2 March 1984, reported the US President's 
former Advisor for National Security, Zbigniew Brzezinski's special interview with 
the newspaper's correspondent Hanif Khalid (as shown in Figure 30). Brzezinski 
told Hanif Khalid that the US would not help Pakistan in the case of Indian attack 
even if such an attack was supported by the USSR. However, Brezinski said that 
in the case of an Afghan attack on Pakistan, considering it communist aggression, 
the US would help Pakistan under its obligations of 1958 agreement.
120
 Jang on 3 
March 1984 reported a strong public reaction in Pakistan to Brzezinski's 
statement. The newspaper argued that the US position had become "more 
doubtful" regarding its "sincerity with Pakistan's security." The newspaper noted 
that common public reaction was that Pakistan was not dependent on the US or 
any other power for its defence and security, and it could defend itself on its own. 
A senior politician and former President of Azad Kashmir (Pakistani held 
Kashmir), Abdul Qayyum Khan told Jang, that circumstances were very 
challenging for Pakistan.
121
 He said that the Pakistani nation needed unity in 
order to "cope with the threats and conspiracies" against its integrity. He further 
said that with such a statement, the former National Security Advisor had added 
to "the already suspicious position" of the US in the eyes of its friends. He also 
said that it was an "encouragement to India" to attack Pakistan on receiving "a 
signal from the USSR." He also exclaimed with wonder that he was unable to 
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understand the purpose of Brzezinski's visit to Pakistan. He concluded that after 
the statement, Pakistan had to rely on its own for its defence and security.
122
 
 
  
Figure 30, Jang's main headline published on 2 March 1984 reported the US President's 
former Advisor for National Security, Zbigniew Brzezinski saying "America will not help 
Pakistan in case of Indian attack" which was interpreted as a sign of a conspiracy 
instigating or at least giving a free hand to India to attack Pakistan.
123
 
Jang on 25 April 1984 reported the US Ambassador to Pakistan Deane Hinton 
to have said that the US was ready to help Pakistan in its nuclear program, 
provided that it signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and complied with the 
requirements of IAEA. He also said that due to tensions between India and 
Pakistan, it was dangerous to help either of them for military purposes. Moreover, 
he also expressed the concerns of the US government that a nuclear bomb in 
third world countries could be accessed by terrorist groups. Therefore, he 
concluded that the US would stop Pakistan's aid if it decided to conduct a nuclear 
explosion.
124
 In comparison, Jang on 2 December 1984 published the 1984 report 
of George Town University's Centre for Military Strategy and International 
Analysis, according to which India had already acquired the capability to develop 
at least twenty-four nuclear bombs, whereas Pakistan would attain such a 
capability by 1990.
125
 In this background, a politician and journalist, Pir Ali 
Muhammad Rashidi who adhered to the right-wing argued in Jang on 8 
December 1984 that it was "totally unfair of the US" to force Pakistan to abandon 
its efforts to acquire a nuclear capability by signing a permanent treaty especially, 
in the absence of any nuclear protection while ignoring India's progress in the 
development of nuclear weapons.
126
 It was therefore a US betrayal of its ally 
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Pakistan to pressurise the latter to abandon its nuclear program while ignoring the 
same of India.  
Though the dominant voices in the Urdu press adhering to both right and left-
wing ideas described US opposition to Pakistan as a betrayal under a conspiracy, 
there existed other voices which would reject the idea of conspiracy. Some of 
such voices were identified through interviews conducted for this research. The 
chief editor of a popular right leaning Urdu newspaper did not agree to the idea of 
US betrayal or for that matter a conspiracy against Pakistan's nuclear program 
and described the US role in this regard as follows: 
America has opposed Pakistan's nuclear program, took 
actions and applied sanctions on Pakistan, but the US did 
not do anything exceptional or out of the way, against 
Pakistan. Thus, America never followed a policy to besiege 
or alienate Pakistan in the world. Generally, this [nuclear 
program] has remained an important issue at bilateral level 
between Pakistan and the US. And even at this, sometimes it 
[US] expressed itself and other times just ignored it. As 
during Afghan jihad, it used to certify, that we were not 
making [nuclear weapons], but in fact we were. Now, 
according to the papers, of their own Secretary of State 
Shultz, America turned a blind eye to Pakistan... During the 
war against the Soviet Union, they ignored many things and 
as a result, Pakistan progressed in its nuclear program. 
Once again, after 9/11, all sanctions were lifted and the US 
accepted Pakistan's nuclear program. 
President Khatami [of Iran] told Farid Zakariya in an 
interview, that you [US] have double standards. You treat the 
nuclear program of Pakistan and Israel differently, than that 
of Iran. My understanding is that in Pakistan, our intellectuals 
and policy makers deal with these things under cover. And 
political parties understand the importance of the relationship 
with America. They know that it would be difficult to do things 
without this [relationship]. But, they are unable to sell these 
things to the public, or they simply do not do it. So, our 
journalists and other related people, their shortcoming is that 
they do not see those things in their right perspective. And to 
provoke a popular sentiment or not even to provoke a 
popular sentiment, they actually attempt to instigate people. 
You [journalists and political forces] brought your own 
narrative of India, Israel, Yahood, and Hanood. All these 
things are to instigate people. [Being Journalists] our 
responsibility is to guide people, in the right and appropriate 
manner, while keeping the events and facts in view. What will 
happen if Pakistan's relationship with America deteriorates? 
Your economic problems would increase. IMF and other 
donor agencies will end their support for you. So, it will bring 
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more disadvantages to you. Therefore, we need to balance 
our approach to this extent [to convey the complete truth].
127
 
Thus, primarily those voices were included in the discourse, which placed 
them near to the idea of US betrayal and most probably under a conspiracy. It 
was argued that US support to India's nuclear program and opposition to that of 
Pakistan was a US conspiracy against Pakistan's security because US's concerns 
about nuclear proliferation were not justified as it had actually supported India's 
nuclear program by providing nuclear fuel and other accessories to India. It was 
further observed that the US stopped Pakistan's economic and military aid in 
order to pressurise the latter on the purchase of a French nuclear reprocessing 
plant and the US also attempted to influence France to avoid supplying a nuclear 
reprocessing plant to Pakistan. It was however noted that the US announced to 
resume the aid only after the agreement for the purchase of a French nuclear 
reprocessing plant was cancelled under US pressure. The Urdu press on the 
basis of past experiences of Pakistan-US relations did not however trust US 
intentions to resume military aid to Pakistan. It was also observed by the Urdu 
newspapers that the US allowed India to increase its military power by all means 
and restricted the same to Pakistan. It was also argued that the US was hatching 
a conspiracy with the help of the USSR, India, and Israel against Pakistan's 
nuclear program and although India was a way ahead of Pakistan in developing 
nuclear weapons, the US was targeting Pakistan's nuclear program only. 
However, such voices remained excluded from the discussions of the Urdu press, 
which could argue that the idea of a US conspiracy and betrayal was not valid 
because the US at times ignored Pakistan's nuclear program allowing it to 
develop nuclear weapons. 
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3.3 MODALITIES OF ALLEGED US CONSPIRACY AGAINST 
PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
The prominent voices of the Urdu press not only established a US politics of 
betrayal under a conspiracy but to back their argument they also explained the 
modalities of such a conspiracy. The discourse described at least three types of 
such modalities: first, US and western media used to propagate against 
Pakistan's nuclear program to set world public opinion against it; second, exerting 
external pressures on Pakistan primarily by using economic and military aid as a 
lever or turning a blind eye to India's nuclear program allowing it to progress in 
the development of nuclear weapons and increasing security risks to Pakistan; 
third, interfering in Pakistan's domestic politics in order to affect Pakistan's 
nuclear program.  
3.3.1 Media Used for Propaganda 
Nawa-i-Waqt, Jang, and journalists writing in the two newspapers highlighted 
that the American and western media were making propaganda against 
Pakistan's "peaceful" nuclear program while ignoring that of India. Such 
propaganda was described as a way to realise the US conspiracy to target 
Pakistan's nuclear program. Therefore, the role of the US and western media 
described in such a manner would facilitate the rationalisation of a US betrayal 
under a conspiracy. 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 29 December 1976 noted that the western media was 
making propaganda against Pakistan's interest in French nuclear reprocessing 
plant. The newspaper reproduced a Washington Post's editorial which expressed 
concerns about nuclear proliferation through the supply of a French nuclear 
reprocessing plant for Pakistan. The Washington Post argued that France had 
refused to cancel the deal, nonetheless it agreed that there was a chance that 
Pakistan could do so, as Pakistan wanted to purchase from the US one hundred 
and ten A-7 aircrafts of worth seventy million dollars, financed by Saudi Arabia. 
The Washington Post argued that the supply of the fighter aircrafts would have its 
own implications for the military balance in South Asia, whereas the American 
President had already spoken against large military sales and provision of nuclear 
technology facilitating nuclear proliferation. The Washington Post hoped that 
France could apply restrictions on its supply of nuclear equipment to Pakistan, 
whereas France had already claimed that it would provide a reliable fuel supply, 
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so that a country is not compelled to acquire its own reprocessing facilities. The 
Washington Post argued that such "reliable fuel supply" could also be misused by 
Pakistan.
128
 
Similarly, Nawa-i-Waqt on 20 May 1982 reported a study by International 
Institute of Strategic Studies, London, in May 1982 which was also published by 
the American and western press. According to the study, Pakistan had developed 
plutonium and was on its way to acquiring nuclear weapons.
129
 The newspaper 
on 23 May 1982 reported the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to have 
responded to the issue by saying categorically that Pakistan was definitely 
developing nuclear weapons and the US had adjusted itself to this situation.
130
 
The newspaper argued that while Pakistan's government sources had already 
rejected the allegations by reiterating the stance that Pakistan neither had nuclear 
weapons nor wanted to develop them, the Indian government and the western 
media was continuing its baseless propaganda against Pakistan.
131
  
Jang on 4 November 1984 reported Richard Kennedy, the US State 
Department's Special Ambassador for Nuclear Power to have told journalists in 
Washington that concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program were exaggerated, 
as Pakistan was far behind in acquiring the capability of making a nuclear bomb. 
He also said that the US had a full realisation of the security concerns in Pakistan 
which had raised its desire to secure nuclear weapons, and the US was trying to 
remove those concerns. He further explained that due to the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan's concerns were justified. He suggested that the only way 
to restrict Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons was to strengthen its sense 
of security. He further said, this was the reason that Pakistan was given 3.2 billion 
dollars aid. He also claimed that the US administration had accepted President 
Zia-ul-Haq's clarification that Pakistan's nuclear program was only for meeting 
energy requirements, and the US had the wish that other countries such as India, 
Brazil, and Argentine would also restrict their program to peaceful purposes.
132
 
Subsequently, Jang on 8 April, 9 April, and 5 November 1984 observed that the 
US Senate was trying to increase checks on Pakistan's nuclear program at the 
behest of Israel and India.
133
 The newspaper explained that Indian and Israeli 
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lobbies were very active in the US and they were influencing the American media, 
and pressurising the American senate and government to take actions against 
Pakistan's nuclear program.
134
 
In the same way, in Jang, a columnist Z. A. Suleri on 14 August 1990 argued 
that it was surprising that the US annoyed with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto during his 
lifetime, after his death "fell in love" with his daughter Benazir Bhutto. He 
explained that "the US was not comfortable" with a military ruler General Zia-ul-
Haq who was interested in Islamisation and not ready to make any compromise 
on the nuclear program. On the other side, the columnist wrote, Benazir Bhutto 
also realised her father's mistake and by spending millions of dollars created a 
lobby in the US for her image building. That is how, the journalist concluded, a US 
and western sponsored media propaganda helped her to rise as a prominent 
political leader in Pakistan in hope that she would compromise the nuclear 
program.
135
 
The leading voices in the Urdu press highlighted the negative role of the US 
and western media facilitating US conspiracy against Pakistan's nuclear program. 
However, there were some voices in Pakistan who did not agree to the idea of the 
US and western media making propaganda against Pakistan to facilitate US 
conspiracy. Some of those voices were identified through interviews for this 
research and included one of former ambassadors to the US and a senior right 
leaning politician who agreed to the stance of the US and western media and 
said: 
 they [US] understood that we were always in need of 
financial assistance and therefore they were concerned, their 
line of argument was that if we built nuclear weapons, we 
could proliferate the technology. Our counter argument was 
that everybody proliferates, at some level or the other. And 
our line of argument was that if we have purchased 
equipment to build our centrifuges that equipment has been 
sold by your suppliers, in most parts. So, your people are 
equally guilty of proliferating, as we might be. But, this was 
not an argument that was well received. 
They thought that we would proliferate. While I was 
ambassador, this was what they would argue with me. And I 
argued by saying, there is no reason for them to suspect any 
such thing. But sadly, I was there in arguing away that we 
would never proliferate [but later] we were caught 
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proliferating. So, years later, Americans were proven right. 
So, this is why they were against developing our nuclear 
weapons.
136
 
 Thus, discussions in the Urdu press described the role of the US and western 
media as one of propagating against Pakistan's nuclear program and facilitating a 
US conspiracy with regard to it. Those voices which could have argued otherwise 
were excluded from the discourse. 
3.3.2 Pressures Exerted on Pakistan  
Another modality of US conspiracy described by the discussions going on in 
the Urdu press was US pressure tactics utilised to besiege Pakistan in a way that 
it would finally abandon its nuclear program. These pressure tactics mainly 
included on one side suspension of economic and military aid, and on the other 
side turning a blind eye to India's nuclear program resulting in increased security 
concerns for Pakistan, increasing its demand for the US military and economic 
aid. 
US Aid Used as a Pressure Tactic 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 9 April 1979 noted that economic and development aid to 
Pakistan was once more suspended by the US on suspicions of the installation of 
a plutonium reprocessing plant at Chashma partially built by Pakistan and 
capable of producing material that could be used for nuclear weapons. The 
newspaper observed that the government of Pakistan reacted against this 
decision by regarding it to be "a discriminatory attitude" and "dual policy" towards 
Pakistan. An unidentified spokesperson of Pakistan's Foreign Office was reported 
to have told journalists that Pakistan would not accept interference in its 
independence and the hegemony of any country.
 137 
On 18 August 1990 Jang noted that the Pakistan-US Defence Agreement was 
to be renewed in 1990-91. According to the newspaper, Pakistan needed US 
support to redress the balance of power in the region, as India had advantage in 
the quantity of tanks with the ratio of 2:1 and of fighter aircrafts with 3:1.
138
 In this 
situation, the newspaper on 23 August 1990 reported senators including Edward 
Kennedy and Stephen Solarz to have said that they would request the US Senate 
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to stop aid to Pakistan if it failed to conduct general elections in October 1990.
139
 
The newspaper on 25 August also noted that the US wanted to stop the aid if 
Benazir Bhutto was declared ineligible to contest elections on the corruption 
charges.
140
 Jang on 23 August and 15 September 1990 criticised such American 
threats by regarding such an attitude as inappropriate. The newspaper argued 
that the US was interfering in Pakistan's domestic affairs, and was "treating 
Pakistan like its satellite," instead of an independent country. The newspaper also 
argued that the US attitude was enough to show, that it was "always interested to 
have governments" and policies of its liking, otherwise it would threaten to stop 
Pakistan's aid. The newspaper wrote that in international relations states need 
mutual trust, which was being affected by the US disappointing attitude. The 
newspaper warned that if the US did not change its attitude towards an ally and 
stopped Pakistan's aid, it would create a bad American image to other allies in the 
world. However, the newspaper concluded that Pakistan could survive even 
without the US aid but could not accept US pressure.
141
 
Afterwards, in Jang a columnist Muhammad Akram Tahir on 6 November 
1990 described US suspension of aid in 1990 under the Pressler Amendment of 
1985, "as another US lever to interfere" in Pakistan's domestic affairs. He wrote 
that people rejected the Pakistan People's Party in the general elections of 1990 
because of its alliance and engagement with the US. The writer acknowledged 
that the people of Pakistan had "always despised" the US for its interference in 
the internal affairs of the country. Therefore, he argued that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had 
secured popularity among the masses due to his anti-American attitude, General 
Ayub Khan had acceptance in public because he wanted Americans to be "friends 
not masters," and General Zia-ul-Haq was liked by the people, because he dared 
to reject trivial American aid by regarding it as "peanuts." The author explained 
that Benazir Bhutto and her party was rejected by the people "because of her 
connections" with the US. The journalist argued that significant evidence of the 
connections between the US and Pakistan People's Party was that Nusrat Bhutto 
the Chairperson of the PPP visited the US and allegedly asked the US authorities 
to suspend Pakistan's aid due to its nuclear program.
142
 Therefore, stopping 
Pakistan's aid was a US tactic to appease a political party, which was supposed 
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to protect the American interests in Pakistan with regard to its nuclear program. 
However, Irshad Ahmad Haqqani another columnist of Jang did not agree with the 
allegation that Nusrat Bhutto was involved in the suspension of the US aid. He 
argued that the US had decided to stop Pakistan's aid on its own and it was its 
pressurising tactic to interfere in internal affairs.
143
 So while the two journalists 
opposed each other on a point that some local political forces such as PPP were 
involved in conspiracy against Pakistan's nuclear program or not, they agreed 
that the US interfered in Pakistan's internal affairs with or without the support of 
local politicians. 
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan a well known metallurgist and the most prominent 
scientist in Pakistan's nuclear program, was reported by Jang on 7 November 
1990 to have told journalists that Pakistan could continue its nuclear program 
without US aid and it should not submit to American pressure.
144
 On 11 November 
1990, a political analyst Niaz Hussain Lakhwaira wrote in his column in Jang, that 
the US always gave its aid to Pakistan, while its interests in the region were 
threatened, whereas when US perception of its interests was changed, or had 
even slightest doubts about Pakistan's role, it would always stop its assistance.
145
 
Likewise, Benazir Bhutto on 8 May 1993 was reported by Jang to have told the 
media during her visit to the US, that "it was unfair of the US" to pressurise 
Pakistan. She said that if elected to power, even her government would not 
unilaterally sign the international agreements about non-proliferation, while India 
had no intentions to do so. She said that every single nation had the right to 
defend its borders.
146
 Jang agreed with Benazir Bhutto's statement and argued 
that Pakistan's nuclear program was in fact related to its freedom, territorial 
integrity, and survival and for that reason, no power had the right to blackmail it in 
the pretext of military and economic aid.
147
 
Jang on 8 August 1993 noted that there was a strong resentment and reaction 
towards the American attitude on the issue of 71 F-16s embargoed by the US.
148
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Earlier, the newspaper on 27 July 1993 reported the US Ambassador to Pakistan, 
John Cameron Monjo to have told Pakistani caretaker Prime Minister 
Moeenuddin Ahmad Qureshi that if Pakistan could agree to roll back its nuclear 
program, all military aid could be resumed.
149
 The Prime Minister Qureshi was 
also reported to have replied Ambassador Monjo that Pakistan's nuclear program 
was peaceful and it would not unilaterally sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
therefore it was "unfair to restrict delivery" of F-16s.
150
 The newspaper on 7 
August 1993 agreed with the Prime Minister's point of view and wrote that it was 
"also unfair to ask Pakistan" to pay for the storage of the aircrafts. The newspaper 
argued that if the US "truly valued Pakistan's friendship" it had to stop 
pressurising Pakistan through economic and military aid.
151
 
It was argued in the Urdu press that the US was trying to use economic and 
military aid as a means to pressurise Pakistan to compromise its nuclear program 
which was its internal affair related to its security and economic development. It 
was also argued that unnecessary US pressure with regard to aid was causing a 
mistrust between the two countries as Pakistan was not ready to submit to 
unjustified US pressure. 
Turning a Blind Eye to India's Nuclear Program and Being 
Unsympathetic to Pakistan's Security under Indian Pressure Resulting 
in Increased Security Concerns for Pakistan 
Jang on 30 October 1974 reported the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to 
have told the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that the US was not asked to 
provide any guarantees regarding supply of arms to Pakistan, but the US should 
continue its policy of not supplying weapons to South Asian countries. The 
newspaper noted Secretary Kissinger to have replied that the US would not 
interfere in the affairs of South Asia.
152
 Thus, the newspaper had presented a 
piece of evidence with regard to the US decision of restricting arms supplies to 
South Asian countries intended to appease India which was affecting Pakistan's 
security. With reference to a BBC radio report Jang argued that the US had not 
resumed supplies to avoid Indian opposition.
153
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Figure 31, Jang on 4 April 1975 published the above cartoon to reflect India's influence on 
the US with regard to military supplies to Pakistan. The cartoon showed Indian Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi riding a cow of Soviet Arms whereas the personified US standing 
next to Pakistan shown as a sheep. The cartoon reflected comparatively huge arms 
supply of the USSR to India and meagre US arms supply to Pakistan. Still, Indian Prime 
Minister warned the US not to supply arms to Pakistan, as caption read, "this part of Asia 
is sacred cow country, sheep-man."
154
 
Subsequently, Jang on 5 April 1979 noted that India through its active lobbies 
was pressing the US to reconsider its decision to supply arms to Pakistan 
whereas it was also angry at being treated on equal terms with Pakistan. The 
newspaper also observed that India also demanded that the US not provide loans 
for arms purchases on subsidised terms.
155
 The newspaper criticised India for its 
undue pressure on the US, and advised Pakistan not to rely solely on the US, and 
to keep in contact with other friendly countries, so that it could fulfil its defence 
requirements.
156
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 14 September 1982 reported the US official response to 
Pakistan's attempts to expand its nuclear program stating that Pakistan had not 
provided a guarantee regarding international protections for using a light water 
nuclear reactor at Chashma. Therefore, the US Department of State vowed not to 
allow Pakistan to build the nuclear plant by taking two immediate steps. First, all 
American firms were asked not to sell any nuclear equipment to Pakistan. 
Second, western nations too were asked not to provide any nuclear cooperation. 
Nawa-i-Waqt added its perspective that the Indian government had not agreed to 
any nuclear protection, international inspection, or monitoring of its nuclear plants 
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either, and in spite of that the US President Reagan announced resumption of the 
supply of nuclear fuel for Tarapur reactor.
157
 On one hand the US was opposing 
Pakistan's nuclear program and on the other hand it was turning a blind eye to 
India's interest in development of nuclear weapons. Likewise, Jang on 18 
December 1984 argued that the US was ignoring the fact that in response to 
Pakistan's military aid, India had received military equipment from the USSR, 
European Countries, and the US much higher in quantity compared to Pakistan. 
Similarly, the newspaper further argued that due to the US and western support, 
India was at a more advanced level of nuclear technology as compared to that of 
Pakistan, therefore it was "simply unjust" to criticise and target only Pakistan's 
nuclear program.
158
 
Jang on 9 April 1984, with reference to the proposals for the Pressler 
Amendment presented in the US Senate in March 1984 to make aid to Pakistan 
conditional on its status as a non-nuclear weapons country, reported Pakistani 
parliamentarians to have argued that the US was doing such things under the 
pressure of a very active Indian lobby.
159
 Similarly, when in 1986 the US turned 
down Pakistan's request to increase the aid for next six years, and to provide 
modern military equipment, Jang with reference to BBC radio report on 26 March 
1986 argued that this was done because of pressure from the Indian government 
and the US Congress under the influence of Indian lobby.
160
 
The Urdu press, journalists, politicians, and officials in Pakistan described US 
aid and ignoring growing Indian conventional and nuclear military power as a 
pressure tactic to make Pakistan compromise on its nuclear program. However, 
there were voices in Pakistan which did not agree about US pressure tactics. 
Some of such voices were identified through interviews conducted for this 
research who described the issue of US aid and its pressure tactics differently to 
the dominant voices included in the Urdu press. A senior right leaning journalist 
argued as follows:  
my opinion is bit different about US attitude to Pakistan's 
nuclear program. I believe that the US always wanted 
Pakistan to become a nuclear power in order to avoid India 
becoming too powerful and hegemonic. It is also a fact that 
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after passing the Pressler amendment, US presidents 
continued issuing certificates that Pakistan did not have the 
nuclear weapons. Technically, they were right, as Pakistan 
had developed the capability to develop the weapons but 
they did not have the weapons by that time. These were the 
days when Pakistan kept receiving aid from the US and 
rapidly advanced its nuclear program.
161
 
Another right leaning senior journalist and chief editor of a leading Urdu 
newspaper also explained the issue of US aid: 
...basic thing is that you are receiving aid while your 
economy has not been able to sustain and you are trying to 
divert the resources after receiving the financial aid. In such 
a situation an aid providing country would definitely object to 
unauthorised diversion of the financial resources.
162
 
Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, journalists, government officials, and politicians who 
spoke through the Urdu press generally described US aid and its overlooking 
India's nuclear program as a modality of US conspiracy against Pakistan's 
nuclear program. However, the voices which would not subscribe to the idea of 
US pressure tactics to enforce its agenda on Pakistan mainly remained excluded 
from the discourse. Some of such excluded voices identified through the 
interviews conducted for this present research argued that the US actually turned 
a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and that the US had genuine 
concerns about Pakistan diverting US economic aid to development of its nuclear 
weapons. 
3.3.3 US Interference in Pakistan’s Domestic Politics 
One more modality of US conspiracy described in the Urdu press was its 
alleged interference in Pakistan's politics. It was argued that the US would oust a 
ruling elite from power, which would not submit to US will and would protect pro-
American political forces in the country in order to achieve its objectives. In this 
context, on 8 November 1990, Syed Asad Gilani a senior Jamaat-e-Islami leader 
noted in Jang that since the murder of Pakistan's first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali 
Khan in October 1951, there had always been echoes of American interference in 
Pakistan's domestic politics.
163
 Historians and journalists in Pakistan always tried 
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to see American involvement in the political instability in 1950s and even in first 
military takeover and martial law led by Ayub Khan in 1958.
164
 Attempts were 
made to establish connections with the removal of Ayub in 1969, and the success 
of Awami League in 1970s elections and soon after with the disintegration of 
Pakistan.
165
 In the post 1971 era, since Pakistan started showing its interests in 
the nuclear technology, the concerns about US interference in Pakistan's internal 
and domestic affairs continued. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's removal from power and 
death was associated with the US as a result of his tough stance on Pakistan's 
nuclear program.
166
 General Zia-ul-Haq died in a plane crash on 17 August 1988. 
Pakistani media and intellectuals talked about possible American conspiracy 
behind the plane crash.
167
 There seemed a general perception within Pakistan, 
(at least in the Urdu media discourse) that the US had made a deal with Benazir 
Bhutto to bring her to power through general elections in 1988, so that she could 
make desired changes in Pakistan's nuclear policy.
168
 Benazir Bhutto's 
government was dismissed in 1990 on allegations of corruption after her 
differences with then President Ghulam Ishaaq Khan and military leadership.
169
 
A founding member of Pakistan People's Party and former Finance Minister 
Mubashir Hassan commented on the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's government in 
1990, alluding that the US was behind the removal of an elected government. 
Hassan said that the US had made a deal with Pakistan to abandon its support 
for Benazir Bhutto in return for getting some military concessions in the wake of 
Iraq-Kuwait War in August 1990.
170
 On 16 August 1990, Abdul Qadir Hassan in 
his column in Jang responded to Hassan's comments by reminding him that it 
was the US who helped Benazir Bhutto to become prime minister, and for that 
reason some people in Pakistan used to call her "viceroy." He also argued that 
the US had assigned two jobs to Benazir Bhutto: first, to accept Indian hegemony 
and second, to sign international agreements for international monitoring and 
inspection of nuclear facilities. Since she failed to deliver on both, he further 
explained, the US agreed to remove her from power. He asked Hassan to make it 
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clear which face of America he liked more, one of bringing Benazir Bhutto into 
power or the one ousting her from office.
171
 
The main headline of Jang, on 17 August 1990, reported the US 
Ambassador's meeting with the President of Pakistan Ghulam Ishaq Khan. 
Reportedly, Ambassador Oakley warned the President that if there was any harm 
to Benazir Bhutto and her family, his government would not remain silent. 
Consequently, the President assured him of the security of Benazir Bhutto and 
her family.
172
 The information published in the newspaper was presented as a 
piece of evidence to confirm US connections with Benazir Bhutto and its degree 
of interference into Pakistan's domestic politics. Conversely, Maulana Irshad-ul-
Haq Thanvi, a journalist in Jang on 12 August 1993 argued that it was interesting 
that in spite of the US pressure, advice, or dictation successive Pakistani ruling 
civil or military leadership from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Nawaz Sharif did not 
compromise on crucial issues such as the nuclear program.
173
 
Contrary to the discussions in the Urdu press describing US interference in 
Pakistan's domestic politics in order to conspire against Pakistan's nuclear 
program, there were some excluded voices which did not agree with the idea of 
US interference in domestic politics as a modality of its conspiracy and betrayal 
and were highlighted through interviews for this research. A senior office bearer of 
a mainstream right-wing political party expressed his views as follows: 
America has never accepted Pakistan's nuclear program but 
there was a time when America did not put much pressure 
on us, due to Pakistan's inclusion in the fight against Soviet 
forces in Afghanistan. Therefore, we found a little space at 
this time. And in this space, we worked to complete our 
nuclear program. America also caused difficulties as we had 
to face sanctions such as Pressler Amendment and others. 
Yes, we have been subject to sanctions but in spite of all that 
America did not put such practical obstacles in the way of 
our work which could wipe out our program altogether but 
this was its own compulsion and we took some benefit of that 
and progressed our nuclear program.
174
 
Thus, Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt communicated those voices of journalists and 
politicians describing US interference in domestic politics as a modality of US 
conspiracy against Pakistan. It was argued that the US interfered in Pakistan's 
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domestic politics in order to conspire against Pakistan's nuclear program. It was 
explained that though US punished some of the political figures in Pakistan who 
did not submit to US pressure and supported those who were more likely to make 
compromises on Pakistan's nuclear program, none of the ruling elite accepted to 
compromise a nuclear program which was essential for Pakistan's survival. Those 
voices were excluded from the discourse which would argue that the US did not 
effectively pressurise Pakistan to restrict its nuclear weapons program and 
therefore did not conspire and betray its ally. 
3.4 CAUSES OF US CONSPIRACY AND BETRAYAL 
Discussions in the Urdu press also detailed the causes behind US conspiracy 
and US betrayal of its ally: first, it was argued that the US conspired against 
Pakistan because it was a hegemonic power which wanted to keep Pakistan 
dependent on its aid and to achieve this end it would make the ruling elite side 
with it; second, it was argued that the US conspired against Pakistan because it 
was an anti-Muslim power and would not allow a Muslim country to become a 
nuclear power; third, it was argued that the US conspired against Pakistan's 
nuclear program in pursuance of its interests in South Asia and preferred India as 
a larger country comparatively more effective in serving US purposes. 
3.4.1 The US as a Hegemonic Power Wished to Secure its Capitalistic 
Interests 
The Urdu press described Pakistan's nuclear program as essentially 
"peaceful" to meet energy and other civil requirements for the sake of country's 
development. Later when the Urdu press recommended that Pakistan amend its 
objectives to include development of nuclear weapons for the sake of security of 
the country, it was also premised on the argument that nuclear technology would 
be comparatively affordable in terms of cost as compared to heavy spending on 
conventional military power. However the Urdu press found the US conspiring 
against Pakistan's nuclear program and it was argued that actually it wanted to 
keep Pakistan dependent on it and would not allow Pakistan to attain a level of 
self-reliance. It was also observed by the Urdu press that the US would tend to 
side with the Pakistani ruling elite in order to realise its conspiracy against 
Pakistan's nuclear program.  
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The US Wanted to Keep Pakistan Dependent on US Aid 
Muneer Ahmad Khan, Chairman PAEC on 4 October 1975 was reported by 
Jang to have told the conference of International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna 
that to meet its energy requirements Pakistan needed at least twenty nuclear 
power generation units in the next twenty-five years, whereas under the pretext of 
Indian nuclear tests, the superpowers had increased checks on Pakistan 
acquiring nuclear plants, equipments, and technical information. He further 
explained that the US and other superpowers were not even considering a 
country's compliance with safeguards and participation into regional or collective 
agreements for non-proliferation. Hence, the reaction of the world powers to the 
Indian tests had affected the cause of nuclear energy and was increasing 
difficulties for developing countries like Pakistan and consequently increasing 
their reliance on the US.
175
 
Likewise, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, while addressing the inauguration 
ceremony of the nuclear power-plant at Karachi on 30 November 1972 was 
reported to have said that Pakistan wanted to use atomic energy for peaceful 
purposes only and for that reason had already accepted the international 
monitoring of its nuclear reactor. He demanded that the subcontinent had to be 
declared a nuclear weapons free region while he insisted that the survival of 
country depended on the effective utilisation of atomic science.
176
 On 21 August 
1974, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi in his memorandum to the United 
Nations General Secretary suggesting a resolution in the General Assembly 
session about declaring South Asia an area free from nuclear activities for military 
purposes was reported to have argued that such an action would help to achieve 
peace, stability, and economic growth for developing countries of South Asia.
177
 
Muneer Ahmad Khan, Chairman PAEC, on 15 November 1975 was reported to 
have explained that Pakistan needed nuclear technology for power generation 
and the growth of agriculture.
178
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 9 September 1976 therefore criticised the US concerns with 
regard to Pakistan's nuclear program and noted that many Asian, African, and 
Latin American developing countries had been trying to acquire nuclear 
technology, but the US had become unnecessarily critical since Pakistan started 
                                              
175
 Jang, news article, 4 October 1970, p.1. 
176
 Ibid, news article, 30 November 1972, p.1. 
177
 Ibid, news article, 23 August 1974, p.8. 
178
 Ibid, news article, 15 November 1975, p.1. 
157 
 
its efforts to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant from France. The newspaper 
argued that the US was looking at each and every attempt for nuclear technology 
with suspicion, regardless of how peaceful the program and objectives were. The 
newspaper argued that it was "unfair on the part of the US" to support the nuclear 
program of "an aggressive country like India" and to oppose that of a smaller 
country like Pakistan. The newspaper concluded that it was clear from American 
practices that it did not want to see the progress of developing countries and 
wanted them to remain dependent on the US.
179
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 14 October 1976 observed that France was determined to 
provide the reprocessing plant, in spite of American opposition. The 
spokesperson of the French government was reported to have told the media that 
France was against nuclear proliferation and it would take special guarantees and 
assurances from the countries receiving nuclear equipment. However, the 
spokesperson clarified that France was against unnecessary sanctions, and did 
not agree to the American suggestion of taking the used fuel back from countries 
in their use of the nuclear reprocessing plants.
180
 The newspaper appreciated the 
French determination and resistance to the American pressure. The newspaper 
on behalf of the Pakistanis thanked the French government for not accepting US 
pressure and for not preferring any interests and purposes over "human ethics 
and morality." It was argued that the courage of the French government would 
have long lasting effects in improving Pakistan-France relationship and would 
also help to "strengthen status" and "trust" on France in the eyes of "developing 
countries sick of the American attitude."
 181
 
Moreover, Nawa-i-Waqt on 6 November 1976 also expressed disappointment 
over unnecessary US opposition to Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program, which 
was also "a lesson for other smaller developing countries," to think carefully about 
relying fully on US aid. The newspaper argued that the US would provide limited 
economic assistance but could not see poor states becoming independent and 
self-reliant. It was claimed that energy was a critical issue for the entire world, 
especially for developing states like Pakistan. Pakistan wanted to purchase a 
reprocessing plant, so that burnt fuel could be reused after reprocessing. The 
newspaper concluded that given "the American attitude" Pakistan had to complete 
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its nuclear processing project and try to become self-reliant.
182
 Likewise, the 
newspaper on 28 November 1976 also argued that the US was opposing 
Pakistan's purchase of the nuclear reprocessing plant, as it could not allow a 
developing ally to overcome its economic problems and becoming self-reliant.
183
 
Saif Nayaz a journalist in Nawa-i-Waqt on 13 December 1976 also argued 
that in pursuance of their interests, superpowers like the US wanted to maintain 
their domination and hegemony over the smaller states, and for that reason 
wanted their energies to be diverted in useless endeavours, such as wasting their 
efforts passing resolutions in the UN.
184
 The journalist explained that countries 
like China and Japan escaped the technological supremacy and hegemony of the 
superpowers, therefore, no superpower could threaten them, and they were not 
dependent on ineffective UN resolutions either. Consequently, the journalist 
advised Pakistan to come out of the shadow of American domination and 
technological superiority, in order to get credible security and economic growth.
185
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 19 December 1976 observed the dilemma for Pakistan, as 
now, it had to decide to choose between the nuclear reprocessing plant and 
American aid.
186
 The newspaper advised in favour of the nuclear reprocessing 
plant as it had great potential to meet Pakistan's requirements for energy and 
economic development. On one side, the newspaper explained that there was 
American aid for which other alternatives could be available, but on the other side 
if Pakistan surrendered to American pressure it would lose the rare opportunity to 
become self-reliant for energy requirements and strengthening its defence. 
Therefore, the newspaper suggested that the only option left to Pakistan for its 
survival and defence of its independence was to stand up to American 
pressure.
187
  
Additionally, Nawa-i-Waqt explained that it was most likely that the US would 
be enraged and try to punish Pakistan. In this situation, while remaining patient, 
Pakistan had to try to convince the US of its defence and economic needs. In 
spite of all its efforts, if the US could not understand Pakistan's situation, then 
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Pakistan might have to take the risk of abandoning American aid. The newspaper 
also argued that in spite of all of its effectiveness and appreciation, the American 
aid given to Pakistan in the past, helped a superficial form of economic growth 
and left Pakistan more dependent on the aid instead of moving it towards self-
reliance. Consequently, the newspaper suggested, if the aid was stopped, it could 
be a blessing in disguise, just as China escaped Soviet aid in 1960 and adopted 
policies of self reliance, which helped its growth. In the same manner, the 
newspaper concluded, Pakistan could also adopt a similar policy of developing its 
own resources and decreasing its dependence on the American aid.
188
 
 
Figure 32 Nawa-i-Waqt on 12 April 1979 published a cartoon to reflect that the US was 
attempting to trap Pakistan through its aid whereas Pakistan did not compromise on its 
national interest and rejected US aid in order to save its nuclear program. The cartoon 
showed Pakistan throwing away the bowl of begging while other developing countries 
were still carrying it. Pakistan personified as a person wearing the national dress said to 
the American President Jimmy Carter, "thank you America!" The board behind the 
American President informs "Sam Brothers Money Lenders: get loans here on strict and 
complicated terms, special aids are given on pledging the national identity (Carter)."
189
 
Chairman PAEC, Muneer Ahmad Khan, on 5 September 1979 was reported to 
have told the Pakistan Engineering Congress at Lahore that the US was opposing 
the reprocessing plant because it wanted to keep Pakistan dependent with regard 
to nuclear fuel. He tried to justify Pakistan's need for a reprocessing plant by 
saying that it had enough resources of uranium and the proposed nuclear power 
plant at Chashma would operate with the reprocessed fuel. He argued that 
Pakistan's future economic progress was highly dependent on a successful 
nuclear program. He claimed that the Americans wanted Pakistan merely to buy a 
nuclear reactor, while leaving issue of fuel supply to them. He said that such a 
dependence was not acceptable for Pakistan because in the past under US 
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influence Canada "ruthlessly suspended supply" of fuel and spare parts for the 
nuclear reactor at Karachi.
190
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 29 October 1979 reported that a Pakistani delegation led by 
the Foreign Minister Agha Shahi had negotiated the nuclear program and aid with 
American counterparts. The newspaper noted that joint declaration disclosed that 
a deadlock was still there. The Pakistani delegation also assured on behalf of 
President Zia-ul-Haq that Pakistan did not want to develop nuclear weapons, 
whereas a similar assurance was already provided to Indian Prime Minister and 
President Carter.
191
 In consequence Nawa-i-Waqt on 20 October 1979 advised 
Pakistan to remain firm on its stance with regard to pursuance of "a peaceful 
nuclear program." The newspaper argued that though the US was a superpower 
and Pakistan could not afford a confrontation, nevertheless it had some important 
interests in the regions, specifically in the oil rich Muslim countries. Therefore, 
sooner or later it would have to reconsider its policies towards Pakistan's nuclear 
program.
192
 A year later on 3 November 1980, the newspaper also advised that it 
would be better for Pakistan's independence and sovereignty, if in addition to 
energy requirements, it could include in the objectives strengthening the defence 
through the use of nuclear technology, which would be comparatively affordable 
as compared to expenses on conventional military weapons and would also make 
Pakistan self-reliant in terms of its defence. The newspaper argued that 
superpowers would not allow developing countries to gain self-reliance in order to 
maintain their hegemony and ensure their capital interests with regard to their 
military industry.
193
 
 
Figure 33, Nawa-i-Waqt on 20 October 1979 published a cartoon to reflect that the US 
wanted to deprive Pakistan of its peaceful nuclear program, which was essential for its 
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economic growth. The cartoon showed American Secretary of State Cyrus Vans trying to 
snatch nuclear capability from Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi. The caption under 
the cartoon read, "differences between America and Pakistan over nuclear program could 
not be resolved."
194
 
 
Figure 34, Nawa-i-Waqt on 1 December 1980 published a cartoon to reflect that the 
peace was not threatened by Pakistan's nuclear program instead it was being 
endangered because of the military industry of the two superpowers, the US and the 
USSR, which were trying to maximise their profits by selling their arms to developing 
countries. The cartoon showed the US and the USSR personified as two women 
pregnant with their arms industry while world peace personified looked worried and 
thinking, as the caption read, "when will both of them think about family planning of 
arms?"
195
 
Pakistani authorities, from President to Chairman PAEC, kept emphasising in 
Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt that Pakistan's nuclear program was purely for "peaceful 
purposes" in order to attain economic development and it did not have any 
intentions to develop nuclear weapons.
196
 A columnist M. Tufail on 2 March 1984 
and Muneer Ahmad Khan Chairman PAEC on 10 and 28 March 1984 in Jang 
argued that Pakistan desperately needed to progress in the nuclear field in order 
to meet its energy requirements and to pursue the development of its industrial, 
agricultural, and health sectors by saving on the import of oil supplies as a major 
source of energy.
197
 Similarly, Jang on 4 December 1984 argued that 
superpowers wanted to keep developing countries like Pakistan dependent on 
them by restricting their economic progress through a peaceful nuclear 
program.
198
 
In response to articles in Jang written by a liberal journalist Abdullah Hussain, 
a series of eleven articles by a historian, a political analyst, and a journalist 
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Muhammad Iftikhar who also adhered to liberal views, published in Jang between 
14 March and 7 April 1984, argued that the USSR and the US in spite of being 
rival superpowers had been treating the newly freed developing countries in the 
same manner. Abullah Hussain emphasised that it was only the US, who 
supported dictatorial regimes in developing countries, followed an anti-Muslim 
agenda by supporting Israel, and tried to make every possible effort to increase or 
at least maintain sales of its arms industry. Muhammad Iftikhar conversely argued 
that it was not only the US, but in fact both the superpowers which had the same 
objectives. Therefore, it was logical that the US would oppose the nuclear 
program of a dependent country, which was a permanent customer of its 
conventional weapons.
199
 
Jang on 5 November 1984 criticised the American circles "exaggerating 
Pakistan's nuclear program" and argued that it was crystal clear that "so called 
critics" of the nuclear program "represented a specific prejudiced mindset." The 
newspaper explained that actual purpose of the US was to weaken Pakistan's 
economy in order to keep Pakistan dependent on it, instead of restricting nuclear 
proliferation and securing a peaceful future of the world.
200
 Likewise, the 
newspaper on 7 and 13 November 1990 argued that aid was actually a tool of the 
powerful states to control developing countries and therefore suspension of US 
aid in 1990 was a blessing in disguise and Pakistan had to continue with its 
nuclear program while relying on its own resources.
201
 
Syed Asad Gilani in his column in Jang on 8 November 1990 analysed the 
history of Pakistan-US relations and argued that the relationship between the two 
countries which had started on the basis of equality went through different stages: 
first as of ties between "a larger and a smaller" country; second between "a 
powerful and weaker" state; third between "a donor and an aid seeking" 
economy; and finally the stage of relationship between "a master and a slave." 
Subsequently, Jang on 22 and 23 November 1990 argued that the US had always 
attempted to secure its own "selfish interests" by keeping Pakistan dependent on 
its aid. For that reason, the newspaper concluded that Pakistan had to behave 
like a self-respecting nation in a manner that the US could realise the fact that 
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Pakistanis wanted to become self-reliant and were no more ready to accept 
dependence on US aid.
202
 
 
Figure 35, Jang on 19 November 1990 published a cartoon to reflect aid as a US tactic to 
trap Pakistan to compromise its nuclear program. The cartoon showed personified US 
holding a bag full of US aid tied to a chain while Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
holding a hammer of new national policy to break the chains of US aid.
203
 
A columnist M. Tufail wrote in Jang on 19 November 1990 that in fact none of 
the Islamic countries was capable of attaining self-reliance in the production of 
defence equipments. He explained that this was due to the fact that Islamic 
countries with financial resources lacked the requisite talent and technology, 
whereas the countries with technical and intellectual abilities were economically 
dependent on the US and the west. Therefore, he concluded that Islamic 
countries could attain self-reliance and "break the shackles of dependence," only 
if they cooperated with each other. 
204
 
It was argued in the Urdu press that Pakistan's nuclear program was meant to 
achieve level of self-reliance in terms of economy and military security and the 
US as a capitalist hegemonic force of the world did not want a developing country 
like Pakistan to become self-sufficient. It was explained that successful 
implementation of the nuclear program was meant to utilise the nuclear 
technology in medicine, agriculture, and production of cheaper energy that would 
help Pakistan accelerate its economic development. Moreover, it was also argued 
that the US wanted to maintain its financial profits through sales of its 
conventional weapons and would not allow Pakistan to become independent 
through utilisation of nuclear technology which was a cheaper source of military 
security. 
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The Pakistani Ruling Elite Suspected of Siding with the US 
Jang on 4 May 1993 with reference to The Voice of America reported that 
Nawaz Sharif government dismissed in 1993 had approached the American 
government to ask the US to "condemn the dismissal" of an elected government 
and to put pressure in order to influence Pakistan to hold a free and fair elections. 
Jang condemned the alleged act of Nawaz Sharif while regarding it as an 
"invitation to interfere" in Pakistan's domestic affairs. The newspaper noted that 
Benazir Bhutto was already suspected for her "secret alliance" with the US and 
therefore not only was the US interfering on its own, but also the ruling elite of 
Pakistan in order to make it into power and to retain it sought such interference.
205
 
However, Jang on 8 May 1993 reported the US reaction to the dismissal of 
Sharif's government as different to that of Benazir Bhutto's government. 
Reportedly, the US regarded the removal of Benazir Bhutto from power as a form 
of "constitutional coup," whereas that of Sharif's government was considered a 
"continuity of democratic process." The reason cited was that the US government 
was not very pleased with Sharif's inflexible stance on Pakistan's nuclear 
program. The US was suspected of having links with Pakistani ruling elite and 
sought to check Pakistan's nuclear program with their help.
206
 
On the other hand, on 19 May 1993, Nayyar Zaidi the correspondent of The 
Jang Group reported from Washington that according to his sources, Sharif 
during the last days of his government had agreed with the US to reconsider 
Pakistan's policy on the nuclear program, but his differences with the President 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan had already reached the point of no return.
207
 Jang on 20 
May 1993 regarded it as a serious allegation and advised Sharif to justify his 
position on this issue.
208
 A columnist, Irshad Mehmood argued in Jang on 10 June 
1993 that in fact Benazir Bhutto in her attempt to prove herself a leader of a 
liberal and progressive political party was a pro-American ready to protect 
American interests. The columnist wrote that Nawaz Sharif who was elected to 
power in 1990 for his anti-American postures had to surrender to American 
pressure and was no longer able to protect Pakistan's interests.
209
 Former military 
chief, Mirza Aslam Baig, wrote in his column in Jang on 20 June 1993 that 
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Pakistan's nuclear program was crucial for Pakistan's security, and for that 
reason, anyone who tried to make a compromise on it could not remain in 
power.
210
 
Subsequently, Asar Chauhan a columnist in Jang on 9 May 1993 analysed the 
extent of the US interference in Pakistan's internal affairs and "dual policies" of 
the ruling elite. He noted that before the military takeover of 1977, Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto complained of US interference and pressure on him due to Pakistan's 
nuclear program. The columnist argued that his daughter Benazir Bhutto who 
used to regard the US responsible for her father's "judicial murder," later in 1988 
came into power with American help. The columnist noted that in the wake of 
Kuwait-Iraq War in 1990 and US involvement in it, while Nusrat Bhutto, the 
Chairperson of Pakistan People's Party, was leading the protest rallies in favour 
of Saddam Husain, where US flags and dummies of the American president were 
being burnt, at the same time, the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was visiting the 
US, and was "offering her services" to the American president. The columnist 
argued that apparently it looked as if Benazir Bhutto had once again made a deal 
with the US and would become the next Prime Minister in the forthcoming general 
elections of 1993 because the US wanted her to be in power to compromise 
Pakistan's nuclear program.
211
 
The two newspapers through their editorials and other prominent voices from 
journalists and politicians explained that the US was a hegemonic power who 
would not allow Pakistan to gain the level of self-reliance on the basis of its 
peaceful nuclear program for civil purposes or even for military objectives. It was 
argued that progress in the nuclear technology would bring economic 
development, as Pakistan would save its economic resources in terms of its 
spending on energy sector and conventional military power. It was also argued 
that the US wanted to side with Pakistani ruling elite in order to keep Pakistan 
dependent on it. However, there were other voices which argued differently and 
were not allowed to take part in the discussions. Some of such voices were 
highlighted through the interviews conducted for this research. A senior journalist 
adhering to left-wing ideas argued: 
although they [Americans] are opposed like us, as we are 
opposed to Pakistan making a nuclear bomb, because it 
                                              
210
 Mirza Aslam Baig, Jang, column, 20 June 1993, p.3.  
211
 Asar Chauhan, Jang, column, 9 May 1993, p.2. 
166 
 
costs us very heavily... Why do both India and Pakistan have 
such large armies? [I think] Pakistan's productive resources 
are misused on them, [whereas] Pakistan's people are 
illiterate, Pakistan's people are half-fed or unfed, and 
Pakistan's forty percent population is definitely below poverty 
line. And then, they are uneducated, they are without 
shelters, and without jobs and burgeoning population, and 
there is a serious threat to Pakistan's society, you can say, 
blasting into a kind of armed anarchy in this area. That is all 
because of misplaced or misuse of Pakistan's limited 
resources. Or [otherwise] to enhance those resources, you 
need investment, so all the investments and all the 
assistance you get is being used on turning it [Pakistan] into 
a security state, and there is no security [laughs].
212
 
Yet another senior liberal columnist explained: 
[one] harm is our cost of security and development of the 
bomb. It would be more beneficial, if the same money could 
be utilised for the welfare of the people. Therefore, making of 
nuclear bomb has caused us harm. Pakistani media has not 
conveyed this perspective to people.
213
  
Thus, the leading voices in the Urdu press including Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, 
government officials, journalists, and politicians belonging to both right and left-
wing ideologies explained one of the reasons behind US conspiracy against 
Pakistan's nuclear program. It was argued that the US being a hegemonic 
superpower did not want Pakistan to achieve a level of self-reliance through a 
cheaper source of energy and security and that the US always attempted to 
collaborate with the local ruling elites of Pakistan in order to protect its own 
financial interests. However, others who were not included in the discourse did 
not agree to the idea of nuclear weapons as a means of securing self-reliance 
and cheaper source of security. In order to facilitate rationalisation of the 
perception of a US politics of betrayal, the dominant voices of the discourse 
established a causality of US conspiracy and betrayal of its ally. 
3.4.2 US Opposition to the Nuclear Program of a Muslim Country 
Discourse in the Urdu press presented another cause of US conspiracy and 
betrayal of its ally by describing the US as an anti-Islamic force. Pakistan's 
nuclear program was identified as that of a Muslim country which would be 
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beneficial to whole Islamic world, whereas India's nuclear program was perceived 
as that of a non-Muslim country threatening its Muslim neighbour. Consequently, 
US opposition to Pakistan's nuclear program and support to that of India was 
rationalised on the basis of the anti-Islamic identity of the US. It was argued that 
the US was part of a wider conspiracy against the Muslim world and therefore 
was opposed to the nuclear program of a Muslim country.  
Muneer Ahmad Khan Chairman of the PAEC was reported by Jang on 30 
November 1972 to have told journalists that Pakistan's experiments in the field of 
nuclear technology would benefit "the entire Islamic world."
214
 He claimed that 
Pakistan was "the first Muslim country" to start a nuclear power plant and many 
Muslim countries were showing their interest in the technology.
215
 Jang on 30 
November 1972 also endorsed the statement by appreciating that Pakistan was 
"the first Muslim country" to construct a nuclear power plant to produce 
electricity.
216
 Thus, in the very beginning the Urdu press and Pakistan's officials 
identified Pakistan's nuclear program with Islamic identity and regarded 
development in Pakistan's nuclear program as beneficial to all Muslim countries. 
On the other hand Jang on 20 May 1974 explained Indian nuclear tests 
conducted on 18 May 1974 were "a grievous threat" by a "non-Muslim country" to 
the security of Pakistan as a Muslim state. The newspaper blamed the 
superpowers for providing resources and technical information to assist India. The 
newspaper feared that Israel and other countries would follow suit and therefore 
there was no reason why Muslim countries should not seek progress in nuclear 
technology.
217
 
Jang on 22 May 1974 advised Pakistan to call an emergency meeting of the 
Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), as the Indian 
tests were "a threat to all Muslim countries." The newspaper argued that tests 
would encourage Israel and South Africa to follow suit, threatening the Arab and 
Muslim countries of Asia and Africa. The newspaper raised the question about the 
reason for restricting Muslim states from acquiring nuclear technology, when non-
Muslim countries of the eastern and western blocs were armed with nuclear 
weapons. The newspaper asked if the United Nations and superpowers had any 
practical solution to save "Muslim countries" from "nuclear aggression, 
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blackmailing, and exploitation." The newspaper advised Islamic countries to think 
about these issues and find some solution to the problem.
218
 
Aziz Ahmad, the Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, was 
reported on 27 June 1974 to have told the OIC Foreign Ministers' Conference at 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, that Pakistan had proof that India and Israel had been 
cooperating in the development of nuclear weapons. He also informed the 
conference that India had enough plutonium to prepare seventeen nuclear 
bombs, whereas there was information that Israel had nuclear weapons. Jang 
argued that it was sure that in any future war "Israel could use nuclear weapons 
against Muslims." Therefore, it was natural for the international community to be 
concerned about nuclear proliferation, but it was of greater anxiety for Muslims. 
The newspaper argued that both "India and Israel were aggressors," as the 
former had caused the disintegration of Pakistan, whereas the latter had occupied 
Muslim territories. The newspaper claimed that these two countries had "a secret 
alliance" against Pakistan and other Muslim countries. For that reason, the 
newspaper proposed the argument that Pakistan had raised its voice for the 
protection of all non-nuclear states, especially Muslim countries. Consequently, it 
was advised that Muslim countries had to opt for one of only two available 
options. First, they had to seek credible assurances against the nuclear threat. 
Second, they had to try to develop their own nuclear power. The newspaper 
suggested that in these circumstances, "the defence of the Muslim world" had 
become the most important issue and Muslim states had to think how to fight 
against nuclear threats of aggressors like India and Israel.
219
 
C. L. Sulzberger, an American journalist was reported by Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 
November 1976 to have written in The International Herald Tribune that Pakistan 
had refused any monitoring or inspection controls for the reprocessing plants that 
had been developed internally based on the model of the French reprocessing 
plant, therefore it was less likely that it would be able to receive French nuclear 
equipment.
220
 Nawa-i-Waqt responded to the article by regarding it as "wishful 
thinking" and "part of anti-Muslim agenda" of the US and its media. The 
newspaper criticised the US for creating hurdles in Pakistan's efforts to acquire 
the nuclear reprocessing plant, on the basis of its "so called non-proliferation 
agenda," while it already had provided Israel with all the ingredients to develop 
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nuclear weapons. The newspaper wrote that the US and Canada indirectly 
supported the Indian nuclear tests and were still supplying heavy water and 
nuclear fuel to India. The US was accused of "the highest form of hypocrisy," 
when it provided nuclear accessories to India under the pretext of previous 
agreements to secure the integrity of its international commitments, while ignoring 
all diplomatic ethics and norms by interfering in French sovereignty and 
Pakistan's legitimate efforts for nuclear technology. It was concluded that US 
opposition was due to the fact that "Pakistan was a Muslim country," a well wisher 
of Arabs, and wanted to see the unity of the Muslim world. Therefore, "animosity 
to Muslims" was a "common feature of Israel, India, and the US."
221
 
 Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 November 1976 noted that Jimmy Carter, who remained 
vocal over the issue of Pakistan's nuclear program during his election campaign 
in 1976, was voted into power in the subsequent presidential elections. The 
newspaper argued that Carter being a Democrat was also expected to have a 
more pro-Indian approach, like his democratic predecessors Kennedy and 
Johnson. The newspaper noted that Carter, who also remained a staunch 
supporter of Israel during his election debates, was thought to be "more anti-Arab 
and anti-Muslims." Therefore the newspaper expressed its fears that opposition to 
Pakistan's nuclear program would "increase manifold" under the Carter 
administration.
222
 
Subsequently, Nawa-i-Waqt on 31 August 1977 also argued that though the 
two superpowers were trying to minimise the nuclear threat for them and their 
non-Muslim allies, Arab and Muslim countries were threatened by India, Israel, 
and South Africa. In these circumstances in a world where "might is right," it was 
advised that Arab and Muslim countries needed to be united, to develop their own 
nuclear capability to counter the nuclear threat from the non-Muslim aggressive 
states.
223
 
Moreover, Nawa-i-Waqt through its editorials and some of its columnists such 
as Sabir Hussain Shakaib and Abdul Rasheed at different occasions during 14 
December 1976 to 29 January 1979, criticised the US decision to start 
negotiations for sale of one hundred fighter planes to India and regarded it a 
move of the western nations under the influence of a "traditional prejudice since 
the time of Crusades." The newspaper argued that Pakistan was a country having 
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its basis in Islam and always willing for the cooperation and unity of all Muslim 
countries of the world. Therefore, in spite of being America's ally, it could not 
expect any favours from the US. The newspaper noted that other Muslim 
countries such as Turkey and Arab countries, which were subject to Israeli 
aggression were also treated by the US in the same manner. Moreover, the 
newspaper and its columnists claimed that the American and Soviet "apparently 
separate moves" to support India's nuclear and military program were "actually 
part of a larger campaign" against Muslim world. For that reason, the newspaper 
advised all Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries to become united for their 
defence and take the full advantage of Pakistan being the "fortress of Islam." 
Muslim countries were also advised to develop a common base for enhancing 
defence capability of the Muslim world.
 224
 
Similarly, Nawa-i-Waqt on 7 January 1979 analysed the need for reshaping 
Pakistan's foreign policy to ensure unity of the Muslim world to forge an organised 
Islamic bloc and to emerge as an effective power. The newspaper advised 
Pakistan to take appropriate steps to strengthen the unity of Muslim states, 
especially in the circumstances when requirements of Pakistan's security of 
independence and territorial integrity had become most important and critical.
225
 
The newspaper also suggested that given past experience, the US could not 
however be "trusted" for its assurances, as long as it did not change its behaviour 
towards Pakistan and the Muslim world.
226
 
 
Figure 36, Nawa-i-Waqt on 7 March 1979 published a cartoon to reflect Pakistan's 
preference to its identity as a Muslim country. The cartoon showed the US President 
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Jimmy Carter and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev as "international town planners" 
willing to allocate space to Pakistan in their respective residential blocs, however 
Pakistan's President General Zia-ul-Haq shown as a potential client asking the both 
Presidents, as the caption read, "leave our plot in Islamic Bloc," hence rejecting to be part 
of either of Soviet or American bloc.
227
 
Furthermore, Nawa-i-Waqt on 8, 22, and 24 April 1979 argued that the US 
had stopped Pakistan's economic aid in April 1979 because of "its prejudice 
against Muslims." It was argued that the US could not afford to allow a Muslim 
state to master a modern technology for energy, as the later could possibly 
extend its support to other Muslim countries to confront the Israeli threat. 
Therefore, the newspaper continued its argument that the object of the US 
opposition was not merely Pakistan but the whole Islamic world. The newspaper 
noted that Pakistan was the only country in the Islamic world with the potential 
and capability to make credible progress in the nuclear field to meet its own 
requirements in particular and that of the Islamic world in general. The newspaper 
advised Muslim countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates, 
and Iran to think wisely and carefully, how they could extend moral, material, and 
financial support to Pakistan for a common cause.
 228
 
In addition to increasing pressure on Pakistan over its nuclear program, 
Nawa-i-Waqt observed on 4 April 1979 that other Muslim countries were also 
under stress. Reportedly, for two years, France had been in the process of 
manufacturing a nuclear reprocessing plant for Iraq. The newspaper claimed that 
this plant was destroyed by some "hidden hands" possibly of Israel's supported 
by the US.
229
 A columnist Sabir Hussain Shakaib in Nawa-i-Waqt expressed his 
concerns that this could have been done by the US to deprive another Muslim 
country of nuclear technology. The columnist argued that Saudi Arabia was also 
interested in acquiring the technology but given "the anti-Muslim prejudice" of the 
US, it was most likely that it would also be subject to similar pressure. Though 
Saudi Arabia and other oil rich Arab countries could use their oil supplies as a 
counter force, they did not have a stronger army to defend against US force, 
whereas Pakistan was conversely not an oil-rich nation but had a comparatively 
stronger army capable enough to protect its nuclear program. The columnist 
suggested that to balance the threat of the American use of military power, 
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Muslim countries had to develop a common nuclear program. Pakistan could well 
provide technical services and human resources, whereas Saudi Arabia and other 
rich Muslim countries could provide financial resources for this purpose. In this 
way, the journalist concluded, Muslim countries could acquire the nuclear 
technology and strengthen the defence of the Muslim world.
230
 
On the other hand, Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 September 1979 observed that the term 
"Islamic bomb" was frequently used as the US authorities and media thought that 
Pakistan's nuclear technology was being sponsored by other Muslim countries 
such as Libya and Saudi Arabia for future proliferation to those countries.
231
 
Nawa-i-Waqt argued that the term "Islamic bomb" was an American creation well 
supported by other western countries with a purpose of "igniting an organised 
movement" of opposition to Pakistan's "peaceful nuclear program" while "ignoring 
the nuclear activities" of countries like Israel, South Africa, and India.
232
 
Likewise, Malik Amjad Hussain a columnist in Nawa-i-Waqt on 14 November 
1981 noted that under Reagan's presidency, while warmth was returning to the 
relationship between the US and Pakistan, they still had differences over their 
respective attitudes towards the Muslim world. The columnist argued that over the 
nuclear program, it was a positive sign that the American attitude had moved from 
its previous "bullying behaviour" in the Carter administration, but the point of 
concern was that Indian and Jewish lobbies in the US were still active against 
Pakistan. The columnist claimed that the change in attitude was because of the 
pressure of changed circumstances due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979. The columnist explained that Pakistan being a Muslim country had a 
different stance towards important issues of the Muslim and Arab world, whereas 
the US was all supportive of Israel and opposed to the Palestinian movement for 
freedom. The columnist noted that the US did not condemn Israel's attack on 
Iraq's nuclear reactor, whereas Pakistan took a different stance. Therefore, the 
columnist suggested that there was substantial and significant difference in 
American and Pakistani approaches to the issues of the Muslim world, which 
would challenge the smooth, stable, and long lasting relationship between the two 
countries.
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Nawa-i-Waqt on 9 and 12 June 1982 observed that in the wake of Israel's war 
with Lebanon in 1982, it was becoming clear that due to the lack of unity in the 
Islamic world at the behest of the US, USSR, or other non-Muslim countries, 
Muslims were becoming victims of the aggression. Kashmir, Cyprus, and Arab 
countries threatened by Israel, Eritrea, and Afghanistan were the examples of 
aggression of non-Muslim powers against Muslims. Therefore, it was advised that 
in order to ensure security of the Muslim world, Muslims needed to be united in 
the development of nuclear security.
234
 
 
Figure 37, Nawa-i-Waqt on 21 June 1982 published a cartoon to reflect "US 
backstabbing" attitude of Arab Muslims. The cartoon showed a personified US 
backstabbing an Arab, while shedding crocodile tears. The only descriptive word 
associated with the cartoon was "Israel," written on the dagger used for backstabbing."
235
 
Consequently, Jang on 5 November 1984 observed that actually it was a 
"non-Muslim nexus between India, Israel, and the US against the Muslim 
countries behind "rigid and unjust American behaviour" towards Pakistan's 
nuclear program.
236
 In two of its editorials published on 3 and 8 March 1986, Jang 
explained that the term "Islamic Bomb" was actually coined by the "Hanood and 
Yahood," anti-Muslim, and anti-Pakistan lobbies.
237
 The reason, the newspaper 
cited was that according to perceptions of hostile lobbies, sooner or later, 
Pakistan's nuclear technology could threaten Israel's interests in the Middle East 
and Indian interests in South Asia. However, the newspaper regarded it a 
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"baseless propaganda" to affect Pakistan's "peaceful nuclear program," which 
would share its benefits with other Muslim countries.
238
 
The most important scientist with regard to Pakistan's nuclear program, Abdul 
Qadeer Khan in two of his interviews published by Jang on 14 March 1986 and 
10 September 1990 argued that Pakistan wanted to progress in its nuclear 
program but scarcity of financial resources and sanctions imposed under "the 
anti-Islam policies" of the US and European countries were the main obstacles. 
He said that the US and western countries had perceptions that Pakistan's 
progress in the nuclear field could benefit the "entire Islamic world" and for that 
reason they were opposed to Pakistan's nuclear program.
239
 On 28 January 1987 
in an interview facilitated by Mushahid Hussain which was first published on 1 
March 1987 by Observer, Khan told Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar that Pakistan 
had developed nuclear weapons and they could be used to defend Pakistan.
240
 
On 13 September 1990, Jang also argued that the US, Israel, and India were 
major anti-Islamic forces, and for that reason were opposed to Pakistan's nuclear 
program.
241
 The newspaper argued that all non-Muslim powers had "joined hands 
against the Islamic world," and therefore Pakistan and other Islamic countries had 
to take a firm stance for their defence and security.
242
 
Though discussions in the Urdu press generally explained the cause of the 
US conspiracy and for that matter betrayal vis-à-vis Pakistan's nuclear program 
on the basis of its anti-Muslim identity, there were some alternate but excluded 
perspectives which would not describe the US as an anti-Islamic force or US 
opposition to Pakistan's nuclear program on the basis of its religious affiliation. A 
senior rightist columnist explained in an interview conducted for this research: 
the US had its rivalry with the Soviet Union and for this 
purpose Pakistan was inevitable for them. Although they had 
concerns about nuclear proliferation, they ignored or they 
avoided strong opposition and in this space President Zia-ul-
Haq continued the nuclear program, which was started by 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, with full force and pushed it too far.
243
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Thus, Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, government officials, the prominent journalists, and 
politicians belonging to both right and left-wing ideologies argued that the US was 
conspiring against Pakistan's nuclear program because it was an anti-Islamic 
force. Pakistan's nuclear program was identified as a nuclear program of a 
Muslim country which would benefit entire Muslim world. India's nuclear program 
was described as a program of a non-Muslim country. It was further argued that 
animosity to Muslims was a common feature of the US, India, the USSR, and 
Israel and therefore they were allied to conspire against the nuclear program of a 
Muslim country. It was also argued that Pakistan's nuclear program was mutually 
beneficial to all Muslim countries and threat from the non-Muslim and anti-Islamic 
forces was also common, therefore Muslim countries needed to cooperate with 
Pakistan for the success of its nuclear program. Those voices were excluded from 
the discourse which would argue that the US had a close cooperation with 
Pakistan and other Islamic countries during 1980s Afghan jihad and it was more 
anti-communist or anti-socialist than anti-Islamic state then. 
3.4.3 The US in Pursuance of its Interests Preferred India over Pakistan 
The Urdu press and the dominant voices of its discourse also argued that the 
US was conspiring against Pakistan's nuclear program and hence betrayed 
Pakistan because India being a larger country of South Asia was more important 
to the US. Abdul Rasheed a columnist in Nawa-i-Waqt on 4 September 1976 
observed that Henry Kissinger in his recent visit to Pakistan reiterated American 
policy to give importance to Pakistan's security. The columnist argued that the US 
expression of interest in Pakistan's security was "a farce," as in practice it had 
adopted a policy of indifference to Pakistan and of support to India. The columnist 
noted that the US was supplying nuclear fuel openly to India whereas threatening 
its ally, Pakistan, with the cessation of economic aid if it did not give up its efforts 
for a French nuclear reprocessing plant. He concluded that the US was a "flirt," 
claimed its love was a mere "hoax," and the US opposition to the nuclear program 
was because Pakistan after its disintegration in 1971 was not as attractive as it 
used to be and therefore much larger and powerful India was its centre of 
attraction."
244
 
Subsequently, Nawa-i-Waqt on 2 July 1977 observed that the US announced 
that it would provide India with of 5573 pounds uranium for its nuclear reactors. 
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The newspaper regarded it was a "double cross" by an ally, given the opposition 
to Pakistan's nuclear program on the basis of its so called reservations on nuclear 
proliferation. The newspaper claimed that there was clear difference in words and 
practice of the US as it always declared Pakistan's security a "corner stone" of its 
policy, but in practice at every occasion preferred its ally's enemy, India, backed 
by the USSR.
245
 Similarly, Mushahid Hussain a rightist journalist/senator in Nawa-
i-Waqt on 9 September 1978 analysed US policies towards South Asia and 
claimed that an explanation for American behaviour towards Pakistan was its 
"obsession with bigness, that is big cars, big buildings, big phrases, big money, 
big markets," and this obsession, expressed through the US diplomacy respected 
power in tangible terms. The journalist argued that such conception of power was 
based on the military might of a country, that is state apparatus, armed forces, 
missiles, nuclear weapons and in this framework more powerful countries were 
treated differently than the less powerful. As a result, the journalist explained, the 
Soviet Union or China would not face a direct response but Korea or Vietnam 
could be attacked directly. Similarly, Cuba could be bullied and marines could be 
sent to Cambodia. Brazil could be ignored when it attempted to take an 
independent posture but Chile could not be forgiven when it tried to assert its 
sovereignty. Likewise, India could afford to be defiant and yet qualify for American 
aid, but Pakistan had to remain pliant or to face the US rage.
246
 
 
Figure 38, Nawa-i-Waqt on 14 May 1982 published a cartoon to express its concerns 
over India's intentions to conduct another nuclear test explosion. The cartoon showed a 
dove, which is generally regarded as a symbol of peace, being inflated by the Indian 
prime minister and about to explode. The cartoon was intended to show that the US and 
other countries which criticised Pakistan's "peaceful nuclear program" as a danger to 
peace in South Asia would ignore the Indian nuclear program actually disturbing peace in 
the region. The caption of the cartoon read, "India will soon do the nuclear explosion for 
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the second time."
247
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 31 October 1982 observed that the US Ambassador to India, 
Iiam Clark, had told the media that the US did not have a tilt or bias towards any 
country in South Asia. He also said that after the Indian Prime Minister's recent 
visit to the US, the nature of relationship between India and the US was improving 
and understanding of Indian concerns about American military aid to Pakistan 
was developing on the US side. Nawa-i-Waqt criticised the statement of the 
American Ambassador and wrote that whenever the US agreed to extend its 
support to Pakistan for the sake of its own interests, it always kept a door opened 
in favour of India. For that reason, when India purposively showed its favourable 
attitude to the US, it was readily appreciated by the American administrations, 
which subsequently impacted on its friendship with Pakistan. Therefore, the 
newspaper concluded that there was a possibility that the US would abandon 
Pakistan once more by stepping back on its commitment regarding military aid. 
Thus, Pakistan could not rely on American friendship and assurances and had to 
seriously think about strengthening its defence by alternate means.
248
 
In the same manner, Jang on 3, 25, and 29 November 1984 argued that after 
the assassination of Indira Gandhi on 31 October 1984, President Reagan would 
prefer India over Pakistan in order to fill the vacuum created by the 
disappearance of a strong leader, who had dominated Indian foreign policy for 
fifteen years. The newspaper also noted that in the past US Democrats were 
thought to be pro-Indian but in current circumstances even the Republican 
administration was trying to appease India by supporting its nuclear program and 
making agreements for transferring arms technology, in addition to the provision 
of military aid.
249
  
Later, the newspaper on 1 March 1986 reported that the public perceptions in 
Pakistan of Indian nuclear threats were therefore increasing. The newspaper 
referred to a survey conducted by Gallup Pakistan, in February 1986, which 
reported 53 percent of Pakistanis having the opinion that in case of war with 
India, it would definitely use nuclear weapons against Pakistan whereas this 
percentage in a similar survey conducted in 1981 was 48 percent.
250
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Nevertheless, the newspaper argued that the US looked unsympathetic to 
Pakistan's security concerns. Jang on 2 March 1986 reported that its panel of 
senior journalists had interviewed the US Ambassador Dean Hinton. The 
Ambassador was reported to have told the panel that the US had "suspicions 
about Pakistan's nuclear program," because if the program was for "peaceful 
purposes," Pakistan had to sign the international agreement for international 
monitoring without waiting for the Indian decision. Moreover, he also said that 
Pakistan's expectation to double US aid was not realistic and therefore was not 
possible.
251
 Jang on 3, 8, and 11 March 1986 responded to the views of the 
American Ambassador by declaring the American attitude "clearly partial" and 
"unsympathetic." The newspaper argued that the US had always opposed 
Pakistan's nuclear program, in spite of the inspections and verifications of 
international agencies confirming Pakistan's claims about the peaceful nature of 
the program. Conversely, the newspaper claimed that the US had never objected 
to the Indian nuclear program and in addition to that it was providing all technical 
and financial assistance to India for advancement of the same. The newspaper 
noted that the US had recently signed agreements with India for the provision of 
modern computers and heavy water, which was a clear indication of the American 
tilt towards India.
252
 
Saleem Yazdani a columnist in Jang on 5 March 1986 noted that as the 
Afghan issue was approaching its solution, American interests in Pakistan were 
diminishing whereas interests in India were on the increase for certain reasons. 
First, the columnist explained, the US wanted to make India a hegemonic and 
mini-superpower within South Asia. Second, the US was trying to increase its 
influence in India to restrict Soviet influence there with the hope of forging an 
India-Pakistan-China nexus against the USSR, which was not realistic given the 
Indian differences with Pakistan and China. Third, France, Italy, and some other 
European countries were interested in big Indian markets and by increasing its 
influence in India the US wanted to keep hold of the market while keeping out 
other interested parties. Fourth, the US had hopes to have a pro-American and 
pro-western Indian government after demise of Indira Gandhi. The journalist 
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concluded that whatever the reasons were, it was "another betrayal" by the 
superpower threatening the security of its ally.
253
 
Jang on 23 September 1988 noted that India had recently acquired from the 
USSR, two nuclear reactors of a thousand watt capacity each of them on very 
flexible terms along with the full transfer of technology without restrictions of 
international safeguards. The newspaper also pointed out that India had already 
received nuclear submarines as a part of its extensive defence ties with the 
USSR. On the other hand, the newspaper wrote, the US was also helping India in 
its nuclear program, as recently it had agreed to supply a super computer which 
had an important role in the development of nuclear weapons. The newspaper 
argued that it was "unreasonable" of an ally to restrict Pakistan's nuclear program 
while helping its enemy with the same. The newspaper also criticised the US for 
pressurising other countries such as France to prevent them from providing 
assistance to Pakistan's nuclear progress. The newspaper argued that if the US 
could not help Pakistan due to its own constraints, at least it should allow other 
countries to cooperate.
254
 
In November 1988, Jang with reference to an American Journal Defence and 
Foreign Affairs pointed out that in the early months of 1989, the Indian Air Force 
would attain the capability of delivering nuclear weapons. The newspaper argued 
that the US and other countries kept opposing Pakistan's peaceful nuclear 
program while giving freedom to Indian nuclear development. Therefore, it was 
now clear that India had nuclear weapons and at least at this stage, the 
newspaper hoped that the US could change its attitude of undue favours to India 
and unnecessary criticism to Pakistan.
255
 Later, in December 1988 the newspaper 
highlighted Indian intentions to conduct another nuclear explosion and advised 
Pakistan not to be hurried in giving up its nuclear options by signing international 
treaties.
256
 
Jang on 7, 8, and 16 August 1988 reported that the Pakistani government had 
expressed hopes that the US would continue to provide aid to Pakistan for its 
security, whereas some in the political circles were reported to have forecasted 
deterioration in the relationship by the end of 1980s.
257
 A mainstream right-wing 
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politician, Abida Hussain, on her return from the US, after attending the 
Democratic National Convention as an observer was reported to have told the 
media that according to her estimates, after meeting with American politicians and 
intellectuals, US interests in Pakistan would diminish with the evacuation of 
Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Therefore, she argued that the US would try to 
increase its ties with New Delhi, whereas Pakistan's nuclear program would 
"continue to haunt them." In this scenario, she concluded, Pakistan had to 
prepare itself on economic and diplomatic fronts to maintain its security and 
national integrity.
258
 
On 30 November 1990, Jang reported senior staff consultant of the US 
Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, Peter Galbraith to have stated in an 
interview that Pakistan had to chose between nuclear weapons and American aid. 
The senator also said that India could not sign the international treaties because 
of its border disputes with China and for that reason Pakistan must not wait for 
India to sign international agreements.
259
 The newspaper regarded it as "dual 
standards" and argued that Pakistan had issues of security with India and 
therefore the US must consider those issues. The newspaper also wrote that the 
Pakistani nation was not ready to make any deal at the cost of its national 
security.
260
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 4 April 1997 reported the US Ambassador to Pakistan 
Thomas Jones to have told journalists in Islamabad that the matter of US military 
aid to Pakistan was an issue of the past and no more applicable and therefore, 
supply of embargoed F-16s was not possible.
261
 He also advised Pakistanis to 
change their anti-Indian thinking in order to normalise their relationship with 
India.
262
 The newspaper on 6 April 1997 wrote that the Ambassador's statement 
was symbolic of American thinking in line with making Pakistan subservient to 
India.
263
 Pakistan's Ambassador to the US, Riaz Khokhar, was also reported on 
15 April 1997 to have told journalists that the US had not refunded the money for 
F-16s.
264
 Ahmad Shuja Pasha a columnist in Nawa-i-Waqt on 29 April 1997 
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argued that there was no hope of getting the F-16s or the refund. The columnist 
noted that it was "unfair of the US," that in spite of being an ally, it was not able to 
understand Pakistan's position and its security requirements vis-à-vis India. The 
columnist argued that it was also "unjustified to pressurise Pakistan" on its 
nuclear program while ignoring that of India.
265
 
Conversations in the Urdu press established that a cause of US conspiracy 
against Pakistan's nuclear program was its intentions to strengthen India more 
than Pakistan as the former being a larger country was more relevant than the 
latter. However, there were also some voices in Pakistan which would not agree 
to the idea of US supporting India at the cost of Pakistan's security. Such voices 
generally remained excluded from the discourse. Interviews for this research 
helped to find some of such voices. A senior journalist who also served as a 
career diplomat and adhered to liberal school of thought rejected the idea of the 
US supporting India's nuclear program being based on India's status as a larger 
country while opposing Pakistan's. The journalist said: 
unlike India, Pakistan was caught, trying to sell nuclear 
technology to other states. Now, both were illegal, both had 
not signed anti-nuclear treaty, so they were free to do 
whatever they wanted to do. But, then the international 
community was free also, to take action against both of 
them. But, the methodology of becoming nuclear power in 
India and Pakistan was different. And one of the reasons that 
we are angry that India has been treated differently from 
us.
266
 
Another senior journalist adhering to liberal values said: 
this is a utopia for our people. We think that by acquiring an 
atom bomb we will become prominent in the world and no 
one can do any harm to us. We have faced many armed 
conflicts with India even after making a nuclear bomb. India 
sent its armed forces to our border, right after making the 
nuclear bomb. If America did not intervene, I think, the 
fighting would have escalated to worse.
267
 
Thus, Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt through their editorials, journalistic and political 
voices adhering to both right and left-wing thinking argued that the US conspired 
against Pakistan's nuclear program because it preferred India being a larger 
country and therefore betrayed its ally. It was argued that Pakistan after its 
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disintegration in 1971 had become even smaller as compared to much larger and 
powerful India and therefore the US was more interested in India than Pakistan. It 
was also argued that larger countries such as India being more powerful than the 
smaller countries such as Pakistan can afford to be defiant and pursue 
development of their nuclear weapons. Conversely, the US would not allow 
smaller countries like Pakistan to progress their nuclear program even for 
"peaceful purposes." It was observed that the US on the one hand was providing 
nuclear assistance to India and on the other hand was opposing Pakistan's 
nuclear program, which was a clear indication of its tilt towards the larger country. 
However, there were some alternate voices which were excluded from the 
discourse and which would argue that the US did not always preferred India as 
being a larger state and at times supported Pakistan's security through economic 
and military aid. 
3.5  CONCLUSION 
In the post 1971 War era, the dominant voices of the Urdu press discourse 
such as Nawa-i-Waqt, Jang, government officials, journalists, and politicians from 
both the left and right-wings expressed Pakistan's security concerns as being due 
to the balance of conventional and nuclear military power tilting to India's 
advantage and Pakistan's disadvantage. In doing so, they hoped for and 
expected a positive and appropriate response from the US. However, strong 
Indian criticism of the US’s response reflecting its interest in Pakistan's security 
raised concerns on Pakistan's side that the US might betray Pakistan again in 
order to appease India. Therefore, when the US opposed Pakistan's nuclear 
program and enforced sanctions on its military aid in 1979 and 1990, this was 
perceived as an expression of a US politics of betrayal and, most importantly, as 
a betrayal forming part of a wider conspiracy. Consequently, the discourse also 
analysed the modalities and causes of such a conspiracy. These modalities 
included the use of the American and western media for propaganda against 
Pakistan's nuclear program, US pressure tactics such as restricting economic and 
military aid, and US interference in Pakistan's domestic politics to harm Pakistan's 
nuclear program. There were three main causes behind such a conspiracy, as 
described by the dominant voices of the discourse. First, the US, being a 
hegemonic world power, wanted to protect its capitalistic interests and therefore 
attempted to keep Pakistan dependent on it. Second, the US, being an anti-
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Islamic force, would not allow a Muslim country to have a nuclear program for its 
economic development and military security. Third, in order to protect its interests 
in South Asia, the US would prefer to be allied to a larger country, India, over the 
comparatively smaller Pakistan. 
Conversely, some important voices, which could have refuted the arguments 
of US conspiracy and its betrayal (along with its modalities and certain causes) 
remained excluded from the discourse. Such voices were highlighted through the 
interviews conducted for this research. A senior liberal journalist concluded that: 
the Urdu newspapers, they all support the nuclear program. 
They are very happy that Pakistan has an atom bomb. They 
do not like American opposition to nuclear weapons, and 
they keep saying that. In the English newspapers, 
sometimes, you know, somebody can raise a question that 
we do not need nuclear weapons, but not in the Urdu 
newspapers.
268
 
Another journalist of liberal thinking admitted that: 
in fact, the favourable aspects of the American perspective 
have not been conveyed to the people. Consequently, there 
exists a credibility gap, because of which people are not 
ready to trust America irrespective of the fact that things are 
genuine or not. Even if someone attempts to give an 
alternate perspective, people are already prejudiced against 
it.
269
 
A right leaning journalist also explained the discourse of the Urdu press:  
I think the media deliberately does not convey favourable 
aspects to people. It is because the media people see the 
existing public perceptions, and then present things in 
exaggerated and sensational manner, in order to stir the 
emotions. Media-men do little journalism based on principles 
of justice. They do more of sensational types of journalism. In 
this perspective, they do not convey the favourable aspects, 
in spite of the fact, that America has not done the wrong only, 
rather occasionally, it has also done some good to 
Pakistan.
270
 
To conclude, it can be argued that the Urdu press discourse on Pakistan-US 
relations over the Pakistani nuclear program premised its argument on a 
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perceived US politics of betrayal and a wider conspiracy which, it claimed, had 
certain modalities and causes. The Urdu press discourse on US role with regard 
to Pakistan's nuclear program was biased because the voices that could have 
challenged the hegemonic voices were excluded from the discourse. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 THE ABBOTTABAD OPERATION: VIOLATION OF 
SOVEREIGNTY, US BETRAYAL AS USUAL 
The general response on the US side over the Abbottabad operation, in which 
Osama bin Laden was killed in a unilateral US action on 2 May 2011, was to 
question Pakistan's commitment as an ally in the War on Terror. It was argued 
that Pakistan was either accomplice in hiding Osama bin Laden or had been 
inefficient in detecting his presence on its territory. However, generally, the US 
argument emphasised the point that someone in Pakistan's military and 
government must have known about Osama bin Laden's presence in 
Abbottabad.
1
  
The response on Pakistan's side differed to that of the US, as a Pakistani 
columnist responded to the Abbottabad operation by quoting Shakespeare: 
While I admire and love Caesar, let there be no doubt that I 
love honour more for which I am prepared to lay down my 
life.
2
 
The overall discourse about the Abbottabad operation expressed feelings of 
the hurt for Pakistanis due to the violation of their national sovereignty by an ally, 
who did not respect the huge sacrifices and alarming financial losses caused due 
to its participation in "a foreign war" started in 2001.
3
 The honour of an ally was 
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also perceived as compromised when the powerful partner showed distrust by 
taking unilateral action. These feelings and their expressions were so strong that 
the government, which initially regarded success in the operation as "a great 
victory" and gave the impression that it was a joint venture, had to change its 
stance and within a few days criticised the US for violating Pakistan's sovereignty. 
The genuineness of the operation was also questioned, and it was argued 
that the Abbottabad operation was "a fake and scripted event" to achieve some 
other ends.
4
 It was suspected that Osama bin Laden was not killed in the 
operation, as he was believed to already have been killed long ago. Other voices 
argued that even if Osama bin Laden was killed in the operation, this was done 
under some conspiracy to achieve some other objectives and meet US interests. 
Regardless of the motives and reasons behind the operation, it was speculated 
that the operation would affect Pakistan for the worse. 
In the Urdu press of Pakistan, the reasons behind the operation were 
explained in many different ways. Religious circles and parties of the right 
attempted to explain it as a sign of American hostility towards Islam and Muslims. 
In this view, Osama bin Laden was sketched as a symbol of Muslim resistance to 
"the evil and oppressive designs" of the US. It was argued that the US was "an 
anti-Islamic force" that had violated the sovereignty of a Muslim country in order 
to kill a "Muslim Mujahid" and possibly to attack the nuclear program of "a Muslim 
country." 
Some perspectives were also included in the discourse which argued that 
either Pakistan knew about Osama bin Laden's presence there or had failed to 
know. Some voices originating from Pakistan, although very few in number, 
argued that it was a case of intelligence failure, and that Pakistan could not be 
singled out for this as it had also happened in the US. On the other hand, voices 
accusing Pakistan of having prior knowledge of Osama bin Laden's presence 
originated from the US or the west and were responded to by the Urdu press very 
strongly. The interviews with politicians and journalists conducted for this research 
revealed that there were also several perspectives which did not appear in the 
Urdu newspapers. These excluded or ignored perspectives could have worked as 
a counter argument to the themes presented repeatedly in the Urdu press. 
This chapter discusses the way in which the Urdu press described the 
Abbottabad operation. Section 4.1 explains the reported responses of the 
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government, opposition parties, and different social circles to the issue 
establishing the operation as an act of US betrayal. Section 4.2 analyses how the 
operation was seen as a "planned conspiracy" against Pakistan in order to fulfil 
some underlying US objectives. Section 4.3 describes the modalities of US 
conspiracy discussed in the discourse in order to strengthen the idea of the 
existence of such a US conspiracy. These modalities include US violations of 
mutually-agreed terms of cooperation and international law, the supporting of 
terrorist activities in Pakistan, and pressurising Pakistan to "do more" in the War 
on Terror. Section 4.4 analyses the causes of US conspiracy and betrayal. The 
causes include seeing the US as a hegemonic power siding with the local ruling 
elite to protect its interests, its possible targeting of Pakistan's nuclear program 
and setting a precedent for Indian action, and Osama bin Laden having been 
assassinated as a symbol of Islamic resistance to the anti-Islamic agenda of the 
US. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter by summarising the general impression 
with regard to a US politics of betrayal vis-à-vis the Abbottabad operation.  
4.1 THE ABBOTTABAD OPERATION AND A US POLITICS OF 
BETRAYAL 
4.1.1 Initial Official Response 
The initial response to the operation, especially the official one, on the part of 
Pakistan was to convey to the world that the operation was a joint venture and not 
a unilateral action taken by the US, in essence, trying to refute the argument 
regarding Pakistan helping Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. It seemed 
bent to admit the intelligence failure while attempted to justify it. The prominent 
voices included Nawa-i-Waqt, Jang, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, Director 
General ISI Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Pakistan's High Commissioner to UK Wajid 
Shamsul Hasan, Pakistan's Foreign Office, and Pakistan's Interior Minister 
Rehman Malik. 
Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, on 3 May 2011 in his interview with French 
news agencies, was reported by Nawa-i-Waqt and Jang to have declared that 
Osama bin Laden's death was "a great victory," and Pakistan's intelligence 
cooperation was with the US in this operation, which was "also acknowledged by 
President Obama." He also congratulated the US for the successful operation.
5
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He said that Pakistan had lost thousands of its youth, women, children, and other 
citizens in the War on Terror.
6
 He reiterated the fact that Pakistan had an 
agreement of intelligence sharing with the US and both countries had to 
strengthen the bilateral relationship.
7
 Nawa-i-Waqt on 4 May 2011 also reported 
Prime Minister Gilani to have appreciated the statement of President Obama, in 
which he reportedly "fully acknowledged Pakistan's cooperation" in the operation.
8
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 May 2011 reported the Prime Minister Gilani to have 
reminded the world that Pakistan was fighting against terrorism not only for itself, 
but also for the peace and stability of the whole world, and in this war had given 
more sacrifices than NATO forces and anyone else. He advised the western world 
to balance its attitude towards Pakistan. He expressed his determination that 
Pakistan would continue to play its due role in the War on Terror as without its 
cooperation this war could not be won. He said that Osama bin Laden was dead 
and the world had to move forward to take more steps for the eradication of 
terrorism. He said that Osama bin Laden was one among many foreigners, 
fighting against Pakistani forces in the tribal areas and as a result of Pakistan's 
military action against them, they were on the run and trying to hide themselves in 
populated and important cities.
9
 In sum, Prime Minster Gilani appreciated the 
operation by regarding it "a great victory" and giving the impression that the 
operation was conducted jointly by the US and Pakistan. 
There were other voices from official circles, reported by the Urdu newspapers 
on 3 May 2011, who supported the Prime Minister's stance. According to the 
Pakistan's Foreign Office, Pakistan's armed forces did not take part in the 
operation.
10
 Although the Foreign Office contradicted the Prime Minister's 
impression of joint military action, it did not deny intelligence sharing with the US 
or did not comment on the US taking Pakistan into confidence. Therefore, the 
Foreign Office also backed the Prime Minister's statement of a cooperative action. 
Pakistan's High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Wajid Shamsul Hasan 
was reported by Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 May 2011 to have said that the operation 
against Osama bin Laden was evidence of cooperation between ISI and CIA, 
whereas the operation was carried out mutually by both America and Pakistan.
11
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The ISI Chief, General Pasha was also reported by Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 May 2011 
to have confirmed on a TV channel in Pakistan that the operation was carried out 
mutually by the US and Pakistan's military forces.
12
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 May 2011 noted that Pakistan verified that Osama bin 
Laden was killed in an American military operation based on intelligence sharing. 
Pakistan's Foreign Office admitted that the American operation was according to 
its stated policy in which the US had already declared that the American military 
would conduct a direct operation to kill Osama bin Laden wherever he was found 
in the world. The Foreign Office called the death of Osama bin Laden a big shock 
to terrorist organisations all over the world, whereas it was also reflective of the 
international community and Pakistan's determination to pursue the War on 
Terror. The statement also reminded the world that Pakistan would continue to 
support all international efforts against terrorism, and its parliament, state 
institutions, and nation was united to eradicate terrorism.
13
 Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 May 
2011 reported the Interior Minister of Pakistan, Rehman Malik to have told 
journalists that everybody knew what happened in Abbottabad. He advised the 
media and politicians to avoid unnecessary statements and criticism on the issue. 
He said that it was not that big a thing as other circles were trying to project.
14
 
Further, Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 May 2011 also reported the western leaders talking 
to Pakistan's leadership and presented as supporting evidence for Pakistan's 
case. For example, the British Prime Minister David Cameron was reported to 
have called his Pakistani counterpart and congratulated Pakistan's role in the 
Abbottabad operation.
15
 The Foreign Office's statement disclosed that President 
Obama called President Asif Ali Zardari and Nawa-i-Waqt on 4 May 2011 reported 
President Obama acknowledging the role of Pakistan's security agencies in 
sharing information in the Abbottabad operation.
16
 According to official statements 
issued by the Government of Pakistan, reported on 4 May 2011 by Nawa-i-Waqt, 
the US Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Marc Grossman in 
his meeting with Prime Minister Gilani, thanked Pakistan for its cooperation in the 
War on Terror and especially for intelligence sharing, which resulted in the killing 
of Osama bin Laden.
17
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Additionally, Pakistani official sources looked bent to admit intelligence failure 
yet attempted to justify it. For example, the Prime Minister Gilani was reported on 
3 May 2011 to have admitted that it was shameful for the whole world that in spite 
of all the latest technology, Osama bin Laden could not be captured previously. 
He said that Osama bin Laden was in a mountainous area of Abbottabad.
18
 
Likewise, the Prime Minister was also reported on 5 May 2011 to have said that it 
was a failure of the whole world not only of Pakistan that they had been unable to 
detect Osama bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad. He said that Pakistan could 
not be blamed for this failure, as the US or anyone else too was not able to find 
him. He explained that fighting against terrorism was a mutual responsibility of the 
international community not exclusively of Pakistan. He did not agree to attribute 
the success of the Abbottabad operation to the world and intelligence failure with 
Pakistan.
19
 
Thus, official sources from Pakistan attempted to convey the sense that the 
operation was a joint effort, Pakistan was a committed partner giving sacrifices in 
the War on Terror, and therefore it should not be doubted as a betrayal by 
Pakistan. Between the lines, intentionally or unintentionally, there was a message 
that if the US had done otherwise, as suggested by some Pakistani authorities, 
and had mistrusted Pakistan, had violated its sovereignty, and disrespected its 
commitment and sacrifices it might have been seen as US betrayal. 
4.1.2 Criticism of the Operation and Pakistan's Official Response 
Right-wing political parties, journalists, newspapers, and the military criticised 
the Abbottabad operation in the press and the government's official stance on it. 
Most of them regarded it as US violation of Pakistan's sovereignty, rejected the 
idea of Pakistan being an accomplice to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and accused 
the US of putting Pakistan's security at stake possibly by conspiring with some 
external forces or the ruling elite of Pakistan and undermined Pakistan's honour. 
There were demands from the US to leave the region, for the Pakistani 
government to revisit the relationship with the US, and those responsible in 
Pakistan to resign. There were also voices from left of centre who regarded it a 
"violation of sovereignty" and opposed Pakistan being characterised as an 
accomplice. All in all, the response of political forces and journalists in the 
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newspapers endorsed forcefully that it was a violation of sovereignty and that 
Pakistan was not an accomplice, and thereby the idea of a US betrayal of its 
strategic partner was strengthened. 
Nawaz Sharif President of right-wing Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) was 
reported between 8 and 12 May 2011 by Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt to have said that 
the operation was an attack on the country's security and sovereignty and if 
Pakistan did not take it seriously more dangers could follow.
20
 He said that the 
world had no reasons to question Pakistan's sincerity and ignoring thousands of 
lives sacrificed by Pakistan for the War on Terror.
21
 Earlier on 3 May 2011 Nawa-i-
Waqt reported Senator Ishaq Dar of PML (N) to have said that the prime minister 
should take parliament and people into confidence so that everybody could know 
the facts. He said that the government had not come up with a clear statement 
and celebrations in the world would soon be turned into anger and diverted 
against Pakistan. He said that according to President Obama's statement, the 
American military forces conducted the operation whereas Prime Minister Gilani 
had said that Pakistan's intelligence agencies shared information with the US. He 
asked the government to clarify why the US conducted the operation against 
Osama bin Laden in Pakistan?
22
 Similarly, Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt on 4 May 2011 
reported Senator Raja Zafar-ul-Haq of PML (N) to have said that Pakistan would 
be affected the most by the incident.
23
 Senator Zafar Ali Shah of PML (N) was 
also reported to have said that if someone could conduct an operation to kill nine 
people in Pakistan, "we are a nuclear state," and therefore some other operation 
might also be conducted in future.
24
 
Imran Khan, Chairman of another mainstream right-wing opposition party 
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, was reported on 4 May 2011 to have said that the US 
forces conducting the operation against Osama bin Laden had questioned 
Pakistan's sovereignty and integrity while increasing its security risks. He 
speculated that Osama bin Laden's killing would further deteriorate law and order 
in Pakistan. He argued that if Pakistan sent its military into its tribal areas at the 
US's will then why could not they be used for the operation against Osama bin 
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Laden? He pointed out that the world was regarding Pakistanis as "hypocrites 
and cheats," but Pakistan's rulers had maintained silence.
25
 
Professor Khurshid Ahmad, a senior politician of a right-wing opposition party 
Jamaat-e-Islami, was reported on 5 May 2011 to have rejected the government's 
stance and said that the statement of the Foreign Office was "shameless" and the 
operation was a failure of political leadership. He said that the nation would take 
revenge as the government remained indifferent while Pakistan's sovereignty was 
being attacked by the US.
26
 Jamaat-e-Islami was also reported to have given a 
call for a nationwide protest on 6 May 2011 against the American operation. Party 
Head Munawar Hassan told the media that the nation should be united and resist 
"American oppression" and threats to Pakistan's security.
 27
 Moreover Sahibzada 
Fazal Karim, Chairman of Sunni Ittehad Council, yet another right-wing opposition 
party, was reported on 7 May 2011 to have asked the UN to take notice of the 
violation of Pakistan's sovereignty as the operation was a "clear violation of 
international law and the UN charter." He said that the operation had caused a 
sense of insecurity to the nation and therefore the government and opposition 
should be united in taking a similar and firm stance on the issue.
28
 
Right leaning journalists and newspapers also criticised the operation and 
official stance of the government. A journalist in Nawa-i-Waqt Ahmad Jamal 
Nizami on 5 May 2011 criticised the government's stance on the operation and 
rejected the assumption that the operation was conducted on basis of Pakistan's 
information sharing with the US. He argued that if it was true then why was the 
Foreign Office saying that Pakistan's military and civil leadership did not know 
about the operation and why was the US stating that it was a unilateral and direct 
activity?
29
 M. Riaz, another journalist in Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 May 2011 observed 
that the public was confused over the government's silence. He argued that the 
public was concerned because where the operation had posed serious questions 
to national security and sovereignty, Pakistan was already "paying the price" of 
US victories and defeats in the War on Terror. He explained that it was a more 
serious concern for Pakistan that foreign helicopters and commandos reached a 
sensitive place like Abbottabad, merely one kilometre away from the Pakistan's 
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Military Academy, to perform a military action, which remained unchecked by 
Pakistan's military and government.
30
 Nawa-i-Waqt appreciated that in a high 
level meeting it was agreed that the US ambassador should be summoned to the 
Foreign Office for an explanation and protest over violation of Pakistan's borders 
and sovereignty.
 31
 
 
Figure 39, Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 May 2011 published this cartoon to reflect the failure of 
political leadership to protect Pakistan's sovereignty. The cartoon showed that a Pakistani 
citizen and his child watching an oath taking ceremony of some newly appointed federal 
ministers on TV. Ironically, on 2 May 2011 few hours before the Abbottabad operation, 
these ministers were taking oath to join the federal government by promising, as the 
caption of the cartoon read, "I will serve Pakistan with full sincerity and protect its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. My full..." The cartoon was a satire on the ruling elite 
who could not defend the sovereignty of Pakistan.
32
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 May 2011 noted that Pakistan's military elite was also 
expected to take a tough stance on the operation considering it a serious violation 
of sovereignty of an ally. It was speculated by the newspaper that in a meeting, 
Pakistan's military leadership should take serious notice of the US conducting 
operation in its territory without taking Pakistan into confidence. The military was 
also expected to consider the possible reaction of Al Qaeda and Taliban.
33
 
Voices from the left of centre and liberal corridors also echoed that of right-
wing circles. Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan belonging to the ruling Pakistan 
People's Party, Shah Mehmood Qureshi on 12 May 2011 was reported to have 
said that the two countries had an understanding that there would be no American 
boots on Pakistani soil. He said that the US had violated the sovereignty of a 
country, which was cooperating in the War on Terror.
34
 Earlier, the Federal 
Minister of Information, Firdous Ashiq Awan on 5 May 2011 was reported to have 
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told parliament through her policy statement that Pakistan had serious concerns 
and was not ready to accept the direct American operation on its territory. She 
said that the US should have informed Pakistan beforehand and that Pakistan's 
civil or military authorities did not have prior information of the operation. She 
explained that since 2009, Pakistan's intelligence agencies had been sharing 
information with the CIA and agencies of other friendly countries, which helped to 
trace Osama bin Laden. She accused the CIA of using information for its own 
purposes. She said that protection of Pakistan's sovereignty and national security 
was "a sacred duty" and that "Pakistan did not make Al Qaeda nor did it invite 
Osama bin Laden to come to Pakistan."
35
 Altaf Husain, the Head of Muttahida 
Qaumi Movement was also reported on 5 May 2011 to have demanded the 
government take the nation into confidence over the operation while bringing all 
the facts into the public domain.
36
 He also asked the government to call a round 
table conference of all political and religious parties immediately, where chiefs of 
all the armed forces and ISI could brief them about the American operation and 
killing of Osama bin Laden.
37
 
Different voices in the discourse namely politicians belonging to right and left-
wing rejected the government's initial stance by regarding the Abbottabad 
operation as "attack on the country's security and sovereignty." It was argued that 
there was ambiguity in the government's stance given the US official statements 
regarding the operation as a unilateral activity and Pakistan's official stance 
attempting to give the impression that the operation was based on Pakistan's 
intelligence sharing. It was also highlighted that the US had not only violated 
international law and the UN charter but also violated pre-agreed terms of 
cooperation by sending its troops on Pakistan's soil and not informing Pakistan 
about the operation in advance. The government was urged by the dominant 
voices of the discourse to take a clearer stance because Pakistan was already 
suffering due to its involvement in the War on Terror and the operation would 
further cause serious consequences to Pakistan in terms of deterioration of law 
and order. Generally, the government's initial response to the operation was 
rejected by the dominant voices in the discourse. 
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4.1.3 Demands for an Investigation 
A consensus was developed to hold a free and fair investigation of the 
operation to find the causes behind the failure of the civil and military leadership 
to intercept the US operation. However, political forces and civil society were 
divided on the nature of investigation to be held. There were three different types 
of demands, to hold investigations through a joint parliamentary commission, 
judicial commission, and through a formal litigation process. The common 
objective of all demands was to find out who in Pakistan was actually responsible 
or negligent for allowing the US operation to happen and to penalise the culprits. 
Opposition parties were insisting on a judicial commission for holding an 
independent inquiry. The government looked interested in the parliamentary 
commission. Whereas some lawyers representing civil society were filing petitions 
in the High Courts and the Supreme Court. Embedded was the assumption in the 
demands that everyone was convinced that the US had violated Pakistan's 
sovereignty and the people were more interested in knowing if the military or civil 
leadership was conspiring with the US, than to know why Al Qaeda's Head was 
killed in Abbottabad. Therefore, the purpose of the requested investigations was 
to know if the US had violated Pakistan's sovereignty on its own or with the 
assistance of the ruling elite. All in all demands for investigations were to 
determine if the US had betrayed Pakistan's trust on its own or in collaboration 
with the ruling political and military elite.
38
 
Renowned journalists, politicians, and intellectuals gathered in a seminar 
conducted by PILDAT
39
 were reported on 4 May 2011 to have passed a 
unanimous resolution demanding the Government of Pakistan to form a joint 
parliamentary commission to investigate the case of Osama bin Laden's killing. 
The resolution also asked the government to explain the circumstances in which 
he was killed and how the government agreed to compromise on the sovereignty 
of Pakistan. Speakers at the seminar asked how were the Pakistani radars made 
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ineffective and American helicopters violated Pakistani airspace to hit their target 
and return without any interception.
40
 
Parliamentarians in Pakistan belonging to both ruling and opposition parties 
were also seen to be unanimous in demanding proper investigation of the 
operation. Prominent politicians and members of the parliament were reported on 
6, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 May 2011 to have demanded that the causes behind the 
operation should be properly investigated and parliament should be given in-
camera briefing.
41
 Senator Raza Rabbani of the ruling Pakistan People's Party 
was reported by Nawa-i-Waqt on 6 May 2011 to have said that only parliament 
was responsible for conducting such investigations. He said that the western 
media and countries did not want to see Pakistan stable, whereas the extremist 
forces also wanted to hijack the political structure of the country in order to 
enforce their agenda based on religious extremism in and outside the country. He 
argued that Pakistan could not therefore sell its sovereignty for a few pennies.
42
 
Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan of Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) was reported on 6 
May 2011 to have demanded that the government bring the facts of the operation 
to the nation.
43
 He argued that people wanted to know why one of the nuclear 
powers of the world was so fragile and four foreign helicopters could smash the 
sovereignty of an independent nation.
44
 Nawaz Sharif was also reported on 11 
May 2011 to have demanded holding a fair investigation through a judicial 
commission to fix the responsibility on individuals or institutions failing to protect 
the country's sovereignty.
45
 
Likewise, the Punjab Bar Council was also reported on 8 and 10 May 2011 to 
have demanded a judicial commission comprised of serving and retired judges.
46
 
The council observed that apparently the purpose of the US operation was to 
increase pressure on Pakistan for particular purposes. The body argued that the 
failure of civil and military leadership to respond to the American operation was a 
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sensitive issue of national security. The council on behalf of all lawyers' 
community condemned the US violation of Pakistan's sovereignty.
47
 
The right leaning journalist Ahmad Jamal Nizami on 13 May 2011 advised the 
government to hold the investigations through a judicial commission as it would 
be beneficial in many ways. First, it would divert the attention of the whole world 
towards the commission whereas in the meantime the government would have 
sufficient time to formulate its strategy to deal with the situation. Secondly, the 
government could reshape foreign policy in light of the findings of the commission 
and in this way the responsibility to end or renew relationship with the US would 
be with the commission. Third, he advised that the jurisdiction of the commission 
could be increased to the extent that it could give directions and guidelines to 
improve the performance of the government and security institutions. The 
journalist wrote that the commission for expert advice could consult with former 
foreign ministers, foreign secretaries, and army generals.
48
 
A barrister Javed Iqbal Jeffery was reported on 3 May 2011 to have filed a 
petition in the Lahore High Court against the American attack in Abbottabad by 
taking the position that it was "a sheer violation of the national sovereignty" of 
Pakistan and international law.
49
 Another lawyer, Ishtiaq Chaudhry was reported 
on 5 May 2011 to have filed a petition in the Lahore High Court against the 
foreign, interior, defence, and information ministers of Pakistan for not taking the 
Pakistani nation into confidence over the issue of the American operation. The 
complainant requested the court to order the government to inform people about 
the real facts as the operation had questioned Pakistan's sovereignty and 
integrity.
50
 Nawa-i-Waqt on 6, 10, and 11 May 2011 also reported similar petitions 
had been filed with the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
51
 
Though all voices in the discourse converged at the point of holding a free 
and fair investigation with regard to the Abbottabad operation in order to 
determine the reasons for Pakistan's government and security institutions' failure 
to protect national sovereignty, they diverged on the method of investigation to be 
adopted. The ruling Pakistan People's Party wanted to hold investigations through 
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a joint parliamentary commission whereas the opposition parties, journalists, and 
bodies of lawyers such as the Punjab Bar Council wanted to have investigation 
through a judicial commission. There were also petitions filed in the Lahore High 
Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan to trial the civil and military institutions 
failing to observe their prime responsibility of protecting national sovereignty. 
Later on 21 June 2011, Prime Minister Gilani announced the appointment of a 
judicial commission to conduct the investigations.
52
 
4.1.4 Change in Official Response: US Betrayal Confirmed and 
Described in the Discourse 
As the discourse progressed, dominant voices from all stakeholders belonging 
to left and right, that is members of the government, opposition parties, the 
military, journalists, and the media, all confirmed the act of US betrayal and 
defined the features of this betrayal. For example, it was explained that the US 
betrayed an ally not only by violating its sovereignty but also by bypassing an ally, 
breaching the agreed terms of cooperation, ignoring old ties, compromising 
honour and sovereign equality, putting aside international norms and values, not 
following diplomatic conventions, helping the enemy of the ally, punishing its ally 
for its own mistakes, increasing financial difficulties of the ally, putting undue 
pressure, affecting a mutual cause, that is the War on Terror, interfering in the 
internal security system of the ally, and disrespecting the contribution and 
sacrifices of the ally and still asking it to do more. The opposition parties were 
trying to project that the reason for betrayal was a tacit understanding between 
the ruling elite and the US, whereas the government still attempted to refute the 
argument and attempted to establish that the betrayal was performed by the US 
on its own. A consensus was also developed to convey the message that no more 
betrayals would be tolerated by Pakistan, thus reconfirming that the operation 
was an established act of betrayal. 
Prime Minister Gilani, who earlier regarded the operation "a great victory," 
shifted his focus to criticise the US for violating Pakistan's sovereignty, thus 
confirming the act of US betrayal. On 7 May 2011, he was reported to have 
expressed his serious concerns over the operation and said that there was no 
need to bypass Pakistan. He argued that keeping in view the old relationship 
between the two countries, the US should not have violated the sovereignty of 
                                              
52
 Ibid, news article, 22 June 2011, p.1. 
199 
 
Pakistan. He explained that it was a serious matter, especially in the presence of 
mechanisms for cooperation on defence and intelligence sharing. He said that 
Pakistan wanted a relationship with the US on the basis of mutual respect and 
equality.
53
 
Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt on 11 and 12 May 2011 reported the Prime Minister to 
have further emphasised that "Osama bin Laden was not a Pakistani citizen and 
no one from Pakistan invited him to come."
54
 He asked who would answer for the 
martyrdom of thirty thousand civilians and five thousand security officials in 
Pakistan in the War on Terror.
55
 He said that he was amazed at the unilateral 
action by the US because the operation in Abbottabad should have been a mutual 
act.
56
 He stated that it would take some time to normalise Pakistan-US relations 
after the operation. However, he expressed his fears that deterioration in the 
bilateral relationship could also affect the war against terrorism.
57
 Nawa-i-Waqt 
appreciated the change in official response and advised the government to seek 
self-sufficiency in a way that diminishes its dependence on the US. The 
newspaper observed that the amount of damages incurred by Pakistan were 
almost 200 percent higher than that of aid received from the US.
58
 
 
Figure 40, Nawa-i-Waqt on 16 May 2011 published this cartoon to reflect Pakistan's 
embarrassment caused due to a US politics of betrayal. The cartoon showed a 
personified Government of Pakistan holding a tiny saw to cut a huge tree of 
embarrassment causing troubles to Pakistan in the result of the Abbottabad operation.
59
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Opposition parties, the government, and the media also suggested dealing 
with the issue in order to avoid any future betrayals of a similar kind. The Prime 
Minister was reported on 12 May 2011 to have told the Senate that the country 
was surrounded by grievous threats and no one should be given a chance to 
harm the national interest. He appealed to the nation to become united at this 
critical juncture for the sake of country's survival and to develop an appropriate 
strategy. He said that no one should be allowed to point fingers at Pakistan. He 
expressed his determination that there would be no compromise on the country's 
security and survival.
60
 
The Prime Minister in his interview with Time was reported on 13 May 2011 to 
have said that cooperation between the CIA and ISI was ended already and 
Pakistan would only agree to allow drone attacks, provided that the US agreed to 
make mutual decisions. However, he warned that if the US wanted Pakistan's 
cooperation, it would have to win the trust of the people. He reminded the US that 
he was a public representative not a military dictator and therefore could not 
resist public reaction.
61
 He also pointed out that public opinion in Pakistan was 
generally against the US and the government was also answerable to a 
parliament where opposition to the US was increasing and if he continued to work 
with the US, his government would be in danger.
62
 Therefore no more betrayals 
by the US could be tolerated. 
Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir in his media briefing stated that the results 
of any other operation like that of Abbottabad would be disastrous. He said that 
the public need not be disappointed, as Pakistan's armed forces and security 
institutions had the full capability to defend its sovereignty and independence. He 
explained that when the American helicopters entered Pakistan's airspace, two of 
its fighter aircrafts were ordered immediately to take off and when the information 
was received in Military General Head Quarters, the military forces present in 
Abbottabad were alerted.
63
 He admitted that Pakistan knew about the operation 
when the American helicopter crashed. He warned that everyone should know for 
sure that Pakistan's armed forces know how to defend its sovereignty, especially 
its nuclear assets.
64
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US Ambassador Cameron Munter was reported on 13 May 2011 to have 
called to Pakistan's Foreign Office to receive an official protest against the 
operation.
65
 Pakistan regarded the operation as serious violation of its 
sovereignty and integrity. Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir made the US 
Ambassador realise that in future Pakistan would not tolerate such unilateral 
actions. He warned the Ambassador that in future if any similar action was 
required the US should share the information with Pakistan, so that Pakistani 
forces could take appropriate action against high value targets.
66
 
The military leadership was reported by Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt on 6 and 7 
May 2011 to have agreed that any unilateral actions of similar kind in future would 
require reconsideration of Pakistan's cooperation with the US. The leadership 
was also reported to have agreed to decrease the maximum limit of the American 
military personnel in Pakistan. The military vowed to defend Pakistan's 
sovereignty and expressed determination to continue fighting against terrorism.
67
 
Former Military Chief, General Aslam Baig was reported on 9 May 2011 to have 
advised Pakistan to take a firm stance by taking all the relevant stakeholders 
onboard. He said that the US should be given a clear and straightforward 
message that Pakistan is a sovereign and independent nation, having the highest 
level of self respect.
68
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 7 May 2011 reported the Director General of ISI, Lt. General 
Ahmad Shuja Pasha in his meeting with the CIA Station Chief in Islamabad, 
identified as Mark Carlton, gave an angry reaction over the operation. Publication 
of the name of an official of the American intelligence agency, though claimed to 
be incorrect by some Pakistani officials, was a violation of the agreed terms of 
intelligence sharing and reflected the level of worsening relationship between the 
CIA and ISI after the operation. However, he warned that the US would be held 
responsible if similar things happened in future as Pakistan would not accept 
such things at any cost. The news reports also disclosed that Pakistan had 
already started working on decreasing the number of the American intelligence 
and military officials, 370 in total, in Pakistan for different purposes. Initially, a list 
of fifty Americans was handed over to the US, asking them to leave the country.
69
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Opposition parties were reported by Nawa-i-Waqt on 10 May 2011 to have 
asked the government to take up the issue at the UN as the operation was a 
violation of international law and the UN charter. If the government failed to take 
appropriate steps, in future it might represent a threat to Pakistan's nuclear 
assets. The government should think about suspending NATO supplies to 
Afghanistan through Pakistan.
70
 Jang on 15 and 17 May 2011 and Nawa-i-Waqt 
on 15 and 16 May 2011 reported Nawaz Sharif to have suggested that in addition 
to revisiting and reviewing the relationship, Pakistan should demand that the US 
stop drone attacks and in case drone attacks were continued, NATO supplies 
should be blocked. He also observed that if the US regarded Pakistan a friend, it 
must respect its sovereignty and develop a relationship on the basis of equality. 
He suggested that the US had to change its policies towards Pakistan in the 
changed circumstances. He reminded the US that Pakistan is a sovereign and 
independent country and therefore the US had to stop "condemnable 
propaganda" against it.
71
 
 
Figure 41, Nawa-i-Waqt on 13 May 2011 published the photograph on the left to reflect 
followers of a major right-wing political party Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) protesting 
in Abbottabad against the US operation. The caption of the photo read "Abbottabad: 
Supporters of PML (N) protesting against the American operation."
72
 Likewise, the 
newspaper on 16 May 2011 published the photograph on the right to show a protest rally 
in Lahore organised by another right-wing mainstream political party Jamaat-e-Islami.
73
  
Nawa-i-Waqt on 7 May 2011 argued that instead of decreasing the number of 
US military personnel in Pakistan, the government should expel all the Americans 
belonging to the US army or intelligence agencies in the interest of country. The 
newspaper concluded that the US should be responded to in "the tone and 
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language which it understands."
74
 The newspaper on 8 May 2011 advised that the 
US should be given a clear message that in future if it violated the sovereignty of 
Pakistan, it would respond with its full capacity and force.
75
 The newspaper on 10 
May 2011 also recommended that Pakistan should reject "the meagre" amounts 
of the US aid and try to achieve self sufficiency with the help of friendly countries 
such as China and Saudi Arabia.
76
 
Jang on 14 May 2011 advised that Pakistan should give preference to its own 
interests by disassociating itself from the US war and considering negotiations 
with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. The newspaper argued that if the US for its 
own interests could talk about negotiations with Taliban in Afghanistan, there was 
no reason that Pakistan could not do so in Pakistan for the sake of peace and 
stability in the country.
77
 The newspaper on 16 May 2011 also advised Pakistan to 
take tough decisions to ensure national security and respect of its sovereignty.
78
 
 
Figure 42, Nawa-i-Waqt on 13 May 2011 published the photograph on the left to show 
that civil and military leadership was taking serious notice of the Abbottabad operation. 
The caption of the photograph read, "Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani presiding over 
the meeting of the Defence Committee."
79
 Later, on 15 May 2011 the newspaper 
published the photograph on the right to show that all military leadership was being 
questioned over their failure to stop the violation of Pakistan's sovereignty, the caption of 
the photograph read, "chiefs of Pakistan's armed forces participating in the joint session 
of the parliament."
80
 
Cabinet's Defence Committee headed by Prime Minister Gilani was reported 
on 13 May 2011 to have decided that an inter agency mechanism having clear 
parameters would be developed to interpret the limits of cooperation with the US 
in the fight against terrorism. The committee agreed that the new mechanism 
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would be according to "national interests and the expectations of people." The 
committee agreed that defence of "national sovereignty and security is a sacred 
duty and therefore must be done at any cost." It was also decided that Pakistan 
was ready to cooperate with the international community to eradicate terrorism 
but its sovereignty should be respected. The committee completely rejected and 
condemned the unilateral actions taken by the US and emphasised that mutual 
respect and trust should be the basis of international partnerships.
81
 
Jang on 9 May 2011 reported that after a high level meeting between the 
President, Prime Minister, and the Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan the President 
House issued a statement asserting that the country's sovereignty would be 
defended at any cost. The details revealed that military and civilian leadership 
agreed that the US should be formally informed that any unilateral action in future 
would be dealt with seriously. The meeting also considered American allegations 
of complicity or inefficiency against Pakistan and it was decided that Pakistan 
would formally protest to the US for showing mistrust on it.
82
 
Interviews done for this research also confirmed that there were journalists 
and politicians who considered the US operation as an act of betrayal and 
therefore needed to be responded to forcefully. A liberal respondent said that the 
media in general and Urdu newspapers in particular: 
are very vociferous, they point out that they [the US] attacked 
Pakistani territory, or they have intruded into Pakistan's 
territory. And they [the Urdu press] do not like it. They also 
publish details. They are quite critical of American activities in 
this regard. They oppose drone attacks, they condemn drone 
attacks. They talk of sovereignty and suzerainty.
83
 
According to some of the interview respondents, the Urdu press has also not 
been able to effectively focus on Pakistan's own internal factors with reference to 
Pakistan-US relations. As a result readers have perspectives which put all the 
burden of Pakistan's failures on the US. One of the respondents, a senior liberal 
journalist working as a Resident Editor of an important national daily and having 
more than twenty five years of experience of journalism said:  
the problem is that we do not criticise our own government, 
our system, our setup, our institutions, and if we begin to 
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criticise our own system then we will be able to understand 
the nature of our relationship and expectations of others from 
us and their interests and our benefits.
84
 
So, the change in the official response reported between 3 May 2011 and 7 
May 2011 not only led to an evolving explanation of the US operation as an act of 
betrayal, but features of the betrayal were also made clear through the discourse. 
While opposition parties and media kept accusing the ruling elite of having an 
implicit understanding with the US, the government attempted to clarify its 
position in order to show that the ruling elite was not allied with the US. Finally, 
everyone agreed that the US had violated terms of cooperation between the two 
countries by violating Pakistan's sovereignty and therefore a stronger message 
should be conveyed to the US authorities so that in future they dare not to repeat 
the betrayal. 
4.2 "A PLANNED CONSPIRACY BEHIND THE ABBOTTABAD 
OPERATION" 
One dimension of the discourse going on in the Urdu press regarding the 
operation was the possibility of some larger US conspiracy behind the Abbottabad 
operation. Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 May 2011 reported with reference to a Wiki Leaks 
report disclosed that the US authorities knew about the presence of Osama bin 
Laden in Pakistan since 2003.
85
 Consequently, the right leaning journalist Khalid 
Ahmad on 4 May 2011 raised the question why did the US not get Osama bin 
Laden before and why did it choose that particular time.
86
 
Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt between 3 and 13 May 2011 noted that the US failure 
to release any photographic evidence about the death of Osama bin Laden raised 
doubts about the operation being genuine.
87
 Many TV channels initially showed 
some pictures of a dead body which were soon after regarded as fake.
88
 Nawa-i-
Waqt on 3 May 2011 also published a report of its correspondent Moeen Azhar 
which raised questions about the genuineness of the operation. The 
correspondent asked why the most wanted person in the world did not bother to 
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change his appearance at least by shaving his beard? The reporter argued that it 
was not understandable that he was living in compound with unusual eighteen 
feet tall boundary walls where there were no telephone lines, internet, or any 
other modern system and the secret agencies including the CIA did not know 
about it. The correspondent further raised the question whether was Osama bin 
Laden being used by the US to support the falling popularity statistics of the 
American presidents, as President Obama was seeking re-election in 2012. Why 
did no one check the suspicious people coming to record Osama bin Laden's 
video statements? When the most important high value target of the world was 
surrounded, what lethal weapons did he have? While he could have been 
apprehended alive, why did the US forces preferred to kill him? If Pakistani forces 
knew about him why did they not take any action against him? Why did Pakistan 
involve the US in this operation?
89
 
Likewise Nawa-i-Waqt's correspondent Itrat Jafri on 3 May 2011 wondered 
how the most wanted man agreed to live in a common and ordinary public area 
and also ignored his security by coming to Pakistan. The correspondent further 
wrote that it was also not understandable why he did not keep an exit way in the 
house and why he did not try to escape while he could do so? It was surprising 
that his premises were without guards, weapons, and any escape routes.
90
 
Moeen Azhar concluded that history would answer these questions but an 
important thing to note was why were the Pakistani authorities silent and afraid of 
telling the truth to people?
91
 
The Afghan Taliban in their response to the operation were reported on 4 May 
2011 to say that they did not have any credible evidence to verify the death of 
Osama bin Laden. The spokesman for the Taliban, Zabeeh Ullah, told the media 
through an email that America had not released any proof to verify the killing, and 
the close companions of Osama bin Laden had also not verified or denied his 
death, therefore the Taliban would not like to comment on the issue beforehand.
92
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 May 2011 reported public reaction depicting the operation 
as a "conspiracy to malign Pakistan." A citizen Awais said that a few years earlier, 
when Musharraf was president, it was claimed that Osama bin Laden was killed. 
It therefore was quite probable that in future Osama bin Laden would be killed 
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again. A Pakistani Adnan Muneer said that the US had deliberately put the case 
of Osama bin Laden on Pakistan under a conspiracy and as long as "we the 
Pakistanis" would take aid from America they would continue to put such cases 
on "us." Therefore, "we" should reject American aid and start relying on "our own" 
resources. Another citizen, Raja Fiaz said that as long as "we" remained 
"cowards," the US would continue to put such "false cases on us." Therefore, 
"we" should reject American aid in order to adopt an independent foreign policy.
93
 
The newspaper on 3, 4, and 5 May 2011 also reported local people living in the 
neighbourhood saying that there was no Osama bin Laden in that premises and a 
person named Akbar used to live there along with his brother, leading a usual and 
simple life. They used to buy stuff for their meals from nearby shops and had two 
ordinary vehicles in their use.
94
 According to news reports, the overall public 
reaction in Abbottabad was that of suspicion about the "operation being a fake 
like 9/11."
95
 
A columnist Ajmal Niazi wrote in Nawa-i-Waqt on 4 May 2011 that the pictures 
of Osama bin Laden's dead body shown in the media were not genuine and 
apparently of a lookalike. He regarded the operation as a "scripted drama" which 
could be easily rejected for its "bad story plot." He argued that Abbottabad was 
not a perfect hideout for a person like Osama bin Laden, because the Americans 
did not have control over certain areas of Afghanistan, and they could not enter 
into Pakistan's tribal areas adjacent to Afghanistan border. Therefore, why would 
Osama bin Laden choose such an easily accessible place to hide while ignoring 
the difficult and inaccessible areas? The columnist argued that Abbottabad was 
chosen by Americans so that they could easily malign Pakistan's military and 
intelligence services.
96
  
Nawa-i-Waqt on 4 May 2011 also agreed that looking at the news regarding 
the operation, apparently it looked like it was not Osama bin Laden who was 
killed in the Abbottabad operation.
97
 Moreover, a few photographs taken by 
someone taking part in the operation were published in the media. A news report 
analysis on 6 May 2011 argued that the people killed in the operation looked 
Pakistanis from their physical appearance and clothes and none of them 
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resembled Osama bin Laden.
98
 Conversely, Seymour Hersh argues that before 
the Abbottabad operation Osama bin Laden's presence was verified through his 
DNA test facilitated by the Pakistani army and the ISI with the help of a Pakistani 
army's major and a doctor, Amir Aziz.
99
 
 
Figure 43, Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 May 2011 reported these photographs to argue that the 
person killed in Abbottabad operation was not Osama bin Laden. The caption of the 
photographs read, "according to social website 'Twitter' the picture on the right hand side 
is made with combining the original picture of the Osama bin Laden on the left hand side 
and the fake picture in the middle. Osama bin Laden's lookalike Zain Muhammad was 
actually killed in the operation: neighbour claims."
100
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 May 2011 also noted that report of the incident was 
registered in the local police station of Abbottabad. However, the report was about 
a helicopter crash not about the killing of Osama bin Laden. The police sources 
told the media that after the incident when they reach the area, "the crime scene" 
was already surrounded by Pakistan's military security and they were not allowed 
to access the area.
101
 Therefore, the newspaper argued that the whole operation 
looked like "an engineered act."
102
 
A right leaning columnist Abdul Qayoom on 6 May 2011 argued that the 
operation was in fact "a US conspiracy" trying to get rid of ISI and Pakistan's 
armed forces by "maligning" them and ultimately to target Pakistan's nuclear 
program. The journalist wrote that Pakistan's civil and military leadership needed 
to understand "the conspiracy" in order to find a way out to counter it.
103
 Another 
columnist in Nawa-i-Waqt Husain Ahmad Paracha on 6 May 2011 argued that the 
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US is "an arrogant power" that has disturbed the peace of the whole world. He 
wrote that the US would not stop "its arrogance" until a competing power 
challenged it. He advised that the government, intelligence agencies, and military 
of Pakistan should let people know about the facts of the operation and tell the 
US clearly to leave the region. He also advised that the government should make 
it clear to the US that if it wanted a relationship with Pakistan it should be on the 
basis of equality and mutual respect.
104
 
In the same manner, Jang on 4, 9, and 10 May 2011 argued that the US 
operation in Abbottabad was a "drama" and conspiracy to increase pressure on 
Pakistan.
105
 The liberal journalist Saleem Safi on 10 May 2011 in the newspaper 
endorsed the idea of US conspiracy by questioning the genuineness of the 
operation and argued that there was no credible evidence of Osama bin Laden 
dying in the US operation.
106
 Likewise, another journalist Saeed Siddiqi in Jang 
on 11 May 2011 argued that Osama bin Laden's death was a puzzle and 
therefore the operation seemed a conspiracy because there was no proof of 
Osama bin Laden's death.
107
 Yet another liberal journalist, Tariq Butt writing for 
Jang on 15 May 2011 argued that the Abbottabad operation was a US conspiracy 
to malign and weaken Pakistan's security institutions.
108
 
Although the Urdu press predominantly argued that the US betrayed Pakistan 
under a conspiracy, there were a few exceptional voices who presented an 
alternate argument. For example, a liberal journalist and politician Shafqat 
Mehmood on 6 May 2011 in Jang argued that although the US violated Pakistan's 
sovereignty and betrayed its ally, Pakistan had to review its own strategy to 
effectively fight against terrorist groups in the country so that in future no one 
could use such pretexts to betray Pakistan.
109
 Likewise, another liberal columnist 
of Jang Safdar Mehmood on 12 May 2011 urged Pakistan to take a rational 
approach to fight against terrorism more effectively.
110
 In the same manner, 
another liberal columnist of the newspaper Rahim Ullah Yousafzai on 15 May 
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2011 argued that Pakistan's military and the government knew about the US 
operation but they did not do anything to avoid direct confrontation with the US.
111
 
Another alternative voice appeared to be of a New York based Pakistani 
columnist, Tayeba Zia Cheema who wrote in Nawa-i-Waqt on 4 May 2011 that a 
school of thought in Pakistan was not ready to accept Osama bin Laden's killing 
in the operation and were regarding it as another American conspiracy against 
Pakistan. She argued that for Pakistan's security the armed forces and 
intelligence agencies had to concentrate on their work instead of interfering in 
domestic politics. She concluded that although it was a bitter truth, Pakistanis had 
to come out of their egoistic shells to see the facts with their eyes open and 
instead of trying to put things under the carpet and deny their mistakes and 
negligence, they should develop sound strategies for the future.
112
 
Another critical voice was of a foreign affairs expert and former Ambassador 
to the US, Abida Husain, who diplomatically speaking, was reported by Nawa-i-
Waqt on 6 May 2011 to have argued in an interview that it was not rational 
thinking that Pakistan opposes the US and expects help from it in return. She said 
it is not possible if "we" wish to take help from the US and in return one is not 
ready to provide the same. She said that regardless of the fact that Osama bin 
Laden's presence in Pakistan was due to "our" inefficiency or complicity, Osama 
bin Laden's presence in Pakistan and the US's unilateral operation were the 
harsh realities which needed to be accepted and Pakistan needed to be 
defended. She also said that "we" were saying loud and clear that Osama bin 
Laden was not in Pakistan but he was found there. She said that "we" made 
some agreements with the US and in return received military and economic aid. 
She concluded that now Pakistanis had to decide if they were to perceive the US 
as "an enemy" or they could accept themselves as "pro-Americans." If they 
decided to call the US "an enemy" then it would not give any aid.
113
 On the other 
hand, she said if it comes out with the investigations that any institution in 
Pakistan had helped Osama bin Laden to hide, Pakistan would become isolated 
in the world.
114
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The interviews for this research also found some further alternate voices 
which rejected with more clarity the idea of a US conspiracy. A senior liberal 
journalist argued: 
actually Pakistan's sovereignty was violated by Pakistan's 
intelligence agencies because it was they who brought 
Osama bin Laden here. And I do not think they were ignorant 
or unaware of who is staying [there]. I think they were 
hosting him [says with emphasis], I mean Osama bin 
Laden.
115
 
Different voices in the discourse on the Abbottabad operation with few 
exceptions who agreed that Pakistan was not making the due efforts in the War 
on Terror and it had to review its own strategy, predominantly argued that the US 
betrayed Pakistan under a conspiracy. The genuineness of the operation was 
questioned by arguing that there was no credible evidence of Osama bin Laden's 
death in the operation because the Taliban, general public reaction, and local 
police sources did not verify Osama bin Laden's death. Moreover, it was pointed 
out that pictures shown on social media and television channels were also not 
genuine. It was also argued that the US had conspired to malign Pakistan's 
security institutions and increase pressure on Pakistan to ask the latter to "do 
more" in the War on Terror. Consequently, it was generally argued that the US 
betrayed Pakistan under a conspiracy to achieve some other objectives. 
4.3 THE MODALITIES OF A US CONSPIRACY WITH REGARD TO THE 
ABBOTTABAD OPERATION 
The discourse not only argued that the US betrayed Pakistan under a 
conspiracy but also characterised the modalities or ways in which this conspiracy 
was being practiced. It was argued that the US was not satisfied with Pakistan's 
performance in the War on Terror in spite of the fact that Pakistan already had 
suffered enough due to its involvement in the War on Terror, therefore the US 
conspired to increase pressure on Pakistan. Such a pressure was presented as 
evidence of the US conspiracy leading it to betray Pakistan by violating its 
national sovereignty. Further, it was also argued that the US violated the agreed 
terms of cooperation between the two countries and international law to achieve 
its underlying objectives of the conspiracy to malign Pakistan and press it to "do 
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more" in the War on Terror. The US was also accused of supporting terrorism 
directly or indirectly in Pakistan which was also presented as a modality of the US 
conspiracy against Pakistan.  
4.3.1 US Violation of Agreed Terms of Cooperation and International 
Law 
A consensus was developed in the discourse that the US had failed to inform 
Pakistan prior to the operation as required by the mutually agreed terms of 
cooperation, and in addition to that also breached international law by violating 
the sovereignty of an independent country. Such violations of terms of 
cooperation and international law were presented as a possibility of the US 
conspiracy against Pakistan.  
The Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir was reported by Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt 
on 6 May 2011 to have argued that due to general concern in Pakistan, the 
incident of Osama bin Laden's killing needed to be seen in the right perspective. 
He explained that the US did not inform Pakistan about the operation and 
jammed its radar systems. He told the media that the American President and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed their Pakistani counterparts at 4 am 
after the operation. He emphasised that the agreed terms and conditions of 
Pakistan-US cooperation must not be violated. He also said that Pakistan-US 
cooperation could be realised within limits and if someone needed Pakistan's 
cooperation it should also be prepared to cooperate.
116
 
Likewise, Pakistan's Army Chief, General Kayani was reported by Jang on 7 
May 2011 and Nawa-i-Waqt on 6 May 2011 to have presided over the corps 
commander's conference to discuss the issue of the operation which agreed that 
although Osama bin Laden's presence in the Abbottabad was an intelligence 
failure, there was no comparison with the successes of ISI, as it had arrested or 
killed more than a hundred Al Qaeda leaders and operatives with or without the 
help of the CIA. It was observed in the conference that there was an agreed 
cooperation mechanism between ISI and the CIA under which the former 
provided information about Osama bin Laden to the latter. However, it was argued 
that the CIA violated the terms of the agreed mechanism of cooperation by not 
informing Pakistan of new developments in the intelligence.
117
 Additionally, 
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Pakistan's former Military Chief and President, Pervez Musharraf was also 
reported on 6 May 2011 to have confessed that he had made an agreement with 
the US to give them access to an airbase in Pakistan, however the Americans 
were not allowed to use it for fighter aircrafts.
118
 Subsequently, Nawa-i-Waqt on 7 
May 2011 reported the ISI Chief General Pasha to have protested to the CIA 
station chief in Islamabad for not sharing intelligence before the operation and 
said that it was an expression of US mistrust of Pakistan.
119
 
Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt between 6 and 13 May 2011 highlighted that experts 
on international law such as J.R. Robertson, analysed the legal position of the 
Abbottabad operation and explained it as "a sheer violation of international law." 
He accused President Obama for ordering an operation to "violate human rights" 
and setting a precedent for the agencies of others to carry out "terrorist activities" 
in other countries.
120
 Subsequently, Nawa-i-Waqt on 13 May 2011 reported the 
Foreign Secretary to have told the US Ambassador that though "Osama bin 
Laden's killing was a success" the US should have taken Pakistan's Government 
and armed forces into confidence. He complained that the US failed to provide 
any prior information regarding the operation and he also told the US 
Ambassador that the operation was a violation of international law.
121
 
Conversely, the interviews for this research found some important voices 
which emphasised Pakistan's violation of the agreed terms of cooperation. For 
example, a politician belonging to Pakistan People's Party and a columnist of 
Nawa-i-Waqt argued that there was "sort of hypocrisy in Pakistan's policy" in the 
case of Osama bin Laden.
122
 Yet another liberal journalist argued that Pakistan 
has adopted a double-faced policy which has not only affected its foreign 
relations, but also caused an increase in terrorism at home. The journalist said: 
during this period, our policy and especially our defence and 
foreign policies have been double-faced. We were saying 
something to America and the west and continued doing 
other things here. We have been saying that we are against 
militants, but we were promoting militancy. So what 
happened here in Pakistan after 9/11 has been due to our 
double-faced policies. Osama bin Laden was living in 
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Abbottabad for a long period, his wife gave birth to a child in 
a hospital in Mansehra, and did not we know about it? He 
managed to build such a large building and we could not 
know about it?
123
  
Different prominent voices in the discourse namely Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, 
Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir, Military Chief General Kayani, Former 
President and Military Chief Pervez Musharraf, and ISI Chief General Pasha 
discussed the possibility of the US conspiracy as it not only breached mutually 
agreed terms of cooperation by failing to inform Pakistan before the operation, but 
also international law to violate the sovereignty of an independent country. Such 
violations were highlighted as a modality of US conspiracy and would help 
rationalising a US betrayal of its ally in the War on Terror. 
4.3.2 Supporting Terrorism in Pakistan 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 May 2011 claimed that Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan which was 
fighting against Pakistan was being operated by the Indian intelligence agency 
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the American CIA. The newspaper 
explained that because Pakistan enjoyed peace at its border with Afghanistan 
during the Taliban government which was friendly to Pakistan, after 9/11 the 
American and international media "propagated the War on Terror" and 
consequently, Pakistan's government and military had to side with the US against 
the Afghan Taliban. The newspaper also argued that the war against the Afghan 
Taliban was not Pakistan's war and therefore the CIA in collaboration with RAW 
supported Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan to perform terrorist activities in Pakistan to 
make it realise that terrorism was also a threat to Pakistan.
124
 
Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt between 3 and 19 May observed that apart from 
threats from other states, that is the US, Afghanistan, and India Pakistan would 
have to face the reaction from terrorist organisations as Afghan Taliban, Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan, and Al Qaeda could increase their terrorist activities in Pakistan 
to take revenge.
125
 Therefore, the expectations of serious consequences of "the 
US violation of sovereignty" made the issue more serious and facilitated a 
rationalisation of a US politics of betrayal under a conspiracy. 
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Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in its immediate response vowed to take revenge for 
Osama bin Laden's death. The spokesperson of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, 
Ehsan Ullah Ehsan, told Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 May 2011 that from this point forward 
Pakistan would be their first target. He said that Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan would 
aim at Pakistani rulers whereas America would be the second target. He accused 
Pakistan of complicity in the operation and argued that America alone could not 
conduct the operation.
126
 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan was reported on 8 May 2011 to 
have threatened to carry out terrorist activities including suicide bombings in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the US.
127
 The Afghan Taliban were also reported on 6 
May 2011 to have announced the formation of a special unit to take Osama bin 
Laden's revenge.
128
 Likewise, Al Qaeda was reported on 5 and 7 May 2011 to 
have announced that they would take revenge for the assassination of Osama bin 
Laden and continue his mission by targeting the US and its agents. Al Qaeda also 
emphasised that it would start a resistance movement in Pakistan. Al Qaeda also 
asked all Muslims in Pakistan to protest against Osama bin Laden's assassination 
and start a rebellion against the state where Osama bin Laden was 
"murdered."
129
 
 Nawa-i-Waqt on 4, 8, and 15 May 2011 reported the intelligence agencies of 
Pakistan to have issued security alerts to the provincial governments, federal 
government, and the law enforcing departments against the possible terrorist 
activities as a fall out of the Abbottabad operation. According to the issued threat 
alert, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and other extremist groups could attack important 
personalities in the government, intelligence and law enforcement agencies, 
offices of foreign countries, and other important personalities.
130
 
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan took the responsibility for one of the deadliest suicide 
attacks on newly trained cadets of a Pakistani paramilitary force, the Frontier 
Constabulary, on 13 May 2011 at Shabqadar, leaving at least 150 injured and 90 
dead. The spokesperson of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan Ehsan Ullah Ehsan told the 
media that it was the first revenge for "the martyrdom of Osama bin Laden" and 
there would be more to follow.
131
 Nawa-i-Waqt argued that Pakistan was facing 
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the adverse consequences of US activities.
132
 Jang on 14 May 2011 argued that 
although there was the possibility of local elements such as Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan being involved in terrorist activities, it was more likely that these 
terrorists were backed by the US, India, and Afghanistan.
133
 
 
Figure 44, Nawa-i-Waqt on 14 May 2011 published this photograph to report terrorist 
incident at Shabqadar to reflect the adverse consequences in terms of terrorist backlash 
Pakistan would face. The caption of the photograph read, "officials inspecting the 
destroyed vehicle after suicide blasts and a person taking an injured child to hospital."
134
 
On the other hand, interviews for this research found some important voices 
which rejected the idea that the CIA and RAW were behind the increasing terrorist 
activities in Pakistan. For example, a liberal journalist argued: 
if Americans say they say rightly that we have adopted a 
double-faced policy. On one side they tell us that we are 
fighting [against terrorism] and because of that militancy has 
been increased in our part. Terrorism has increased due to 
our own double-faced policies. If we had taken action against 
them from the beginning they could not have increased. 
Now, they have come out of tribal areas and have spread in 
cities, it is just because of the double-faced policies of our 
civilian and military leadership.
135
 
Generally, in the discourse threatening statements of Al Qaeda, Taliban, and 
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan reported by Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt were followed by a 
severe terrorist incident. Additionally, the US and India through their respective 
intelligence agencies were accused of supporting terrorist activities in Pakistan. 
The issue became far more serious for Pakistanis as they realised the immediate 
reaction to the US unilateral operation in Abbottabad. Thus, the impacts of a US 
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politics of betrayal under a conspiracy on Pakistan became more real than 
imagined. 
4.3.3 Pressurising Pakistan to "Do More" in the War on Terror 
The discourse helped characterise a modality of the US conspiracy against 
Pakistan by highlighting US increasing pressure to do more in the War on Terror 
while not acknowledging the sacrifices and contributions of Pakistan in the war. 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 4 May 2011 reported Prime Minster Gilani to have emphasised 
the need and importance of positive and constructive communication regarding 
the operation and have asked the American and western media to realise the 
sensitivity of the issue and avoid giving a different interpretation to the facts. He 
also warned the media and American think tanks against attempting to create 
misunderstandings between the two countries over Afghanistan.
136
 He suggested 
that the US, being responsible for the trust deficit between the two countries, 
should talk directly to Pakistan instead of speaking to Pakistan through the media. 
He warned that if the US decided to stop its aid and cooperation, Pakistan would 
also have to take some tough decisions which might affect the bilateral relations. 
He also complained that Pakistan's citizens were dying but the US was making a 
nuclear deal with India.
137
 
Likewise, Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir was also reported by Jang and 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 6 May 2011 to have told the media that Pakistan had "always 
been asked to do more" while ignoring its "sacrifices and contributions" in the War 
on Terror and that allegations against ISI of inefficiency or having links with Al 
Qaeda were baseless. He reminded the world that Pakistan had supported the 
international community in the War on Terror and had made sacrifices for it. He 
said that we do not need sympathy but Pakistan must not be pressurised. He 
reminded the US that ISI had arrested important leaders of Al Qaeda including 
Khalid Sheikh, Abu Zubaydah, and Abu Hamza.
 
Moreover, he argued that the 
American strategy to bomb Tura Bora was a mistake causing the Al Qaeda's 
leadership to flee to Pakistan and other areas. He said that Pakistan's advice not 
to bomb Tura Bora was not considered by the US. He confessed that Pakistan-
US relations were at a critical juncture, yet both countries had to move forward.
138 
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A former Military Chief, General Aslam Baig was reported on 7 May 2011 to 
have argued that if Osama bin Laden was unarmed why was he not arrested? He 
said that everybody knew that Osama bin Laden was killed long ago and 
therefore the US game which started with lies was ended with lies. He said that it 
was absolutely wrong to say that Pakistan had failed to perform its duties.
139
 A 
right leaning columnist in Nawa-i-Waqt Javaid Qureshi on 9 May 2011 analysed 
the situation and argued that both Pakistan and the US were not happy with each 
other over the operation, yet the US had to realise that Pakistan could not bear a 
repetition of "do more" demands, as it had already suffered enough and was 
doing a lot. The US was also advised to realise the fact that Pakistan was 
involved in someone else's war but the US could not continue this war without 
Pakistan's help. Therefore, the US should quit the practice of baseless allegations 
and start talking about cooperation for mutual interest.
140
 
Najam Sethi, former (caretaker) chief minister of Punjab, TV anchorperson, 
and a journalist in Jang on 10 May 2011 pointed out that the US did not have the 
appropriate evidence to accuse Pakistan of being accomplice to Osama bin 
Laden's presence in Pakistan and they could not answer why the ISI exchanged 
information about Osama bin Laden with the CIA. Therefore, the journalist 
argued, the US should not place emphasis on Pakistan's complicity because it 
would deteriorate the Pakistan-US strategic relationship, while the US needed 
Pakistan's support in the War on Terror. However, the journalist claimed that the 
US had encouraged its media to take up this issue to increase pressure on 
Pakistan. Conversely, the journalist speculated, if in future the US was able to find 
some evidence about ISI being accomplice the situation might change and the 
US authorities would pressurise Pakistan directly.
141
 
Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister and then opposition leader was 
reported by Jang on 15 and 17 May 2011 and Nawa-i-Waqt on 15 and 16 May 
2011 to have said that it was really sad that 3000 people lost their lives in 9/11 but 
since then, Pakistan had lost 35,000 civilians including 5,000 security 
personnel.
142
 He said that Pakistan suffered the maximum loss of human lives, 
while unemployment and poverty also increased in the country and in spite of all 
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that Pakistan was being treated as a criminal.
143
 Jang on 13 May 2011 also 
argued that although Pakistan was already doing enough and suffering because 
of its involvement in the US led War on Terror, the US was thankless and 
pressurising Pakistan to "do more" to fight against terrorism beyond its 
capacity.
144
 
However, the interviews for this research highlighted some existing 
perspectives which did not agree that the US had conspired or betrayed Pakistan 
in order to pressurise it to "do more." A right leaning journalist in his detailed 
response stated: 
look! its matter of national interest of each country. The US 
has been protecting its own interests and for the sake of its 
interest if betrays Pakistan, it is not a new and strange 
phenomenon. If the US giving money to Pakistan, it is not a 
matter of betrayal, the US is following its own interests. As 
they say it is a stick and carrot policy, when someone is 
hungry they offer a carrot, but they keep their stick to use if 
required. They prefer their global interest more than anything 
else, and if someone is against that interest they do not 
ignore.  
For the incident of Osama bin Laden, at their part, they 
accuse Pakistan army, especially ISI, they blame Pakistan 
for this. They tried but they could not find any evidence. If 
they had found the evidence, they would propagate it. But 
our negligence and inefficiency was proved at international 
level. 
Such a dangerous person was living so closer to Pakistan 
Military Academy, and they caught him, we did not. But 
problem was also theirs not ours. So, in all this, a message 
was conveyed regarding negligence, our laziness, and 
disinterest, which caused embarrassment to our government. 
Out of that embarrassment they protested to the US for not 
taking Pakistan into confidence before conducting the 
operation.  
Their point of view was that if they had shared the 
information, Pakistan would alert him. They did not trust us. 
There were very harsh questions in the National Assembly, 
and people of ISI and military were called to the parliament 
which demoralised our army. It was a shame.
145
 
Similarly a liberal journalist stated: 
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nobody will give us billions of dollars for free. It is give and 
take. We do not have the understanding of the give and take. 
We take the money and cannot understand why the US is 
asking for Osama bin Laden?
146
 
Generally, it was argued in the discourse that the US had ignored Pakistan's 
contributions and sufferings due to its involvement in the US led War on Terror in 
order to pressurise Pakistan to "do more" in terms of the eradication of terrorism. 
Such a pressure on Pakistan which would raise suspicions about US intentions in 
violating the sovereignty of its ally was presented as a modality for the expression 
of the US conspiracy which consequently would facilitate rationalisation of a US 
politics of betrayal with regard to the Abbottabad operation. 
4.4 THE CAUSES OF US CONSPIRACY AND BETRAYAL WITH REGARD 
TO THE ABBOTTABAD OPERATION 
The discourse on Pakistan-US relations with regard to the Abbottabad 
operation not only established the US act of betrayal under a US conspiracy but 
also analysed the underlying causes of a US politics of betrayal. 
4.4.1 An Alleged Tacit Understanding between the Ruling Elite and the 
US 
While the dominant voices explained the betrayal and its different aspects, 
there was also a debate about the causes of betrayal. Opposition parties and the 
media were insisting that it happened because of a secret alliance between the 
ruling elite and the US, whereas the civil and military leadership attempted to 
explain it as an exclusive action of the US. Hence, debate was not whether it was 
a betrayal or not, the discussion also began to be focused to argue whether the 
ruling elite facilitated the act of betrayal or not. 
Senator Professor Khurshid Ahmad of Jamaat-e-Islami on 4 May 2011 was 
reported by Jang to have said that Pakistan had to make its own way and had to 
come out of the War on Terror.
147
 Munawar Hassan of Jamaat-e-Islami on 5 May 
2011 was reported by Nawa-i-Waqt to have said that the Americans had failed to 
provide credible evidence of Osama bin Laden's death. He argued that the 
Pakistani ruling elite had proved that they preferred American orders over national 
security. He said that "the American terrorists" were set at large in the country and 
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the rulers were ignoring them.
148
 However, Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 May 2011 
appreciated that Pakistan's institutions relating to national security, foreign policy, 
and defence finally seemed in agreement on developing a new strategy due to 
criticism of the opposition. The military officials in a high level meeting were 
reported to be of the view that at the moment the country's defence and security 
was more important than the relationship with the US and for that reason, anyone 
who dared to violate its sovereignty would face a response with full strength. The 
report also disclosed that the national security institutions were assigned the task 
to be on alert to defend borders and not to allow any future adventurism.
149
 
Imran Khan, Chairman of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, was reported by 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 6 May 2011 to have criticised Pakistan's ruling elite for being 
subservient to the US. He said that Pakistan's ruling elite did not have the 
courage to tell the US that Pakistanis had the same rights as that of Americans. 
He accused the rulers of putting Pakistan's security at stake.
150
 Consequently, on 
one side he asked the US to leave the region, as soon as possible, whereas on 
the other side he demanded that the President, Prime Minister, and Army Chief 
resign for their failure.
151
 Other opposition parties and circles of civil society such 
as the High Court Bar Association were also reported demanding resignations of 
top civil and military leadership for the same reason.
152
  
The Prime Minister was reported by Jang on 6 and 8 May 2011 and Nawa-i-
Waqt on 7 May 2011 to have responded to opposition's criticism by saying that he 
would take political parties into confidence, call a meeting of the Defence 
Committee, and give his policy statement in the Senate to clarify the position.
153
 
However, the Head of a major opposition party Nawaz Sharif between 8 and 12 
May 2011 on multiple occasions was reported by Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt to have 
suggested that the Abbottabad operation was a tragedy bigger than the fall of 
Dhaka in 1971.
154
 He said that Pakistan was passing through a critical time and 
was surrounded with multiple dangers and that the government had to "take steps 
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in accordance with the people's expectations" in order to reinstate national 
honour.
155
  
Similarly, Jang on 8 May 2011 advised the government to devise a sound 
strategy to respond effectively to the threats to Pakistan's sovereignty, security, 
and independence.
156
 The newspaper on 9 May 2011 argued that the ruling elite 
of the country had to realise their responsibilities with regard to defending the 
national sovereignty of the country. The newspaper suggested that the ruling 
elites had to reconsider their own weaknesses and mistakes and utilise their 
energies to strengthen the country instead of prolonging their rule.
157
 
Other politicians of the opposition such as Imran Khan were also reported on 
10 May 2011 to have said that the government was still trying to please its 
"foreign masters" and that the Prime Minister should have dismissed the army 
chief for his failure to stop the American intervention. It was also advised that the 
government should allow an open debate on the issue in the parliament 
recognising the fact that the US had shown disrespect to Pakistan's 
sovereignty.
158
 Conversely, Shah Mehmood Qureshi of Pakistan People's Party 
was reported by Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt on 9 and 10 May 2011 to have said that 
when he was the foreign minister, Prime Minister Gilani and President Zardari 
issued directions to provide visas to the Americans without following the due 
procedure of ISI clearance. He also argued that putting responsibility of the issue 
on the shoulders of ISI and the military was not appropriate as according to the 
constitution, both institutions work under the Prime Minister's command.
159
 
Therefore, it was suggested in the emerging discourse that there was a tacit 
understanding between the ruling elite and the US. 
Military Chief General Kayani was reported on 10 May 2011 to have 
emphasised the need to take the people of Pakistan into confidence in order to 
build a national consensus over the issues of national security.
160
 Subsequently, 
Prime Minister Gilani was reported on 11 May 2011 to have said that he believed 
that "there was no one in Pakistan who would think against the national interest" 
and therefore everyone has to be united to take the country out of the crisis. He 
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told the senators that the "government was not sleeping" while the operation took 
place. He said that at 2 a.m. Military Chief General Kayani informed him over the 
phone about the helicopters and expressed his suspicions that it might be the US. 
The Prime Minister said that on this information, he directed the Defence 
Secretary to make inquires with the US Ambassador. He said that General Kayani 
called him again at 6 a.m. and a high level emergency meeting was called at the 
President House.
161
  
Likewise, Information Minister Firdous Ashiq Awan was reported on 12 May 
2011 to have told the media that the operation against Osama bin Laden was a 
sensitive issue and opposition parties and the media should not speculate on 
such a critical issue. She said that parliament was being given in-camera briefing 
over the issue. She suggested that the opposition parties should bring any 
suggestions into the parliament instead of giving statements in the media, and 
they should bear in mind that Pakistan could not live on its own in this modern 
world and it was already cooperating with the US in many fields.
162
 
However, the right leaning journalist Ahmad Jamal Nizami on 12 May 2011 
advised that Pakistan for the sake of its survival and security should come out of 
the shadow of "slavery to America."
163
 Similarly, opposition parties such as 
Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) rejected Prime Minister Gilani and his 
government's position over the issue. Nawaz Sharif was reported on 15, 16, and 
17 May 2011 to have told journalists that the government's stance over the issue 
was still weak. He said that his party was not satisfied with the government's 
proposal in the parliament to revisit the relationship with the US rather 
government should have given a more stronger message and formed a judicial 
commission to penalise those who failed to defend national sovereignty.
164
 
Jang on 11 May 2011 urged the government to accept the demands of the 
opposition to form the judicial commission and take the issue to the International 
Court of Justice.
165
 The newspaper on 12 May 2011 also demanded the 
government develop a consensus to counter any US adventurism in future 
because if such an action repeated the situation could spiral out of the 
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government's control and nobody would be able to save the ruling elite.
166
 The 
newspaper on 16 May 2011 suggested that Pakistanis were people of honour and 
therefore at any cost, they were not ready to accept "slavery" in their relations 
with the US. The newspaper advised the ruling elite to leave their subservient and 
submissive behaviour with the US, reject US hegemony, and determine ways to 
live with honour and respect. The newspaper also emphasised that to ensure 
Pakistan's sovereignty and independence the ruling elite should at least follow 
parliament's joint resolution in which it was decided that if the US violated 
Pakistan's sovereignty again, NATO supplies to Afghanistan would be blocked 
and in case of US drone attacks, the drones would be shot down.
167
 
However, the interviews for this research pointed out that a perspective also 
exists that Pakistan has not been able to perform well in terms of its economy 
because of its own policies, and therefore it is not justified to blame the US or any 
other country for its underdevelopment. One of the major reasons, as explained 
by some of the respondents, has been that Pakistan has to spend a huge portion 
of its budget on its defence. A liberal journalist explained his perspective: 
Pakistan's establishment, is actually responsible for this kind 
of deterioration because Pakistan did have resources and it 
could develop as a very rich, you can say, agricultural 
country. It can even produce so many products like dairy 
products. It could produce all kinds of fruits and it could even 
develop lot of industry. It has copper, aluminium, and so 
many other [elements]. Aluminium and copper both, I mean, 
can get you a lot of money. Even now there is no industry 
which is functioning there. It could have started with 30 
million rupees, but now cost is exceeded to 300 million. But 
no investment is being made on that because they do not 
have money. They are spending it on the payment of their 
instalments of loans and they are spending it on the civil 
services and on the armed forces. And from the civilian funds 
now they also pay pensions of the armed forces personnel 
who have retired, and who retire early. They are the earliest 
to retire and receive pensions from our kitty, I mean from the 
civilian budget.
168
 
The hegemonic voices of the discourse namely Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, political 
parties of the opposition, and journalists generally argued that the reason behind 
the perception of a US politics of conspiracy and betrayal with regard to the 
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Abbottabad operation was that local ruling elites were siding with the US in order 
to protect their own material interests. It was argued that it was due to the 
weakness of the country's rulers that the US violated Pakistan's sovereignty. 
Consequently, the ruling elite tended to defend their position and argued that it 
was the US who betrayed Pakistan on its own without their help. However, the 
Urdu newspapers and opposition parties rejected the government's position and 
advised the ruling elite to mend their ways. 
4.4.2 Pakistan's Nuclear Program and Setting a Precedent for India 
Described as "the Real Target" 
Targeting Pakistan's nuclear program was explained by dominant voices in 
the discourse, as another underlying US cause for the violation of Pakistan's 
sovereignty. It reinforced the idea that the US in spite of being a strategic partner 
always remained insincere to Pakistan's security. It failed to rescue Pakistan in 
1971 while the country was disintegrating. When Pakistan in response to the 
Indian nuclear program and harsh experience of disintegration pursued its 
nuclear program, the US always opposed it. Similarly, in the post 9/11 period the 
US was attempting to target Pakistan's nuclear program under different pretexts. 
Statements of Afghan and American authorities were presented as evidence by 
newspapers of US intentions towards Pakistan's nuclear program. 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 May 2011 reported that the spokesperson of the Afghan 
Defence Ministry expressed concerns over the security of Pakistan's nuclear 
programs. He said that it was the incompetence of Pakistan's intelligence 
agencies for being unable to find Osama bin Laden out which also put a serious 
question on the security of its nuclear weapons. Former Foreign Minister of 
Afghanistan Abdullah Abdullah was also reported to have accused Pakistan 
military establishment of complicity and said that "there were elements in the 
military" who knew about Osama bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad, which 
reflected support of such elements for Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Therefore, he 
further said that there were chances that Al Qaeda or the Taliban might get 
access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons through "those elements" in the military.
169
 
Likewise, the newspaper on 9 May 2011 reported the US Senator Lugar arguing 
that Pakistan was not a safe country, as Osama bin Laden hid himself for six 
years and because there was a clear divide between Pakistan's government and 
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military in which the latter was more powerful than the former and suspected of 
having "some elements" supporting Al Qaida or the Taliban, its nuclear weapons 
could go into the hands of "terrorist organisations."
170
 
The Head of Jamaat-e-Islami, Munawar Hassan on 6, 8, and 12 May 2011 
was reported as saying in an interview that the purpose of the US operation was 
to target Pakistan's nuclear program. He argued that these objectives might be 
realised in future with help of India.
171
 A journalist in Nawa-i-Waqt Khalid Lodhi on 
11 May 2011 argued that it was actually "a US conspiracy hatched with the 
collaboration of India and Israel" to target Pakistan's nuclear program.
172
 Hafiz 
Saeed Ahmed, Head of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, was reported on 4 May 2011 to have 
said that "the US had hatched some conspiracy against Pakistan with the help of 
India and Afghanistan." And for that reason, Hafiz Saeed Ahmed further 
explained, India was threatening Pakistan with the possibility of conducting a 
similar operation in the future. He argued that the objective was to "target 
Pakistan's security and integrity" by making propaganda against the safety of 
Pakistan's nuclear program on the grounds that it might go into hands of terrorists 
who had "safe havens and access into Pakistan's settled areas."
173
 
Former Military Chief Aslam Baig in his interview with Nawa-i-Waqt on 6 May 
2011 was reported to have said that the contradictory statements of civil and 
military leadership were a grievous threat to the country's future. He said that the 
ruling elite were confused due to the public reaction to the operation. He said that 
Prime Minister Gilani wanted to hide his own inefficiency and failure by regarding 
it as a failure of the whole world. He said that "the US and India had prepared a 
charge sheet" against Pakistan and its ruling elite were showing indifference to 
the realities that would threaten its nuclear program in the future. He argued that 
Pakistan was surrounded by extreme dangers and if the ruling elite continued to 
hide its criminal negligence, it would ultimately have severe effects on national 
security. He advised the ruling elite to admit their failure and inefficiency, take the 
nation into confidence, and come out to protect the national interests. He said that 
the ruling elite would be answerable to the nation, and people would not let them 
escape.
174
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Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the father of Pakistan's nuclear program on 11 
May 2013 was reported by Nawa-i-Waqt to have said that "the nuclear program is 
a symbol of Pakistan's prestige and honour" and if some power succeeded in 
harming it, Pakistan would become "subservient and a satellite of others." 
Therefore, he advised the nation to be prepared to fight for its independence, 
sovereignty, and protection of its nuclear assets to ensure survival of the 
country.
175
 
Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt between 12 and 19 May 2011 advised Pakistan take 
appropriate measures to save its nuclear program which the US wanted to target. 
The newspapers wrote that Pakistan should disassociate itself from the war of 
American interests and force US led NATO forces to leave the region as soon as 
possible. The newspapers argued that sooner rather than later, the US would 
conduct similar operations to find Mullah Omer and Ayman al Zawahiri and with 
every passing day would keep increasing its "aggressive activities" on Pakistan's 
independent soil unless it achieved its "ultimate target" Pakistan's nuclear 
program.
176
 
Thus, dominant voices argued that the US actually wanted to target Pakistan's 
nuclear program and the Abbottabad operation was a mere pretext to achieve its 
objectives. The explanation was also given in terms of ruling elites of the country 
siding with the US while ignoring national security. Moreover, the US perceived as 
an accomplice in Pakistan's disintegration in 1971 at the hands of India and 
opponent of Pakistan's nuclear program and supporter of Indian ambitions for the 
same, once more was characterised as a facilitator for "Indian aggressive 
designs" towards Pakistan. Consequently, the discourse described one of the US 
hidden motives behind the Abbottabad operation as setting a precedent of 
unilateral action against non-state actors. It was speculated that India could also 
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follow the American example and violate Pakistan's sovereignty which could lead 
to a war or even a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 May 2011 reported Indian Interior Minister P. Chidambaram 
to have said that the Abbottabad operation had proved that "Pakistan was a safe 
haven for terrorists." He accused Pakistan of providing refuge to "masterminds, 
controllers, and accomplices of Mumbai attacks" and India wanted to apprehend 
those "terrorists." He said that the US was "justified" in acting against Osama bin 
Laden and his companions after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Indian Foreign 
Minister S.M. Krishna was also reported to have said that terrorist organisations 
attack thousands of innocent people and therefore the world had to continue its 
efforts to eradicate terrorism by destroying "the safe havens of terrorists in 
Pakistan."
177
 Likewise Indian Military Chief General V.K. Singh was reported on 5 
May 2011 by Nawa-i-Waqt to have told journalists that India would also not 
hesitate to conduct surgical strikes on the pattern of the American operation in 
Pakistan as Indian forces had the full capability to conduct such strikes.
178
 
Waseem Akhtar, Head of Jamaat-e-Islami Punjab, was reported on 7 May 2011 to 
have said that the Indian military chief General V.K. Singh and others dared to 
threaten Pakistan due to the failure of military and civil leadership in defending 
the country's sovereignty.
179
 The newspaper reported unidentified authorities of 
Pakistan's Ministry of Defence to have informed the US that any adventurism 
from India might result in the nuclear war.
180
 
A columnist Khalid Ahmad in Nawa-i-Waqt on 6 May 2011 responded to the 
Afghan and Indian reaction to the operation. He raised the question about who 
pushed Osama bin Laden into Pakistan, especially in a condition when he was 
continuously ill and needed regular treatment nearly every month. He wrote that 
actually India and Afghanistan were responsible for it. "India out of its enmity" 
wanted to start a new phase of War on Terror directed against Pakistan and for 
this purpose was using Afghanistan and "the US was playing in their hands." 
However, the columnist suggested that Pakistan should accept the US presence 
in Afghanistan and warn them of "Afghan and Indian hypocrisy and evil 
designs."
181
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Nawa-i-Waqt argued that Abbottabad being a sensitive place because of 
having certain offices of Pakistan's security forces was a significant place for the 
operation. "In this pretext Pakistan's enemy India had attempted to blame 
Pakistan for sponsoring terrorism."
182
 However, the newspaper argued, if the 
news of Laden's killing in Abbottabad were true, as apparently presented by the 
US, it certainly would bring new security concerns to Pakistan. The newspaper 
speculated that India could use it as pretext to attack Pakistan's sovereignty. 
Therefore, the newspaper advised Pakistan's military and political leadership to 
be cautious of Pakistan's security.
183
 
Conversely, interviews for this research highlighted an existing perspective 
with regard to Pakistan losing international support for bearing terrorists on its 
soil. One of the liberal journalists and former career diplomat argued: 
there is falsification. I think Pakistan is alone in this. Pakistan 
is a very isolated country and the violation of sovereignty, is 
one of the fruits of this isolation. You say you are sovereign, 
but if you have foreigners on your territory, doing terrorism 
across the border, then you really cannot claim to be 
sovereign. You have areas, on your territory, where there is 
no governance, even one third of Karachi, there is no state, 
somebody else is ruling. In Balochistan a very large area, is 
not under government control. In the Frontier and the tribal 
areas, also this is the state of affairs. I think about sixty 
percent of Pakistan's territory, lacks governance, which 
means that drones are the only effective way of killing people 
who are international terrorists. Pakistan cooperated with the 
drone technology. It cooperated actually in targeting certain 
individuals, who were endangering Pakistan, but then the 
policy changed. Because the drones were also killing those 
terrorists that Pakistan did not want to target.
184
 
The different voices in the discourse especially the right-wing political parties 
and journalists suggested that the underlying cause of US betrayal and 
conspiracy was to target Pakistan's nuclear program. Additionally one possible 
motive or at least an effect of the US operation was also explained as setting a 
precedent for India to violate Pakistan's sovereignty under the pretext of taking 
action against non-state actors reportedly harboured by Pakistan. It was reported 
that it could lead to more disastrous consequences of full scale war or even 
                                              
182
 Nawa-i-Waqt, editorial, 3 May 2011, p.10. 
183
 Ibid, editorial, 3 May 2011, p.10., news article, 4 May 2011, p.8. and news article, 8 May 2011, 
p.12; Jang, editorial, 19 May 2011, p.6. 
184
 Respondent 2 
230 
 
nuclear war. Thus, the effects on Pakistan of the US operation were described as 
serious and far reaching and would help to rationalise the idea of a US politics of 
betrayal with regard to the Abbottabad operation. 
4.4.3 Osama bin Laden's Assassination as an Act against "A Symbol of 
Muslim Resistance" 
While the rightist newspapers, politicians, and religious clergy described 
Osama bin Laden as a symbol of Islamic resistance to US policies against Islam 
and Muslims, however, the left leaning or liberal newspapers or politicians did not 
conversely describe him as "terrorist." For example, Prime Minister Gilani, 
reported by Jang on 11 May 2011, in his speech in the Parliament said Osama bin 
Laden was not a Pakistani citizen and no one invited him to come to Pakistan but 
did not explicitly describe him as a terrorist.
185
 Moreover, the operation was also 
seen as yet another manifestation of the ruling elite siding with the US. As a result 
there were protests and memorial services observed all over the country. The 
Abbottabad operation was described as the US war against Islam and Muslims, 
thus providing a way to rationalise the perception of a US politics of betrayal and 
conspiracy. 
Memorial services for Osama bin Laden were observed throughout the 
country which were reported by the Urdu press. Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 May 2011 
reported one such service observed in Lahore by Jamaat-ud-Dawa lead by Hafiz 
Muhammad Saeed who reportedly had tears in his eyes during the service 
whereas other participants were also seen praying and crying in grief.
186
 Hafiz 
Saeed Ahmed was reported to have told the participants that Osama bin Laden 
was "a great motivating personality for Muslims" who offered "tremendous 
sacrifices for Islam and Muslims" which would be remembered forever. He said 
that the rulers of Pakistan were "hostile to Muslims" but "friendly to enemies of 
Allah." He said that the behaviour of the rulers on the killing of Osama bin Laden 
was disappointing. He said that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and 
therefore on this issue the "feelings and emotions" of the rulers should be same 
as that of "Pakistani nation and Muslims."
187
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Nawa-i-Waqt on 3 May 2011 explained that one reason behind the US 
dumping Osama bin Laden's dead body into the sea might be to avoid him getting 
the status of "martyrdom." The newspaper wrote that Osama bin Laden's death 
was a historic event for the Islamic movement led by him with the possibility of it 
becoming more dangerous with him being dead than alive. The newspaper 
explained that it could affect or decrease the global movement of "jihad" but could 
not eliminate it. The newspaper noted that the Americans were happy indeed to 
get rid of their "enemy number one" but they would be amazed to know that 
Osama bin Laden would continue to haunt them even after his death.
188
 The 
newspaper also reported hundreds of people gathered to protest in Quetta to pay 
homage to Osama bin Laden and condemn his killing by the US. The American 
flags were burnt by the enraged protesters who were also chanting slogans to 
curse America. The rally was lead by a religious and right-wing political leader of 
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Ideological) and member of the National Assembly Maulvi 
Asmat Ullah who declared that Osama bin Laden was the "hero of Muslims" and 
his "martyrdom" had deprived the Islamic world of a "great Mujahid."
189
 
 
Figure 45, Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 May 2011 published the photograph on the left to show 
citizens in Multan burning American flag to protest against the assassination of Osama 
bin Laden.
190
 Likewise, the newspaper published the photograph on the right to show 
supporters of a right-wing political party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman) in 
Quetta during a protest rally holding pictures of Osama bin Laden and chanting slogans 
against the US.
191
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 11 May 2011 reported Maulvi Asmat during the session of the 
National Assembly, along with some other members without the permission of the 
speaker, to have prayed for Osama bin Laden and extended condolences to his 
family members. Speaking at a point of order, he was reported to have said that 
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the US had accepted the "Islamic identity of Osama bin Laden" by offering Islamic 
rituals before dumping his body into the sea, therefore Muslims had also the right 
to pray for him.
192
 The Urdu newspapers also reported Pakistani mainstream 
political and religious leaders too have described Osama bin Laden as a "symbol 
of Islamic movement of resistance" against the US. Nawa-i-Waqt on 5 May 2011 
reported Chairman of Sunni Itihad Council Sahibzada Fazal Karim to have said 
that the world's "ruthless imperialist powers" had speeded up their conspiracies 
against Pakistan because it was a Muslim country. He said that the US wanted to 
treat Pakistan like Kabul and Baghdad but it should know that every child of 
Pakistan was ready to sacrifice its life to protect its nuclear assets for the honour 
of the country. Another political and religious leader said that the number of 
killings which history would put on Osama bin Laden's account would not be 
greater than that of Bush and Obama.
193
 
Senator Sajid Mir, the Head of an important right-wing political and religious 
party Markazi Jameeat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith, on 5 May 2011 was reported to have said 
that one could differ from Osama bin Laden's method and way of thinking, yet the 
world had to find out why people like Osama bin Laden had emerged. He said 
that to stop more Osamas emerging, injustice in the world had to be eradicated 
and that Muslims were the largest in number being killed and at the same time 
being accused of terrorism. He explained that the US was an "enemy of Pakistan" 
attacking its sovereignty and targeting its nuclear program and that the common 
man had started viewing the role of the Pakistan's military with suspicion which 
was not a good thing for the nation. He suggested that the Islamic world would 
have to develop independent policies to come out of the shadow of American 
hegemony. Otherwise Muslim countries would continue to become victim one 
after the other. He also suggested that the US would have to stop helping Israel 
and India so that Palestinians and Kashmiris could get their due rights.
194
 
Nawa-i-Waqt on 16 May 2011 reported Politicians and religious scholars 
belonging to most of the political and religious parties of Pakistan to have 
gathered in Lahore and demanded the government to stop "spying on Muslims" in 
the name of intelligence sharing with the US, striking down US drones, blocking 
NATO supplies, and asking the US to vacate any bases in Pakistan. They also 
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demanded an end to "any secret agreements" with the US. They argued that any 
Muslim could not be declared a terrorist on the basis of "false propaganda." They 
argued that the US was engaged in "a war against Islam" and its "intentions were 
to occupy Muslim lands of Afghanistan and Pakistan."
195
 Nawa-i-Waqt noted that 
the joint declaration issued at the end of the gathering demanded the government 
to end the relationship with the US, recall its ambassador to the US, and expel 
the American ambassador to Pakistan. The declaration also noted that the US 
always "backstabbed and betrayed Pakistan" being a Muslim country and 
therefore the government should declare the US "an enemy country." The 
declaration also demanded the government call an emergency meeting of the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference to decide a mutually agreed strategy to deal 
with the situation.
196
 
Nawa-i-Waqt and the right leaning journalists also portrayed Osama bin 
Laden as a symbol of "global jihadist and resistance movement" against America 
and the west for the cause of Islam and Muslims.
197
 For example, the right 
leaning columnist Attaul Rehman on 3 and 4 May 2011 concluded that although 
President Obama claimed that the US was not opposed to Islam, no one could 
deny the fact that the US had actually "enslaved" many Muslim countries directly 
such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and indirectly such as Palestinians with the help of 
Israel and Kashmiris with the help of India, and Osama bin Laden was resisting 
the US against this "oppression."
198
 
Some of the journalists also described Osama bin Laden as the symbol of an 
"ideology of resistance" whose death would further enhance his movement and 
would also affect Pakistan's domestic politics.
199
 One such right leaning journalist 
Salman Ghani, in his poetic style of narrative on 5 May 2011 in Nawa-i-Waqt 
wrote that Osama bin Laden's body in spite of it being dumped into the sea was 
still lying in Abbottabad and was too heavy to be removed by the two countries. 
He wrote that this body would not be buried into history, and it would remain there 
and continue to influence Pakistan's politics in general and of the region's in 
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particular. He explained that after 9/11 when the US started its War on Terror and 
Pakistan became an ally, in reaction the people of Pakistan gave a heavy 
mandate to religious parties which did not agree with the government's policy to 
join the war. He wrote that similarly Pakistanis had been rewarding the Bhutto 
family by electing them in various elections because Zulfikar Ali Bhutto opposed 
the US. Similarly, people would keep Osama bin Laden's death in mind and return 
their sympathies in domestic politics by rejecting those parties supporting the US 
against Osama bin Laden.
200
 
The journalist argued that there would be agreements and disagreements with 
Osama bin Laden but after his death he would become a "symbol of resistance to 
global imperialism" and would turn into a movement. This was the reason, he 
explained, that President Obama had to say that "Osama bin Laden was not a 
leader of Islam," sounding as Obama himself held such a position. He further 
argued that Al Qaeda had already spread in the form of smaller groups, all over 
the world and worked as the common ideological platform for those groups. Now 
after the assassination of their ideological leader they had a dead body to 
"decorate and honour their movement" that would help the growth of the 
"ideology" and Pakistan would not be able to escape from it.
201
 He further 
explained that the first signs of such a phenomenon were the memorial services 
and protests being held throughout the country to pay "tribute to the resistance 
movement." He regarded the assassination of Osama bin Laden without due trial 
and legal procedure to prove any allegations, as injustice. He wrote that the US 
could not be given the right to declare anyone terrorist through propaganda and 
kill people under this pretext.
202
 
Likewise, another right leaning columnist Muhammad Ajmal Niazi on 8 May 
2011 in his column took the credit for writing of Osama bin Laden as a "shaheed 
(martyr)" and appreciated all those newspapers and journalists who dared to write 
about him so. He wrote that Osama bin Laden was an Arab and "leader of Afghan 
Mujahedeen" who succeeded in becoming a "militant leader of humanity and the 
Islamic world." He argued that Osama bin Laden was "a brave Muslim" and wrote 
history by fighting against an "anti-Islamic superpower." He wrote that it was "an 
honour" for Osama bin Laden as he had scarred the whole of America and was 
killed by it bestowing upon him "the status of martyrdom." He argued that anyone 
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killed under US conspiracies becomes "a martyr." He wrote that Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, Shah Faisal, Zia-ul-Haq, and Benazir Bhutto got "the status of martyrs" 
because they were "killed under US conspiracies."
203
 The columnist on 11 May 
2011 wrote that Osama bin Laden's "struggle for independence and honour was 
jihad" against the US oppression of Muslims all over the world.
204
 
Conversely, in interviews conducted for this research some of the 
respondents highlighted that Pakistan's rightist elements having sympathies with 
the Taliban, started viewing the US after 9/11 as an enemy of Islam and Muslims. 
According to some of the respondents of interviews after 9/11 rightist elements in 
Pakistan started very strong propaganda against the US describing it an anti-
Islamic force. A senior right leaning journalist and Chief Editor of a mainstream 
Urdu newspaper argued: 
the real problem has emerged in Pakistan-US relations after 
9/11. After 9/11 the rightists of this country, religious elements 
had sympathies with the Taliban. And when action was taken 
against the Taliban in Afghanistan, it triggered very strong 
propaganda against the US. Prior to that the US was a friend 
or betraying friend, but those religious elements did not 
consider it enemy. Now the religious elements came up with 
a pro-Taliban narrative. They put India, Israel, and America in 
one category and started propaganda.
205
 
Likewise, a liberal journalist explained: 
you see, the theory is that America is opposed to Islam, and 
Muslims' [point of views] have been presented by Urdu 
media. The Americans and right-wing channels, political 
parties, and even the religious parties were all united so long 
as they were fighting against the Soviet Union. Religious 
parties were supported by America. They got their resources 
from them, and then there was backing from the Americans, 
then there was no problem. At that stage the attacks on 
United States were also very nominal, because that was the 
Zia-ul-Haq's period. And first of all there was the dictatorship 
that forged that policy.  
But when Americans started bombing the Taliban, then the 
right-wing parties and the religious parties, became anti-
American. So now they are more anti-American [laughs] than 
the leftists, you know, because they think that their [Muslims'] 
Kingdom or Kingship in Afghanistan has been snatched from 
                                              
203
 Muhammad Ajmal Niazi, Nawa-i-Waqt, column, 8 May 2011, p.2. 
204
 Ibid; Muhammad Ajmal Niazi, Nawa-i-Waqt, column, 11 May 2011, p.2. 
205
 Respondent 13 
236 
 
them.
206
 
The discourse in the Urdu press described Osama bin Laden as a "symbol of 
Islamic resistance" against "American imperialism" and the Abbottabad operation 
was explained as part of "the US war against Islam." The protests and memorial 
services held by political and religious forces in the country were widely covered 
by the Urdu press representing both left and right leaning media. The killing of 
Osama bin Laden was also explained in terms the ruling elite siding with the US, 
causing disadvantage to the underprivileged and suppressed classes of Muslims. 
Thus a rationalisation of a perceived act of betrayal was offered by all the 
dominant voices in the discourse. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
Pakistan's official response to the US operation in Abbottabad changed from 
an accommodating perspective to a highly critical one, due to the severe criticism 
from opposition parties and the local media. The criticism of the government also 
increased after the US authorities and media raised questions around the 
reasons for Osama bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad. Initially, Pakistan's Prime 
Minister declared the US operation "a great victory" and tried to give the 
impression that the action against Osama bin Laden was mutually taken by the 
US and Pakistan. However, a few days later the government had to change its 
stance by declaring the unilateral US action "a severe violation of Pakistan's 
sovereignty," and "disrespectful to its sacrifices" in the War on Terror. 
While the Pakistani opposition parties and local media in general and the 
Urdu press in particular were censuring the government and military for their 
failure to protect Pakistan's sovereignty, they kept demanding investigations to 
identify those responsible. The expression of such demands appeared in 
parliament, courts, non-governmental organisations, the media, and the public. 
The focus of such demands was on investigating the reasons for Pakistan's 
failure to defend its sovereignty so that in future such unilateral actions by the US 
could be checked.  
The Abbottabad operation was also explained in the Urdu press as a planned 
conspiracy against Pakistan. It was argued that the operation was "a US's staged 
play" and that Osama bin Laden, who had been believed to be killed long ago, 
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was not in fact killed in Abbottabad. Therefore, the conspiracy stated that the US 
had conducted a fake operation in defence of its vested interests. It was also 
argued that regardless of whether Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad or 
not, the action was a clear conspiracy against Pakistan. 
Evidence with regard to the possibility of a US conspiracy was also presented 
in the discourse. First, it was argued that the US had violated mutually-agreed 
terms of cooperation by not informing Pakistan before the operation, and had also 
violated international law to pursue some underlying objectives. Second, it was 
argued that the US, in collaboration with India, was supporting terrorist activities 
in Pakistan. Third, the US was said to be willing to increase its pressure on 
Pakistan to convince it to do more against Al Qaeda and the Taliban and to bring 
the battlefield into Pakistan from Afghanistan. 
The underlying objectives behind the alleged US conspiracy and betrayal 
were also analysed. First, it was argued that in order to protect its interests, the 
US as a hegemonic power sided with the Pakistani ruling elite to betray Pakistan. 
Second, speculation was put forward that the operation could be a full dress 
rehearsal to attack Pakistan's nuclear program in the future. The purpose of the 
operation could be to convince the international community that Pakistan's armed 
forces and intelligence agencies were not capable of curtailing terrorists, and that 
therefore, the possibility of terrorists accessing Pakistan's nuclear weapons was 
very high. Therefore the US would pressurise Pakistan to curtail or roll back its 
nuclear program. It was also argued in the discourse that the US, as usual, 
wanted to strengthen India and to weaken Pakistan. Such an action would also 
set an international precedent for India to violate Pakistan's security. 
Finally, the Urdu press particularly presented the operation as part of the US’s 
ongoing war against Islam. Osama bin Laden was described as a symbol of 
Islamic resistance to the US. He was portrayed as "a Mujahid," who had been 
struggling for the rights of the Muslims all over the world. Memorial services and 
prayers were organised throughout Pakistan to pay homage to a person who was 
considered "a martyr of a greater cause." The protest rallies organised by 
different political and religious parties criticised the American violation of 
sovereignty of a Muslim country to kill "a Muslim dissenter," and claimed that it 
had possibly been aimed to target "the nuclear program of a Muslim country." 
Though India and Israel were also suspected of being involved in the conspiracy 
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to hit a Muslim target, the major emphasis was on the US as a sponsor and 
patron of the "oppressive activities" of Israel and India against Muslims. 
The interview research disclosed a few alternate perspectives which were not 
given space in the discourse. However, the interviews also confirmed the 
hegemonic voices in the discourse. In general, Pakistan's reaction as presented 
by the discourse was well summarised by a senior politician and high level 
government functionary belonging to a left-wing party, who stated that:  
we as a brave nation, we as a nation, for respect of our 
sovereignty, took a stand, and we boycotted the Bonn 
Conference. And we also asked the United States to 
apologise to Pakistan. And at the same time we also 
requested them to vacate Shamsi Base, and at the same 
time, we said the new terms of engagement would be made 
through the parliamentary committee on our national security, 
and it will be vetted by the parliament, and beyond that no 
concessions will be acceptable.
207
 
Overall, it was argued that many Pakistanis felt disrespected, hurt, and 
dishonoured due to the perceived US politics of betrayal under a conspiracy 
based on violations of mutually-agreed terms of cooperation and international law, 
supporting terrorist activities in Pakistan in order to pressurise it to "do more" in 
the War on Terror. The US objectives were characterised as pursuing its interests 
with the help of the Pakistani ruling elite, targeting Pakistan's nuclear program, 
setting a precedent for India to violate Pakistan's sovereignty, and assassinating 
Osama bin Laden as a symbol of Islamic resistance to suit the anti-Islamic 
agenda of the US. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
 CONCLUSION 
This chapter concludes the research by taking an overview of the history and 
structure of the Urdu press discourse since the 1971 War in section 5.1, then 
analysing the relevance and contribution of this research in the context of the 
existing literature on Pakistan-US relations in section 5.2. Section 5.3 analyses 
some important factors that can be said to be responsible for the bias in the 
discourse. Section 5.4 discusses the Pakistani public, media, ruling elite, and the 
US with regard to the biased discourse. Section 5.5 suggests some future 
research dimensions, and finally, section 5.6 offers some concluding remarks 
based on the overall findings of the thesis. 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE URDU 
PRESS DISCOURSE ON PAKISTAN-US RELATIONS SINCE THE 
1971 WAR 
US betrayal of Pakistan as a military ally was first perceived during the Sino-
Indian War of 1962, when the US started offering enormous military aid to India, 
and more seriously later, when it suspended military aid to both Pakistan and 
India during the 1965 War. Though the balance of power in South Asia was 
expected to be disturbed by US aid to India in 1962, Pakistan attempted to 
maintain the balance by strengthening its ties with China. Later, in 1965, although 
the suspension of military aid was perceived as a US betrayal, the Pakistani 
government, politicians, and journalists did not place much emphasis on US 
politics of betrayal because the net outcome of the war with India was claimed as 
a victory. The Urdu press in Pakistan, however, could view and describe US 
betrayal in the 1971 War in more concrete terms as Pakistan lost its eastern 
territory, which became Bangladesh. Therefore, the 1971 War can be seen as the 
tipping point of the Urdu press discourse in describing the US as a betraying 
partner. 
The 1971 War was in fact a story of shattered hopes for Pakistanis. The 
dominant voices of the discourse included the important Urdu newspapers such 
as Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt, as well as politicians and journalists who espoused 
both right and left-wing ideologies. The hopes were raised higher when Pakistan 
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played a role in the normalisation of the relationship between China and the US in 
July 1971. It was argued that India would not be able to wage a war against 
Pakistan because China and the US were siding with Pakistan, and even if it 
waged war, it would not be able to succeed. However, India soon not only waged 
war but also succeeded in providing military support to the armed resistance in 
East Pakistan, resulting in Pakistan's defeat and its consequent dismemberment. 
The Urdu press propagated the probable military involvement of the US on 
Pakistan's side during the war. The US Seventh Fleet, which carried nuclear 
weapons, was reported to have been sent by the US to support Pakistan's 
military, which seemed to be about to defeat Indian forces in December 1971. 
However, when Pakistan's military had to surrender and over 90,000 of Pakistan's 
military and civilians were taken as prisoners of war, East Pakistan become an 
independent country, Bangladesh, and Pakistanis felt betrayed by the US’s 
ultimate lack of action in support of its ally. 
Moreover, after the war it was argued that the US not only betrayed Pakistan 
due to its own limitations, but that it also caused Pakistan's disintegration through 
a conspiracy. All the dominant voices of the discourse highlighting US 
conspiratorial designs since 1970 after the War became self-fulfilling prophecies. 
All the diplomatic and non-diplomatic means through which US was perceived to 
be interfering in Pakistan's internal matters were perceived as the modalities of a 
US conspiracy against Pakistan. Further, the causes behind the conspiracy were 
also analysed in the discourse. First, it was argued that the US’s strategic interest 
in using India as a counterweight to China was the cause of a US conspiracy and 
its betrayal. Second, it was argued that the US was an anti-Islamic force which 
was conspiring with other non-Muslim countries to dismember a Muslim country. 
Third, it was argued that the US was a hegemonic imperial power which wanted 
to protect its interests and which had caused East Pakistan's underdevelopment 
through its exploitative policies that resulted in the sense of deprivation and 
demands for autonomy and independence arising on the part of the Bengali 
population of East Pakistan. 
The alternative voices to those arguments listed above would argue that 
internal socio-political and socio-economic factors were the more relevant causes 
behind Pakistan's disintegration and, for that reason, their proponents, who would 
not agree with the idea of US betrayal and conspiracy, were excluded from the 
discourse. Some such important voices of politicians and journalists were 
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identified through the interviews conducted for this research. Some of the 
interviewed politicians and journalists belonging to both right and left-wing views 
argued that internal political, economic, and social factors were the actual causes 
of Pakistan's disintegration and loss of East Pakistan, and they also expressed 
the belief that the Urdu press discourse was frequently biased and misleading 
during the East Pakistan crisis and the 1971 War. 
Afterwards the dominant voices of the discourse argued that the country’s 
shattered hopes had also shattered the confidence of Pakistanis with regard to 
the US as a reliable ally. In the post 1971 War era, Pakistan's security threats 
were perceived as increasing due to an imbalance of conventional military 
weapons and India's interest and progress in its nuclear weapons program. 
Pakistan conveyed its security threats to the US, and the latter responded 
positively by expressing its interest in Pakistan's security. However, India severely 
criticised the US response, which raised Pakistani doubts about the US’s 
determination to support Pakistan's security. The different voices in the 
newspapers justified these doubts by arguing that in the past, the US had been 
unable or unwilling to help Pakistan avoid its own disintegration, and had 
appeased India. Consequently, when the US opposed Pakistan's interest in 
purchasing a nuclear reprocessing plant from France and suspended its military 
aid in 1979 and again in 1990, these acts were perceived as a US politics of 
betrayal, confirming Pakistani doubts.  
It was also argued by the prevalent discourse in the Urdu press that the US 
was conspiring against Pakistan's security and its nuclear program, and that this 
was therefore a betrayal under a planned conspiracy. The discourse helped to 
provide different modalities of the US conspiracy which mainly included pressure 
tactics such as the grant or withdrawal of military and economic aid and US 
interference in Pakistan's domestic politics in order to affect Pakistan's nuclear 
program. The causes behind the US conspiracy and perceived betrayal were also 
analysed. First, it was argued that the US, being a hegemonic capitalistic power, 
wanted to protect its capitalistic interests by keeping an ally dependent on its 
military and economic aid. Second, it was argued that the US, being an anti-
Islamic power, did not want a Muslim country to become a nuclear power and 
gain that level of self-reliance. Third, it was argued that in South Asia, India, as a 
larger country, was more useful to the US in protecting its economic and strategic 
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interests and that the US therefore opposed Pakistan's nuclear program while 
supporting that of India.  
The alternate voices which potentially refute the argument of a US politics of 
betrayal and conspiracy were, once again, excluded from the discourse. Some 
examples of these voices were discovered through the interviews conducted for 
this research. Some politicians and journalists with both right and left-wing views 
argued that although Pakistan had some genuine security concerns vis-à-vis 
India, US concerns with regard to nuclear proliferation were also genuine and not 
a conspiracy. In fact, to contain the Soviet expansion in Afghanistan, the US 
needed Pakistan's support and therefore turned a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear 
program in the 1980s to a certain extent. It was also argued that although the US 
had reservations about Pakistan's nuclear program, it did not take any substantial 
action to sabotage it. The idea of a US conspiracy and betrayal vis-à-vis 
Pakistan's nuclear program was therefore not based on fact. 
The latest phase of cooperation between Pakistan and the US began after 
9/11. This time, the Urdu press neither expressed hopes nor doubts about the US 
as an ally. Instead, from the very beginning it opposed Pakistan's involvement in 
the War on Terror. Consequently, when the US conducted a unilateral operation in 
Abbottabad against Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011, Pakistan's government 
initially regarded the killing of Osama bin Laden as "a great victory" and gave the 
impression that the operation had been conducted jointly. Later, under severe 
criticism from the media and some politicians, it had to change the focus of its 
narrative to accuse the US of violating Pakistan's sovereignty. The discourse in 
the Urdu press became more focused on the violation of Pakistan's sovereignty 
and less on Osama bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad. It was argued once 
again that the US had betrayed Pakistan as part of a conspiracy to achieve some 
other objectives against Pakistan. The evidence detailed to strengthen the 
possibility of the conspiracy included US violations of mutually-agreed terms of 
cooperation for the War on Terror and international law, supporting terrorist 
activities in Pakistan, and pressurising Pakistan to "do more" in the War on Terror.  
In the same manner as in the past, the causes of US conspiracy and betrayal 
were also analysed. First, it was argued that the US, as a hegemonic power, had 
betrayed Pakistan in collaboration with the Pakistani ruling elite. Second, it was 
argued that the US wanted to target Pakistan's nuclear program and also wanted 
to set a precedent for India to violate Pakistan's national sovereignty under the 
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pretext of searching for wanted terrorists. Third, it was argued that Osama bin 
Laden had been a symbol of Islamic resistance and therefore the US conducted 
the operation to assassinate him to follow its anti-Islamic agenda. 
Although a few exceptional voices in the Urdu press were allowed to discuss 
the possibility of Pakistan's failure to play an effective role in the War on Terror, 
once again voices categorically rejecting the idea of a US conspiracy and a 
politics of betrayal were excluded. The interviews for this research identified some 
political and journalistic voices holding both right and left-wing views who rejected 
the idea of a US conspiracy and betrayal, and argued that Pakistan knew about 
the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and therefore that it was 
ultimately Pakistan, and not the US, who had betrayed their ally. 
Thus, this research has helped to build understanding of the history of the 
discourse in the Urdu press on the perceived US politics of betrayal. The 
discourse has existed at least since the 1971 War, and its dominant voices have 
constructed a sustained idea of a US politics of betrayal. In the 1971 War, the US 
was characterised as an ally who had betrayed Pakistan by failing to support it in 
avoiding the disintegration of the country. In the post 1971 era in the case of 
Pakistan's nuclear program, the US was characterised as a betraying ally who 
was no longer trusted not to betray again. Finally, in the post 9/11 era during the 
War on Terror, and before and after the Abbottabad operation, the US was 
analysed as "an enemy" and a hostile force which was habitually betraying 
Pakistan, its supposed ally. Therefore, the Urdu press discourse on Pakistan-US 
relations since the 1971 War has characterised a perceived US politics of betrayal 
in a continuous and incremental manner. 
The discourse of the Urdu press has also developed a general structure with 
regard to its characterisation of a US politics of betrayal. At first it establishes an 
act of betrayal, such as the US failure to support its ally to protect its national 
integrity in the 1971 War, the US opposition to Pakistan’s "peaceful nuclear 
program" and ignoring of the security concerns of its ally, or the US violation of 
sovereignty and mistrust in its ally in the Abbottabad operation. Second, it is 
generally argued that the US betrayed Pakistan as part of an ongoing conspiracy, 
most of the time acting in collaboration with other hostile powers such as India, 
Afghanistan, Israel, or even the USSR. Third, the discourse discusses different 
modalities of US conspiracy, such as using pressurising tactics, or propaganda 
through the American and western media, and interference in Pakistan's internal 
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affairs, using both diplomatic means such as its diplomatic staff in Pakistan and 
undiplomatic means, such as the CIA and non-governmental organisations. 
Fourth, the discourse details different causes of the perceived US politics of 
betrayal which generally fall into three categories. First, the causes are explained 
in pragmatic terms such as with reference to national interests based on power, 
for example the US preference for India as a larger country which can be used as 
a more effective counterweight to China. Second, the US is characterised as a 
hegemonic capitalistic power that wishes to protect its interests by exploitation of 
the underprivileged with or without the cooperation of the local ruling elite. Third, 
the US is characterised as an anti-Islamic force which betrays its Muslim ally 
because of its religious identity. The main voices included in the discourse are 
those of the newspapers through their editorials, cartoons and photographs, 
journalists through their columns, and politicians, government and military officials 
through their statements. 
5.2 HOW DOES THIS RESEARCH RELATE AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE 
EXISTING LITERATURE ON PAKISTAN-US RELATIONS? 
The past literature on Pakistan-US relations is closely related to this research, 
although it does not consider public opinion or, for that matter, its contribution as a 
significant factor affecting international relations. However, there are numerous 
examples in the history of international relations, as mentioned in the introduction 
to this thesis, which demonstrate that though public opinion is not always the 
most decisive factor, it is still an important factor in the conduct of a country’s 
foreign relations. 
Analysis of the Urdu press discourse on Pakistan-US relations, as one of the 
important contributing factors to public opinion in Pakistan, has also helped to 
build understanding of the history of popular press perceptions with regard to a 
perceived US politics of betrayal, which in turn contributes to anti-Americanism in 
Pakistan. A US politics of betrayal has been perceived and analysed thoroughly 
by the Urdu press at least since the 1971 War. This research has also helped to 
understand the general structure of the discourse which has discussed the US 
politics of betrayal since the 1971 War. The discourse is predominantly premised 
on the idea of US betrayal and conspiracy.  
 Although the existing literature does not focus on the structure and history of 
the Urdu press discourse on Pakistan-US relations, it helps to strengthen the 
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arguments of the discourse, which are mainly premised on the idea of US 
betrayal, conspiracies, and modalities of conspiracies. The existing literature has 
mainly engaged with the objective study of verifiable facts which have been used 
to rationalise the US politics of betrayal by characterising the causes of such 
betrayal. The realists would not agree with the idea of a betrayal in international 
relations, as national interest is the factor which matters and not the so-called 
betrayal, sincerity, or faithfulness of a country. However, realists describe an "act 
of betrayal" as a change in a state's policy according to the requirements of its 
national interest. Similarly, Marxists would argue that changes in policy are 
always an issue of exploitation of the underprivileged for the protection of the 
interests of hegemonic powers. Likewise, writings from the perspective of some 
particular preoccupations would argue that Pakistan-US relations are defined by 
one or the other invariable factors, such as Pakistan's preoccupation with India as 
an "enemy" or the "religious extremism in the country," or the US being an anti-
Muslim power. For example, Dennis Kux, in adhering to realist traditions, argues 
that the reason for the volatility in Pakistan-US relations has not been "American 
fickleness or Pakistani stubbornness" but instead that the interests of both states 
have often been at odds.
1
 Tariq Ali, a Marxist writer on Pakistan-US relations, 
argues that Pakistan’s military and civil elites have always been used by the US 
to pursue its global agenda for power.
2
 Ameer Hussain, who arguably can be 
viewed as writing from the perspective of US’s preoccupation with its anti-Islamic 
agenda, argues that the US and India are "the real enemies" of the Muslim world 
and Pakistan, a view which is taken to define Pakistan-US relations.
3
 
The above-mentioned explanations of Pakistan-US relations from three 
different categories of the existing literature are not ignored by the hegemonic 
voices of the Urdu press discourse, rather, they selectively utilise them for their 
own rationalisation of the perceived US politics of betrayal and conspiracy. Any 
voice in the discourse, depending on its background and political orientation, 
argues to define the causes of the perceived US betrayal in a specific way. For 
example, right-leaning journalists, politicians, and newspapers such as Nawa-i-
Waqt generally explain the US as an anti-Islamic force, which conspires to betray 
its Muslim ally. Similarly, journalists, politicians, and Urdu newspapers such as 
Jang, which hold a liberal or leftist perspective, characterise the US as a 
                                              
1
 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies, xviii. 
2
 Tariq Ali, The Duel.  
3
 A. Ameer Hussain, America Aur India. 
246 
 
hegemonic, capitalistic power which conspires to betray its dependent ally. More 
pragmatic voices have also spoken from both the left and the right. Examples 
include Mushahid Hussain, a right leaning journalist; Abida Husain, a right leaning 
politician; Najam Sethi, a liberal columnist at Jang; and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a 
politician of the left. Each of these individuals would define Pakistan-US relations 
in terms of their respective national interests with or without referring to the idea 
of a US betrayal or conspiracy. However, when placed in the overall structure of 
the discourse, such explanations directly or indirectly serve to rationalise by 
providing causality to the idea of a US politics of betrayal and conspiracy. 
Literature from the perspective of discourse analysis is the closest category to 
describe this present research. However, the majority of the studies identified in 
the literature review at the beginning of this thesis come from the field of media 
studies, which attempts to study the impact or role of the media as an 
independent or dependent means of mass communication. Moreover, most media 
studies works are also based on English language newspapers and do not give 
due importance to the popular Urdu press. Consequently, they have not shown 
interest in the history and structure of the Urdu press discourse on Pakistan-US 
relations, which provides a way to understand the negative public perceptions of 
the US in Pakistan. In contrast, this research breaks new ground by attempting to 
explain the history and structure of the Urdu press discourse on the perceived US 
politics of betrayal and therefore helps to rationalise incremental anti-
Americanism in Pakistan. 
The literature review carried out for this research also refers to another aspect 
of the discourse analyses of Pakistan-US relations. Given the limited number of 
studies conducted in relation to the Urdu press discourse on Pakistan-US 
relations, this area of study seems to have been poorly served by prior 
researchers. The voices that have had the privilege to communicate through the 
Urdu press have also had access to the existing academic literature, which may 
well be regarded as hegemonic in terms of its quantity and access, and they form 
the most important part of the overall discourse on Pakistan-US relations. 
Therefore, the arguments of the dominant voices of the Urdu press are also 
informed by the wider, hegemonic academic discourse. Consequently, journalists 
or politicians whose knowledge is dependent on such a discourse in the media or 
in academic works are less likely to break the tradition and characterise the 
causes of the perceived US politics of betrayal differently. For example, journalists 
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and politicians may not consider that one of the reasons that the US is perceived 
as a betraying or conspiring ally is because it has been historically characterised 
as such in a systematic manner over a long period of time. 
Thus, this research allows a different way to see Pakistan-US relations from 
the perspective of discourse analysis by breaking the hegemonic traditions of the 
prior academic discourse, that is it sees the relationship through the discourse in 
the Urdu press, and offers criticisms of, and alternatives to, that discourse. This 
study also facilitates the understanding that people contributing into the Urdu 
press discourse have access to a wider discourse which is also hegemonic, and 
which does not easily allow them to see the relationship from any new 
perspective. 
Finally, it can be argued that the US politics of betrayal as perceived and 
analysed by the Urdu press is a social construct or reality that has been produced 
and reproduced through overall discourse in society, whereas the Urdu press is a 
part of the overall discourse on Pakistan-US relations. The Urdu press has 
characterised the US politics of betrayal at least since the 1971 War and has 
developed a structure of this discourse which argues that the US not only betrays 
Pakistan but also conspires against it. This discourse also analyses different 
modalities and causes for the perceived US politics of betrayal and excludes 
alternative voices which could possibly refute the argument presented by the 
hegemonic voices of the discourse. Such a biased discourse which only includes 
the voices which identify, define, and rationalise a US politics of betrayal is likely 
to strongly contribute to the increasing anti-American sentiment in Pakistan which 
is one of the constraining factors to the smooth conduct of Pakistan-US relations.  
5.3 SOME POWER FACTORS CAUSING AN IMBALANCE IN THE 
DISCOURSE 
Multiple factors in Pakistan determine and control the boundaries of the 
popular media discourse. Institutional forces, such as the civil and military ruling 
elites, are among such factors as they have been influencing the media through 
governmental controls in order to maximise their own internal political benefit.
4
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Media organisations are primarily business enterprises, and therefore their 
corporate interest is also a factor that influences the way they characterise the US 
as a betraying and conspiring ally. The discourse woven around conspiracies has 
a sensational appeal to the public and for that reason, in order to increase and 
maintain their popularity and to protect their financial interests, Pakistani media 
outlets often premise their arguments on conspiracies.
5
 Apart from formal 
institutional forces, the discourse has its own power which also helps to 
determine its boundaries.
6
 One of the senior liberal journalists interviewed for this 
research stated that:  
there are so many factors that affect the discourse of the 
Urdu Press. Religion, poverty, ignorance, institutional 
pressures, media controls but most important is that no one 
wishes to say something which is not popular, which is not 
easily accepted. We sell stereotypes because they are easily 
sold.
7
 
Likewise, a right leaning journalists observed that: 
now, people are against the US at grassroots level and no 
politician is so daring to say anything which goes in favour of 
Americans. The same is the case with the print media, they 
do not want to say something which is not accepted by the 
people and which goes against the interests of those people 
who help their businesses. The media has failed to provide 
the complete picture of the reality.
8
 
 In Pakistan's context, institutional forces such as the civil and military ruling 
elites, media organisations and the power of the established discourse itself are 
the most important power factors that influence and determine the boundaries of 
the discourse.  
5.4 THE PAKISTANI PUBLIC, THE MEDIA, THE RULING ELITE, THE US 
AND A BIASED DISCOURSE 
Husain Haqqani has observed that Pakistan's narrative of Pakistan-US 
relations has been biased and misleading.
9
 Likewise Adam Ellick in a 
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documentary for The New York Times in May 2010 argued that "in most of the 
world conspiracies are the stuff of fringe but in Pakistan they make for the 
mainstream [media]."
10
 The documentary reflected that Pakistanis, including the 
educated urban classes, believe in US conspiracies against their country based 
on its perceived anti-Islamic agenda, global interests, and the view of the US as 
an exploitative capitalistic force. Ellick's documentary endorses the findings of this 
study by arguing that in order to improve ratings and increase revenues, the 
popular media in Pakistan has generally premised its analyses of Pakistan-US 
relations on the themes of US betrayal and conspiracy, and Pakistani people at 
large have, unsurprisingly, been affected by this stereotyped, biased discourse. 
The documentary also argues that anti-Americanism in Pakistan is not only due to 
the biased discourse of the popular media but also because of the US’s failure to 
communicate more effectively with people of Pakistan. Ellick also argues that 
Pakistan's ruling civil and military elite has been using the continuous argument of 
US betrayal in order to associate Pakistan's internal failures with external forces 
conspiring against Pakistan.  
The Pakistani public needs to realise the fact that in order to maximise their 
ratings and profits, the media in general and the popular press of Pakistan in 
particular have produced and sustained a discourse on Pakistan-US relations 
which is biased and which promotes certain stereotypes and prejudices. The 
majority of Pakistanis subscribe to a religious identity and are a patriotic people, 
sensitive to the security and survival of their country, but they should understand 
that both Pakistan and the US have their own interests in the bilateral relationship 
and their policies towards each other are based on those interests, which may 
sometimes be at odds. This researcher’s conversation with the research students 
and faculty members of the Department of Political Science and International 
Relations at Bahauddin Zakariya University, Pakistan in May 2015 concluded with 
the consensus that Pakistanis expect that the US should be a faithful ally and 
help Pakistan in every critical situation. They also believe that the US has always 
betrayed Pakistan when the latter required support by the former. However, the 
participants in the conversation agreed that in reality, the US or Pakistan may not 
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live up to the expectations of each other, depending on their respective 
constraints which, in turn, are based on their interests. 
The Pakistani media in general and the popular press in particular should be 
giving comparatively more space to the excluded voices on Pakistan-US relations 
and adopt a more realistic approach to analyse the relationship instead of 
premising their argument on the ideas of US betrayal and conspiracy. Otherwise, 
the Pakistani media may lose its credibility in the future as people's access to 
information sources increases due to the growth of satellite TV channels, the 
internet, and social media. 
Pakistan's civil and ruling military elites, who speak through the country’s 
media, also need to realise the importance of public perceptions, especially with 
regard to the gradual growth of democracy in the country. Although the ruling 
elites understand the significance of Pakistan-US relations, they do not convey 
this to the public. On the one hand, they use it as a negotiating tool to tell the US 
that despite public opposition they are willing to continue in alliance with the US, 
and on the other hand, they use the US as a scapegoat for their internal 
failures.
11
 However, with the growth of democracy in the country, public opinion is 
being given more importance and therefore, in future it may be more difficult for 
the ruling elites to continue both with their relations with the US and with fuelling 
negative public perceptions at the same time. 
The US also needs to realise that it has failed so far to communicate 
effectively with the people of Pakistan. Ellick's documentary reflected that US 
officials visiting Pakistan mostly avoid clear communication with the media, 
leaving more space for speculation and conspiracy theories.
12
 Moreover, while 
developing its policies towards Pakistan it should consider the people's and the 
media’s likely reactions to them and take appropriate measures to properly 
convey the intentions behind certain actions. 
5.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has analysed the discourse of two newspapers in the popular 
press in Pakistan with regard to the perceived politics of betrayal in Pakistan-US 
relations and ideas of US conspiracies. However, the US has also accused 
Pakistan of betrayal, for example when Pakistan was suspected of hiding Osama 
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bin Laden in Abbottabad and supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan.
13
 
Consequently, negative public perceptions do not exist only on Pakistan's side; 
such perceptions have also been witnessed among the American public. For 
example, during the East Pakistan crisis, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger 
could not support Pakistan beyond a certain point because of high levels of anti-
Pakistan sentiment with regard to the military operations in East Pakistan which 
started in March 1971.
14
 Therefore, a similar study on the American popular press 
could help to build understanding of the history and structure of the discourse on 
Pakistan-US relations along with identification of the voices which have been both 
included and excluded in the discourse. 
This study can also be expanded to other newspapers, such as those of the 
English press in Pakistan, to compare the history and structure of the discourse in 
the Urdu and English newspapers. Other forms of discourse, such as television, 
radio, social media, film, art, and works of fiction, can also be considered in future 
research to understand their respective roles in contributing to negative public 
opinion in Pakistan and the US with regard to their respective attitudes towards 
the other country. 
5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Urdu press discourse on Pakistan-US relations since the 1971 War has 
clearly been biased, as it has only included voices characterising the US as a 
betraying ally. The argument of a US politics of betrayal has been primarily 
premised on US conspiracies which, in turn, are based on its identity as an anti-
Islamic, hegemonic, capitalistic power and its interest in India as the larger 
country in South Asia. The discourse has excluded alternative voices which do 
not agree with the idea of a US politics of betrayal and conspiracy. Such a biased 
discourse contributes to the anti-American sentiments of many Pakistanis. The 
Pakistani media in general and the Urdu press in particular should decrease its 
focus on US conspiracies by giving more space to the excluded alternative voices 
in order to make the discourse it presents more balanced. 
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 APPENDIX-A 
US Aid to Pakistan 1948-2010 
 
Summary of US Aid to Pakistan 1948-2010 
Year Economic 
Assistance,  
Total 
Economic 
Assistance (through 
USAID) 
Military 
Assistance, 
Total 
Coalition 
Support 
Funds 
1948  0.77  0  0   
1949  0  0  0   
1950  0  0  0   
1951  2.89  0  0   
1952  74.25  73.55  0   
1953  748.29  286.23  0   
1954  156.95  152.24  0   
1955  733.15  477.18  266   
1956  1065.67  700.89  1086.5   
1957  1079.65  619.9  437.59   
1958  968.22  589.59  533.13   
1959  1367.93  985.25  366.81   
1960  1689.84  1181.35  230.39   
1961  989.53  780.04  260.47   
1962  2334.65  1446.28  549.02   
1963  2066.77  1063.68  292.31   
1964  2222.66  1334.16  187.55   
1965  1928.9  1041.58  77.38   
1966  816.28  691.28  8.4   
1967  1213.36  719.38  26.33   
1968  1501.68  672.5  25.98   
1969  541.76  504.31  0.5   
1970  968.32  570.93  0.87   
2 
 
Year Economic 
Assistance,  
Total 
Economic 
Assistance (through 
USAID) 
Military 
Assistance, 
Total 
Coalition 
Support 
Funds 
1971  474.25  31.21  0.73   
1972  692.87  261.87  0.42   
1973  715.35  387.63  1.24   
1974  381.97  219.13  0.95   
1975  614.34  326.02  0.92   
1976  644.1  336.78  1.28   
1977  319.16  209.4  0.92   
1978  214.92  55.49  1.52   
1979  128.81  23.31  1.2   
1980  137.53  0  0   
1981  164.16  0  0   
1982  400.6  200.07  1.2   
1983  534.18  383.29  499.77   
1984  568.05  415.84  555.9   
1985  607.26  447.53  583.53   
1986  623.56 460.91  545.82   
1987  599.07 469.53  534.54   
1988  769.14 635  430.69   
1989  559.72 421.27  367.06   
1990  548.07 422.37  283.44   
1991  149.59 141.78  0   
1992  27.14 0.57  7.2   
1993  74.19 7.98  0   
1994  68.43 0  0   
1995  23.13 10.1  0   
1996  22.79 0  0   
1997  57.17 0  0   
1998  36.32 0  0   
1999  102.14 6.72  0.22   
2000  45.72 0  0   
2001  228.02 0.54  0   
2002  937.34 744.74  1739.7  1386.06  
2003  377.93 284.81  1760.23  1450.98  
2004  406.12 316.56  891.39  794.11  
2005  490.42 374.04  1397.06  1050.15  
2006  689.43 488.46  1246.1  916.13  
2007  688.62 498.91  1079.72  755.74  
2008  614.48 392.05  1378.32  1014.9  
2009  1353.65 1076.25  1114.26  685  
2010  1867.13 1529.53  2524.61  1220.5  
Note: All figures are in US$ (millions). Figures are adjusted for inflation and 
presented in 2009 constant dollars1 
                                              
1
 The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2011/jul/11/us-aid-to-pakistan> [accessed on 1 February 2015] 
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 APPENDIX-B 
Significant Political Parties of Pakistan and their Popular Support Based on General 
Elections for National Assembly in May 2013
1
 
Political Parties Popular vote Percentage 
Pakistan Muslim League (N) 14,874,104 32.77% 
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf 7,679,954 16.92% 
Pakistan People's Party 6,911,218 15.23% 
Independents 5,880,658 12.96% 
Muttahida Qaumi Movement 2,456,153 5.41% 
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F) 1,461,371 3.22% 
Pakistan Muslim League (Q) 1,409,905 3.11% 
Pakistan Muslim League (F) 1,072,846 2.36% 
Jamaat-e-Islami 963,909 2.12% 
Awami National Party 453,057 1.00% 
Mutahida Deeni Mahaz 360,297 0.79% 
Pakhtun-khwa Milli Awami Party 214,631 0.47% 
National Peoples Party 197,829 0.44% 
Pakistan Muslim League (Z) 128,510 0.28% 
Bahawalpur National Awami Party 113,365 0.25% 
Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Nazryati 103,098 0.23% 
Awami Muslim League 93,046 0.20% 
Sindh United Party 82,634 0.18% 
Tehreek-e-Tahaffuz-e-Pakistan 76,358 0.17% 
Awami Jamhuri Ittehad Pakistan 71,175 0.16% 
Pakistan Muslim League (J) 71,773 0.16% 
Jamiat Ulma-e-Pakistan 67,966 0.15% 
Balochistan National Party 63,979 0.14% 
National Party (Pakistan) 61,148 0.13% 
All Pakistan Muslim League 54,231 0.12% 
Pakistan National Muslim League 52,398 0.12% 
Pakistan People's Party (Shaheed Bhutto) 50,046 0.11% 
Qaumi Watan Party 46,574 0.10% 
                                              
1
 Election Commission of Pakistan 2015 
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Tehreek-e-Suba Hazara 43,265 0.10% 
Majlis-e-Wahdat-e-Muslimeen 41,520 0.09% 
Sunni Ittehad Council 37,732 0.08% 
Sunni Tehreek 25,485 0.06% 
Sindh Taraqi Passand Party 23,397 0.05% 
Qoumi Wattan Party 19,253 0.04% 
Awami Workers Party 18,650 0.04% 
Balochistan National Party (Awami) 12,866 0.03% 
Hazara Democratic Party 11,052 0.02% 
Mohajir Qaumi Movement 10,575 0.02% 
Jamote Qaumi Movement 10,468 0.02% 
Saraiki Party 5,236 0.01% 
Kissan Ittehad 4,367 0.01% 
Falah Party 4,207 0.01% 
Awami Justice Party 3,803 0.01% 
Pakistan Justice Party 3,230 0.01% 
Islamli Tehreek 2,694 0.01% 
Christian Progressive Movement 2,523 0.01% 
Mohib-e-Wattan Nowjawan Inqilabion Ki Anjuman 2,503 0.01% 
Mutahidda Qabil Party 2,399 0.01% 
Voter Turnout 45,388,404 55.02% 
Registered voters  84,207,524 100% 
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 APPENDIX-C 
Important Newspapers and their Circulation in Pakistan
1
 
Name of the 
Newspaper 
(Daily) 
Language Place of Publications Year 
Founded 
Recorded 
Circulation 
Nawa-i-Waqt Urdu Lahore, Karachi, 
Rawalpindi, Multan 
1941 500,000 
Jang Urdu Karachi, Lahore, 
Rawalpindi, Multan, 
London 
1946 850,000 
Pakistan Urdu Lahore, Islamabad, 
Karachi, Peshawar 
1997 279000 
Express Urdu Lahore, Islamabad, 
Karachi, Peshawar, 
Quetta, Multan 
1998 - 
Khabrain Urdu Islamabad, Karachi, 
Lahore, Peshawar, 
Multan, Haiderabad, 
Muzafarabad and Sukkar 
2000 232,000 
Dunya Urdu Lahore, Islamabad, 
Karachi, Quetta, 
Faisalabad, Gujranwala 
2011 -- 
Nai Baat Urdu Lahore, Karachi, 
Peshawar, Quetta 
2011 -- 
Dawn English Karachi, Islamabad, 
Lahore 
1947 109,000 
Business 
Recorder 
English Karachi, Islamabad, 
Lahore 
1965 22,000 
The Frontier 
Post 
English Peshawar, Quetta, 
Lahore 
1985 -- 
The Nation English Lahore, Karachi, 
Islamabad 
1986 -- 
Pakistan 
Observer 
English Islamabad, Karachi, 
Lahore, Peshawar, 
Quetta, Muzaffarabad 
1988 -- 
The News 
International 
English Karachi, Lahore, 
Rawalpindi, London 
1991 120,000 
Daily Times English Lahore, Karachi, 
Islamabad 
2002 -- 
Pakistan 
Today 
English Lahore, Karachi, 
Islamabad 
2010 -- 
The Express 
Tribune 
English Karachi, Lahore, 
Islamabad, Peshawar 
2010 -- 
 
 
                                              
1
 The data is based on Shahzad Ali, Growth of Print Media in Pakistan from the Perspective of 
Economic and Social Indicators, 35-53.  
1 
 
 APPENDIX-D 
Questionnaire for Semi Structured Interviews with Journalists and 
Politicians 
1. Why do you think that relations with the US are important for Pakistan? 
2. In your opinion what has Pakistan lost and gained in its relationship with the USA?  
3. How do you see Pakistan-US relations in future? Will it get better or worse? 
4. Why have the people in Pakistan anti US perceptions? (According to Pew survey 2012 
around 75% of Pakistani population hate US) 
5. Media and Political parties are one of the important sources of information for Public. 
What do you think that these sources of public information communicate information 
based on facts or they deliberately frame the information to serve some particular 
purpose? 
6. In your opinion what is the importance of public perceptions for Pakistan's foreign 
relations with the US? 
7. In your opinion what is the role of Pakistan's print media especially Urdu newspapers 
in development of Public perceptions of US? 
8. Does the print media plays a uniform role in these perceptions or is there any variation 
of role within? 
9. Does the prominent Urdu press spreads information independently and based on facts 
or is there any influencing factor or factors that may force it to disseminate framed 
information with some particular purpose to serve? 
10. Does prominent media groups like Jang and Nawa-i-Waqt become mouthpiece of 
some particular political forces and why? 
11. How do you see the role of Urdu print media in representing the US role in 1971 war 
and creation of Bangladesh? Do you agree with their representations of US in this 
issue? 
12. How do you see the role of Urdu print media in representing the US attitude towards 
Pakistan's nuclear program? Has this representation been factual or based on myths? 
13. How do you see the role of Urdu print media in representing the US violating 
Pakistan's sovereignty in Post 9/11 period especially in the case of the Abbottabad 
operation on 2 May 2011?  
14. Would you like to suggest any corrective measures for press in order to balance its role 
regarding public perceptions or you think Urdu press is already playing a balanced 
role? 
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Consent for Participation in Interview Research 
1. I volunteer to participate in a research titled "Politics of Betrayal: Pakistan–US 
Relations since 1971" conducted by PhD student Mr Shakil Akhtar under 
supervision of Dr. Philip Constable from University of Central Lancashire, Preston, 
UK. I have read and understood the information sheet provided by the researcher. 
2. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be 
paid for my participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any 
time without penalty. If I decline to participate or withdraw from the study, I have 
the right to do so.  
3. I understand that most interviewees in will find the discussion interesting 
and thought-provoking. If, however, I feel uncomfortable in any way during the 
interview session, I have the right to decline to answer any question or to end the 
interview.  
4. Participation involves being interviewed by a researcher from University of 
Central Lancashire, UK. The interview will last approximately 60 minutes. Notes 
will be written during the interview. An audio tape of the interview and 
subsequent dialogue will be made. If I don't want to be taped, I will inform the 
researcher.  
5. I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any 
reports using information obtained from this interview, and that my confidentiality 
as a participant in this study will remain secure. Subsequent uses of records and 
data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect the anonymity of 
individuals and institutions. However, I also understand if the researcher needs to 
publish my name and designation in his report will ask for my permission 
separately and explicitly. 
6. I understand that this research has been reviewed and approved by the 
relevant committee for Studies Involving Human Subjects at the University of 
Central Lancashire, UK. 
7. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all 
my questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in 
this study.  
8. I have been given a copy of this consent form.  
 
Signature of Participant        
Name of Participant 
 
Date       Signature of the Investigator  
 
 
For further information, please 
contact:  
School of Social Sciences,  
University of Central Lancashire,  
Preston, UK. PR1 2HE . 
Tel: +44 (0) 1772 893090 / 893969  
Fax: +44 (0) 1772 892922. 
Email Sakhtar3@uclan.ac.uk 
 
 
WEDNESDAY JUNE 27, 2012 
Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More  
Critical of U.S. 
74% Call America an Enemy 
Andrew Kohut, 
President, Pew Research Center 
Pew Global Attitudes Project: Pew Research Center: 
Richard Wike, Associate Director James Bell, 
Juliana Menasce Horowitz,  Director of International Survey Research, 
Pew Research Center Senior Researcher 
Katie Simmons, Research Associate Bruce Stokes, 
Jacob Poushter, Research Analyst 
Director of Pew Global Economic Attitudes,  
Pew Research Center 
Cathy Barker, Research Assistant Elizabeth Mueller Gross, 
Vice President, Pew Research Center 
For Media Inquiries Contact: 
Richard Wike 
Vidya Krishnamurthy 
202.419.4372 
http://pewglobal.org 
Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S. 
74% Call America an Enemy 
Following a year of tensions between their 
country and the United States, Pakistanis 
continue to hold highly unfavorable views of 
the U.S. and offer bleak assessments of the 
relationship between the two nations.   
Roughly three-in-four Pakistanis (74%) 
consider the U.S. an enemy, up from 69% last 
year and 64% three years ago.  And President 
Obama is held in exceedingly low regard.  
Indeed, among the 15 nations surveyed in both 
2008 and 2012 by the Pew Global Attitudes 
Project, Pakistan is the only country where 
ratings for Obama are no better than the 
ratings President George W. Bush received 
during his final year in office (for more, see 
“Global Opinion of Obama Slips, International 
Policies Faulted,” released June 13, 2012). 
Only 13% of Pakistanis think relations with the 
U.S. have improved in recent years, down 16 
percentage points from 2011.  Strengthening 
the bilateral relationship is also becoming less 
of a priority for Pakistanis.  While 45% still say 
it is important to improve relations with the 
U.S., this is down from 60% last year.   
Moreover, roughly four-in-ten believe that 
American economic and military aid is actually 
having a negative impact on their country, 
Pakistani Views of U.S. Remain 
Grim 
Is the U.S. more of a… 
2009 2011 2012 
11-12 
Change 
% % % 
Partner 9 6 8 +2 
Enemy 64 69 74 +5 
Neither 12 9 10 +1 
Don’t know 15 16 8 -8 
U.S. favorability 
Favorable 16 12 12 0 
Unfavorable 68 73 80 +7 
Don’t know 16 16 9 -7 
Confidence in Obama 
Confidence 13 8 7 -1 
No confidence 51 68 60 -8 
Don’t know 36 24 34 +10 
U.S.-Pakistan relations 
Improved 27 29 13 -16 
Not improved 43 44 58 +14 
Don’t know 30 26 29 +3 
Improving relations is…
Important 53 60 45 -15 
Not important 29 22 35 +13 
Don’t know 18 18 20 +2 
Impact of U.S. econ. aid
Mostly positive -- -- 12 -- 
Mostly negative -- -- 38 -- 
No impact -- -- 17 -- 
Don’t know -- -- 33 -- 
Impact of U.S. military aid 
Mostly positive -- -- 8 -- 
Mostly negative -- -- 40 -- 
No impact -- -- 15 -- 
Don’t know -- -- 37 -- 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q8a, Q40a, Q88, Q88b, Q100, 
Q100b & Q105b. 
Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project – www.pewglobal.org   
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while only about one-in-ten think the impact is positive.  
Additionally, over the last few years, 
Pakistanis have become less willing to work 
with the U.S. on efforts to combat extremist 
groups.  While 50% still want the U.S. to 
provide financial and humanitarian aid to 
areas where extremists operate, this is down 
from 72% in 2009.  Similarly, fewer Pakistanis 
now want intelligence and logistical support 
from the U.S. than they did three years ago.  
And only 17% back American drone strikes 
against leaders of extremist groups, even if 
they are conducted in conjunction with the 
Pakistani government.   
Since 2009, the Pakistani public has also 
become less willing to use its own military to 
combat extremist groups.  Three years ago, 
53% favored using the army to fight extremists 
in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) and neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
but today just 32% hold this view. 
Overall, concerns about extremism have ebbed 
since 2009, when the Pakistan military was 
battling Taliban-affiliated groups in the Swat 
Valley area near Islamabad.  Then, fully 69% 
were concerned that extremists might take 
control of Pakistan, compared with 52% today. 
While concerns about extremism may have 
decreased, extremist organizations remain 
largely unpopular.  Majorities, for example, 
express a negative opinion of both al Qaeda  
and the Taliban, as has been the case since 
2009.  In 2008 – before the peak of the Swat 
Decreasing Support for U.S. Help 
Fighting Extremist Groups  
% Support the U.S.… 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q133a-c. 
Waning Support for Using 
Pakistani Army to Fight Extremists 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q132. 
Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project – www.pewglobal.org   
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Valley conflict – pluralities expressed no opinion about these organizations. 
When Pakistanis are asked more specifically about the Afghan 
Taliban and Tehrik-i-Taliban (also known as the TTP or 
Pakistan Taliban), opinions are again, on balance, negative, as 
they were in both 2010 and 2011. 
Views are somewhat more mixed, however, regarding Lashkar-
e-Taiba, a radical group active in Kashmir and widely blamed 
for the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.  Roughly one-in-five 
Pakistanis (22%) have a favorable view of Lashkar-e-Taiba, 
while 37% give it a negative rating and 41% offer no opinion.   
Meanwhile, a solid majority (64%) offers no opinion about the 
Haqqani network, a group associated with the Taliban that is 
active on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but is 
largely believed to be based in the FATA region of Pakistan. 
Respondents in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province consistently 
express more negative views about extremist groups than those 
in other provinces.  Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban, the 
Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba all receive especially poor 
ratings in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.  Pakistanis who pray five 
times per day are also more likely than those who pray less 
often to offer negative views of extremist groups. 
These are among the key findings from a survey of Pakistan by 
the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project.  Face-to-
face interviews were conducted with 1,206 respondents 
between March 28 and April 13.  The sample covers 
approximately 82% of the Pakistani population.1  The poll in 
Pakistan is part of the larger 21-nation spring 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey.  Throughout 
the report, unless otherwise noted, trends from 2011 refer to a survey conducted in Pakistan 
from May 8-15, 2011, following the May 2, 2011 U.S. military raid that killed Osama bin 
Laden.2  The May 2011 survey showed that, with a few exceptions, the killing of bin Laden had 
1 For more on the survey’s methodology, see the Survey Methods section of this report. 
2 An earlier survey had been conducted in Pakistan in April 2011 – overall, results showed few differences between the two 2011 
polls.  For more, see “U.S. Image in Pakistan Falls No Further Following bin Laden Killing,” released June 21, 2011. 
Little Support for 
Extremist Groups 
 Fav Unfav DK 
Al Qaeda % % % 
         2012 13 55 31 
         2011 12 55 33 
         2010 18 53 28 
         2009 9 61 30 
         2008 25 34 41 
The Taliban 
         2012 13 66 20 
         2011 12 63 24 
         2010 15 65 29 
         2009 10 70 20 
         2008 27 33 40 
Tehrik-i-Taliban  
         2012 17 52 32 
         2011 19 51 30 
         2010 18 51 31 
Afghan Taliban 
         2012 14 45 41 
         2011 15 50 35 
         2010 16 49 34 
Lashkar-e-Taiba 
         2012 22 37 41 
         2011 27 37 36 
         2010 25 35 40 
Haqqani network 
         2012 5 31 64 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q46b, Q46d 
& Q134a-d. 
Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project – www.pewglobal.org             
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little impact on America’s already low ratings in Pakistan.  The current poll reveals that, in 
some key areas, Pakistani views of the relationship between the two countries have become 
even more negative in the year since the Abbottabad raid. 
 
 
High Marks for Khan, Low Ratings for Zardari, Gilani 
 
Pakistanis continue to express considerable discontent with conditions in their own country.  
About nine-in-ten (87%) are dissatisfied with the country’s direction, barely changed from last 
year’s 92%.  Similarly, 89% describe the national economic situation as bad; 85% held this 
view in 2011.  And overwhelming majorities rate unemployment, crime, terrorism, and 
corruption as very big problems. 
 
The dismal public mood is reflected in poor 
ratings for the leaders of the incumbent 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), President Asif 
Ali Zardari and former Prime Minister Yousaf 
Raza Gilani.  Only 14% view Zardari favorably, 
little changed from last year, but down 
significantly from 64% in 2008.  Gilani, who 
was recently convicted of contempt and 
dismissed from office by Pakistan’s highest 
court, fares only somewhat better, at 36% 
favorable.  Gilani received similarly poor 
ratings last year, although as recently as 2010 a 
majority of Pakistanis expressed a favorable view of him. 
 
The most popular leader included on the survey is Imran Khan.  Seven-in-ten Pakistanis offer a 
favorable opinion of the former cricket star and leader of the Pakistani Tehreek-e-Insaf party 
(PTI).  This is essentially unchanged from last year, but up significantly from 2010. 
 
Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is also generally well-regarded – about six-in-ten offer a 
positive view of the leader of the country’s main opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim 
League-Nawaz (PML-N).  Sharif has consistently received high marks in recent years, although 
his ratings are down somewhat from the 79% registered in 2009.   
 
Slightly more than half rate Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and Chief 
Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry favorably.  Ratings for both the army chief and the chief 
Khan Tops Leader Ratings 
 % Favorable 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 % % % % % 
Khan -- -- 52 68 70 
Sharif 76 79 71 63 62 
Kayani -- -- 61 52 54 
Chaudhry -- 61 61 51 51 
Musharraf 44 -- -- -- 39 
Gilani -- 67 59 37 36 
Zardari 64 32 20 11 14 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q46a, Q46c & Q46e-i. 
Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project – www.pewglobal.org   
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justice have slipped slightly since 2010.  Former President (and military chief) Pervez 
Musharraf, who has occasionally suggested he may return to Pakistani politics, receives 
relatively poor ratings. 
Meanwhile, the military continues to receive overwhelmingly positive marks from the 
Pakistani public – 77% say the institution is having a good influence on the country.  Roughly 
six-in-ten (58%) also say this about the court system.  
Negative Views of India 
Only 22% of Pakistanis have a favorable view 
of traditional rival India, although this is 
actually a slight improvement from 14% last 
year.  Moreover, when asked which is the 
biggest threat to their country, India, the 
Taliban, or al Qaeda, 59% name India.  
Pakistanis have consistently identified India as 
the top threat since the question was first 
asked in 2009.  The percentage fearing India 
has increased by 11 points since then, while the 
percentage naming the Taliban has decreased 
by nine points. 
Despite these negative sentiments, 62% of Pakistanis say it is important to improve relations 
with India.  And roughly two-thirds support more bilateral trade and further talks to try to 
reduce tensions between the two nations.   
Most Indians also want better relations, more trade, and further talks between the two nations.  
Still, Indian attitudes toward Pakistan remain largely negative.  Roughly six-in-ten Indians 
(59%) express an unfavorable opinion of Pakistan, although this is down slightly from 65% in 
2011.  
India is not the only country, however, where negative views of Pakistan prevail.  Majorities or 
pluralities give Pakistan a negative rating in six of the seven other countries where this 
question was asked, including China, Japan, and three predominantly Muslim nations – 
Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia.   
India a Greater Threat Than 
Taliban or al Qaeda 
% Saying greatest threat 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
% % % % 
India 48 53 57 59 
Taliban 32 23 19 23 
Al Qaeda 4 3 5 4
All/None (Vol) 7 11 9 7 
Don’t know 9 10 10 7 
“Of all these threats I have named, which of these is the 
greatest threat to our country?” 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q126. 
Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project – www.pewglobal.org   
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Also of Note: 
 A 43%-plurality of Pakistanis expect the economy to get worse over the next 12 months,
while just 26% think it will improve.  Still, there is more optimism than in 2011, when
60% said the country’s economic situation would worsen in the coming year.
 China continues to receive high marks in Pakistan.  Nine-in-ten Pakistanis consider
China a partner; only 2% say it is more of an enemy.
 Pakistanis and Indians agree that Kashmir should be a priority for their countries.
Roughly eight-in-ten Pakistanis and about six-in-ten Indians say it is very important to
resolve the dispute over Kashmir.
 Those who identify with Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaf party are especially likely to
oppose American involvement in the battle against extremist groups in Pakistan,
including American aid to areas where extremists operate and intelligence and
logistical support to the Pakistani army.
7 
About the Pew Global Attitudes Project 
The Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project conducts public opinion surveys around the world 
on a broad array of subjects ranging from people’s assessments of their own lives to their views about 
the current state of the world and important issues of the day.  The project is directed by Andrew Kohut, 
president of the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan “fact tank” in Washington, DC, that provides 
information on the issues, attitudes, and trends shaping America and the world.  The Pew Global 
Attitudes Project is principally funded by The Pew Charitable Trusts.  
Since its inception in 2001, the Pew Global Attitudes 
Project has released numerous major reports, 
analyses, and other releases, on topics including 
attitudes toward the U.S. and American foreign policy, 
globalization, terrorism, and democracy.  
Pew Global Attitudes Project team members include 
Richard Wike (Associate Director), Juliana Menasce 
Horowitz, Katie Simmons, Jacob Poushter, and Cathy 
Barker.  Other contributors to the project include Pew 
Research Center staff members James Bell (Director, 
International Survey Research), Bruce Stokes 
(Director, Pew Global Economic Attitudes), and 
Elizabeth Mueller Gross (Vice President), as well as 
Bruce Drake, Neha Sahgal, Carroll Doherty, and 
Michael Dimock.  Additional members of the team 
include Mary McIntosh, president of Princeton Survey 
Research Associates International, and Mike 
Mokrzycki.  The Pew Global Attitudes Project team 
regularly consults with survey and policy experts, 
regional and academic experts, journalists, and 
policymakers whose expertise provides tremendous 
guidance in shaping the surveys.  
The Pew Global Attitudes Project’s co-chairs are on leave through 2012.  The project is co-chaired by 
former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, currently principal, the Albright Stonebridge 
Group, and by former Senator John C. Danforth, currently partner, Bryan Cave LLP. 
All of the project’s reports and commentaries are available at www.pewglobal.org.  The data are also 
made available on our website within two years of publication.  Findings from the project are also 
analyzed in America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked by Andrew 
Kohut and Bruce Stokes, published by Times Books.  A paperback edition of the book was released in 
May 2007. 
For further information, please contact: 
Richard Wike 
Associate Director, Pew Global Attitudes Project 
202.419.4400 / rwike@pewresearch.org 
Pew Global Attitudes Project 
Public Opinion Surveys 
Survey Sample Interviews 
Summer 2002 44 Nations 38,263 
November 2002 6 Nations 6,056 
March 2003 9 Nations 5,520 
May 2003 21 Publics* 15,948 
Spring 2004 9 Nations 7,765 
Spring 2005 17 Nations 17,766 
Spring 2006 15 Nations 16,710 
Spring 2007 47 Publics* 45,239 
Spring 2008 24 Nations 24,717 
Spring 2009 25 Publics* 26,397 
Fall 2009 14 Nations 14,760 
Spring 2010 22 Nations 24,790 
Spring 2011 23 Publics* 29,100 
Spring 2012 21 Nations 26,210 
* Includes the Palestinian territories.
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1. Views of the U.S. and American Foreign Policy
Pakistanis continue to have overwhelmingly 
negative attitudes toward the United States.  
Eight-in-ten currently express an unfavorable 
view of the U.S.  Among the 21 nations 
included in the spring 2012 Pew Global 
Attitudes survey, only Jordanians offer more 
negative ratings. 
Similarly, President Obama gets poor marks 
from Pakistanis – only 7% have confidence in 
him to do the right thing in world affairs.  And 
key aspects of American foreign policy are 
widely unpopular.  Most believe the U.S. acts 
unilaterally on the world stage, and there is 
widespread opposition to American anti-
terrorism efforts. 
A 74%-majority of Pakistanis see the U.S. as an 
enemy, and most think U.S.-Pakistani relations 
have failed to improve over the last few years.  
Moreover, for a growing number of Pakistanis, 
enhancing the relationship between the two 
countries is not an important priority. 
Pakistanis express mixed views about 
American involvement in the fight against extremist groups.  On balance, there is support for 
American financial and humanitarian aid to areas where these groups operate, as well as for 
U.S. intelligence and logistical assistance to the Pakistani military.  Support for both, however, 
has declined in recent years.  And few back American drone strikes. 
Over the last decade, the U.S. has provided billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan in an effort to 
increase bilateral cooperation and improve its image.  But these policies are not seen in a 
positive light by Pakistanis – many say that both American military and economic assistance 
are having a negative effect on the country. 
Pakistan and Jordan Give U.S. Its 
Lowest Ratings 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q8a. 
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Low Ratings for U.S., Obama 
Fully 80% of Pakistanis have a negative opinion of the U.S., up seven percentage points from 
last year.  This view has become more common over the course of the Obama era.  In 2008, 
during President George W. Bush’s last year in office, 63% expressed a negative view of the 
U.S.  
Throughout Obama’s 
presidency, few Pakistanis 
have held a positive view of 
the American leader.  Today, 
six-in-ten say they have little 
or no confidence in him, 
down slightly from last year, 
but up from the 51% 
registered in 2009.  Obama’s 
ratings are very similar to 
those received by President Bush in 2008, when 61% expressed a lack of confidence in the 
former president.  
U.S. Foreign Policy Distrusted 
Pakistanis continue to believe the U.S. acts unilaterally in world affairs.  Almost two-thirds 
(65%) do not think the U.S. considers the interests of countries like Pakistan when it is making 
foreign policy decisions.     
Opinion of U.S. Worsens in Pakistan 
1999/
2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Views of U.S. % % % % % % % % % % % % 
Favorable 23 10 13 21 23 27 15 19 16 17 12 12 
Unfavorable -- 69 81 60 60 56 68 63 68 68 73 80 
Don’t know -- 20 6 18 18 17 16 17 16 16 16 9 
1999/2000 survey trend provided by the U.S. Department of State. 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q8a. 
Obama Rates as Badly as Bush 
Bush Obama 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
08-12 
Change 
09-12 
Change 
% % % % % 
Confidence 7 13 8 8 7 0 -6
No confidence 61 51 60 68 60 -1 +9 
Don’t know 31 36 32 24 34 +3 -2 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q40a. 
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Although this has been the prevailing view among Pakistanis for a decade, the percentage who 
say the U.S. does not consider their interests is up nine points since last year, and is now 
higher than at any point since Pew began asking this question in 2002. 
American anti-terrorism efforts have also been consistently unpopular in Pakistan over the last 
decade.  In the current poll, 61% say they oppose U.S.-led efforts to combat terrorism, 
essentially unchanged from 62% last year. 
Most Say U.S. an Enemy 
Nearly three-in four Pakistanis (74%) consider 
the U.S. an enemy to their country, while just 
8% say it is a partner.  One-in-ten believe the 
U.S. is neither a partner nor an enemy, and 8% 
offer no opinion. 
The percentage describing the U.S. as an 
enemy has grown steadily since 2010 and is 
currently at its highest point since 2008.  
Those who live in the Punjab province are 
especially likely to think of the U.S. as an 
enemy (85%). 
Pakistanis Continue to See U.S. Acting Unilaterally 
Does the U.S. take into account the 
interests of countries like Pakistan? 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 
% % % % % % % % % 
Great deal/Fair amount 23 23 18 39 21 22 19 20 13 
Not too much/Not at all 36 62 48 41 54 53 56 56 65 
Don’t know 41 15 34 20 25 26 25 24 21 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q53. 
U.S. Seen as Enemy  
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q105b. 
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Important Not important
Pakistani views about their relationship with 
China are quite different.  Nine-in-ten 
Pakistanis consider China a partner, while just 
2% say it is more of an enemy.   
Relations Not Improving 
A shrinking minority of Pakistanis believe 
relations between their country and the U.S. 
are improving.  Only 13% say the bilateral 
relationship has improved in recent years, 
while 58% disagree. 
Assessments of U.S.-Pakistani relations have 
grown more negative over the last year, and 
have become considerably more negative since 
2010, when the Pakistani public was almost 
evenly divided on this question. At that point, 
36% said relations had improved and 39% said 
they had not.  
Those who identify with the Tehreek-e-Insaf 
party – led by government critic Imran Khan – 
are particularly likely to say relations have not 
improved: 78% hold this view. 
Overall, the goal of improving U.S-Pakistani 
relations is becoming less important to 
Pakistanis.  Less than half (45%) say enhancing 
the relationship is important, down from 60% 
last year and 64% in 2010.   
Have U.S.–Pakistan Relations 
Improved in Recent Years? 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q88. 
Fewer See Importance of 
Improving U.S.–Pakistan Relations 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q88b. 
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Limited Support for U.S. Help in Fighting Extremists 
There is some support for cooperation between 
the U.S. and Pakistan in the fight against 
extremists.  Half want the U.S. to provide 
financial and humanitarian aid to areas where 
extremist groups operate, while just one-in-
five oppose this idea.  Still, support has 
dropped significantly since 2009, when 72% 
favored these efforts.  
Meanwhile, 37% support the U.S. providing 
intelligence and logistical assistance to 
Pakistani troops fighting these groups, while 25% are opposed.  Again, support has declined 
since 2009, when 63% were in favor. 
American drone attacks have been consistently unpopular, even if the attacks are coordinated 
with Pakistani authorities.  Only 17% favor the U.S. conducting drone strikes in conjunction 
with the Pakistani government against leaders of extremist organizations, little changed from 
23% in 2010, the first year the question was asked. 
Supporters of the Tehreek-e-Insaf party  are especially likely to express opposition to American 
aid and U.S. intelligence and logistical support. 
Opposition to Drone Strikes 
Just over half of Pakistanis (55%) say they have heard a lot or a little about drone attacks that 
target leaders of extremist groups.  Awareness is considerably higher in the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province (87%), which borders the semi-autonomous Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) in northwest Pakistan where most drone attacks have taken place.   
Among those who have heard a lot or a little, nearly all (97%) consider them a bad thing.  
Roughly seven-in-ten (69%) believe the U.S. government is conducting these strikes, while 
another 18% volunteer that they believe both the U.S. and Pakistan are responsible. 
U.S. Involvement in Combating 
Extremists 
Support Oppose DK 
% % %
Provide aid to areas 
with extremists 50 20 31
Provide intelligence and 
logistical support  37 25 39
Conduct drone attacks 17 44 39 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q133a-c. 
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Those who are familiar with the drone 
campaign also overwhelmingly believe the 
attacks kill too many innocent people (94%). 
Nearly three-quarters (74%) say they are not 
necessary to defend Pakistan from extremist 
organizations.   
Meanwhile, those who have heard about the 
strikes are somewhat divided over whether 
they are being done with or without approval 
from the Pakistani government. 
U.S. Assistance Having Negative Impact 
On balance, American aid efforts are seen in a negative light by 
Pakistanis.  Around four-in-ten (38%) say U.S. economic aid is 
having a mostly negative impact on Pakistan, while just 12% 
believe it is mostly positive.  Similarly, 40% think American 
military aid is having a mostly negative effect, while only 8% 
say it is largely positive.   
Both forms of assistance are held in especially low regard by 
supporters of the Tehreek-e-Insaf party – 59% see U.S. 
economic aid negatively, and 61% believe American military 
assistance is having a detrimental impact on Pakistan. 
There is no consensus in Pakistan about whether American 
assistance is largely military or largely designed to help 
Pakistan develop economically: 18% say it is mostly military; 
17% believe it is mostly economic; 22% think it is both equally; 
and 43% do not know.    
Drone Strikes… 
Agree Disagree DK 
% % %
Kill too many innocent 
people 94 4 2
Are being done without 
gov’t approval 41 47 12
Are necessary 19 74 7 
Asked of those who have heard a lot or a little about drone 
attacks (55% of the total sample). 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q131a-c. 
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2012 Pew Global Attitudes Survey in Pakistan 
Survey Methods 
The survey in Pakistan is part of the larger Spring 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey conducted 
in 21 countries under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International.   
Results for the survey in Pakistan are based on 1,206 face-to-face interviews of adults 
conducted March 28 to April 13, 2012.  It uses a multi-stage cluster sample of all four 
provinces stratified by province and the urban/rural population, representing roughly 82% of 
the adult population.  The Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Gilgit-Baltistan, Azad Jammu 
and Kashmir were excluded for security reasons as were areas of instability in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province) and Baluchistan — roughly 18% of 
the population.  The sample is disproportionally urban, but the data are weighted to reflect the 
actual urban/rural distribution in Pakistan.  Interviews were conducted in Urdu, Pashto, 
Punjabi, Sindhi, Hindko, Saraiki, Brahvi, and Balochi.   
The margin of sampling error is ±4.2 percentage points.  For the results based on the full 
sample, one can say with 95% confidence that the error attributable to sampling and other 
random effects is plus or minus the margin of error.  In addition to sampling error, one should 
bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can 
introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls. 
